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
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
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
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




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








**THE HISTORY**  
**OF**  
**ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY.**



**By DR. HEINRICH RITTER.**

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### HISTORY OF THE DECLINE OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY.

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# HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY.

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## CHAPTER I.

### PRELIMINARY REMARKS ON THE WHOLE PERIOD.

IN our attempt to determine the several periods of Grecian philosophy, we characterised the third and last as that of its decline, and the history of this period will furnish an unbroken chain of testimony to the justness of this designation. But, as we formerly remarked, this check in the progress of philosophy cannot justly be regarded as a general retardation of human enlightenment. For the decline of philosophy does not necessarily involve anything more than a decay of the intrinsic and concentrating energy of scientific culture, with which, however, its diffusion over both a more extensive range of matter, and a wider circle of mind, may very well consist. Indeed, it is possible that, in all other branches of mental culture, considerable advancement may accompany the decline of philosophy. And such indeed was actually the case; as in fact it could not well be otherwise, unless we were at liberty to suppose, that during the many centuries which compose this period of our history, the human mind had been asleep, and never once awoke into activity.

If to the right understanding of the earlier periods of this history, a brief sketch of the general state of literature and intelligence which prevailed in them were necessary, it is particularly so in the present case, since the weaker the philosophical impulse becomes, the more dependent is it on the circumstances of its age. In this sketch the most prominent feature will be the state of Rome, which had now become the centre of the civilized world, and with which consequently all the rest was more or less connected, and of which, on this account, our information is the most complete. Other places, however, which are at this time principal seats of learning will also claim our notice. Thus, notwithstanding our wish to be brief, these preliminary remarks will inevitably extend to a greater length than any others which it has appeared advisable to introduce in this history.

Viewed as a whole, this period presents in these grander and more prominent features, which at once arrest the eye of the observer, a spectacle which has rarely if ever been surpassed in brilliancy. So likely is the eye to be dazzled, and the judgment corrupted, by the outward splendour and the increased means of enjoying life which prevailed from the commencement of this period to the close of the second century, during which even industrial pursuits had advanced to the dignity of a fine art. All the grand works of architecture which, though in ruins, still enforce our admiration—all the master-pieces of art, whether of marble or of bronze, which have escaped the destroying hands or the indifference of barbarism belong principally to this period. They

testify, it is true, to a union of splendour with taste; but at the same time they remind us of an earlier time, which, combining a pure and noble taste with great fertility of invention, furnished the models which the existing age was content to imitate and copy. The arts, as cultivated by imperial Rome, are, like its literature, but echoes of the Grecian. But even as such they might still afford a ground of gratulation to the student of humanity, if the pure pleasure which they are capable of exciting were not marred by the many traces which the political scene of their development exhibits of inherent barbarism and passion, which no mental culture could check or modify. The immense proportions of the buildings of Rome compared with those of Greece, while they remind us of the colossus of her power, witness at the same time to the iron hand of rapacity by which the provinces were administered, and rich and flourishing districts laid bare and desolate, in order to enrich and embellish imperial Rome. They awaken the reflection that this wealth had been amassed by violence, and that, augmenting as it grew the desire for display and luxury, it led still to fresh and greater enormities, while the heads of the republic competed with each other in every evil art, until at last they were over-reached by a single individual and a single family, who from that time viewed all rivals with cruel and vindictive suspicion. The frauds and violence which marked the last days of Roman freedom, and are too well known to need recapitulation in this place, were nevertheless relieved in some degree by a firm and vigorous



policy, an intelligent and skilful conduct of affairs, and a sincere and bold spirit of patriotism. But these virtues of the Roman citizen and statesman were quickly extinguished, or rather driven into the shade, by the cruelty of the first Cæsars: wholly extinguished they certainly were not, but only smothered for a while; for a time came when under a milder sway a better spirit prevailed again, and when upright and moral principles were not only professed but acted upon both in private and in public life. Yet even in this better aspect of things it is but too evident that the public morality was devoid of a real and abiding principle; since otherwise it would neither have been repressed by the frown of a court, nor required its smile to call it forth again. And it was even under these better emperors that the weakness and decay of the Roman empire first showed itself distinctly; for of the olden military excellence of Rome nothing was left to her but the form and organization of her armies. The more Rome was driven to admit into her legions the neighbouring barbarians, the more rapidly was she hurrying to her ruin. It soon became impossible to conceal the painful truth, that the voice of the legions disposed of the imperial throne, and that the army was no longer the instrument but the possessor of authority. Impatient of obedience, and refusing all control, where its goodwill could not be conciliated, its favour or its forbearance even must be bought. And this army too was no longer recruited from the pure blood of Roman citizens, and animated by Roman spirit, but a motley conflux of mercenary and rapacious aliens! From

such a state of things it was no great step to the subjection of the Western half of the Roman world by warlike adventurers of the German race. And even the half which escaped this degradation scarcely presents a more cheering spectacle. Here the language of Greece was fated to regain the ascendancy, but it was no longer the Greeks of old by whom it was to be spoken, but a race long habituated to slavery, and ready enough with tongue and guile, but incapable of great resolutions or of glorious deeds. The outward splendour of the Eastern empire ill concealed its inward weakness.

As to literature, which is more akin than politics to the immediate subject of our history, it had in general, at the opening of this period, taken a bold flight, and produced works of great and undoubted excellence, which served for the models of later times. But this master-age, this glory of the Latin language and literature, was of brief duration. And how, in truth, could it be otherwise? For as the end of every literature is the appropriate expression of the national consciousness, the range and extent of the latter must determine the richness and copiousness of the former. Now that these were very limited in the Roman mind, few will hesitate to admit. The mental character of the Romans undoubtedly possessed this feature in common with that of the Greeks;—that the love of country was the focus towards which all their intellectual efforts converged. Perhaps, indeed, the efforts of Rome were directed to this end with greater steadiness and singleness of purpose, and

with a larger and more comprehensive policy than those of Greece, and thereby the Romans arrived at nicer distinctions and a more extensive survey of all the relations of life, and of human society especially. But, on the other hand, they were almost wholly devoid of that ideal flight, and that calm observation of nature, to which the Greek had risen by the artistic character of his mind. Two things principally are calculated to impart this ideal flight:—art and religion. Now the influence of the latter, both with Greeks and Romans, was very secondary, being merged either in political or else in artistic considerations. To the former of these two the religious feeling of the Romans was entirely subordinate, and accordingly whatever of sublime or of grand their religious history exhibits, is confined to the sublimity of their exalted patriotism, and the enthusiasm with which they laboured for the defence or aggrandizement of their republic. With this national feeling, whatever was peculiar in their religion had grown up and coalesced, while the form of their worship they willingly received from foreign sources, in the adoption and maintenance of which they were equally influenced by political considerations. Their religion accordingly was little calculated to raise them to the ideal, but was indebted for the favour which they showed it solely to calculations of public utility. As to art, it undoubtedly met with a sort of general encouragement among the Romans, who were not wholly insensible to its charms; nevertheless, as the creative energy which developed itself among them was but weak and limited, their whole literature

could not be animated by any fresh and spontaneous breath of enthusiasm. In poetry, which of all arts they cultivated the most, since in it they could not avail themselves of the labours of a foreign artist; they nevertheless were far behind the Greeks, and especially in those branches which required a sustained effort of fancy, and consequently of a mature and cultivated sense of ideal beauty. In dramatic and epic poetry, they remained the imitators of the Greeks; and wherever they attempted to leave the real in order to rise to the ideal, instead of chaste and perfect models of the beautiful, we rarely meet with anything but exaggeration, a mock sublimity, and rhetorical extravagance. Their attempts to combine the natural and the simple with the ideal, were seldom happy. In lyrical poetry, likewise, they seem to have adhered closely to their Grecian originals; and although this branch of Latin poesy is marked more frequently than the two former by natural simplicity of thought and language, it is far from betraying the profound and contemplative spirit of the Greeks. The particular province in which the Roman muse was most prolific and most original, is of a mixed kind, which, seldom rising above a delineation of active life, and for the most part satirical and playful, expresses itself with natural feeling indeed, but rests almost entirely on a personal view of things. With this personal view it undoubtedly combines in some degree the pursuit of ideal excellence, which is essential to every species of art; but this ideal is confined to the limits of the desirable, and never transcends that degree of perfection which may appear attainable under

certain favourable circumstances, and in the existing state of enlightenment. That keen perception of natural beauty which the Greek owed to the artistic character of his mind,—the enthusiasm with which he loved to penetrate into the inmost recesses of nature, to trace the universal form, and to brood upon the many traces which it exhibits of a mysterious relationship, sympathy, and communion between man and the natural world, were very rare and little encouraged among the Romans. They looked upon the external world for the most part as the arena of human activity, and consequently they have contributed little to the advance of natural sciences. On the other hand, they applied themselves earnestly to the practical development of human nature, and especially to the grand problem of politics. This was the spring and the animating principle of their whole literature and mental enlightenment. The statesmen of the last days of the republic were in fact highly enlightened, refined, and even learned men. From a very early period the Roman statesmen had directed their whole attention to the attaining to a comprehensive knowledge of the legal principles of political intercourse, and they considered learning to be essential to the right administration of state affairs. Upon the subjection of Greece, therefore, an acquaintance with literature and arts appeared to them indispensable. There is hardly a statesman of this age who did not strive to qualify himself for political life by cultivating this branch of learning, or at least who did not do homage to it by acknowledging its necessity. The most illustrious of her statesmen

went even further; they sought not only to acquaint themselves with the literature of Greece, but even to imitate it; nay more, to engraft it upon the national intellectual character. And the attempt was successful in such branches of mental culture as the Romans had independently pursued for themselves; and all these were more or less of a political nature. Accordingly, the branches of literature in which their reputation is the highest, are political history and oratory. In these, perhaps, the Romans may even rival the Greeks; for although they diligently studied the Grecian models, they nevertheless drew from themselves both the matter and the form of their works. At the same time we must confess that their histories are destitute of that calm, contemplative character which constitutes the peculiar excellence of the Greek historians; and that as they employ throughout at one of passion and partizanship, they consequently evince a disposition to give a personal rather than an historical estimate of events.

But, however worthy of admiration these productions of the Roman mind may be, the literary activity of Rome was extremely limited both in extent and duration. By remounting to first principles we find that the literature of every people depends both for its first rise and subsequent maintenance on a spontaneous effort of art to exhibit and portray the national consciousness. By the continual efforts of this artistic effort a certain skill of execution is formed, and a taste to estimate its own and foreign creations. Now as the artistic principle was very weak in the Roman mind, it is

by no means surprising that its influence was limited and transitory, and incapable of long maintaining a pure taste. Except under powerful and favourable circumstances it was unable to produce aught of importance. Such advantages were provided for it in the last days of Roman liberty, when every talent, whether of good or of evil, was put in requisition for the attainment of a brilliant object—the empire of the world, for a longer or a shorter period. A proud and powerful aristocracy had entered into competition for this brilliant prize. Birth and ancestral recollections gave a claim to enter into the contest; but these alone afforded little hope of success which depended greatly upon wealth, but still more on personal talents for war and peace. The possession of these qualifications ensured the acquisition of the others; indeed we might also venture to assert that a genius for peace even availed more than military talents. The latter might perhaps enable their possessor to acquire, but without the former it was impossible to retain. For the Romans had not yet learned to see with patience the helm of state guided by unskilful hands; there were still many both powerful and vigilant to take advantage of the weakness of their opponents. Now the art of maintaining authority in peace must be founded on a varied and enlarged knowledge of men and things, a gifted and ready eloquence, and a refined and cultivated taste. Accordingly there have been few periods in the history of the world, in which the cultivation of literature was more general among statesmen than in the last days of Roman liberty. Of these times, the Augustan age was the

sum and the result—the harvest of this earlier seed-time; and when at a later period a new vitality seemed to be infused into the literature of Rome under Trajan, yet the germ from which it sprung was the intellectual culture which prevailed in the days of Cicero and Augustus.

But even at this date, the little originality of Roman science and arts is strikingly manifest. As they had sprung up beneath the breath of favourable circumstances, so upon the disappearance of these advantages they immediately declined. The further development of Roman literature was checked by two circumstances chiefly,—its dependence on court patronage, and its relation to Grecian literature. As soon as the power of the nobles, who had emulously rivalled each other in every generous as well as ambitious pursuit, had been supplanted by the tyrannical authority of an individual, the taste of the court became the standard of literary excellence. While, therefore, the court laboured to put down the troublesome independence of the nobles, and in short to repress every Roman feeling and sentiment, and when the possession of a free and independent spirit was as dangerous as it was rare, the Roman works of science and poetry naturally sank into superficial unmeaningness, learned trifling, and a pompous display of ornamental diction. The superintendence which the new, and consequently suspicious, authority of the emperors claimed over the public diffusion of literary works, could not but be unfavourable to the free exercise of thought and fancy. The only favourable circumstance of this time, was the diffusion of the Latin tongue over the



Western provinces of the empire ; and from this date Spaniards and Gauls and Africans began to play no inconsiderable part in Latin literature, whilst in Rome itself and in Italy the taste for it was declining rather than advancing. In the court, it is true, it still maintained itself for a while, but in a weak and overpolished style ; at one time affecting learned but obsolete applications, another, priding itself in elegant but enervated forms, and at another striving to reproduce by ingenious but laboured antitheses the force and terseness of the older writers. To find a natural expression for thought, had become a difficulty. Those who still retained a lingering sympathy for ancient liberty, could not easily emancipate themselves from a veneration for ancient works, which they regarded as the best models of modern composition. Numerous commentaries and explanations appeared accordingly, and a general desire prevailed to outdo, if possible, their peculiar excellencies ; and both these circumstances equally tended to repress the true freedom of nature.

To all these causes of corruption we must add, the imitation of the Greeks, which in any case could not but be prejudicial to Latin literature ; but more especially when the models of imitation were not chosen from the ancient works of its best ages, but from the later and artificial productions of the Alexandrian school. These were recommended, both by their proximity in time, for the present is always more powerful than the remote, and by being, in common with that of Rome, dependent on the protection of a court. Moreover, the literature of Rome had, even from its origin, a formidable rival

in that of Greece. For a long time the Latin language was looked upon as too rude for the composition of works calculated to meet the approbation of men of refined taste. Thus both Sylla and Lucullus preferred the language of Greece as the medium of transmitting their life and actions to posterity; for the readers of Greek greatly outnumbered those who read Latin.<sup>1</sup> It was only in a part of Italy and in the Roman colonies that Latin was vernacular; it had not as yet acquired that wide diffusion which it subsequently attained by the spread of the laws and customs of Rome. If Latin literature was able to make any head against the pressure of the Grecian, it was indebted for this principally to the necessity which existed of employing the language of Rome in the practice and pleadings of the Roman tribunals, from which cause it acquired an almost exclusively rhetorical character. But alongside of it, in every country, the language and literature of Greece maintained themselves, which, although not equally indispensable for the conduct of affairs, possessed nevertheless the reputation of greater fitness for such a purpose. In all the more distinguished families Greek was spoken: the confidential slaves, the freedmen, the favourite associates of the Romans, were for the most part Greeks. It was the fashion, both in conversation and correspondence, to introduce Grecian terms and phrases. The fine arts were almost exclusively in the hands of Greeks: Grecian teachers and professors abounded everywhere; and

<sup>1</sup> Cic. pro Arch. poëta 10. Græca leguntur in omnibus fere gentibus, Latina suis finibus, exiguis sane, continentur.

even in grammar and rhetoric they were by many preferred to Roman masters. Accordingly, it was only natural that, after a brief pre-eminence, the Latin literature should abandon all rivalry with the Grecian, whose victory was complete at the second century under Trajan. And this continued to be the relative position of the two literatures, until both were alike driven into the shade by a new doctrine and a new religion.

In a certain sense it is undeniable, that the Grecian literature after a brief period of neglect and obscurity, which was consequent upon and contemporaneous with the decline of the older philosophical schools, commenced a new era of splendour towards the close of the first century after Christ. But, as this splendour was not the result of any inherent energy, such as animated the youthful productions of the Greek mind, but was the result of external causes, it was merely by a false and superficial glitter that it sought to maintain itself. To trace this false and perverted taste to its origin, requires an accurate knowledge of the extant history of the rhetorical schools of Rhodes and Asia. Their influence commences with Cicero and his contemporaries who availed themselves of the instruction afforded by them. That the literature which was formed in these schools was anything but rich in matter is of itself highly probable. Of that of Asia it is well known that it sought to conceal its poverty by poetical ornament and pompous diction. It was here perhaps that that Oriental influence of which we shall speak hereafter first made itself gradually felt. Along with these schools that of

Athens, although constantly varying in importance, enjoyed high repute, and stood in a certain opposition to that of Asia. Here historical recollections would naturally lead the Athenian professors to choose their models from the earlier writers, and accordingly the first objects of this school were to preserve the purity of the Athenian dialect, and to avoid the faults of an overladen and flowery diction. Moreover the proximity of the philosophical schools, and the influence which they necessarily exercised on the cultivation of eloquence, may have contributed greatly to give to the oratory of this school a predominant richness of thought over diction. But it was not long before the influence of the Asiatic school made itself felt even here.<sup>2</sup> Its pernicious bias may be traced even in the more correct writers, who adorned the close of the first and the opening of the second century A.D., of whom it will be sufficient, in this respect, to instance Plutarch alone. Nevertheless this corrupt tendency must have been counteracted, in some degree, by the constant endeavour of the school to maintain a pure Attic style, which, however, bore too exclusively a character of imitation to produce any great or permanent effects. In this revival of literature, philosophy was highly cultivated, for philosophy ever constituted the basis of the scientific labours of Greece; and at the present moment, as will hereafter be shown in detail, it had received a fresh impulse,

<sup>2</sup> Petron. 2. *Nuper ventosa isthac et enormis loquacitas Athenas ex Asia commigravit.* But the Asiatic eloquence had been imported into Athens somewhat earlier. Westermann *Geschichte der Beredsamkeit in Griechenland.* v. Rom. 1. Th. § 82.

both from the wants of the Roman mind, and from the introduction of Oriental modes of thought. In the speculations of this philosophy, politics, in which the Greeks now played a very subordinate part, and which, moreover, at this date, furnished but slight occasions for general inquiry, fell to the back ground; while on the other hand, the duties of families and individuals, the habits and passions of men, were more largely and diligently examined. All the special branches of science and art were likewise studied with great diligence; although, indeed, the researches of this age were far from being fruitful or original, being for the most part grounded on the labours of earlier times, of which, it confined itself to the explanation and facilitation. In no one point is the mental weakness of this age so strikingly and so undeniably exhibited as in this. As to the influence which the Roman character exercised on Greek literature at this period, that is evinced principally in the rhetorical aspect which it assumed in common with that of Rome. Luxuriance of style and language was scarcely ever carried further than it was in this age, and never was the talent of empty declamation more in vogue or better paid. Both the name and the profession of a Sophist were again in repute. The rhetoricians, like princes, prided themselves on the number of their followers: they were the intimate associates of the emperors and the most eminent personages. Under such distinguished patronage the profession flourished of course, and, however trivial its end, was the object of general and lively pursuit, and elegance of style became a

paramount object even with philosophical writers, to which all other literary excellence was sacrificed. From this date good sense becomes rarer and rarer among the learned. At last even this faculty of playing with words was lost, and nothing remained but a faint remembrance of the ancient fulness and force of the language.

This revival of Grecian literature in Athens and Rome was accompanied by a phenomenon which, in the history of philosophy, will on more than one occasion demand our attention; and this is the influence which Oriental views, ideas, and pursuits exercised on the Greeks and Romans. This influence did not, undoubtedly, first begin in the reigns of Trajan and Hadrian, its origin is of a much earlier date; but it was at this date only that it was first sensibly experienced at Rome, from whence it materially affected the habits and opinions of the whole civilized world. Its first rise was contemporaneous with the earliest symptoms of decay of the purely Greek character; when, sensible of its growing weakness, it sought to supply by external aids its loss of intrinsic vigour. For thus it ever is: those whom the present satisfies not, and are yet devoid of a good courage to set their hopes on the future, invariably look to the past for the better and the more beautiful. Such dreams have at all times been rife. But there is still a wide step between such dreams and the point at which the mind, abandoning itself to its longing for the realization of such ideal excellence, hopes to find it in the past or even the existing history of a foreign people. Such a hope can never be seriously entertained by

such as have any sense of a progressive energy in their own nation. We formerly saw even disciples of Socrates fondly dilating upon the existence of a better state of things in the early ages of a foreign world, which they zealously depicted as a model to the Greeks, both of life and conduct. When, therefore, the great part of Asia had been brought under the dominion of Greece, a pretty general disposition was evinced to place in these remote countries, which as yet the Greeks had scarcely explored, the existence of the best of men, whom they loved to adorn with all that they themselves deemed most estimable and precious in humanity. Or at least they pretended to discover a profound wisdom in the earlier times of the conquered people. And thus an opinion soon spread of the profound philosophy of the Indians, and of the holiness of their lives. The wisdom of the Egyptians, of the magi, and of the Phœnician priests and the Jews, soon became famous. A hope was generally entertained that these people might furnish the solution of the greatest mysteries, and arts imparted by them by which the gods might be appeased, and nature herself brought under subjection to man. A more extensive acquaintance with these nations naturally tended to repress this highly wrought and extravagant opinion; nevertheless a germ of it, whose root was deeper, still survived the shock of disappointment.

The growing intercourse of the Greeks and Orientals was not without considerable influence on the character of both. The Greeks, who ruled by superiority of arms as well as civilization, diffused

their language over a great part of Asia and Africa, and in many places, indeed, the use of it quickly superseded the vernacular tongue. With the language of Greece, the nations of the East received also, in some degree, her scientific enlightenment. However proud they were of their own ancient science, it was scarcely possible for them to despise that of Greece. They possessed a natural taste for science, however limited it may have been; and a desire to promote its further development, led them to consult Grecian teachers. But while they laboured to acquire this science, they made it their own, by introducing into it their own sentiments and ideas; they formed of it a mixed Greek-Oriental doctrine. It is not too much to assume—for the obscurity of the matter precludes all precision and certainty—that such combinations of Greek science and Oriental ideas were even composed in the languages of the East. From these compositions, much which had previously been exploded, found its way again into the literature of Greece. Now, if the Orientals thus acquired a wide enlargement of their mental consciousness, they were far from being on their part incapable of stimulating the Greek mind. At an early period of our labours we remarked, that the religion of Greece, as it fell more and more within the domain of art, was gradually stripped of its significancy; that consequently a collision ensued between the religious conceptions and the scientific ideas of this people. All subsequent efforts to reconcile them, when the pressure of the times had revived a sense of the importance and necessity of religion, failed of producing any satisfactory result;



because, in fact, the loss of the primary significance of the religious rites and symbols was ill supplied by an arbitrary one. At the time when Greece came into closer contact with the East, a very general desire existed for some form of worship which might serve as an adequate expression for this reviving sense of religion, and the rites of the East appeared in every respect calculated to satisfy this want. Accordingly, we find the Greeks insensibly adopting more and more of the public and mysterious rites of the East, entering warmly into the examination of its religious traditions, and comparing them with their own, which thereby acquired a more profound and pregnant meaning. It was natural that such a proceeding should lead to the introduction of a great mass of superstition, which at first spread obscurely, and among the lower classes of the people. Upon philosophy, this Oriental movement was without effect before the rise of the neo-Pythagoreans. On this point, unfortunately, our information is far from satisfactory. It was only under the first emperors that they first attained to any great public consideration, which, however, was as yet confined to a few isolated phenomena, to which the Roman character was directly opposed. Among the earliest of the more distinguished Greek writers by whom this tendency is clearly and openly evinced, Plutarch is especially to be mentioned. From the time of Hadrian, it spread rapidly and widely. It showed itself in the deification of highly gifted individuals, who were venerated as founders of a holy and virtuous life, in the confusion of all religious forms, and the longing after a mystical

union with the divine, which was pretended might be attained to, partly by abstinence, and partly by empty and fanciful ceremonies, in comparison with which all the duties of active life were more or less neglected, and even looked upon as unholy and defiling. It is manifest that these phenomena had their source in that deeply religious feeling which, while it led many to embrace Christianity, furnished ample food for the grossest superstition in those for whom the meek and humble spirit of Christianity had no charms. The culminating point and extreme result of this tendency was the opinion, which after the final triumph of Christianity was very generally diffused among its opponents, that in the central and less accessible parts of Asia, that life of sanctity and community of god-fearing sages, which ought to be the dearest object of man's wishes, was to be found.

In the preceding sketch of the literature and history of these times, we have chiefly given the darker side of the picture; but at the same time we have indicated some of its brighter and more cheering spots. It is now, however, for the first time in our history, taken as a whole, that its more cheerful objects are driven into the back ground. For the source of the prevailing corruption was the result of the decay of the true Greek spirit, or its combination with the peculiarities of the national character, and consequently must on the whole have had an unfavourable effect upon the older philosophy, which we have learned to regard as a pure creation of Greek intellect. Nevertheless, we find it necessary to take a more particular notice of the better

aspect of this age, both because it was not wholly without influence on philosophy, and also because it is our duty to point in what way this period contributed to the development of humanity.

To present distinctly to the reader the unqualified antagonism between good and evil which necessarily marks this period from all others, we have only to consider, that, in reference to the mental development of man, it represents the termination of that authority which Greek science and art had for a long while maintained in directing the progress of human civilization. With the overthrow of this authority, much which had previously worked beneficially on humanity was naturally destroyed; and, before a new regulative principle could be established from out of the elements into which it was dissolved, the course of things was necessarily marked by fluctuation and uncertainty. To the Greeks we are indebted for the discovery and the elements of nearly all the sciences and arts which even now are deemed worthy of an enlightened attention; and even what they did not themselves invent, that by a happy quickness of apprehension they wisely appropriated and improved upon. Their intellectual supremacy long survived the decline of their political ascendancy, and the people of Rome and of the East were but the instruments by which the learning and intelligence of Greece were more widely diffused. Upon the dissolution of this intellectual empire, a dark and disturbing element was united with the earlier science and enlightenment, in order that a new essence might form itself out of the combination. This is the process

which we are to observe in the present period of our history. Now the alloy which principally corrupted the purity of Grecian civilization, was derived partly from the Roman, partly from the Oriental character. In order, therefore, rightly to understand the course of events, it will be expedient to determine what elements of this mixture were supplied by the East, and what by Rome; and how far they furnished, either respectively or in common, the seeds of a new development.

Favoured by the prevailing tendency of the age, the East furnished a new stimulus to the religious feeling; while Rome, with its vast political efforts, added grandeur and dignity to the pursuits of life. Both furnished a valuable accession to the objects of human interest, but their proper effects were greatly impeded and marred by existing circumstances, which also prevented their true importance being fully perceived at the time. For an attempt was made to combine them with the Grecian character, which was thus submitted to directly opposite actions; at once an immature fermentation was produced, which dissolved every peculiarity of national character. Hence the subversion of independent political communities, and the decay of national spirit, which forms so striking a feature in the political history of this period. Out of this medley of nations, which were held together by no other principle of union than a common subjection to an absolute power, the peculiarities of new nations were subsequently to evolve a new nationality and a new state. Hence too it was that the body of laws, which it is the glory of the Roman mind to have put forth

in this period, and by which it conferred a lasting and important benefit on mankind, is not a new code or more perfect revision of public rights, but merely a systematic exposition and a scientific grounding of the rights of individuals. At the same time, the revival of religious feeling, which commenced from the East, prepared the way for a profounder and a purer religion. It would be as foolish as useless to deny that the diffusion of Christianity was greatly favoured by the whole direction which the East had given to the opinion of this age, and particularly by that sense of religion which the Oriental creeds had tended to revive in the minds of Greeks and Romans, which, although it showed itself unquestionably in many objectionable forms, nevertheless needed nothing more than a right apprehension of itself, and of the requisitions of man's nature in which it is founded, in order to lead immediately to the adoption of Christianity. The very circumstance which constitutes the weakness of this age must also have been subservient to this end. So long as the Greek and Roman characters retained their strong political bias, it was impossible to gain them over to a religion which acknowledged no country, and which, simply because it was an alien and exclusive, could not be otherwise than despised by the patriotic Greek and Roman. Christianity, which was destined to be the faith of all nations, could not diffuse itself in its full energy until all the peculiar characteristics of the ancient races had passed away, and thereby the influence of the political element which, if it did not constitute the essence of the olden religions is distinctly

traceable in them, had been entirely abrogated. In general terms, we may regard it as the proper mission of this age to prepare the world for the reception and diffusion of Christianity.

But it is clear that this mission could not have been accomplished without the co-operation of a circumstance, which we have already slightly alluded to—the rise and formation of new nations. We shall here take it for granted, that the political life of a people must have its historical basis; that a community, in short, cannot become a nation except by the inheritance of an earlier age, of common traditions, a common country, and a common language, and that so long only can it be truly said to live and flourish as this common inheritance is livingly propagated. Now how would it have been possible to reconcile Christianity with this inheritance of the olden nations? Ancient traditions, the memory of ancient deeds, and of ancestors who had thrown such glory and such authority upon their descendants, drew the minds of men in one direction; while Christianity with its precepts and injunctions called them to another. With the growing authority of Christianity, therefore, ancient political associations became weaker; or rather they had previously been entirely abrogated, in order that Christianity might spread. On this account, perhaps, a certain opposition to the Christian doctrine may have grown up in that movement of religious ideas which the East had awakened, having for its object the protection of the olden spirit of nationality against the influence of the new religion. This, however, was a reaction not so much against the

sentiments of Christianity, as against the destructive force which it involuntarily brought to bear against the olden feeling of citizenship. But its efforts were vain, for the political spirit of the ancient nations had become corrupt and had lost all its purifying force, being dissolved into a mere collection of heterogeneous elements; since, in truth, no national peculiarity can long stand against the advance of catholic humanity. But, on the other hand, the peculiarities of national character are a in certain degree indispensable to the orderly advancement of humanity; since it is a necessary condition of its progress, that it maintain the bequests of olden times among its especial treasures. Out of the olden nations, therefore, new ones were to be formed, which should receive the patrimony of antiquity, without, however, adopting it as radically their own; in order that, on the one hand, whatever was reconcilable with the spirit of Christianity might be preserved, and, on the other, whatever was hostile to it rejected.

Now we know that these new nations were formed by the irruption of the German races into the western provinces of the Roman empire. This event has consequently been taken to mark an epoch in the history of the world. But, in truth, this phenomenon was merely a continuance, on a larger scale, of earlier proceedings. For had not German soldiers been admitted long previously into the armies of Rome? Had they not often played the despot over the tottering empire? Were not emperors taken from their ranks? That fusion of nations which was effected by the migration of the

German races had long been going on in quiet; and, first introduced on private life, subsequently became undeniable in the public. The irruption of the northern races did but give a more decided character to this fusion, and carry it on on a larger scale. It removed all doubt that the Teutonic element was to form its ruling element and source of vigour; but at the same time made it equally undeniable that the laws and enlightenment of the already half changed Roman, and that Christianity also, should exercise a decided influence in the formation of the new national characters. Accordingly, we believe we were not going too far, when we asserted that the character of the new nations was formed out of the Roman political character, and when we regard this result as the peculiar mission of the period now under consideration. Even the Germans, who remained in their ancient seats on the southern and western boundaries of the empire, came into manifold contact with the Romans, and were unable to withdraw themselves from the course of civilization on which their emigrated brethren had entered.

Such was the essential problem of this period of humanity. It was for the most part remote from science, and therefore it was only in very subordinate matters that it could avail itself of the scientific element of human nature. Still we dare not venture to assert, that these times were wholly unfruitful for science, only that the scientific fruits which they brought to maturity were rare; and that, agreeably to the character of the age, even these were not cultivated independently and for their



own sakes, but in subservience to the purposes of active or of religious life. As early, real developments of reason must exercise a favourable influence on science, so those which were pursued in this age were not without beneficial effects upon science, and therefore upon philosophy also. If in philosophy it would be sufficient to look to detached thoughts alone, then, indeed, we might justly affirm, that more philosophy was contained in the New Testament, than in all the writings of the Greek philosophers altogether. But as the pregnant ideas which the New Testament contains are not given in a scientific, i. e. philosophical form, they can only be regarded as the germs out of which later philosophical views were evolved.

But with the development of these germs, we have not at present to do. Our proper task, as immediately connected with our previous labours, is to paint the decline of ancient philosophy. The development of the new, which took its form from Christianity, notwithstanding that it proceeded almost contemporaneously with the decay of the old, must be reserved to a special exposition. To the expediency of this course we previously alluded, when we were treating of the division of the history of philosophy into the old and the new. The course of our history will confirm what we there intimated, that the times to which the close of the one and the opening of the other belong, had a double literature, a double culture, and also a double philosophy, of which the histories require to be discussed separately. We shall find that the old literature of the Greeks and Romans, however ready it may have

been to adopt new and discordant elements from the East, at first took scarcely any notice of the sentiments and ideas of Christianity; and that afterwards, proud of its antiquity, of the splendour wherewith an occasional glimmer of the light of antiquity seemed to invest it, looked down upon its unshowy rival; but that at last, when it could no longer deny the power and constraining influence which it had upon the minds of men, it scorned to be taught by it, and therefore adhered the more closely and anxiously to the lifeless remains of antiquity; and, when all these were vain to help it, plunged into despair. In the same manner, therefore, that this ancient literature and philosophy held themselves studiously apart from the Christian, we feel ourselves obliged to keep their histories separate, if we would render their opinions, views, and spirit, respectively intelligible.

This period of the history of ancient philosophy, as it is the longest in duration, so it is the poorest in solid and lasting results. This intellectual poverty crawled on through six centuries. The long duration of its agony, undoubtedly affords proof of the tenacity of life possessed by a nationality independently evolved. But at the same time we must admit, that many concurrent circumstances helped to support the vitality of the slowly sinking philosophy of Greece. Even were it to be sustained merely as a matter of tradition, it must have an occupation, and some vital interest must attach itself to it: for even a tradition cannot maintain itself in a perfectly dead form; it must connect itself with something endued with life, from which

it may receive its support and aliment. Now in the case of Grecian philosophy, this interest was furnished by its relation to the East and the Roman world. These two relations led to the diffusion of philosophical doctrines over nearly the whole of the then civilized world. Greece, small in extent, sent its teachers over the vast regions of Asia Minor, Syria and Egypt, and even to the very confines of India; Rome, from whence the scholars of Greece, men as it were domesticated in its doctrine, were disseminated over the whole of western Europe and the Roman province of Africa. In the East, where Grecian kingdoms and colonies flourished, so as either to suppress everything like national sentiment, or to transmit it into a species of Grecian, the nature of things imposed upon philosophy a necessary task. With the other civilizing means of the Greek schools, it must contribute its part to the completion of this rapidly advancing change. In the West, on the other hand, where the mighty rulers of the world, eagerly thronged the assemblies of Grecian philosophers, as Alexander the Great formerly did, received them into their confidence, and made them presents from the spoil of nations, ambition, and every other passion, must have been stimulated by the keenest spur to master a science deemed worthy of such enviable distinction. But how wide a departure is this from the natural source of philosophy! It was no longer the love and inclination for science, which led men to cultivate it; and it was only sustained on the one hand by the necessary continuance of the schools, and on the other, by the pursuit of those outward

advantages which were to be attained by its instrumentality. Such inducements were required by the Greeks, who, in the time of Cicero, were already described as a cunning, conceited, and worthless race.<sup>3</sup>

If, now, in this respect, the influence of Rome and of the East upon philosophy must in some measure be estimated as equal, they nevertheless respectively introduced into philosophy a very different character. Not only had the Romans nothing of scientific development to impart to the Greeks, but their very character was little calculated to furnish them with any powerful stimulus to further researches, or new ideas in philosophy. The general pursuits of the Romans kept them far from the domain of speculation, which it is the highest problem of philosophy to explore. Their desire, however, to establish a legal organization of civil life, did, undoubtedly, exercise some influence on particular questions of morals. And in this respect, indeed, the Romans were more nearly related to the Greeks than the Orientals; for, as we have already shown, the later Stoics had diligently entered upon this topic, so that at most we can only allow that, owing to the predilection of the Romans for the practical questions of civil life, philosophical inquiry was directed more exclusively to the details of Ethics than had ever before been the case. But if the Roman mind was incapable of furnishing the Greeks with any pregnant element of philosophical development, it nevertheless greatly modified the form of philosophy as conveyed by the

<sup>3</sup> See, for instance, Cic. ad Quint. fr. I. 2, 2.

Greeks to their Roman disciples. Under this influence it gradually formed itself into a fixed tradition, and now, for the first time, became completely a formal doctrine of the schools; instead of, what it previously was, a vital movement of intelligence. Undoubtedly, as we have already remarked, the old creative energy had been gradually declining in the philosophical schools, nevertheless there still existed in them a certain activity, which was able to introduce a new cast of ideas into the old form of doctrine. This is true of all the chief schools of philosophy; the only school to which it does not apply, is the spurious philosophy of the Epicureans, which, from its very commencement, adhered strictly to the old. Thus even among the Peripatetics, down to the time of Cratippus, we find a change of formulæ, which seems to indicate, in a certain degree, a change of view and a degree of activity, however weak, in moral treatises; while the Old Academy transplanted itself into the New, under ever varying forms, while the development of the Stoical schools may be distinctly traced down to the times of Cicero. But under the influence of the Romans, this gradually ceased to be the case. If the Romans came to learn of the Greeks, it was not the Greeks then living, a race deeply despised, that they venerated as models. But it was by the ornaments of an olden time, whose transmitted labours were the pride of the existing scholars of Greece, that the Romans sought to be instructed. This desire naturally led the philosophers back to the founders of their schools; and the principal object now with them was, not so much to invent new, as to re-

exhibit the old in its purity, and as much as possible to make it their own. In fact the present age could scarcely set itself a better task. Accordingly, the chief occupation of the schools now was to read and to explain the works of the older philosophers; philosophers and grammarians rivalled each other in disseminating these works, in separating the spurious from the genuine, in arranging them in the order best suited for perusal, and in explaining their meaning. In this way the works of Plato and Aristotle, in particular, became subjects of learned investigation in the Academic and Peripatetic schools. In the Stoical school the reputation of its first three founders still survived; but a more active and original development animated this than any other sect, simply because the severe character of their ethical speculations accorded well with the spirit of the Romans and of the age generally. In this kind of learned labour with philosophy, a certain general sum of the results, which the several schools might claim as their property, was established; these leading principles were learned by the students as a brief comprehensive summary of the system which they professed, and even passed into common life as generally received opinions. Some of these points, indeed, were still controverted; but these disputes were reserved for the schools, where they were agitated as exercises of ingenuity, and for a display of superior learning or judgment, rather than from any true interest in the investigation. When the doctrines of the several schools had been mutually limited, they, undoubtedly, were ever ready to measure their strength with

each other ; but they soon found that controversy could lead to no good result, and the conviction was soon established, that their several differences of opinion rested ultimately on the particular view of the question which the respective schools had adopted once for all. The principles of a doctrine were no longer passed under examination with a view of attaining thereby to a further development of science : but, in philosophy, as in politics, men blindly followed a leader and adopted a particular party.

Naturally enough this erudite handling of philosophy sanctioned and gave encouragement to the pursuit of whatever bore the stamp of age. For in general erudition willingly remounts to the bygone, and among the Romans, especially, ever since the fall of the republic, a predilection for the past was almost universal. Accordingly, every system of philosophy which had long been exploded, now reappeared on the scene. The principal part were, it is true, still played by the four leading sects which even in earlier times had been of the most consideration :— the Academy, the Lyceum, the Porch, and the Garden, but along with them the doctrines of the Heraclitics, Pythagoreans, Cynics, and Sceptics were again in vogue. Of these, the latter two alone call for observation in the present place, for it is only in a few isolated points that the revival of the Heraclitic philosophy is discoverable ; and as to the importance of the neo-Pythagoreans, it was derived from its connexion with the impulses of Greek-Oriental philosophy. The revival of the Cynical doctrine, on the other hand, may be referred to that prevailing disposition of the age which favoured the spread

of Stoicism ; for, as we formerly found, the Stoical system itself contained a germ of Cynicism. It was the practical aspect of this doctrine that formed its principal attraction, and which was in a great measure called forth again by the union of the Roman character with Greek philosophy; nevertheless, it did not meet with much favour, because it naturally was offensive to the refined manners of the nobles of Rome. But Scepticism, notwithstanding its repugnancy to the Roman character, was a result of the form which philosophy, as modified by that character, necessarily assumed. For it must be evident that the habit which we have lately noticed of regarding the philosophical systems of the several schools as so many independent views of the world and of life, which admitted of as many interpretations as they presented different points of view, naturally favoured the introduction of a sceptical habit of thought. That this scepticism should not have followed the forms of the new Academy, but attached itself, in preference, to the older Scepticism is explicable, partly by the fact that the new Academy had itself undergone a modification, either by going back in some measure to Plato, or by assuming a friendly relation with Stoicism, and partly also by the impossibility almost of the new Scepticism attaching itself to any of the four schools of philosophy, from a learned comparison of whose several opinions it principally took its rise.

Moreover, it scarcely requires to be observed, that such a mere learned and school-philosophy as was in vogue in this age, should almost inevitably be



attended by a tendency to Eclecticism. Even though, from a sense of weakness, all attempts at original invention may have been abandoned; a certain freedom of judgment which shows itself by making a choice from among several already formed views may still survive. According to the mental habits of individuals, this choice necessarily differs; whenever they do not adopt their master and his opinions from mere caprice or hazard, it must be some personal inclination which leads them to join a particular sect. Still it is not to be supposed that their adhesion is altogether unconditional; for the opinions of men never wholly agree, and so man gladly avails himself of a compromise by attaching himself in one particular, or perhaps in all important points, to one party; but in others to another. This expedient is the more easy whenever the opinions of a particular school are adopted without previous examination, and adopted therefore without a thorough conviction of their validity. Now it lies in the very nature of a selection from many existing systems that their scientific enchainment be dissolved, and thereby a loose and illogical method of proceeding with ideas, introduced. The probable would become the limit of inquiry; but the probable appears different to different minds: yet, at the same time, great deference is shown to general opinion, and the ideas which are commonly received and passing current in the world. This, perhaps, constitutes the greatest merit of the Eclectic system. It thereby preserves, in some degree, the consciousness of what the general reason demands of philosophy, and by opposing the false

interpretations of an unsatisfactory philosophy, which is disposed to go beyond those requisitions of man's nature which first led to philosophy, arrived at a certain moderation of results seldom attained even by the greatest philosophers. But, in all this, there was no sound principle: the moderation of the Eclectics had its source in weakness. Anxious to avoid exaggeration, it feared the ultimate consequences to which a one-sided speculation, or a partial apprehension of a particular principle, necessarily led when fully worked out; but it suffered the one-sided view and the partial apprehension to remain, and thus nourished the enemy within its own bosom. Its moderation is only so far worthy of praise as it transmits to future times, opinions calculated to awaken philosophical research. Eclecticism seeks to reap the fruits of earlier times without toil or trouble to itself: but without labour there can be no mental progression.

The result, therefore, of the Roman influence on philosophy was a fusion of different doctrines, which was almost inevitably accompanied by an opinion that the differences of the schools, especially of those which were in some degree related to each other, concerned only a few unessential points, and might be peaceably adjusted. Traces of such an opinion have been already noticed in the Stoical school and later Academies. But such an attempt at accommodation was prevented from making any vital progress by the course which the Romo-Greek philosophy had taken. For as this was reduced to the learned occupation with the works of the olden philosophers, in which the Roman taste for the

historical was not without its influence thereon, it was impossible to pass so easily over the difference of the several doctrines.

On the other hand, the direction which was given to philosophy by the fusion of the Greek and Oriental characters, opened a far wider field for the disposition to combine the most opposite views, and to overlook the most important differences. Where a belief could exist of the possibility of combining the Grecian with the Oriental, there assuredly the faculty of distinguishing must have been very weak. How was it likely, that in such a quarter, any effectual resistance should be made to the attempt to see all in every doctrine? Moreover, the attempt was far from difficult in the particular domain of contemplation, which was at this time the favourite object of attention. This, we know, was confined to the obscurest matters of philosophy, for the expression of which language is inadequate, and of which all perception is denied; which are accessible only to conjecture, and which fetter our eyes and our thoughts, simply on this account, because our longings for them transcend the limits of cognition. Now, in the old philosophers, nothing was to be found concerning these topics beyond slight allusions conveyed in figurative and mythical terms, and designed to indicate the limits of actual knowledge; or if more definite opinions were occasionally advanced, they were accompanied by an indication that these were not to be understood in their more obvious sense. In short, it was impossible to deny that the matter so treated of was one which did not admit of being clearly expressed, which there-

fore, if not inaccessible to intelligence, certainly could not be reduced to any precise form of doctrine. When, however, man found himself, irresistibly attracted to this domain of investigation, the difficulty was sensibly felt of finding appropriate expression for this great mystery, in order to render it intelligible, to set it forth in its true importance, and to portray it as an object of veneration. In this constraining desire to reduce to language the mystery of the divine, and its relation to man, without sacrificing the reverence for it as something inexpressible; the Orientals had recourse to the philosophy of Greece, and the Greeks to the mystical wisdom of the East. Now the more that men felt themselves, in this pursuit, constrained to take expressions in a figurative and mythical sense, the more would it be found that a free interpretation might be given to the olden philosophies, and that behind the more direct intention of the word, a deeper significancy might be discovered. It is obvious that such a conclusion must have greatly favoured the growing opinion, that in different formulas the same sense was conveyed; that fundamentally all, or at least all the most profound, philosophies agreed with each other: and especially when it was seen that more unanimity was to be found among them here, on the utmost limits of human inquiry, than in those investigations which were directed to the manifold phenomena of the universe. The difference of opinion on the latter points might, it was believed, be overlooked by those who exclusively placed the essence of philosophy in the unveiling of the divine nature, as far as possible, but who at the

same time little considered how closely the investigation of mundane things is connected with a knowledge of divine. Accordingly, they concluded that all philosophy, in whatever shape it might have been originally conveyed, ultimately tended to one object, that which the most ancient sages had sought to reveal, and which alone had been acknowledged as truth, alike by Greeks and Jews, by Egyptians, Priests, Magi, and Gymnosophists; but under different forms, and in different degrees of purity. Thus there was effected a mixture of all religious doctrines, and all philosophical systems, which consequently brought about the loss of all rigour and distinctness of doctrine.

A characteristic feature of this direction of mind is, a bigoted reverence for the antiquated in religious doctrines, rites, and ceremonies. Indeed, the higher they remounted to antiquity, the nearer it was believed they approached to the divine. In remotest antiquity lay the origin of those religious sentiments, out of which all the ancient religions had sprung, and there also, consequently, the purest efforts to express the views of the old religion were to be found. So long as a new religion was not adopted, it was right and consistent to endeavour to return to the primary sense of this original. It was natural, therefore, that this direction of ideas, in which philosophical and religious were blended together, should also lead to a disposition to go back to the doctrines of the earliest philosophers. Now, it is easily conceivable, that in the attempt to reconcile these with each other, and to make them all subservient to one and the same end, a very

arbitrary method of interpretation would be followed. But the credibility of the freest expositions, both to their authors themselves, and to others, was greatly augmented by the opinion, which was daily gaining ground, that all the philosophical systems of Greece flowed from an older source—the teaching, viz. of Oriental sages, whose wisdom also was derived from a common centre—a revelation. To follow out the remotest traces of this revelation, which, alas, it was now idle to attempt directly to exhibit, and to give them again, wherever it was possible, in their original purity, and to represent all true knowledge of the divinity, and of his relation to man as a broken ray of primitive wisdom, was the problem which philosophers now took in hand to solve. How wide a field was here opened to conjectures, which, from the prevailing weakness of historical criticism, quickly came to be viewed as well-founded traditions! spurious, supposititious works of every kind were produced in support of this tendency; and the delusion was gradually formed that it was not impossible to discover one common source of all true knowledge among men.

If, however, this knowledge is not to be found in its full purity among the later philosophers and in the existing generation, yet they must nevertheless possess a standard, by which the greater or less purity of different doctrines may be estimated. Now, this could be no other than the general view of the age concerning that which ought to be worshipped as divine, and of its relations to the world; and as this view was formed out of a religious necessity, the philosophical systems which appeared

to be most favourable to the religious element of life, would consequently be regarded as the true expression of primal wisdom. In this spirit, the Pythagorean and Platonic systems were especially preferred; and the doctrine of Aristotle was also accommodated to this end. The Stoical, on the contrary, although much, perhaps the principal part, of its details, was borrowed for this purpose, contained many things which eluded every attempt of the kind; its Materialistic view, for instance—its inexorable fate—the proud confidence of the sage in his own wisdom; nevertheless, even from this, the endeavour was made to extract a germ of good. But the rigid exclusiveness of the Atomistic theory was the least capable of combining with the other views in this general fusion; nevertheless we occasionally find the poetic apophthegms of Democritus, and the example of his life, adduced as testimonies to the truth. Thus, the less confidence men had in the energy of their own mind, the greater was their desire to accumulate authorities whose value was estimated not by their weight respectively, but by their number. The agreement of antiquity, or rather of all times, all nations, and all sages, was thought to constitute a tribunal, from which there was no appeal. It is to be observed, that this view of divine things, and of their relation to the world which was found in the Græco-Oriental philosophy, was essentially different from the doctrines of the old Grecian philosophy, but that it was in perfect unison with the circumstances of the age. In the attempt to remount to the primary revelations of God, the opinion was gradually adopted, that the

revelation of divine light, which illuminates man and the whole world, shone on the world more brightly in the early ages, but that it was gradually obscured by the guilt of mankind. The very appearance of the present state of things, and every comparison of it with the past, into which it was possible for man to enter, seemingly confirmed this opinion. Where was now that creative vigour of thought which had produced such great works, and had animated so many patient and fruitful researches? Every individual of the existing age was constrained to acknowledge himself a disciple of the past. To such a degree was mind asleep, that men could not conceive that others could ever have been inventive; it was merely supposed that they had possessed better traditions, and as they lived nearer to their origin, they were better able to seize their true meaning. It appeared, therefore, that the only course now left to man, was to remount from the better known, and more accessible, but troubled traditions of proximate times, to the obscurer but more pregnant revelations of the earliest ages, and by the necessary intermediate steps to acquire, as far as possible, a right understanding of the past. This procedure led to the view that the divine can only be revealed to man by a *decreasing* series of revelations, and as at the same time it was considered necessary to connect every thing with the divine, the idea was formed that to proceed through such a series was essential to the nature of God. Accordingly, it was thought that mankind and the world are only mediately in connection with God, who is a being shut out from, and inaccessible to,



man. This is the view on which was grounded the theory of emanations, which was generally diffused in the period we are now treating of, but which was wholly unknown to Grecian antiquity; a view which arose out of Oriental modes of thought, and harmonized particularly with the general opinions of the day.

To the mind of the Greeks, the idea of an active creation appeared to be more nearly allied to the idea of perfection which they connected with that of deity, than it did to the Orientals. Accordingly, it was only in a very imperfect form, and almost entirely polemical, that the former could evolve the view which in modern times has been designated as the theory of immanence; while the latter, on the contrary, introduced into philosophy the view which placed the supreme excellence of life in an absolute quietude of contemplation. They consequently would be the first to moot the question in explicit terms, whether the unrest of the mundane activity could ever be evolved out of the rest of the all-perfect being. And of this question they would naturally seek to find such a solution, as making the world to emanate from God would leave him unchanged in his essence, and represent him as taking no further part in the emanation of the world than permitting it to proceed out of himself. These points, in short, constitute the essence of the doctrine of emanations, which supposes the world to emanate from God without any intervention of his activity: the emanation being not in God, but merely in some other entity. In what manner the further idea was herewith associated, that these

emanations must proceed through a decreasing series of entities, we have attempted to explain from the particular ideas which were prevalent in this age. In general, however, it may be said to have its source in a sense of evil predominating in the world, and in a belief that evil has not its origin in the divine essence. Thus, in fact, a question was warmly mooted, which previously had scarcely been discussed. The question of the origin of all things in God was brought forward in a more serious and definite form than had ever before been the case.

But the way which, in this feeling of predominant evil and of remoteness from God and his primary revelation, was applied in order to satisfy the requisitions of man's nature for an intimate union with the Godhead, was essentially different from that which the illustrious Greeks and Romans had believed it right to follow. This union was not to be attained by a busy and active life. Activity in political affairs, or even in the sphere of private duties, was no longer recommended for the claims of social or domestic life, and stood very low in the estimate of the Orientals, and also of the Greeks who had adopted Oriental opinions. A higher view of political interests was impossible where there was no field for the active prosecution of them; and as civil pursuits were preferred to all other active duties by the ancients, their estimate of external activity in general naturally fell with their low opinion of the former. Moreover, as outward nature is the necessary sphere of active life, this opinion was further strengthened by the fact, that the

Orientals looked upon matter and body as a limitation of spirit, as the principle of impurity, and the source of evil. By a due consequence, therefore, it was inferred that every action or occupation which had to do with the outward world, incurred the risk of pollution by its contact with the material. Even Plato had formerly asserted that the elaboration of the external, and even the consideration of it, is a work of necessity rather than of beauty. This view probably appeared a slighter deviation from the opinion of classical antiquity and the older Greek philosophers, than it would have been to express a contempt for the method of scientific reflection, or even to take a low estimate of its importance. For, occasionally, no doubt, the Greek philosophers did cast an unfavourable eye upon the admirers of the encyclic sciences; but, on the other hand, the most eminent of them were not indisposed to admit their value as furnishing a true intellectual culture, and as forming the preparatory step to philosophy. But even their utility in this respect was denied by the Orientals, who could only see in them the negative merit of withdrawing the mind from the corporeal: they lead to no positive good, but merely accustom the mind to abstain. Now this abstinence is properly that which, as the right road, will lead to a higher intelligence, and the reception of the true revelation of the Godhead, i. e. as far as possible a total abstinence from all pollution of matter. The highest attainable degree of abstinence from sensual pleasure, and of mortification of the appetites, and purification of the flesh, was regarded as the only means of attaining to happiness

and wisdom. It was hoped that as soon as the eye and every other sense were closed against the material world, the spiritual vision and perception would be opened. The consequences of this opinion were as pernicious for the development of science, as for practical life. While man withdrew himself from the duties of life, or, at most, discharged them merely as yielding to the force of necessity, in order to hold the higher opinion of himself, the more he despised them, the sciences which were connected with the realities of life naturally sunk in repute. Hence arose a distinction between that which in science is subservient to the interests of life, or what in the ordinary conceptions of it must be steadily maintained, and that which recedes from it, and, on the other hand, looks to the ideal limits of all science. These last elements of science, constituting what in modern times have been called the transcendental, which seek to examine and determine the ideas of God and the world, were, by the philosophers of whom we have now to speak, separated from the former with a view to apprehend them in their pure and absolute nature. By this course they introduced a schism and contradiction into science, similar to that which they found existing in the world, where good and evil, matter and mind, are in perpetual collision. Even this might have been endured with patience, if they had not gone so far as to advise us to shut the eye against the evil principle, and to tie our hands in the presence of the enemy. For this they did when they sought to throw aside active life, which attacks matter. But they went even further, when they declared *all* the occupation with the sciences

which are connected with practical life, is only allowable so far as they are means of withdrawing man from its active duties. After this, it is impossible to deny, that in the ideas and conceptions of these men, a confusion of the most heterogeneous elements prevails throughout.

But while they dissuaded man from the sensible, and considered the encyclic sciences merely as an instrument of withdrawing the mind from the false, but not of elevating it to the true, by what means did they hope to attain to the cognition of truth? For this purpose they confided, as we said, with religious reverence, in the olden traditions, which they attempted to trace, step by step, from old to older; and, as they believed that they could draw the same spirit from them all, the comparison and interpretation of them appeared the most important and profitable task that man could undertake. In many minds this reverence of the transmitted letter was not exempt from superstition; for, generally, in the times of which we are speaking, and especially in this direction of mind, great stress was laid upon the secret power of words and signs, and on all such mystical arts of interpretation. But the majority of those who had sincerely devoted themselves to philosophy, still saw that to understand the old traditions, they must be studied in a right spirit, and that ingenious trifling or laborious conceit, however busy with the outward form, which would hear words and see signs without a suspicion of their proper sense, could never lead to a right explication of them. They required that man should go with a pure heart and a pious faith, with zeal and with

intelligence, to consult the holy oracles of philosophers and prophets, if he would draw from them the desired profit. To satisfy these conditions, a total withdrawal from the sensible world, and an exclusive contemplation of the pure essence of mind or reason, were held indispensable. Thus was established a simplification of man's essence and the object of contemplation; and the importance acknowledged of that inward meditation, which the Orientals had recommended in so many ways. In this attempt to isolate himself from all external objects, man wished to interrupt the natural connection of all things, in order to set himself in a more elevated position. But as both were alike impossible, the natural consequence was an arbitrary system of ideas, which, however, when ultimately analysed, was nothing less than a distorted image of the true connection of the inner and outer worlds as reflected by the broken mirror of a personal point of view. Now, that no true science could be realised by such a method is easily conceivable. The false and deceitful world, whose polluting contact man avoids, was itself made to be nothing more than a delusion of the imagination, an abstract image of the sinful desires in which mankind were sunk, the guilty source of which man preferred to transfer from himself to the outward world. The very truth which lay at the bottom of these errors, had no other origin than the sense of the weakness, both of life and principle, in which the ancient nations were plunged, and the desire to which it gave rise for the formation of a higher and more energetic principle of life.

Christianity, as we previously remarked, was destined to form and to animate this new principle for the further development of humanity. To prove this assertion at large, is the proper province of a complete history of humanity, of which that of philosophy is but a part. But a general proof of it is furnished by the simple fact, that all the nations from whom the advancement of modern civilization proceeded, were shaped by the Christian religion, both in customs and institutions, in sentiments and science: and the history of philosophy itself contributes its testimony to the justness of the assertion, since it shows that the progress of modern philosophy resulted from Christianity, being essentially designed to find a science consonant to Christian sentiments and ideas. However, this result of the history of philosophy does not at present lie before us, and it is only in the consideration of Christian philosophy that it can be gradually illustrated. But even in the phenomena which accompanied the close of ancient philosophy, with which we are at present concerned, we discover at least a preparation for the Christian character of thought, which was furnished by the longing after something better than any thing that could be found in the existing state of intelligence. But, at the same time, we must admit, that most of the heathens who felt this longing, failed to seize the right means to satisfy it; they looked for good, not in promises of the future, but in the realities of the past, in which lay the glory of the olden nations. Hence their adhesion to olden superstitions and idolatry; their confidence in the sufficiency of olden rites and

external sacrifices to atone for sin and appease the wrath of the gods ; hence, too, their impotent resistance to the new sentiments and direction of mind, which they hoped to put down by a mixture of philosophical ideas with the religious aspirations of antiquity. Even where a hope was indulged of a later and more perfect revelation, it was entertained in agreement with ancient ideas, and a national revelation was looked for, which was to be accompanied by a restoration of the olden splendour and renown of the people. The old philosophy, with its olden sentiments and ideas, had not as yet learned to renounce that olden spirit of nationality to which they owed their origin and character.

Nevertheless, this longing was itself the preparation of Christianity. It is on this account that the particular development of philosophy, in which this desire expressed itself, was more immediately the object of this period than that of the Græco-Romish philosophy, and accordingly its duration was the longer. In its disputes with Christianity the olden philosophy became purely heathenish, and yet even in this form was constrained to give its testimony to the truth and excellence of the new religion, by exhibiting itself as a distorted image of it. On the other hand, it quickly united in itself all the philosophical impulses which the close of the olden nations revealed ; and, as early as the beginning of the third century, it had decidedly assumed the superiority over all other species of philosophy. At this date the literature of Rome was sunk in greater insignificance than ever, and with it the Græco-Roman philo-



sophy had naturally declined. As the Roman empire gradually lost its Roman character, the opinion, that the bloom of nations and the true revelation were to be found only in remote antiquity, gained strength and support. For the Romans, so long as their nationality was preserved, would naturally be indisposed towards such a view, since the date of their national splendour was too recent, and the narratives of its rise had assumed too strictly an historical character to be easily adjusted to such mythical sources. All the energy still surviving in the olden notions, centred all its efforts at self-defence in its resistance to the Christian religion.

Having thus indicated at length the nature of those circumstances, in the midst of which the philosophical activity of the period was developed, the suitable division of our subject will readily suggest itself. The beginning of the third century A.D. forms a remarkable epoch in the history of this period. The opposition which existed between the Grecian and Oriental characters, and also between the several philosophical sects of Greece, now ceases almost entirely. Stoics and Epicureans, Sceptics and Cynics, and all others, by whatever names they may choose to be called, scarcely evince a sign of life. The Platonic and the Aristotelian philosophy alone continues in repute, being treated, for the most part, as doctrines of correspondent views; and it is rarely that we meet with an occasional preference, and still more rarely with the slightest symptom of controversy. The opposition between them was indeed a very secondary matter. The disputes of the several sects were hushed in the general

struggle of heathenism with Christianity, in which the latter sought to equip itself with the whole force of the earlier philosophical enlightenment, so far as it is available for the contest, and thereby raised the olden philosophy to eminent importance. Its voice is heard with a vigour, and with a more youthful fire than it had exhibited for long. Now, this fire is manifested in a thorough prosecution of that philosophy, which, by the application of no little ingenuity, brought into firm connection whatever the Græco-Oriental philosophy had previously effected in the same direction, though only in isolated ideas, and with little rigour of consequence. But it was more the flight of a bold fancy, which painted in fairer colours the past, and the importance of philosophy, than a sober insight into its true nature; an extravagance, rather than a sound vigour, which impelled men to this prosecution of the neo-Platonism, and consequently it quickly sank either into subtle sophistry or the darkest superstition.

Accordingly, this period falls into two great portions. The first portion, however, contains two essentially distinct but cotemporaneous elements—the Græco-Roman and the Græco-Oriental philosophies. The Greek philosophy spread, nearly at the same time, over both the East and the West. Nevertheless, the Græco-Roman has the prior claim to our attention, partly, because by its character it is more nearly allied to the earlier Greek philosophy, and also because it died off earlier than the Græco-Oriental, which in this period forms little more than the preparation for the more glorious unfolding of the same tendency in neo-Platonism.

To mix up together the consideration of these two tendencies, from merely chronological considerations, would be to mistake the difference of their characters and their importance respectively. The Græco-Roman philosophy, to give a brief character of it, may be defined as an erudite Eclecticism, with a predominantly practical tendency. The Græco-Oriental, does, it is true, present no less the character of erudition; it is, however, wholly and completely devoid of that historical sense which seeks to seize and exhibit differences: the mystical view which predominates in it, attempts to draw into a common indistinctness of a misty outline whatever is not directly opposed to itself. The Græco-Roman philosophy indicates, therefore, that aspect of the decline of the philosophical spirit under which it resembles an aged frame, which has outlived the principle of its vitality, and all its members are ossifying. All its doctrines are quickly transformed into bare formulæ, or lifeless words. The Græco-Oriental, on the other hand, gives us the picture of a gradual dissolution of all organic forms—an indeterminate decay which we formerly compared with the sinking of the living body into foulness and corruption.

As to the arrangement of the several topics in each of these sections, we shall experience some difficulty in the first, from an almost total want of movement and progress. The Græco-Roman philosophy exhibits almost nothing but the stiff form of erudition; and accordingly in this portion of our labours we shall be driven very reluctantly to adopt the form almost of a mere history of literature. For

we shall have little more to do, on the whole, than to trace the diffusion of Grecian philosophy among the Romans, to exhibit its fluctuating fortunes, and to point out the modifications which the Roman character gave to it, without, at the same time, imparting to it any further development. The works of by far the greater number of the writers who belong to this part of our history are lost; all we find concerning them are a few scattered notices; at times we have nothing more to adduce than bare names, or a few circumstances connected with their personal history. Of many individuals we know that they belonged to this or to that sect, merely from the circumstance of their having otherwise played an important part in the memorable history of their time. Even those whose philosophical writings have come down to us, have, for the most part, to thank chance for this favour, rather than any great influence that they exercised on the philosophy of their age, or for the importance which for other reasons may be ascribed to them as parts of Roman literature, or as treatises on the special sciences or morals, or as illustrating the history of their times. And yet we cannot pass them over entirely in silence, because they did, undoubtedly, contribute in some measure to the diffusion of philosophy, and in some degree determined the shape in which it has been transmitted to modern times, and in which it acquired an influence on special sciences, and on life itself. Moreover this portion of our subject falls naturally into many isolated details, since, as we formerly mentioned, the several schools were continued without exercising any vital influence

on each other. In this period the case was nearly as it was in the first age of Grecian philosophy, when also several schools were developed side by side without mutually understanding each other; but the causes which produced the same phenomenon in the two periods were widely different. In the earlier period it arose from the natural desultoriness of youthful efforts, the want of a general survey of the whole domain of science, and of facilities of intellectual communication; but in the present times, the separation of the schools was owing to want of inventive energy. The clearest and most decided expression of this want is contained in the Sceptical school, whose chief art consisted in bringing into juxtaposition the different views of the several sects, and in submitting the arguments respectively advanced by them to the test of a traditional standard, without being in the least moved by the truth which a particular view might contain. It affords, moreover, the purest specimen of the erudite method of treating philosophy; on which account the exposition of its doctrines appears to form the most appropriate close of the first part of the first section, and an easy transition to the consideration of the Græco-Oriental. There cannot be a more striking contrast than that which exists between the Sceptics and this forerunner of the new Platonists. The former sought to throw out in the strongest light the conflicting opinions of philosophy, insisting, for the most part, upon verbal differences merely, which moreover they laboured to make still more pointed. The latter, on the contrary, sought to fuse together the most opposite

doctrines, rarely striving to penetrate to the inner core and deeper meaning, and industriously softening the points of difference. The Sceptics allowed the old customs of worship to remain, merely because, with their own want of all-fixed opinions, they yet deemed it advisable to comply in outward forms with the general opinion; but it was only the external forms of religion that they maintained, for they hoped by so doing to afford no room for any gainsaying of philosophy. The Greek-Oriental philosophers, on the contrary, showed the greatest zeal possible for religion; to its rites they ascribed great value, while fundamentally they changed its significance, and placed their general philosophical view in every form of religion, however peculiarly developed. If the Sceptics of this period rejected the olden philosophy, they yet were far from wishing thereby to abandon all the enlightenment of the olden times, but were willing to appropriate to themselves whatever in it was of service for the practical ends of existence and for the advancement of the useful arts. The Græco-Oriental philosophy, on the other hand, set little value by the useful arts, and it is only the philosophy and the science of old which raises itself above the common view of life, that appeared to them a worthy object of pursuit. In this way does the period under review exhibit the dissolution of the olden enlightenment into its several elements; it is only in its exclusive direction, that it is any longer maintained, but without any power or knowledge to understand and to appropriate the proper coherence of its parts.

Now in this development of the Græco-Roman

philosophy, we may distinguish two aspects, according as one or other of the two elements which are contained in it—the learned tradition or the practical object—obtain the preponderance. In the predominance of practical objects, we distinctly trace the influence of the Roman character, which reveals itself especially in the leaning to the Stoical doctrine, with which also the Cynical school is closely connected. Now as this effect of the Roman character is felt most strongly in the beginning of this period, but afterwards dies gradually away, it will be most proper to begin with the consideration of this aspect of the Græco-Roman philosophy. On the other hand, the Roman character does not participate so decidedly in the predominantly erudite transmission of philosophy, and this consequently is not so exclusively confined to the districts in which the Roman element preponderated. The Orientalists, indeed, contributed their share thereto; but the effects of this cannot be traced at all accurately. As to the close of this period, as already indicated, it is most appropriately marked by the Sceptical school.

In the second part of the first section, in which we propose to treat of the Græco-Oriental philosophy, at its first appearance and in the fragmentary phenomena in which it ran parallel with the Græco-Roman, it will be impossible to avoid entering again upon the obscure domain of Eastern opinions; for as the Orientals did not, like the Romans, merely adopt the philosophy of Greece, but added to it new contributions of their own, it is indispensable to trace the origin of these additions. For whether

we embrace the opinion of those who hold that the Orientals could not, without a stimulus from Greece, have produced a philosophical doctrine, or that other opinion, that they did evolve a philosophy of their own, or lastly maintain with others that all that has been given out as a philosophy of the East, bears falsely this name,—it cannot, at all events, be denied, especially now that modern research has thrown some light upon the Indian character, that a doctrine is found among them which may as justly lay claim to the title of philosophy, as the writings of Democritus or Epicurus. And it is very probable that the development of this species of philosophical doctrine had already begun at the time when the Oriental habit of thought first exercised an influence on Grecian philosophy; and that it also, though perhaps indirectly, afforded a stimulus to the Græco-Oriental philosophy. But here we must confess the disadvantage we lie under, both from our inability to draw our account of this philosophy from original sources, unable either to inform ourselves as to the Oriental, and from the incomplete and unsatisfactory nature of all the information that we possess at second hand. This disadvantage is peculiarly felt, when we attempt to show on sure grounds in what way the connection between it and Grecian philosophy was brought about. For every thing relating to these points is involved in the general obscurity which prevails on all the vital topics connected with the historical development of Oriental antiquity: and, accordingly, we would willingly, if such a course were at all allowable, either altogether



omit this portion of our work, or commit it to other hands. But the former course appeared dishonest both towards others and ourselves, and to resemble the habit of infants, when in an uncertain light they catch an indistinct view of any object, to close their eyes in fear. The latter course was impossible, since the labours of Orientalists on the philosophy of the East have furnished hitherto nothing more than a mass of undigested materials; or else they have gone to work so uncritically with whatever they took in hand, that we could not with confidence adopt the results of their speculations. Treating, for the most part, of matters which belong to uncertain tradition, or else merely seeking to elucidate fragmentary parts of history, it is with clumsy and unpractised hands that they apply the standard of historical connection, which the history of the West presents. Accordingly the only course that remains, is to use our best endeavours to give as far as possible a faithful account of all those elements in the eastern habit of thought, which appear to us capable of having spontaneously acquired a philosophical form. This, however it may seem to be a digression from our main subject, is an indispensable portion of the history of Grecian philosophy, which may be passed over by all who are satisfied that they possess a correct knowledge of eastern ideas, and that they are capable of rightly estimating their influence on Grecian opinions. The other matters which make up this second part of our first section admit of an easy division, although it will sometimes be difficult lucidly to expose the connection of the several details, in con-

sequence of the fragmentary nature of our information, which again may, it is not improbable, have had its source in a want of connection in the events themselves. On the one hand, we shall have to show how the Grecian philosophy affected the Oriental mind; and, on the other, how the Greeks were moved by Oriental ideas to give another direction to their philosophic view. The two parts seem chronologically to follow in this order; at least we find among the Orientals, who had imbibed the civilization of Greece, a decided disposition to that mixture of different modes of thought, which will here come under consideration, long before we can discover any appearance of it among the Greeks; and this fact may perhaps favour an analogical inference that a similar tendency had been previously evinced by the pure Orientals also.

Now the disposition of the Greeks for Oriental ideas aptly introduces our second section; it forms the natural transition to it: for we shall here find Oriental and Greek elements so combined as outwardly to give to the compound a thoroughly Greek character. This section proceeds in a more connected course than the first does, and on this account more amply repays historical research. It is also more fruitful in philosophical ideas, or, at least, in attempts to place the problems of philosophy in a new light. Moreover, the sources both for the internal and external history of the philosophy in this period, are more abundant; for the philosophy of the Greeks now again assumed, in the course of development, an important and prominent position. Having to enter into a contest which at this

time agitated the whole world, it naturally attempted to exhibit itself as a worthy rival of Christianity : the consciousness of this importance,—the endeavour to exhibit to the people of those days their ancient religion in a worthy light, and by its olden illumination to satisfy the religious want which now began to make itself generally felt,—the zeal which was communicated to philosophical investigation by this religious sentiment, animated and invigorated, for a long time, the neo-Platonic school. In its history, indeed, we shall see the old philosophy brought, in a certain degree, into collision with Christianity and its literature ; so as in this respect to raise a doubt whether it would not be expedient henceforward to discuss the ancient and Christian philosophy, in connection with each other, rather than to adhere to our former determination, to treat the two separately : however, several important reasons confirm us in our first design. In the first place, it is desirable to exhibit, in a progressive series, and consequently in the greatest possible purity, the effect produced by Christian sentiments and ideas on philosophy. With this wish is associated the consideration, that whatever regard the neo-Platonists paid to Christianity, is only external, adopting nothing from it but what appeared to be previously existing in the ancient sentiments of the Greeks, Romans, and Orientals, and merely attacking that which lay on the surface of its phenomenon—its humble form, for instance, which was directly opposed to the pride and splendour of the olden civilization—and never suspecting the profound meaning which lay beneath this unpretending veil. Lastly, we are further con-

firmed in our design by the fact, that the neo-Platonic school, from its formation down to Plotinus, takes scarcely any notice of Christianity, and does not seem to have been further influenced by it than was inevitable in the general movement of mind in a religious direction, on which, moreover, the propagation of the whole school was dependent. With much more confidence we may assert, that Christian philosophy was influenced by the first commencement of neo-Platonism, than that conversely the rudiments of the former influenced the latter; we shall have, therefore, no occasion, in the history of our first section, to take for granted any thing of Christian philosophy; it is only an acquaintance with the outward appearance of Christianity, as it is diffused among us, that must occasionally be tacitly assumed. But it lay in the very nature of the thing, that Christianity and the views and tendencies which flowed from it into philosophy, should, in the course of time, assume a greater influence. The diffusion of its spirit over the whole life of the people of antiquity was necessarily followed by an extension of its influence on philosophy; and as this gradually increased, it at last, by due consequence, subverted the several systems of heathen philosophy. We cannot, therefore, wonder that the spread of Christianity should overthrow the authority of neo-Platonism, and that the dissensions which arose within the Christian church, which, by running out into subtle disputations, favoured a formal dialectic, should have awakened, even in the neo-Platonic school, and also generally, greater attention than

had latterly been shown to writings of Aristotle.

Before we proceed to details, we have yet a few words to say in general, on the outward circumstances attending the cultivation of philosophy in this period. Throughout the whole of the second period, Athens had been the chief seat of philosophy. It is true that during this period occasional branches of the different schools sprung up in other Greek cities and colonies, and that towards its close, when philosophy had already been taught in many places of Asia and in Egypt, the most distinguished teachers removed the scene of their philosophical labours to Rome, Rhodes, and Alexandria: nevertheless, the ancient glory of Athens, as being the chief seat of philosophy, was not yet wholly eclipsed. It was in the third period that the rudest and most decided shock was given to its prerogative, although ancient prescription still attracted many teachers and students of philosophy to Athens, and thereby, from time to time, infused new life into the Athenian school. In these changes external considerations had naturally the chief influence; since, wherever the inner principle of life is weak, outward impulses, whether the favour or the displeasure of the great, work the more powerfully. Nevertheless, these alone cannot rule, and still less shape, the life of philosophy: it is only here and there that they penetrate into its outward form, and a middle result is produced by the joint action of internal and external incitements. A general sketch of these will not be without its interest for the period before us.

Athens, Alexandria, and Rome, in particular, played an important part at this period in the diffusion of philosophy: the fortunes of each of these cities were alike variable. First of all, Athens at the beginning of this period was depressed by the misfortunes which it suffered in consequence of the victory of Sylla. This event seems to have been a principal cause why the chief teachers of philosophy left Athens, at least for a time, and taught at Rome, Alexandria, and Rhodes. This, as we mentioned, was, at all events, the case with the Stoic Posidonius, and with the Academicians, Philo and Antiochus. When it had become the fashion of the leading Romans to have philosophers in their suite, and when philosophical schools had been established throughout the whole extent of Asia, Egypt, the Roman provinces of Africa and Europe, the authority which attached to Athenian philosophy very naturally declined. There were now philosophical schools whose reputation occasionally threw a shade over the renown of Athens: thus Athens was unable to adduce any eminent teacher of the Stoical school, whose chief seat was now at Rhodes, where Posidonius, and his disciple Jason after him, taught.<sup>4</sup> Marseilles was a long time the chosen seat of learning, to which the Romans sent their young men for instruction in rhetoric and philosophy.<sup>5</sup> Nevertheless, in the last times of Roman freedom, Athens was again the high school of the philosophical sects, and the spot where most of the Romans acquired their knowledge of philosophy.

<sup>4</sup> Suid. sec. v. Ἰάσων.

<sup>5</sup> Strab. iv., p. 291, ed. Tauchn.

Here, in the times of Cicero, the Epicurean school flourished under Phædrus and Patro,<sup>6</sup> the Academy under Antiochus and his brother Aristo,<sup>7</sup> and somewhat later, the Peripatetic school under Cratippus.<sup>8</sup> Yet all these sects appear about this time to have fallen into decay at Athens; many teachers and students still resorted thither, but we hear little of them, and nothing that is important. The violence of the times may perhaps have had an unfavourable effect on the schools of Athens.<sup>9</sup> The Cæsars of the first century seem to have been unfavourably disposed towards it: upon the accession, however, of Hadrian to the imperial throne, the liberality which he showed towards the learned generally, was also extended to the rhetoricians and philosophers of Athens; many received liberal presents from him, and he also established a library at Athens.<sup>10</sup> Marcus Aurelius and Antoninus Pius gave similar encouragement to this ancient seat of the sciences. They appointed teachers of rhetoric and philosophy,<sup>11</sup> with liberal endowments, which were continued under succeeding emperors, and quickly assumed the appearance of legal institutions.<sup>12</sup> By these means a regular institution of philosophical instruction was established, in which the four leading

<sup>6</sup> Cic. ad Div. xiii. 1; de Fin. v. 1.

<sup>7</sup> Cic. ad Att. v. 10; Ac. i. 3; de Fin. v. 3; Tusc. v. 8; Brut. 97; Plut. v. Brut. 2, where Aristo is wrongly read.

<sup>8</sup> Cic. de Div. i. 3; ad Div. xii. 16; xvi. 21; de Off. i. 1.

<sup>9</sup> Thus we hear something of the school of the Epicureans. Cic. ad Div. iii. 1. From this it is manifest that the Romans exercised an early influence on the fortunes of the philosophical schools.

<sup>10</sup> Pausan. i. 18, fin.

<sup>11</sup> Capitol. Ant. Pius c. 11; Philostr. v. Soph. ii. 2, 20; Dio Cass. lxxi. 31.

<sup>12</sup> Eunap. v. Soph. i. p. 138, ed. Commel.

schools, the Platonists, Peripatetics, Stoics, and Epicureans, had each two teachers, who, in addition to a considerable salary, received fees from their scholars.<sup>13</sup> How this establishment was modified by later circumstances, and the spirit of the times, will be more appropriately indicated after we shall have taken a view of the state of Rome and Alexandria.

Upon the decay of the Athenian schools, the union of the Grecian with Roman and Oriental ideas, naturally exercised a considerable influence. Rome and Alexandria, on the contrary, profited by it, and it was in these two cities, that for a long time philosophy was most extensively and successfully cultivated. Rome being now the capital of the empire of the world, attracted the teachers of philosophy from all sides. Nevertheless no school of philosophy properly so called, was formed there; still it is not easy to find a single eminent philosopher who from some cause or other, was not led to visit Rome, and to sow there the seeds of his doctrine. That this was not the case immediately and in a higher degree at the very opening of the present period, is attributable to circumstances alone. The prevailing taste of the Romans for Grecian literature with which philosophy was so inseparably connected, as to make it almost indispensable for every educated person to have at least a superficial acquaintance with it,<sup>14</sup> greatly pro-

<sup>13</sup> This salary amounted to 10,000 drachmas; the fee for teaching does not seem to have been fixed. Luc. Hermot. ix. Eunuch. ii. iii.; Eunap. i. 1. mentions only six teachers of philosophy.

<sup>14</sup> Tac. Hist. IV. 5.



moted its interests. And these were still further advanced by the utility which was ascribed to it for forming the oratorical character,<sup>15</sup> and by a belief that comfort and support were to be found in it for all the political misfortunes of the times.<sup>16</sup> At first, indeed, its progress was impeded by the jealous eye with which the older Romans looked upon its introduction as a strange and dangerous innovation, and which, on several occasions, caused the Grecian philosophers to be banished from Rome.<sup>17</sup> But such measures could not long be of any avail, and their effects must for the most part be confined to the lower classes, whereas the rich and noble were not restrained by law from seeking instruction from Grecian philosophy. The latter, perhaps, in the times of the first emperors, may have been deterred from philosophical pursuits by the opinion that philosophy, and especially the Stoical and Cynical doctrines which were most consonant to the character of the Romans, was dangerous to the tyranny of those in power, and generally to a monarchy. This opinion rendered the presence of the philosophers at Rome disagreeable to the Cæsars of the first century, when almost every thing depended on imperial favour, and even caused Domitian to expel them from Rome and Italy,<sup>18</sup> and the reputation of being a Stoic was universally shunned, as

<sup>15</sup> Tac. de Orat. 32 ; Cic. Orat. 3.

<sup>16</sup> Cic. ad Att. ii. 5, 9, 13. &c. Tac. Hist. i. 1. Ann. xvi. 34.

<sup>17</sup> Sueton. de Clar. Rhet. 1 ; Gell. xv. 11 ; Athen. xii. 68. p. 547 ; Aelian. v. h. ix. 12.

<sup>18</sup> Gell. i. 1. Suet. Domit. 10 ; Dio Cass. lxxvii. 13. The banishment of the philosophers from Rome under Vespasian, was not universal. Dio Cass. lxxvi. 13.

sure to entail upon its possessor accusation and death.<sup>19</sup> But with the commencement of a milder rule and one friendly disposed to science and letters, philosophy was again taught at Rome with greater zeal than ever ; and, reviving under Trajan even, it flourished still more when Hadrian and the Antonines assembled around them the learned of every class and pursuit. From this date Rome became, for a considerable period, the chief seat of philosophical doctrines, and in later times attracted the neo-Platonists as zealously as it had formerly afforded an asylum for the teachers of the older schools.

Not less important as a school of philosophy, but in a different respect, was Alexandria in Egypt. It is well known how learning in general flourished here under the Ptolemies, although at first with little profit to philosophy. But as soon as philosophy began to be pursued as a matter of mere literature, it quickly passed into the course of studies which were prosecuted at Alexandria, whose critical labours on the ancient authors had also comprised the history of philosophy or rather of philosophers.<sup>20</sup> But it was only towards the close of the Ptolemaic dynasty that distinguished teachers of philosophy resorted thither ; and under the dominion of the Romans, Alexandria became an influential school, not only of erudition but also of philosophical development. The literary treasures which were preserved there, the meetings of the learned in the Museum which was maintained and indeed enlarged

<sup>19</sup> Tac. Ann. xiv. 57 ; xvi. 22.

<sup>20</sup> This was the common object of the labours of Sotion and Sphærus, Apollodorus and Satyrus, two disciples of Aristarchus.

by the Roman emperors,<sup>21</sup> the great commerce of the city, all contributed to render Alexandria one of the chief seats of science and literature; accordingly we meet there with teachers of every kind of philosophy.<sup>22</sup> The Stoical philosophy, which had now established its authority in all parts of science, was disseminated by numerous teachers, some of whom were not without eminence; a series of commentators on Aristotle, whose views were authoritatively appealed to by later interpreters, stretched to the times of the famous Alexander of Aphodisias and the emperor Caracalla who from a mad hatred of Aristotle persecuted the Peripatetics of Alexandria.<sup>23</sup> The Platonic philosophy also must certainly have had its teachers, since we discover a strong predilection for it in Alexandria. The same may be said of the Pythagorean philosophy; and we also discover traces of a reproduction of the doctrines of Heraclitus. Amid such learned labours with all the branches of philosophy and science, the gradual rise of a new Scepticism was nothing singular. But it is not so much these labours of erudition that constitute the importance of Alexandria in the history of philosophy, as the development which it gave to the mixed Greek and Oriental views. It was not, it is true, exclusively their birth-place, but no place was so well fitted to furnish them with food. For here, where all nations

<sup>21</sup> Strab. xvii. p. 427; Suet. Claud. 42.

<sup>22</sup> For brevity's sake I refer to Matter *Essai Historique sur l'école d'Alexandrie*, tom. 2. chap. viii. p. 116, sqq. whose statements, however, must be used with great caution.

<sup>23</sup> Dio. Cass. lxxvii. 7. cf. ib. 23.

were collected together by traffic and commerce, in the neighbourhood of one of the much lauded springs of eastern wisdom, and where at the same time Grecian science was cultivated in its utmost range, and invested moreover with every circumstance of external splendour, a strong disposition to effect a union of Greek and Oriental ideas sprung up almost of necessity. Accordingly, it is at Alexandria that we first discover numerous and decided traces of such a design. Even here, however, the earliest symptoms of this mode of thought are very obscure; probably because it was among the lower classes of the people, and not among the ruling Greeks but the conquered Orientals, that the earliest attempts of this kind were made; and we have to thank the zeal of the Christian teachers for whatever was in any way connected with the development of our religion, for all the knowledge that we possess of the progress of a philosophy which, at the beginning of our period, was already formed among the Jews of Alexandria. Philo the Jew is the first certain point for its history; but the maturity and precision of the view which we find in his writings, excludes all doubt that he had precursors in it, among whom we may perhaps venture to reckon Aristeas and Aristobulus. This process which was going on among those Jews who were conversant with Greek literature, in all probability took place among other Orientals also, and from them passed over to the Greeks and Romans. For such a fusion of different views, Alexandria was perhaps in no small degree prepared by the strong disposition which she had previously evinced for an Eclectical philo-

sophy,<sup>24</sup> and it is therefore very natural that Alexandria should have been the seat where neo-Platonism was first cultivated and acquired shape and consistency under the hands of Ammonius Saccas and Plotinus. From hence it spread rapidly wherever Grecian philosophy was studied. In Rome, Plotinus founded its school; and in Athens it seems to have gained a firm footing soon after its first teaching there by Longinus. Nevertheless the old philosophy declined at Alexandria, probably in consequence of the prevalence of Christianity. About 391 A.D. the Serapium, a principal seat of the heathen religion and philosophy, was pillaged and destroyed during a bloody fight of parties; and all the heathen temples of Alexandria were at the same time converted into churches and cloisters.<sup>25</sup> Alexandria however still retained its teachers of philosophy.

We have already mentioned that the liberality of the Antonines had restored Athens to one of the principal seats of philosophical instruction. But the Stoical and Epicurean schools displayed little energy, notwithstanding that the former enjoyed, in a special degree, the imperial favour. So little does patronage avail for the promotion of mental development, even in the worst days of its decline.<sup>26</sup> The neo-Platonic and the Peripatetic, on the other

<sup>24</sup> No reliance can be placed on what is said of the Eclectical school of Potamon by Diog. L. i. 21; Suid. s. v. *αἵρεσις* vel *Ποτάμων*, and also Pophyr. v. Plot. sect. 6. of the Basle edition; but still the way in which the Alexandrian Christians cultivated an Eclectical philosophy, which at first evinced a leaning to Stoicism, Clem. Alex. Strom. i. p. 288; vi. p. 642, ed. Par. 1641, appears to justify the assertion of the text.

<sup>25</sup> Neander's Church History. ii. l. p. 161, sqq.

<sup>26</sup> The Platonic school possessed a private property, which was very considerable down to the times of Proclus. Phot. Cod. 242. p. 565. Hoesch.

hand, were flourishing. Even though the neo-Platonists of greatest renown did not exclusively teach at Athens, still the Academy there always had at its head eminent men, who by showy if not substantial attainments, spread far and wide the reputation of their sect. By a process of Eclecticism the neo-Platonists were connected with the Peripatetics, whose labours were, for the most part, confined to the exposition of their great master's works. Thus did Athens become once more the centre of rhetorical and philosophical studies which were attached to the olden civilization, and this became more completely the case as Christianity advanced rapidly in the other principal seats of learning, Rome, Constantinople, and Alexandria. The olden civilization of antiquity seems to have concentrated itself at Athens as a stronghold whence to defy all attacks. Here she was exposed to the most fearful trials. For not alone had she to endure the persecutions which the Christian Cæsars inflicted on the heathen philosophers,<sup>27</sup> but also the inroads of the German races brought a terrible visitation on Athens when Greece was wasted by Alaric. The ancient seats of Greek philosophy now appeared to be for ever laid waste ;<sup>28</sup> nevertheless they revived yet once again, and a great number of disciples from every region of the Roman empire, not heathens only, but also Christians, sought there general learning and practice in the rhetorical

<sup>27</sup> The Emperor Constantine withdrew the allowances of the teachers of philosophy, which, however, were restored by Julian, and suffered to remain by Valentinian.

<sup>28</sup> Synes. Ep. 136; Eunap. v. Soph. p. 93. Differently, however, Zosim. v. 5, 6.

art. Human institutions come to an end from the want of an inward vital energy, rather than from any unfavourable pressure of external circumstances. And thus it was that ancient philosophy died away solely from its own inertness and languor. To trace the steps of this decay, belongs to another place, and we must be content here with remarking that the outward bearings, even of the philosophical schools of the fourth century of our era, distinctly reveal their inward weakness and corruption. They presented the wildest scenes of irregularity and disorder. The teacher sought distinction in the applause of numerous scholars whom he sought to win by every unworthy means, and to retain by factious fraternities of country and classes. Pre-eminence was contended for, not by intellectual weapons, but by the force of lungs and partizanship, and the strife of parties broke out at times, even into deeds of violence and bloodshed.<sup>29</sup> The philosophical schools having fallen into intrinsic corruption, the formal closing of the schools by the emperor Justinian A.D. 520, accomplished what was wanting to silence the olden philosophy for ever.<sup>30</sup>

<sup>29</sup> See Schlosser on the Universities, Students, and Professors of the Greeks in the time of Julian and Theodosius, in the *Archiv. für Gesch. u. Litt.*, Schlosser and Bercht. i. 217, sqq.

<sup>30</sup> Johann. Malala, xviii. p. 451. ed. Bonn. Procop. h. arc. 26. c. not. Alem.

PART I.—SECT. I.  
GRÆCO-ROMAN PHILOSOPHY.

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CHAPTER II.

COMMENCEMENT OF PHILOSOPHY AMONG THE  
ROMANS.

EVEN when opposition from political considerations to the philosophy of Greece was strongest, a taste for her arts and literature had taken deep root in the minds of the most distinguished of the statesmen of Rome. The futility, therefore, of all prohibitory measures against the natural course of things, must have been evident, if only the eyes of Roman statesmen had been open to the close connection subsisting between the literature and philosophy of Greece. The very fact that the M. Porcius Cato, who caused the abrupt dismissal of the Greek philosophers, and who openly avowed himself the opponent of foreign learning, did nevertheless apply himself in his old age to the study of the Greek language,<sup>1</sup> is frequently quoted as the triumph of Grecian civilization. However this may be, it is notorious that Cato failed in his design, whatever may have been the motive of his hostility to

<sup>1</sup> Cic. de Sen. 1, 8 ; Plut. v. Cat. Maj. 2, 22, 23. The ardent fondness for Greek literature, which Cicero ascribes to the older Cato, appears to me suspicious. Indeed the whole story is full of difficulties ; for Cato was already far advanced in years when the Athenian embassy arrived at Rome.



Grecian philosophy; for the individuals who are expressly named by Cicero as its earliest patrons among the Romans, in all probability received their first taste for it from the lessons of the Grecian ambassadors.<sup>2</sup> These were no less eminent characters than a P. Scipio Africanus, and his friend C. Lælius the wise: with these, Cicero occasionally associates L. Furius.<sup>3</sup> These men of consular dignity afforded to the later Romans an example of friendly and intimate intercourse, with the scholars and philosophers of Greece. Scipio kept for a long time in his train the Stoic Panætius, who was also admitted to the familiar society of Lælius, who had previously been a hearer of Diogenes of Babylon. Panætius appears to have exercised great influence on the formation of the philosophical character of the Romans; for besides the illustrious individuals above named, many other eminent statesmen and lawyers are numbered among his disciples, Q. Ælius Tubero, for instance, and Q. Mucius Scævola.<sup>4</sup> When we call to mind the nature of the philosophical labours of Panætius, we feel justified in assuming that he initiated the Romans in the Platonic, as well as in the Stoical philosophy, since he was a great admirer of Plato, and even of many members of the later Academy. Cicero, at least, takes it for granted that the disciples of Panætius, whom he introduces in his dialogue on the State, were well acquainted with

<sup>2</sup> Cic. Tusc. iv. 3.

<sup>3</sup> De Orat. ii. 37.

<sup>4</sup> Cic. Brut. 31; pro Murena 36; Tusc. iv. 2; de Fin. iv. 9; de Orat. i. 17. A different account is found in Van Lynden de Panætio, § 13.

the doctrines of Plato.<sup>5</sup> Now when these two kinds of philosophy once found free course among the Romans, ignorance of the other schools could not long continue. Those who diligently studied any one of these schools must, by their very disputes, have been more or less instructed in the doctrines of the others. Moreover, the very nature of the literature of Greece at this period bore too much of the character of erudition for the Romans to be long without an historical review of the whole domain of Grecian philosophy. The Epicurean doctrine gained, it is well known, an easy diffusion among the Romans, among whom it found more numerous advocates than any other sect.<sup>6</sup> In the times of Cicero, moreover, the New Academy had become popular, after the teaching of it by Philo of Larissa and Antiochus, and even the Peripatetic school found adherents among the learned after Sylla had brought to Rome the works of Aristotle, and a valuable edition of them had been given to the world by the joint labours of Andronicus of Rhodes and Tyrannion.

But now, although every school almost found its admirers, the Romans were too directly the disciples of the Greeks not to be influenced in a great measure by the prevailing spirit of Grecian speculation. Accordingly, we find that the Epicurean, the Stoic, and the New Academy, were the chief favourites. The Peripatetic school found, so far as our knowledge extends, no other adherent than M. Pupius Piso,<sup>7</sup> who was taught its doctrines by the

<sup>5</sup> Cic. Ac. ii. 44.

<sup>6</sup> Cic. Tusc. iv. 3.

<sup>7</sup> Cic. de Fin. v. 3; de Nat. D. i. 7; ad Att. xiii. 19. M. Crassus is also num-

Neapolitan Staseas; but even he evinced a disposition to blend and modify the pure Aristotelian doctrine with the Platonic, and partly also with the Stoical.<sup>8</sup> The doctrines of the Old Academy, as well as those of its founder, were, it is true, in high repute; but they owed their consideration principally to the grace and charms of Plato's style, rather than to any right appreciation of his doctrines. For the unpractised intellect of the Romans was scarcely capable of divining the profound meaning which lay couched beneath the mythical, and often ambiguous, form of his style, and they were in general disposed to adopt the expositions of his philosophy, which Philo and Antiochus gave to their numerous friends among the wealthy and most distinguished Romans. Agreeably to the opinions of these philosophers, the doctrine of the Academy assumed among the Romans, not so much a sceptical character as that of a theory of probability, which examined the opinions of the several schools, and deferred to whatever appeared most plausible, without, however, taking it for more than a valid opinion, which it was right to believe. Such was the tendency of the views of Cicero, a disciple of Philo, and also of the most distinguished statesmen of his day. The only apparent difference between them is, that some inclined more with Antiochus to the Stoical doctrine, which showed a greater predilection for the Sceptical character of the New Academy. In

bered among the Peripatetics, Plut. v. Crass. 3. But we have not reckoned him because he was far from being highly enlightened.

<sup>8</sup> So we judge in general from the opinions which Cicero puts into his mouth. De Fin. i. 1.

the former number we may reckon L. Lucullus, who was distinguished for a love of Grecian literature in general, and particularly for all its philosophical systems ; among which, however, he gave a decided preference for the doctrine of Antiochus,<sup>9</sup> which however he embraced in the character of an illustrious patron, rather than in that of a profound disciple.<sup>10</sup> In the same class, but probably possessed of more solid knowledge, we may place M. Brutus, Cæsar's murderer. Instructed by Antiochus and his brother Aristus, he had likewise adopted a predilection for the Academy, which now was called the old, in distinction from the middle, as founded by Arcesilaus, and the new, by Carneades.<sup>11</sup> Brutus, however, was far from confining his studies to the Platonists. The works which he composed in Latin, have only the slight merit of being eloquently written. Conformably to the Roman character, they were exclusively confined to the Ethical portion of philosophy; while the fact that, like so many others of his countrymen, he wrote a treatise on duties, appears to prove that he, as well as the rest of the disciples of Antiochus, took the works of the Stoics for his models.<sup>12</sup> Of the others who belong to this class, the most distinguished was M. Terentius Varro, whom Cicero joins with Brutus as a fellow scholar of Antiochus,<sup>13</sup> and who in his multifarious works, none of which, however, were exclusively

<sup>9</sup> Plut. v. Luculli, 42 ; Cic. Acad. ii. 2.

<sup>10</sup> Cic. ad Att. xiii. 16.

<sup>11</sup> Plut. v. Brut. 2 ; Cic. Ac. i. 3 ; ad Att. xiii. 25.

<sup>12</sup> Cic. Ac. i. 1 ; de Fin. i. 3 ; ad Att. xiii. 46 ; Sen. Ep. 95 ; Quint. x. 1, 123.

<sup>13</sup> Ac. i. 3 ; ad Att. xiii. 12, 16 ; ad Div. ix. 8.

devoted to philosophical subjects,<sup>14</sup> most probably interspersed many philosophical ideas.<sup>15</sup> From statements regarding his opinion of the gods, that he combined the physical doctrines of Stoics with the philosophy of the Academy, in the same way that Brutus combined the Ethical with it. For while he rejected the popular notions of the gods, and distinguished mythical theology from political and physical, he nevertheless attempted to give to the anthropomorphic conceptions of the gods a more exalted signification, and agreeably to the Stoical doctrine, interpreted them by the universal force of nature, which pervading the whole system of the world in different degree of existence and in different individual entities, is consequently adored under different names and forms.<sup>16</sup> Thus did the Stoical doctrine gain under a strange name a wide diffusion among the Romans, at the same time that it had many adherents who professed its tenets without limitation or disguise. In the doctrines of the learned legists of Rome many Stoical principles have been pointed out, and it is probable that the philosophy of the Porch found a permanent school among the teachers and founders of Roman jurisprudence.<sup>17</sup> Q. Mutius Scævola who has been

<sup>14</sup> Cic. Ac. i. 2, puts in his mouth a reason for being averse to write in Latin on philosophy. However, philosophic works of his are quoted, e. g. *August. de Civ. D.* xix. 1.

<sup>15</sup> Cic. Ac. i. 3.

<sup>16</sup> *August. de Civ. D.* iv. 31 ; vi. 5, 8 ; vii. 5, 6, 23.

<sup>17</sup> I ground my assertion on J. A. Ortloff's *Abhandlung über den Einfluss der Stoischen Philosophie auf die Römische Jurisprudenz*. Erlangen, 1797. This is a subject well worthy of further examination by our Jurists. The result, perhaps, would be, that philosophy was able to exercise but a slight and merely external influence on so positive a doctrine as Roman Jurisprudence.

already mentioned among the disciples of Panætius was the teacher of many of the late juriconsults, among whom were the distinguished contemporaries of Cicero, C. Aquilius Gallus and L. Lucilius Balbus who taught Servius Sulpicius.<sup>18</sup> To this Balbus, the Q. Lucius Balbus in whose mouth Cicero, in the treatise *De Naturâ Deorum*, puts the exposition of the Stoical view, appears to have been related. That Servius Sulpicius was an admirer of the Stoics is unquestionable, since he had studied rhetoric and philosophy at Rhodes while Posidonius was teaching there.<sup>19</sup> His disciples L. Aulus Ofilius and Alfenus Varus betray likewise a Stoical character in their legal doctrines. But of all the contemporaries of Cicero, M. Porcius Cato the younger most contributed to the glory of the Stoical philosophy, in which he had received the instructions of Antipater of Tyre and Athenodorus Cordylion. It was, however, the moral and political points of this philosophy that most engaged his attention, and these he anxiously sought to reduce to practice in public life;<sup>20</sup> and by the strictness of his own principles, and especially by his life and death, gained for it a high consideration among his countrymen. The Epicurean school reckoned a far greater number of adherents. We should have a long list, indeed, of names to adduce, if we were to attempt to enumerate all the illustrious individuals who, as we know from the correspondence of Cicero, were Epicureans. It will be sufficient to enumerate

<sup>18</sup> Cic. *Brut.* 42.<sup>19</sup> *Ib.* 41.<sup>20</sup> Plut. v. *Cat. Min.* iv. 10; Cic. *ad Div.* xv. 4; *Parad. Proœm.*; *pro Murena* 29.

a few of the most eminent: such as T. Pomponius Atticus, the dearest friend of Cicero; C. Cassius, one of Cæsar's murderers,<sup>21</sup> L. Torquatus and C. Velleius, whom Cicero makes the spokesman of the Epicurean sect in his works on the supreme good and the nature of the gods.

Most of the individuals above-named were eminent as statesmen, and it is only from their having themselves taken a considerable part in the politics of the day, or being more or less connected with the leading politicians, that we are acquainted with their philosophical opinions: as for the propagation or development of philosophy they contributed little to either. But as this, however, is the principal point to which our attention should be directed, we must now endeavour to trace the commencement and progress of philosophical literature among the Romans. Its first appearance was very humble, as was to be expected from the nature of the case. This is evident from the contempt with which Cicero speaks of it, who scarcely deigns to mention two names of the first Latin writers on philosophy—Amafanius or Amafinius, and Rabinus, whom he blames as deficient in dialectical skill, but at the same time confesses never to have read their works.<sup>22</sup> Nevertheless, these writers were, in all probability, of some importance in their own age; since they possess the merit of having brought the philosophy of Greece within the reach of the Romans, as Cicero himself confesses, when, in accounting for the great popularity of the Epicurean philosophy among his countrymen, he attributes it in a great measure to

<sup>21</sup> Cic. ad Div. xv. 16, 19.

<sup>22</sup> Ac. i. 2; Tusc. ii. 3.

the fact of its having been the only one that was accessible to them in their own language.<sup>23</sup> These writers, therefore, must have been Epicureans; and it may have been from this circumstance alone, that Cicero inferred their deficiency in dialectics. Still we can readily believe that these first essays were rude and unskilful; and that before the times of Cicero the Romans did not possess any perfect philosophical work in the Latin language. Nevertheless, we must set it down as an exaggeration on the part of Cicero, when he asserts, that before his time philosophy among the Latins was without dignity, and had received no honour from the Latin language; and when he claims for himself the merit of being the first to attempt to earn for the Latin language the same gratitude from philosophy as it already owed to the Greek;<sup>24</sup> for Lucretius had already published, in Latin, a very skilful exposition of the Epicurean doctrine. Still it is undoubtedly true, that it was in the times of Cicero, and principally by his labours, that philosophy was domesticated in the Latin tongue. The Latin writers who wrote on philosophical subjects before this date, are all lost; but Cicero has for many centuries been revered as a teacher and fountain of philosophy: we shall, therefore, have to take especial notice of Cicero, after having, in the first place, briefly recounted the rise and spread of Epicurism among the Romans.

When it is considered that the Romans applied themselves to the practical, rather than to the theoretical, portion of philosophy, it appears somewhat

<sup>23</sup> Tusc. iv. 3.

<sup>24</sup> Tusc. i. 3; ii. 2; de Nat. D. i. 4.



singular that in the very school which was pre-eminently ethical, the Romans should have confined themselves principally to physics. In the case of Amafanius this is beyond dispute;<sup>26</sup> and of Catius, another teacher of the Epicurean philosophy, and a contemporary of Cicero, it is well known that he composed, if not exclusively, yet for the most part certainly, on the physical system of Epicurus;<sup>26</sup> but the strongest proof of our assertion is furnished by the work of T. Lucretius Carius, which is still extant.

Even the Epicurean Cassius found it impossible to approve of the writings of Amafanius and Catius;<sup>27</sup> while, on the other hand, Lucretius extorts an unwilling eulogy from Cicero.<sup>28</sup> His didactic poem, *On the Nature of Things*, undoubtedly soon superseded all earlier essays of the Latin Epicureans; and this circumstance justifies, in some measure, his silence as to his predecessors in the same field, and the boast that he was the first to give a Latin version of the doctrines of Epicurus.<sup>29</sup> Like the generality of his countrymen, Lucretius was a close imitator of the Greeks. His poem was composed after the model of that of Empedocles, whom Epicurus extols in the highest language of praise. As to natural grace and poetical ornament of expression, Epicurus, in all probability, was not far behind his original.<sup>30</sup> As to the matter of the poem, agreeably to the practice

<sup>26</sup> Cic. Ac. i. 2.

<sup>26</sup> What Cicero, ad Div. xv. 16, says of him refers to physics; he is represented as having written four books, *de Rerum Natura et de Summo Bono*. Comm. Vet. in Horat. Sat. ii. 4.

<sup>27</sup> Cic. ad Div. xv. 19. Catius meets with qualified praise from Quint. x. 1.

<sup>28</sup> Ad Quint. Fr. ii. 11.

<sup>29</sup> V. 338.

<sup>30</sup> l. 717, sqq.

of the Epicureans, it is little better than a re-echo of his master's doctrines, and furnishes a strong proof of the slavish veneration of the school for its founder; consequently, in our notice of Lucretius, we shall confine ourselves to such few points as will suffice to show the sense in which the Romans understood and adopted the philosophy of Epicurus.

The surprise which we at first feel to find the Roman followers of Epicurus occupied principally with physical questions, is at once removed by the express design of this work. Its object, as Lucretius himself avows at the very opening of his poem, is to emancipate the human mind from religion—from all superstitious fear of the gods, and to raise them to a consciousness of their power over destiny, and to exalt them to heavenly might.<sup>31</sup> Accordingly he omits no opportunity of ridiculing and decrying the perversity of the religious conceptions of his countrymen and the poets, which, however agreeable as fables, are very remote from truth.<sup>32</sup> He ridicules the belief that in the thunder and lightning the Lord of heaven displays his power,—and the Tyrrhenian songs, which pretended to see in lightning the signs of the Divine will. He de-

<sup>31</sup> I. 63, sqq. Humana ante oculos fœde quom vita jaceret  
In terris oppressa gravi sub religione,  
Quæ caput a cœli regionibus ostendebat  
Horribili super adspectu mortalibus instans,  
Primum Grajus homo mortaleis tendere contra  
Est oculos ausus, primusque obsistere contra.

Quare religio pedibus subjecta vicissim  
Obteritur; nos exæquat victoria cœlo.

Cf. *ibid.* 932; iii. in.; iv. in.; vi. 49, sqq.

<sup>32</sup> II. 600, sqq.

mands why, in that case, so many bolts are wasted without effect in the water and in desert regions; why Jupiter does not strike the wicked, and not his own temples and statues.<sup>33</sup> This imaginary power of the gods can avail nothing against fate and the laws of nature; for even their holy temples and images are not exempted from decay. In answer to those who hold that the order of nature is an indisputable proof that the world was originally formed by gods, he thinks it sufficient to object the evil and irregularities which are discovered in it.<sup>34</sup> To those who fear that a denial of all religion must lead to godless principles, and shameful crimes, he objects that religion itself has led to the greatest enormities—human sacrifices, for instance, and the deed of an Agamemnon, who did not spare even his own daughter.<sup>35</sup> It is not piety to bow round stocks and stones, to visit every altar, to prostrate one's self to the ground, and to stretch out hands before the statues of the gods, to inundate their altars with blood, and to heap vow upon vow; but piety consists rather in the calm and imperturbable feeling of the sage.<sup>36</sup> What return could human gratitude be to perfectly happy beings, that they should be induced to undertake any thing for the sake of man? What could induce them to wake up from their eternal repose to the creation of the world?<sup>37</sup> This false worship he derives from the ignorance of man who, from the manifestations of the divinity, in sleep, and even in his waking senses, had been led

<sup>33</sup> VI. 378, sqq.

<sup>34</sup> II. 167, sqq.; the same literally with lengthy examples, v. 196, sqq.

<sup>35</sup> I. 81, sqq.

<sup>36</sup> V. 1200, sqq.

<sup>37</sup> V. 166, sqq.

to form an idea of immortal beings of human form, but endued with eternal youth and infinite power, in order to be able to refer to the power of these gods, those phenomena of nature of which he could not discover the causes ;<sup>38</sup> and, accordingly, his chief endeavour is to dissipate the prevailing ignorance of nature, and, in imitation of Epicurus, as he avows, to break down the barriers in which nature had been closely confined by the erroneous belief in gods.<sup>39</sup> Now, however much this attack upon the false gods of the olden religion may have contributed to the destruction of superstition, yet on the other hand, the remedy which Lucretius would substitute, was certainly little better in kind. It is to be noticed, that he frequently recurs to the doctrine of Epicurus, that the gods are beings perfectly happy, and enjoying eternal repose, and never troubling themselves about the government of the world ; but his proof of the existence of such beings is weak, and far from forcible, resting chiefly on the arguments already advanced by Epicurus.<sup>40</sup> Equally zealous with his master in the wish to destroy whatever could give countenance or support to the superstitious horrors of religion, he attacks also the belief of the immortality of the soul, and conducts his attack perfectly in the manner of Epicurus and his school. Who, he argues, that is acquainted with the nature of the soul, and knows that it is formed out of fire, and air, and earth, and some fourth principle, which is a very subtle body, endowed with sensation as its essential

<sup>38</sup> Ibid. 1163, sqq. ; Cf. *ibid.* 83, sqq. ; vi. 49, sqq.

<sup>39</sup> I. 71 ; ii. 1087, sqq.

<sup>40</sup> VI. 75.

property, can doubt that this weak, frail, body, must, as soon as it is deprived of its shell, by being expelled from the body, be destroyed by the slightest shock ?<sup>41</sup> By such arguments did Lucretius seek to dispel the fears of Acheron, and all the apprehensions of religion, by the light of his own, or rather of Epicurus' theory of Nature. Nature is the only deity that he is willing to venerate; he preaches her holy laws and ordinances, and teaches that she produces all things, and suffers them again to decline and perish as soon as they have grown to their measure, as determined by their respective laws of existence.<sup>42</sup> This doctrine of Lucretius, which, in all probability represents the general effect of the natural system of Epicurus on the Roman mind, affords a fair specimen of the tendency of philosophical physics, when superficially cultivated, to detract from the fear of God. This influence must have been the stronger on the Romans, the more indisposed they were to profound research into nature, and the more readily they adopted, at this time, when the higher interests of their life were dying off, a light-minded view of the world and of the destination of man.

We do not consider it necessary to enter fully into the details of the physiology of Lucretius, since, for the most part, he does no more than repeat the well known positions of the Epicurean school. It is merely in the method of treating his

<sup>41</sup> IIL 413, sqq.

<sup>42</sup> I. 71, 147, sqq.; where the regularity of nature is employed to prove the proposition, *Ex nihilo nihil*; ii. 1087, sqq. 1118.

*Donicum ad extremum crescendi perfica finem*

*Omnia perduxit rerum natura creatrix*

V. 925; 1364.

subject that Lucretius is original, and this occasionally gives rise to a peculiar mode of viewing things, of which we must now seek to give an account. The attempt itself to treat, poetically, so dry a subject as the Epicurean doctrine, which, so far as we know, no one before Lucretius had ever made, naturally shed upon it a peculiar light. This is seen in the great liveliness and variety with which nature and her elements are depicted by Lucretius, and which the lifeless and uniform character of the Epicurean physiology hardly seemed to admit of. Thus, when he represents nature as an all-ruling unity, and rejects the doctrine of a divine government of the world, as destructive of the liberty of nature, and when he ascribes to her a creative energy—in all such conceptions nature is regarded as a person, and makes herself felt as a peculiar and independent power. The case is the same with his descriptions of all other principles which exercise a universal influence on the existence of individual things: thus, when the sun is described as a being who, by the heat of his rays, gives life to all the fruits of the earth; or, when he depicts, at great length, the way in which the earth became the mother of all living things—how at first she freely emitted from her womb, plants, and beasts, and men; and how, for their sustenance, she had prepared milk; and how, at last, like other animal mothers, having passed the period of fecundity, she produces nothing more immediately. In these and similar representations he has continued to throw an appearance of life, on the otherwise dead masses of the Epicurean world. This constant effort of his poetical feeling to invest all nature with life, is further seen in the conjecture which he hazards

in direct contradiction to the Epicurean theory ; that the stars possibly are living beings which have their proper motions, which they perform in search of their appropriate food.<sup>43</sup> We are far from wishing to deny that Lucretius intended all this to be understood in a merely figurative sense ; nevertheless, it must be owned, that he dwells with a fond enthusiasm on many of these descriptions ; and that the series of ideas to which they belong, have contributed in no small degree to recommend the whole system, both to himself and to others. Among these ideas we must reckon that of an internal impulse of the atoms, which Epicurus originally advanced, in order to explain their deviation from the perpendicular, the contingency of natural events, and the freedom of the human will. Lucretius, however, adopts this idea in a still more extensive sense, notwithstanding that it is, in many respects, quite inconsistent with many of his other opinions. Thus, he speaks of atoms possessing in themselves a principle of motion,<sup>44</sup> and by it accounts for the voluntary movements of living creatures, which, he argues, must be referred to an inherent power of the atom, to produce out of themselves, and at pleasure, a beginning of motion ;<sup>45</sup> for the will operates a new motion, which is then pro-

<sup>43</sup> V. 525, *sqq.*

<sup>44</sup> II. 132. *Prima moventur enim per se primordia rerum.*

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.* 251. *Denique si semper motus connectitur omnis  
Et vetere exoritur semper novus ordine certo,  
Nec declinando faciunt primordia motus  
Principium quoddam, quod fati fœdera rumpat,  
Ex infinito ne causam causa sequatur,  
Libera per terras unde hæc animantibus exstat,  
Unde est hæc, inquam, fati avolsa voluntas,  
Per quam progreditur, quo ducit quemque voluptas ?*

pagated through all the members of the vital frame He describes at length the way in which the fourth nameless nature, which is the source of sensation in the soul, as it were the soul of the soul, communicates the motion which itself originates to the limbs, and imparts it to the heat, and air, and breath—the other natures which compose the soul.<sup>46</sup> It is true he does not admit that this internally-moving power can produce an ascending motion; <sup>47</sup> on the contrary, he even refuses to concede that it admits of an oblique direction in the descent of heavy bodies, which the truth of things must contradict; it is merely a slight deviation from the straight line, which is invisible to the eye, which he would request permission to assume; a direction, he says, so slightly oblique that it scarcely deserves the name.<sup>48</sup> Thus eagerly does he strive to maintain the regularity of Nature, his goddess, and without, at the same time, sacrificing to it the life in individual things.

In this respect he appears to be advantageously distinguished from Epicurus, that he labours to maintain more strictly than the latter the regularity

<sup>46</sup> III. 265. Sic calor atque aër et venti cæca potestas  
Mista creant unam naturam et nobilis illa  
Vis, initum motus ab se quæ dividit ollis,  
Sensifer unde oritur primum per viscera motus.

<sup>47</sup> II. 185. ——— Nullam rem posse sua vi  
Corpoream sursum ferri, sursumque meare.

<sup>48</sup> II. 243. Quare etiam atque etiam paullum clinare necesse est  
Corpora, nec plus quam minimum, ne fingere motus  
Obliquos videamur et id res vera refutet.  
Namque hoc in promptu, manifestumque esse videmus  
Pondera, quantum in se est, non posse obliqua meare,  
Ex supero cum præcipitant, quod cernere possis.  
Sed nihil omnino recta regione viai  
Declinare, quis est, qui possit cernere, sese?



of the development of natural phenomena. This is manifest in the details of his theory of nature. Thus he likes not the notion of chance, and even submits the free motion of the will to a directing law. For he makes the will to be dependent on the conceptions of the soul, and these again to arise from sensuous impressions which are received from without.<sup>49</sup> The divine felicity itself is regarded in the light of a force of nature.<sup>50</sup> And although he does not abandon wholly the manner of Epicurus, and attempts to give several explanations of celestial phenomena, and even ridicules the astrologers who will not admit that these events may happen otherwise than they assert, it is nevertheless far from being his opinion, that the regular ordinary phenomena of heaven have different causes at different times, but he merely thinks that different explanations must be admitted, because it is difficult to discover the one sole cause by which the stars are set in motion.<sup>51</sup> And, accordingly, the object of his physical theory throughout is, to show that all things proceed by fixed and determinate laws. This is nowhere more clearly seen than in that part of his poem where, having adopted the Empedoclean account of the origin of living creatures, he describes many of the immature and monstrous births of the earth, but refuses to follow Empedocles in believing the existence of abortions which, like the fabulous centaurs or chimæra, combine the nature of

<sup>49</sup> IV. 887. Dico animo nostro primum simulacra meandi  
Accidere atque animum pulsare, ut diximus ante.  
Inde voluntas fit; neque enim facere incipit ullam  
Rem quisquam, quam mens providet, quid velit, ante.

<sup>50</sup> II. 171, sq.

<sup>51</sup> V. 528. sqq.

two or more different species.<sup>52</sup> For, he says, all things grow after their proper manner, and preserve the differences which the fixed law of nature prescribes to them.<sup>53</sup>

Lucretius appears to have discussed this part of physics more fully than any of his predecessors in the Epicurean school. To one of his poetical turns of mind, the subject was peculiarly attractive. It naturally introduced the description of the first discovery of the useful arts and the origin of human institutions. In discussing these topics the ultimate conclusion at which he arrives is, that nature and experience gave man a direction towards good, but that by abandoning himself to his passions and the first childish emotions of his soul, such as fear and hope, desire and aversion, he had corrupted much that was good, and thereby created evil for himself from which philosophy alone could now deliver him.<sup>54</sup> Now when we remember that Epicurus and ~~and~~ his followers, not excepting Lucretius himself, warmly opposed the validity of any explanation of natural phenomena by final causes, it is impossible to consider this enlargement of the Atomistic physiology, as legitimate or consistent; since it seems to reduce itself to this, that nature herself had a providential care of mankind, had produced them under favourable circumstances, and preserved and taught them by felicitous accidents. When, however, Lucretius hopes to free men, by means of philosophy, from the evil which they have brought upon themselves by their passions, he places his con-

<sup>52</sup> Ibid. 879, sqq.

<sup>53</sup> Ibid. 924. *Res sic quæque suo ritu procedit et omnes  
Fœdere naturæ certo discrimina servant.*

<sup>54</sup> E. g. iv. 829, sqq.; v. 157, sqq.

fidence in the strength of human will, which he considers able to overcome even the constitution of nature. In this point also, Lucretius apparently quits the beaten tracks of his school. For instance, he derives from the different portions in which the three materials—warmth, air, and breath—are combined in the soul, the differences of temperament. A soul in which the constituent of warmth is predominant, is disposed to anger; that, on the contrary, in which the windy breath preponderates is actuated by cold fear; whereas, lastly, the soul in which the calm element of air is found in the greatest proportion, is of a calm temperament, and as far removed from fear as from the ungovernable rage of anger—but, on the other hand, it receives all events with more indifference than is becoming. This variable combination he makes the source of the infinite diversity of human character,<sup>55</sup> concerning which he deems it possible and expedient to determine only this much, that although no one is able entirely to overcome the original nature of his constitution, yet the sage may so far bring it into subjection, as to enable himself, by the force of his reason, to lead a life assimilated to the divine.<sup>56</sup>

<sup>55</sup> III. 283, sqq.

<sup>56</sup> Ibid. 302. Sic hominum genus est: quamvis doctrina politos  
Constituat pariter quosdam, tamen illa relinquit  
Naturæ ejusque animi vestigia prima,  
Nec radicitus evelli mala posse putandum est,  
Quin proclivius hic iras decurrat ad acres,  
Ille metu citius paullo tentetur, at ille  
Tertius accipiat quædam clementius æquo.

• • • • •  
Illud in his rebus video firmare potesse,  
Usque adeo naturarum vestigia linqui  
Parvula, quæ nequeat ratio depellere doctis,  
Ut nihil impediat dignam dis degere vitam.

This result is manifestly the operation of that fourth and sentient nature of which Lucretius ascribes to man, and to the sage especially, in no inconsiderable measure, in order that by its means he may smooth all inequalities of temperament. Another cause of the infinite variety of human character, according to Lucretius, is the fact that the atoms which compose the elements of fire, air, and breath, and the other constituents of the soul, are not of like but similar figures. For here also Lucretius appears to go a step beyond Epicurus, and not only assumes an indeterminate multitude of original figures, but expressly maintains that the number of different figures exactly equal the multitude of atoms, even because they were not shaped by the hand of an artist, after one and the same model.<sup>57</sup> When, therefore, he speaks of round atoms, these even must be understood to be of similar and not of like forms. Even this modification of the Epicurean doctrine must likewise be derived from the poetic character of the mind of Lucretius, which naturally sought for multiplicity and peculiarity of form.

In addition to the physiology, which it is the object of the poem to exhibit, it also contains many allusions to other parts of the Epicurean doctrine. Its logical principles, however, are but slightly touched upon. Ethics are more extensively treated, and in a manner quite consistent with the character of the Epicurean system of nature, which was intended solely to serve as a handmaiden to ethics.

<sup>57</sup> II. 333, sqq. There is no contradiction between this verse and v. 477, where it is taught that the figures of the prime elements must be finite in number; for, as is clear from the argument, this refers only to the magnitude of the figures; on which point Lucretius is apparently opposed to the view of Democritus, that there may be also very large atoms.

As, however, the moral doctrines of Epicurus do not exhibit aught that is original, but yet agree entirely with the moral views of the Roman Epicureans in general, we shall interweave our observations on the ethical opinions of Lucretius with the general remarks which we have to advance on this head.

It has been objected to the Roman Epicureans, that by their debauchery and excesses they had brought the Epicurean doctrine into disrepute. No traces, however, of such dissolute habits are to be found in the character either of Lucretius or of any other Epicurean of this age; on the contrary, they are full of exhortations to moderate and legitimate enjoyment, such as Epicurus himself did not object to. Such a course is moreover only agreeable to the Roman character, and if we were looking to find a reason why physiology was the principal favourite of the Roman Epicureans, we should perhaps be justified in adducing the severity of morals, the reverence for virtue and justice, which formed a leading feature of the Roman character, which, however they may have been at this date an occasional subject of ridicule in private life, did not as yet permit the open promulgation of a doctrine which appeared to favour light thoughts on such a subject. Cicero expressly says, that the Epicurean dared not, for this very reason, acknowledge his doctrine in public; he must pay respect to the opinion of the ignorant multitude; and even in the senate he would not venture openly to avow the disgraceful tenets of his sect.<sup>58</sup> Accordingly, we find that the moral system

<sup>58</sup> De Fin. ii. 22. On this account the Epicureans were accustomed to say that their opponents and the multitude generally had misunderstood the expression voluptas, which was the received interpretation of the Greek term ἡδονή

of the Epicureans was far from receiving a laxer and more indulgent interpretation from the Romans than the Greeks, but, on the contrary, was tempered with more severity. Even the Stoic Seneca finds it impossible to reproach the Epicureans with effeminacy of doctrine; what he says of Epicurus himself, that he gives true and holy precepts, he extends to the Epicureans generally.<sup>59</sup> The testimony of Cicero to the character of the Roman Epicureans is unquestionable, since he was a zealous opponent of the principles of their moral theory. When he asserts that the pleasure of the Epicureans is grounded simply on sensual or carnal enjoyment, he does not adduce his own countrymen as instances, but Epicurus himself and Metrodorus. When, on the other hand, he speaks of the Epicureans of his own age and nation, he directly intimates that they were, for the most part, false to their principles. In two points particularly he charges them with this inconsistency: in the first place that they assumed a pleasure of the mind independent of the body;<sup>60</sup> and secondly, that they held that there is pure and disinterested friendship, worthy of the sage. On these points they seem to have had a theory of their own. For they taught that friendship invariably begins, it is true, in some selfish view; but that when the friendly intercourse has lasted for a time, a love of the friend for his own sake is then formed, which

This excuse is fiercely attacked by Cicero; but it is nevertheless so far grounded in truth, as it is true that voluptas implies something bad, which is not contained in *ἡδονή*. Such nice shades of language express the differences in the characters of nations.

<sup>59</sup> De Vit. Beata, 13.

<sup>60</sup> De Fin. i. 17.

is without any regard either to profit or pleasure.<sup>61</sup> With this modified moral theory, the occasional opinions of Lucretius agree, in their general character more, perhaps, than in particulars. It is true, he does not insist upon the necessity of a very rigorous morality, and does not object to sensual enjoyment, but only to inordinate desires; indeed he even declares the promiscuous gratification of sensual love, in order to restrain its vehemence, to be not immoral.<sup>62</sup> On which point, however, not even a Stoic would have censured him. On the other hand, he lavishes his praises on chaste wedlock, as being the first to introduce gentle manners among men, and to teach them compassion for the weak, and respect for sacred obligations.<sup>63</sup> These views, however, evince, in fact, greater disinterestedness than, according to the Epicurean doctrine, it becomes the sage to cultivate. On all other occasions likewise he brings forward the best aspect of the moral theory of his sect. Thus he recommends moderation in enjoyment, warns men against unchastened desire and the love of power and glory, against envy and other passions,<sup>64</sup> and especially against injustice, which is perpetually tormented by the dread of discovery and punishment. These are the great enemies of mental tranquillity; these are the real torments of Acheron,

<sup>61</sup> De Fin. i. 20; ii. 26. Attulisti aliud humanius horum recentiorum, nunquam dictum ab ipso illo (sc. Epicuro), quod sciam, primo utilitatis causa amicum expeti, cum autem usus accessisset, tum ipsum amari propter se, etiam omissa spe voluptatis.

<sup>62</sup> IV. 1072, sqq.

<sup>63</sup> V. 1012, sqq.

<sup>64</sup> II. 37, sqq.; iii. 59, sqq.; 1013, sqq.

which the fool fears; they exist in the bosom of the criminal, in his own agonised conscience, in the fear of punishment which he cannot escape.<sup>65</sup> True pleasure, on the contrary, is the pleasure of the sage which he enjoys within his own breast; this all nature pursues; and besides it, nothing is required for the happiness of life, except a freedom from bodily pain and a sufficiency for the simple wants of nature.<sup>66</sup>

Thus, then, do we find, that even the Epicurean school, which, by its rigid exclusiveness and obstinate adherence to its master, appeared to be most safe against change, yielded in some measure to the softening influence of Roman Eclecticism. But how much more easily, and in how much greater a degree must this have been the case with those doctrines which were not so stiffly opposed to each other as the Epicurean was to all others? A most illustrious instance of this is afforded by the opinions of one individual who, in our present disquisition, pre-eminently demands our attention.

M. Tullius Cicero belongs to those rare characters who, favoured and stimulated by their own tastes and by circumstances, carefully cultivated extraordinary talents, and by the application of them to the most opposite pursuits, acquired a great and diversified reputation.<sup>67</sup> Cicero is distinguished as an orator, a statesman, and a philosopher. But his principal talent was for eloquence. He was least successful

<sup>65</sup> V. 1152, sqq.; iii. 988, sqq.

Atque ea nimirum, quæcunque Acheronte profundo  
Prodita sunt esse in vita sunt omnia nobis.

<sup>66</sup> II. 7, sqq. Sed nil dulcius est, bene quam munita tenere  
Edita doctrina sapientum templa serena.

<sup>67</sup> Tac. de Orat. 21.



in his poetical attempts, since poetry is, more than any other pursuit, incompatible with oratory. As a statesman, he boasts the most brilliant results: but it is not on these alone that his fame rests; as a philosophical writer, his eloquence made him of the greatest influence. These foundations of his glory were associated with many other qualities which adorn and embellish the individual. With the nicest knowledge of men and things, without which no orator can be great, he combined a fine sense of justice and benevolence, love for his friends who remained true to him through the various changes of his fortunes; unwearying diligence, and a shrewd and comprehensive forecast of future events, and the inevitable consequences of a present position of affairs. To be as great as he was brilliant in political life, he only wanted that perfect enthusiasm which is engendered in the mind by confidence in its own resources, and resolute firmness in the moment of action. This, however, is what indeed at all times is most difficult to attain to, but especially in such circumstances and in such an age as Cicero lived, when, feeling as he did, the clearest conviction that the fortunes of the state were hopeless, such bold resolution could only have been purchased by a calm spirit of self-denial, which was hardly to be expected of the soft and yielding mind of Cicero. We cannot therefore wonder if we see him often wavering, often hesitating and dissatisfied with himself, unable either to encourage hope, or to banish fear, ashamed of his unworthy position and ambiguous policy, and yet unable to follow out his own plans of honourable action.

We might have omitted to notice these features of his political career, since the life of Cicero is so intimately interwoven with the history of the period as to be generally known, were it not for our opinion that it closely accords with the part which he played as a philosopher. The same qualities which procured him splendour in the political world, made him also a brilliant champion and disseminator of philosophical labours: the same defects which, as a statesman, deprived him of the highest praise, also prevented him from being truly great in philosophy; moreover, all his philosophical labours were mainly dependent on his political life.

Born of an illustrious family, in a provincial city which previously had never participated in the highest political honours of Rome, not destined and little fit for military life, his lively ambition saw no other road open to distinction than the study of law, of the domestic and foreign relations of his country, and the exercise of his talents for oratory. These he cultivated originally at Rome, and after Roman models, although he undoubtedly must have felt it necessary to combine therewith an acquaintance with Greek civilization and philosophy, as indispensable for the formation of an orator. His first teacher in philosophy was Phædrus, the Epicurean, whom, however, he shortly quitted, to join the Academician Philo, of Larissa, on whose authority he greatly relied, even in his old age. At the same time, he sought instruction in dialectic, from the Stoic Diodotus, whom he maintained in his house until death. Thus prepared, he entered upon the

practice of the law with a youthful, fiery eloquence, but unchastened both in language and delivery. He tells us himself that a weakness of constitution, which the vehemence of his oratorical labours had rendered critical, was the occasion of his adopting a more chaste and composed style of pleading. With a view to this object he began in his twenty-seventh year to study under the Greek rhetoricians. In Athens he attached himself to the Academician Antiochus, without, however, wholly neglecting the instruction of the Epicurean Zeno; he then travelled to Asia, stopping particularly at Rhodes, where, for a considerable time, he was a hearer of Posidonius the Stoic, and combined with the oratory of Greece the study of her philosophy, being convinced that the sciences in general, but philosophy especially, are the sources of perfect oratory, and of all good deeds and words.<sup>68</sup> After devoting two years to these pursuits, during which he had become so perfectly initiated in the language and style of the Greeks that he could discourse almost as fluently in Greek as in Latin, he returned to Rome, where, by the new style of his eloquence, he quickly gained the reputation of being the first orator of his day.<sup>69</sup> He himself confesses that he was indebted to the Greeks for whatever he possessed of intellectual culture.<sup>70</sup> Thus did his zeal for Grecian philosophy grow up with his progress as an orator, and thus was he prepared for his duties of a philo-

<sup>68</sup> Brut. 93. *Litteris, quibus fons perfectæ eloquentiæ continetur,—philosophiam,—matrem omnium bene factorum beneque dictorum.*

<sup>69</sup> Brut. 89, sqq. ; ad Div. xiii. 1 ; de Nat. D. i. 3 ; de Fin. i. 5.

<sup>70</sup> Ad Quint. Fr. i. 1, c. 9.

sophical writer. When, then, the fortunes of the republic were so low that Cicero could no longer hope to gain an honourable arena for his eloquence, he returned to philosophy, under a conviction that there was no worthier occupation for his leisure—no better alleviation of his sorrows and regrets, both domestic and public—than the composition of philosophical works, which, rivalling those of Grecian philosophers, might acquire, both for himself and his nation, great literary distinction.<sup>71</sup> Thus, from the circumstance of his age, as well as his individual position, he became more and more intimately acquainted with Grecian philosophy.

But his personal tastes also recommended these pursuits to him. In support of this assertion we do not intend to adduce the somewhat pompous language in which he paints philosophy as the school-mistress of a truly human life; even the expressions which, in his letters to his friends, he occasionally drops on this subject, are liable to suspicion; the only sure proof appears to be his philosophical writings themselves, which evince a more intimate acquaintance with the philosophy of his times than was to be expected of an individual who had been led to philosophy by extraneous considerations alone. They show that he had given his attention not only to those parts of philosophy which readily admit of rhetorical display, but that he also diligently entered into its drier matters, and had laboured, so far as the character of his mind

<sup>71</sup> De Div. ii. ; Ac. i. 3 ; Tusc. ii. 2. Quam ob rem hortor omnes, qui facere id possunt, ut hujus quoque generis laudem jam languenti Græciæ eripiant et perferant in hanc urbem, sicut reliquas omnes, quæ quidem erant expetendæ, studio atque industria sua majores nostri transtulerunt.

allowed, to investigate them thoroughly. In this respect none of his cotemporaries can be compared with him. We find, also, that the species of philosophy which he sought to diffuse was entirely suited to his position and mental character, and that he felt himself pervaded by it exactly in the same degree that he sought to penetrate into its spirit; as also that he did not devote himself to any particular school, but, conscious of a want of creative originality, he made a selection of opinions from the several sects, of which the connexion, coherence, and centre, are to be sought for in the position of his age and his nation, and in his own personal character.

But in order to do justice to his philosophical labours, we must not forget that the whole cast of his mental training was decidedly political; and on this account his philosophy also, in proportion as it arose out of his own views, naturally assumed the colour of his political tendency. This he observes himself;<sup>72</sup> and the close dependence of his philosophical authorship on his political position is clearly expressed in the manner in which they appear, as the employment of his involuntary leisure, in the intervals between the days of his extreme peril, and his restoration to honour and power. Passing over his youthful productions as consisting merely of translations from the Greek, or of rhetorical essays on philosophy, which may appropriately be viewed as preparations for his oratorical career, the composition of his

<sup>72</sup> De Off. ii. 1.

philosophical works appears to belong exclusively to two periods. The first was when the first triumvirate held the state in such a feverish state of agitation that Cicero despaired of its safety; while the second is contemporaneous with the dictatorship of Cæsar and the consulship of Antony, during which it was impossible for him to take any part in political affairs with honour to himself. To the former belong his works *De Republica*, and *De Legibus*,<sup>73</sup> while the latter claims the other philosophical works of his maturer age. Now in both of these periods Cicero was urged neither by necessity nor wish to take any part in politics; but as soon as the expectation again presented itself, that his talents for business might be of some public benefit—when Pompey again attached himself to the party of the Optimates, during the civil war, and after the death of Cæsar, or so soon as personal fears for himself and family took entire possession of him—his philosophical pursuits were immediately abandoned. He considered them, therefore, as a refuge from the troubles of life, as the solace and employment of his leisure. Accordingly, when he saw the vessel of the state sinking, he declares to his friend Atticus his resolution, based upon a radical conviction of the vanities of this world, to devote himself entirely to philosophy; but even yet he has not lost all hope; he still informs himself very accurately of the state of these vanities.<sup>74</sup>

As his contemporaries looked to philosophy for

<sup>73</sup> It is true he says, *de Div.* ii. 1, that he wrote the treatise *De Republica* while he yet held the helm of state; this, however, is a mere rhetorical flourish.

<sup>74</sup> *Ad Att.* ii. 5; 13.

consolation in misfortune, whether it might be from the Stoical or Epicurean doctrine, so Cicero hoped, by her help, to rise above the ruins both of himself and his country.<sup>75</sup> Vain hope ! When his case was urgent, and danger imminent, he sought by every species of sophistical question, to arrive at an issue worthy of himself ; but even his philosophy became a plague to him, since it recommended, as alone worthy of his fame as a philosopher and a statesman, a resolution which his personal want of courage disabled him from putting in practice.<sup>76</sup> He saw too clearly that the consolations of philosophy are of no real avail ; that he must look to events alone for tranquillity ; that scientific occupations cannot afford any solace.<sup>77</sup> In his domestic troubles he even thinks, that without ~~them~~ the mind would perhaps be more insensible to pain ; while they enrich and humanize the mind, they probably increase its sensitiveness to suffering ; they do not furnish any permanent relief, but merely a short oblivion of pain.<sup>78</sup> Nevertheless, this was his sole object ; in the prosecution of philosophy he appeared to think that his mind became stronger ; by the example of the Socraticists, he felt himself raised above all care for the empty advantages of the world ; he believed that he had conquered fear, and that it could never degrade him again ; from henceforth his whole life should be

<sup>75</sup> Ad Att. ix. 4.<sup>76</sup> Ib. viii. 11.<sup>77</sup> Ib. x. 14.

<sup>78</sup> Ad Att. xii. 46. Quid ergo ? inquires ; nihil litterarum ? In hac quidem re vereor, ne etiam contra. Nam essem fortasse durior. Isto enim animo nihil agreste, nihil inhumanum est. Ad Div. v. 15. Itaque sic litteris utor, in quibus consumo omne tempus, non ut ab his medicinam perpetuam, sed ut exiguum doloris oblivionem petam. Tusc. iv. 38 ; v. 41, fin. ; de Off. iii. 1.

devoted to virtue ! But with the revival of his political hopes, his previous vacillations and weaknesses return.<sup>79</sup>

To one of such a character, no other form of philosophy could be suitable than a sober Scepticism ; which itself is an expression of a vacillation in science, similar to that which Cicero's whole life exhibits between the necessity of self-denial and the allurements of fame, fortune, and power. However weak he may appear in the hours of despair, when he weeps, and in a conscious sense of his faults and disgrace wishes for companions in his fall,<sup>80</sup> it is, nevertheless, undeniable that a certain trait of nobleness runs through the whole tissue of his life. It is true the ideal which floats before his imagination, is not that of a sublime and disinterested virtue ; but still it was his aim to deserve the commendations of good men : he sought to maintain integrity in life ; while a death suitable to such a course of life was a worthy object of desire, he cannot hide his shame at his not daring boldly to meet such a death.<sup>81</sup> On this subject he is dissatisfied with himself ; hence his vacillation and doubt, and when he would give himself up to the highest ideal of philosophy, and the sternest requisitions of virtue, he feels himself incapable of submitting to and fulfilling them with firmness and constancy. Thus he does, it is true, show a disposition for them, but at last he declares the doctrines which flow from them to be at most but probable. In this

<sup>79</sup> Ad Att. xiv. 9 ; ad Div. xvi. 23 ; Tusc. v. 2.

<sup>80</sup> Ad Att. xi. 15.

<sup>81</sup> Ad Att. xiii. 28.



sceptical spirit he investigates on all sides, and seeks to be friendly with every philosophical opinion, which is not too strongly and too directly opposed to his own nobler sentiments. We may well say of him, that this fondness for investigation made him an instructive writer for the Romans and for later times, since it has given to his works the character of brief compendia of all the important systems of philosophy. The fact, moreover, that his philosophy is the true expression of his whole habit of thought and mental character, raises him high above most of the Greek and Latin philosophers of his day, who were more dependent upon the authority of some distinguished individual or school, than was consistent with their own independence of judgment.

In the attempt we must now make to give an account of Cicero's philosophy, and to measure the influence which it had upon subsequent generations, we may well confine ourselves in the main, to pointing out the connection subsisting between his own sentiments and that which he considered as philosophy. For as to the matter of his doctrine, little of it is new ; it is almost entirely borrowed from the Greeks. When a nation stimulated by the example of another, labours to create for itself a literature, a spirit of rivalry generally exhibits itself emulously striving to equal, if not to surpass, its model in every branch of art. Cicero is full of this emulation. He would if possible, render Grecian literature unnecessary to the Romans, and he believes that in some points he has succeeded in so doing. But with all this he naturally applies him-

self to those branches of literature which are most to his own taste. Although urged by his friends and the admirers of his talents to make the fame of the Romans in history also equal to that of the Greeks, he has, nevertheless, not responded to their call; probably not so much for the reasons alleged by himself,<sup>82</sup> as that his own inclination did not carry him to the peculiar kind of research which history requires. In philosophy, on the contrary, he has done his utmost to effect this desired object.<sup>83</sup> Here he endeavours to examine the whole domain of philosophy, in order to give to the Romans in their own language whatever he considered necessary for its study. This has occasionally led him to adopt a style of exposition which almost servilely follows his originals.<sup>84</sup> To his friend Atticus, who was well versed in the literature of Greece, he frankly admits that his own works are often mere copies—translations of the Greek;<sup>85</sup> but with the general reader he is not so candid; he refuses to be called a mere interpreter, and lays claim to the merit of having given a better arrangement to the arguments of the Grecian philosophers, and to have added his own judgment to theirs. But in truth he scarcely ever does more than communi-

<sup>82</sup> De Legg. i. 3.

<sup>83</sup> De Div. ii. 2. Sic parati, ut—nullum philosophiæ locum esse pateremur, qui non Latinis litteris illustratus pateret.

<sup>84</sup> Thus he believes himself obliged to insert verses in his philosophical treatises, in order not to be behind the Greeks in this respect also. Tusc. ii. 11. But he was perhaps, also seduced to do so by a fondness for his earlier poetical essays.

<sup>85</sup> Ad Att. xii. 52. ἀπὸ γράφα sunt; minore labore fiunt; verba tantum afferro, quibus abundo. He wrote at this time the Hortensius, the Academica and de Finibus.

cate their opinions, and he sometimes confesses, what he could not pass over in total silence, that when he sees fit, he does not abstain occasionally to give mere versions of entire passages.<sup>86</sup> By this method of working up the Grecian doctrine, he boasts of having surpassed the Greeks themselves,<sup>87</sup> either by exhibiting the investigations of philosophy more plainly and more clearly, or by giving them in a better arrangement and greater completeness, even an entirely new method.<sup>88</sup> But he especially claims it as his peculiar merit to have combined eloquence with philosophy.<sup>89</sup> In all this there is perhaps, of little vanity, considering the models which he had before him. However highly he may extol Plato and Aristotle, he seems to have made far less use of them than of the Stoics, the Epicureans, and the New Academy. These were nearer to him in point of time, and the New has always a decidedly superior attraction to the Old. We doubt not, that in many pieces Cicero has really far surpassed these authors; but that he should have chosen these for his models, and should not have displayed more taste for the excellencies of the older philosophers, affords no favourable testimony to the freedom and independence of judgment with which he sought to

<sup>86</sup> De Fin. i. 2. Quod si nos non interpretum fungimur munere, sed tuemur ea, quæ dicta sunt ab iis, quos probamus, iisque nostrum iudicium et nostrum scribendi ordinem adjungimus, quid habent, cur Græca anteponant iis, quæ et splendide dicta sint, neque sint conversæ de Græciâ? Ib. c. 3. Locos quidem quosdam, si videbitur, transferam et maxime ab iis, quos modo nominavi, cum inciderit, ut id apte fieri possit. De Off. iii. 2.

<sup>87</sup> Ad Att. xiii. 13. He is speaking of the Academicæ Questiones.

<sup>88</sup> Tusc. iv. 5. Better order and greater completeness, de Off. i. 3, 43; iii. 2: a new mode of exposition, de Rep. i. 22, 23; ii. 11.

<sup>89</sup> De Off. i. 1.

adopt to himself and his countrymen the philosophy of Greece. It would be vain to expect from Cicero a larger and nobler view of the whole domain of science than was taken by his contemporaries. Like them, he treats philosophy as a mere collection of isolated disquisitions upon certain given questions.<sup>90</sup>

To the opinion which we formerly advanced, that a temperate Scepticism was the species of philosophy most correspondent to the mental character of Cicero, we have to add the remark that several inferior motives contributed to recommend it. Of the Sceptical doctrines of the earlier Greek philosophy, the moderate doctrine of the New Academy, as taught by Philo, was at this time in the highest repute. Now as we formerly stated, Philo had been Cicero's teacher, and thus his earliest associations connected him with this school. But it was further recommended to him by its cultivation of a rhetorical style,<sup>91</sup> the want of which he objects to the Stoics, and condemns their ethical treatises, to which otherwise he was not indisposed, as not sufficiently eloquent in the commendations of virtue.<sup>92</sup> The method of Eclecticism which Cicero pursued, by its superficial investigation into principles, necessarily caused him to doubt the principles of science, which apparently led to opposite results. And as the design of Cicero was simply to make the Romans acquainted with the results of Greek philosophy in general, he could not adopt a more appropriate

<sup>90</sup> This is strongly expressed, *Tusc. v. 7*, in the comparison of philosophy with mathematics. Philosophy he makes to fall into several loci which may be separately treated. *De Div. ii. 1, 2*.

<sup>91</sup> *Tusc. ii. 3* ; *de Div. ii. 1* ; *de Fato 2*.

<sup>92</sup> *De Fin. iv. 3*.

method for this purpose than that of the Academicians, which was to give on every subject the arguments and objections of the several sects.<sup>93</sup> Rightly to appreciate the merits of Cicero as a philosophical writer, we ought to keep constantly in view both the object and the readers for whom his works were composed. Those whom Cicero sought to please and also to convince by his writings, were not philosophers of the school, but men of the world and of rank, to whom he wished to furnish rules for the right conduct of life and the due appreciation of things, and to give a general taste for philosophy. To such, philosophy is only agreeable when it does not come forward with too high pretensions;<sup>94</sup> when not insisting on the unqualified reception of its laws, it allows free scope to individual opinion, and without invariably adhering strictly to principles, leaves as wide as possible space for discussion and social conversation. Accordingly, Cicero cautiously abstains from advancing his own opinions too positively; he refuses to be bound by any authority, and at the same time never attempts to establish his own.<sup>95</sup> In fact, sometimes he goes too far in this respect, and boasts that he will not chain himself down to any doctrine, but will preserve his freedom even here, that he lives only for the day, and takes for a time what for the present appears most probable.<sup>96</sup> From this we

<sup>93</sup> Tusc. ii. 3; de Div. ii. 1.      <sup>94</sup> De Div. ii. 1. *Minime arrogans.*

<sup>95</sup> De Nat. D. i. 5. The mode in which the study of philosophy was cultivated is strikingly indicated in the passage, Ac. ii. 3.

<sup>96</sup> Tusc. v. 11. *Nos in diem vivimus; quodcunque nostros animos probabilitate percussit, id dicimus; itaque soli sumus liberi.* Ib. c. 29; de Off. i. 2. *Sequemur igitur hoc quidem tempore et hac questione potissimum Stoicos.*

may see how we are to understand the praise of consistency which he claims for his Academician doctrine before all others:<sup>97</sup> it does not contradict itself, even though at one time it may consider one doctrine probable, and at the next, its direct opposite. Still it is a little inconsistency with this liberty of speculation, when he allows himself to be moved by the authority of others, and takes no small pains to adduce, in confirmation of his own opinions, ancient authorities from the most famous philosophers and other eminent men, and in support of his own views, appeals to the testimony of Socrates, Plato, and Arcesilaus, and occasionally also of the Peripatetics,<sup>98</sup> and in his rhetorical way, recommends to imitation the renown and example of the old Romans. Yet all this is very appropriate in a popular philosophy, which it is the object of each of his works to disseminate, and with which the smoothness and ornament of his own style, and which he considers so great an excellence in the Academical philosophy, very well agree.

But Cicero endeavours to combine with the popular style of his philosophy a degree of profoundness both of investigation and method, and we must confess, that to a certain point, he has been successful. It is only in some of his writings which do not make any pretension to scientific precision (as for instance the *De Officiis*, *De Republicâ*, and *De Legibus*, and also in several of his smaller works), that he allows himself to speak according to popular opinion, and to lay aside the strict form of doctrinal method.<sup>99</sup> In such works we meet with

<sup>97</sup> *De Div.* ii. 1.<sup>98</sup> *E. g.* *Ac.* i. 4, 12.<sup>99</sup> *E. g.* *de Off.* ii. 10; *de Legg.* i. 13.

passages accommodated to common opinion, which by no means express his own convictions, as is the case, e.g. with his assertions concerning the gods and soothsaying, and many other topics. But at other times he shows that he can rightly appreciate the importance of accurate language, and the rigour of definitions, divisions, and arguments, and proves that it was not in vain that he had diligently perused the works of Plato and Aristotle, and exercised himself in the dialectic of the Stoics, even though his primary object may have been simply the improvement of his oratorical talents. This is proved pre-eminently by his short work on the Topics, and also the demands he makes for a regular progress in philosophical investigation.<sup>100</sup> Now in this attempt to combine this strictness of method with general intelligibility, he was greatly assisted by his adoption of the Academic doctrine, which did not recede much from common opinion,<sup>101</sup> but, on the contrary, owed its origin to an endeavour to reconcile philosophy with common sense. It is the invariable object of Cicero to avoid all extreme consequences—the absurdities of philosophers;<sup>102</sup> he wishes for a philosophy with which the life and conduct of the philosopher may be in unison;<sup>103</sup> that is, a philosophy not of the sage, but of the good man of ordinary life, who has only a certain

<sup>100</sup> Tusc. ii. 2; Ac. ii. 14.

<sup>101</sup> Parad. Proem. Quia nos ea philosophia plus utimur, quæ peperit dicendi copiam et in qua dicuntur ea, quæ non multum discrepant ab opinione populari.

<sup>102</sup> De Div. ii. 58. Nihil tam absurde dici potest, quod non dicatur ab aliquo philosophorum. Ac. ii. 44, fin.

<sup>103</sup> Tusc. ii. 4.

resemblance to the ideal sage.<sup>104</sup> But while he seeks to establish a harmony of science and life, he labours equally to maintain unity and consistency in science itself; and although he is more immediately occupied with such doctrines as may be applicable to the conduct of life, yet the connection which holds between all scientific branches of knowledge gradually widens the circle of his inquiries, so that it ultimately comprises the whole domain of philosophy.

But these remarks have brought us to a point which we have already indicated as forming in general the character of the Roman view of philosophy—a predominant tendency to the practical. When Cicero, the distinguished statesman, entered deeply into the investigations of philosophy, like Plato, he found it necessary to defend himself and his own philosophical views against those politicians who either absolutely disapproved of or at most barely tolerated philosophy, and to recommend the study of it to his readers. To this object, he devoted a special work, the *Hortensius*, which has been highly praised, but is unfortunately lost. However, the arguments he there made use of, may in a manner be gathered from his extant works on this subject. On the whole, they amount to this, that philosophy is the wise instructress of life, and the only true comforter in affliction. This to his mind is the very sum of all philosophy, which, therefore, is altogether of a practical tendency

<sup>104</sup> De Amic. 5. Negant enim quemquam virum bonum esse, nisi sapientem. Sit ita sane. Sed eam sapientiam interpretantur, quam adhuc mortalis nemo est consecutus. Nos autem ea, quæ sunt in usu vitæque communi, non ea, quæ finguntur aut optantur, spectare debemus. Cf. de Off. iii. 3, 4.



But at the same time he sees that the practical cannot stand without the theoretical. In general he adopted the doctrine of Socrates in the sense in which it had been explained by Xenophon, and most commonly understood, as pre-eminently insisting upon the pursuit of moral good in human life and conduct, and neglecting whatever in the investigation of nature transcends the powers of human cognition.<sup>105</sup> If then he considers philosophy as the pursuit of wisdom, but wisdom as the knowledge of divine and human things, and the cognition of the causes of all that exists, yet he adds thereto as indicating its proper end, that it is designed to awaken man to an imitation of the divine, and to produce a conviction that all humanity is subjected to virtue and morality.<sup>106</sup> Thus does he give, on the whole, a practical aim to philosophy, and accordingly looks upon the practical as the proper domain to which man is by nature designed to direct his attention. It is true that he occasionally reminds those who would confine the necessary objects of man's attention to his public and domestic duties, that man's proper habitation is not merely his house enclosed within four walls, but the whole world, which the gods have given to us and themselves for an habitation and a common country. But ultimately he always recurs to the opinion that the inquiry into the state and into morals is more consonant with man's nature than the study of the universe, which surpasses the powers of human

<sup>105</sup> Ac. i. 4.; de Rep. i. 10.

<sup>106</sup> Tusc. iv. 26. *Ex quo efficitur, ut divina imitetur, humana omnia inferiora virtute ducat.* This addition is wanting in de Off. ii. 2.

cognition.<sup>107</sup> Accordingly, he might without inconsistency recommend a moderate and not very profound philosophy to a mind overcharged with public affairs; yet at the same time he expressed it as his opinion, that it is difficult to philosophize only a little, because it is difficult to select a little out of much; whoever acquaints himself with a little of philosophy will soon feel himself attracted to the rest, since all is so connected together that no one can form a thorough acquaintance with a part without having studied the most or the whole.<sup>108</sup> And accordingly his own philosophical investigations extend far beyond the limits of ethics. He perceives that man must take a comprehensive view of the whole, in order to understand the meaning and relative importance of each part. Although he thought that the boasted dialectic of the Stoics had failed to furnish a catholic criterium of truth, and was only of use in determining the validity of its own positions; <sup>109</sup> he nevertheless held logic in great esteem, especially as furnishing rules for methodical investigation, and as treating of the question of the criteria of truth.<sup>110</sup> Equally does he appreciate physics also, which as raising the human mind to the eternal and imperishable, and thereby above the mean passions of this earthly life, frees it from

<sup>107</sup> De Rep. i. 18, 19.

<sup>108</sup> Tusc. ii. 1. Difficile est enim in philosophia pauca esse ei nota, cui non sint aut pleraque aut omnia. Nam nec pauca nisi e multis eligi possunt, nec qui perceperit, non idem reliqua eodem studio persequetur, &c.

<sup>109</sup> Ac. ii. 28.

<sup>110</sup> Ib. ii. 9. Etenim duo esse hæc maxima in philosophia, iudicium veri et finem bonorum.

superstition, and enriches it with profitable knowledge.<sup>111</sup>

In close connection and agreement with this, is the remark which he makes upon the relation subsisting between the practical and the theoretical. He attributes, unconditionally, a peculiar value to scientific researches and knowledge. Science furnishes, in and by itself, pleasure;<sup>112</sup> in it the sage finds his happiness, and consequently his inquiries extend to every part of philosophy;<sup>113</sup> the prosecution of science is a part of morality;<sup>114</sup> and consequently all parts of philosophy are, after the manner of the Stoics, regarded as virtues.<sup>115</sup> In this direction Cicero, who on other occasions is wont to recommend philosophy merely as the recreation of leisure, and even to excuse his own participation in it, goes so far as to put into the mouth of an Academician the declaration, that the investigation into the nature of the gods is preferable even to business.<sup>116</sup> And again, in his delineation of a happy life, exempt from the cares and sorrows which the union of the soul and body entails upon man, Cicero hesitates not to declare, that it consists in the cognition of nature and in science, which is the source of true pleasure, both to gods and men; whereas all else is matter merely of necessity.<sup>117</sup> But these, how-

<sup>111</sup> De Rep. i. 15, seq.; Ac. ii. 41; de Fin. iv. 5; de Nat. D. i. 21.

<sup>112</sup> De Fin. i. 7.

<sup>113</sup> Tusc. v. 24, 25.

<sup>114</sup> De Off. i. 43.

<sup>115</sup> Tusc. v. 25.

<sup>116</sup> De Nat. D. ii. 1, fin. *Minime verò, inquit Cotta, nam et otiosi sumus et iis de rebus agimus, quæ sunt etiam negotiis antepondendæ.*

<sup>117</sup> Hortens. Ap. August de Trin. xiv. 9. *Una igitur essemus beati cognitione naturæ et scientia, quæ sola etiam deorum est vita laudanda. Ex quo intelligi potest cetera necessitatis esse, unum hoc voluptatis (al. volunt.). Cf. de Fin. v. 4, fin.; de Off. i. 5.*

ever, are but hopes; and it becomes not the philosopher to indulge in hope, however good, but to apply himself to the actual and real. Now the consideration of reality convinces Cicero that the practical pre-eminently claims the attention of man. The most important question for the investigation of philosophy is, what is the supreme good—the knowledge of which will furnish man with a guide and rule of life?<sup>118</sup> He avows, therefore, his disinclination to assent to Plato's dogma, that it is only on compulsion that the sage will take a part in political affairs;<sup>119</sup> on the contrary, he explains the usual aversion of philosophers from public business as resulting from effeminacy and want of moral courage,<sup>120</sup> and starts the question, whether the philosopher himself, if he were condemned to perpetual solitude, would not feel unhappy even in the midst of his speculations?<sup>121</sup> It is evident, he thinks, that the duties which grow out of the relations of human society, are to be preferred to the obligation of pursuing scientific researches; for no one, however anxious he may be to discover the nature of things, would not immediately lay aside his investigations at the first call of country, relations, or friends.<sup>122</sup> In this point, therefore, Cicero does not consider himself justified in following the doctrines of Plato and the Peripatetics, however he may be

<sup>118</sup> De Fin. v. 6.<sup>119</sup> De Off. i. 9.<sup>120</sup> Ib. 21.<sup>121</sup> Ib. 43.

<sup>122</sup> De Off. i. 43. Quis est enim tam cupidus in perspicenda cognoscendaque rerum natura, ut si ei tractanti contemplantique res cognitione dignissimas subito sit allatum periculum discrimenque patris, cui subvenire opitularique possit, non illa omnia relinquat atque abjiciat, etiam si dinumerare se stellas aut metiri mundi magnitudinem posse arbitretur? atque hoc idem in parentis, in amici re aut periculo fecerit.

influenced by their general views. The bias both of his national and personal character carried him to action rather than to speculation.

How greatly this bias must have influenced the whole course of his philosophical studies is obvious : but it was chiefly his zeal for the examination of the principles of human knowledge that was most materially affected by it, as it led him to doubt every opinion, the more remote it appeared from the practical conclusions of ordinary life. Accordingly, the sceptical character of his mind is not so strongly exhibited in his moral theory as in his physics and logics. Moreover, this subordination of the speculative to the practical, necessarily showed its influence on every occasion, and thereby favoured a mixture of the several parts of philosophy. To this result, the rhetorical style employed by Cicero in treating of it, contributed in no small degree. Accordingly, in our exposition of his view, it will be impossible to keep the several parts of it clearly distinct.

Cicero's adhesion to the new Academy, was no doubt greatly influenced, independently of his own mental temperament, by the consideration of the endless and inextricable disputes of the different sects. This controversy he carries into all the three parts of philosophy, and attempts in each of them to show how, upon certain questions, the Epicureans are at issue with the Stoics, and Aristotle with Plato.<sup>123</sup> It is here necessary to remark, that Cicero neglects no opportunity of expressing his contempt for the now philosophical sciences. Geometry, in its first

<sup>123</sup> Ac. ii. 36, sqq. de Nat. D. i. 6.

definitions as well as in its astronomical inferences, appears to him doubtful; and, with the empirical physicians, he questions the utility of anatomy.<sup>124</sup> This is indeed the manner of the old Sceptics, who had been transplanted into the New Academy, and laboured to involve the useful branches of knowledge in the same fate with philosophy.

But the doctrines of physiology, above all others, appear to Cicero to be involved in doubt.<sup>125</sup> He cannot sufficiently express his astonishment at the temerity and the conceit of those who could persuade themselves that they possessed a perfect knowledge of any of these difficult subjects.<sup>126</sup> For they are all, he says, hidden and veiled in thick darkness, so that no acuteness of human view can pierce into the heaven and the earth. Man cannot understand even his own frame, however assiduously he may dissect it, in order to examine its internal structure, for who can say that its parts have not undergone a change during the operation? how much less then can he hope to determine the nature of the earth of which he is unable to penetrate and lay open the interior! Philosophers speak of the inhabitants of the moon and of antipodes! what doubtful conjectures! The motion of the heavenly bodies is denied by those who ascribe motion to the earth, and who knows whether this opinion is not nearer to the truth than the ordinary statement of astrologers? What is to be said of the assertions

<sup>124</sup> Acad. ii. 36; 39.

<sup>125</sup> De Nat. D. i. 21. Omnibus fere in rebus et maxime in physicis, quid non sit, citius, quam quid sit, dixerim.

<sup>126</sup> Ac. ii. 36. Estne quisquam tanto inflatus errore, ut sibi se illa scire persuaserit?

of philosophers regarding the nature of the soul, and its mortality or immortality? of their doctrines concerning the nature and existence of the gods, their providence, and their revelations of futurity?—all alike are involved in doubt and obscurity. A knowledge of the body is more easily attainable than that of the soul. What the nature of the latter may be, whether mortal or immortal, and which opinion of the philosophers concerning it is true, that a God alone can decide; it is not easy for man to determine even which is the more probable. Man may indeed persuade himself that there are gods, yet even this is a question not without its difficulties. What if nature produced all things out of herself? To form a notion of God is impossible, for it is evident that he must be regarded as perfect, and yet none of the four virtues can be rightly ascribed to him. If we believe in the providence of God, how can the existence of evil be explained? At least, it must be allowed that the gods did not well provide for man when they made him the dangerous present of reason.<sup>127</sup> After thus enumerating all the difficulties of physics, he concludes with a recommendation of his own theory of probability, and elucidates, in some degree, its method. He suggests to the Dogmatists, that they themselves detracted considerably from the credibility of their doctrines, by their practice of placing matters which are but insufficiently attested in the same rank with the most probable. When, for instance, they maintain that the croaking of

<sup>127</sup> *Ac.* 38, *seqq.*; *de Fin.* v. 12; *Tusc.* i. 11; *de Nat. D.* i. 1, 22; iii. 15, 27, 32, 33.

a raven forbids or enjoins a particular action, or that the sun is of a certain determined magnitude, with as much positiveness as they assert that the sun is the source of light, they raise a doubt, whether their knowledge in the latter case is greater than in the former. Certainty does not admit of degrees, but probability does.<sup>128</sup> It is clear that Cicero regards the evidence of the sensible and present, to be more certain than the proofs of science.<sup>129</sup> The complication of a long chain of deductions, the wide range of correlative doctrines, and the contradictions of conflicting opinions, make him distrustful. He fears that in the winding paths of science the truth may be easily missed.<sup>130</sup>

Even in the consideration of moral questions, he is pursued by this conflict of opinions; but in these, as we previously observed, he exhibits a more decided judgment. He felt himself more at home in this department of inquiry, and could, therefore, more confidently trust himself to take a comprehensive survey of it. Moreover, he believed that the dissension of the schools upon the fundamental principles of morals, might be equitably adjusted. The selfish theory of the Epicureans, and the principles of the other schools, are, it is true, irrecon-

<sup>128</sup> Ac. ii. 41. Non mihi videntur considerare, cum physica ista valde affirmant, earum etiam rerum auctoritatem, si quæ illustriores videantur, amittere.—Nec enim possunt dicere, aliud alio magis minusve comprehendere, quoniam omnium rerum una est definitio comprehendendi.

<sup>129</sup> He therefore says of the disciples of the Porch, Ac. ii. 37. Quamcunque vero sententiam probaverit, eam sic animo comprehensam habebit, ut ea, quæ sensibus; nec magis approbabit nunc lucere, quam, quoniam Stoicus est, hunc mundum esse sapientem, &c.

<sup>130</sup> Ac. ii. 36. Perficies, ut ego ista innumerabilia complectens nusquam labor? nihil opiner?



cileable. But against such opponents as the Epicureans, he felt himself strong in the convictions of his own nobler nature. However, when he is adducing the grounds of his Scepticism, he does not entirely reject even the principles of the Epicureans; he even feels his soul moved in a certain measure by them, and although he cannot assent to them, from a fear of robbing virtue of some of her splendour, yet they forbid him to adopt the opposite views of the Stoics and Socraticists, as anything more than probable.<sup>131</sup> When, however, he reflects that the Epicurean doctrine, if consequentially carried out, must subvert all duty and virtue, he decides unconditionally against it,<sup>132</sup> and declares that no other course is left to him, but to assent to the concurrent doctrines of the Peripatetics, Academicians, and Stoics, whose precept is to follow nature.<sup>133</sup> But what again is the meaning of this rule? To obey it rightly, we must first know what the nature of man is, but on this point philosophers widely disagree, and to reconcile their discordant opinions Cicero feels to be a task above his power. At times he seems to show a disposition to consider the dispute between the Stoics and the Peripatetics, from whom the Old Academy did not essentially differ, as a mere war of words.<sup>134</sup> But, on other occasions, he admits, that there is in reality a difference between them, which is not merely verbal but material, and amounting to this, that while the Peripatetics attribute a certain importance to external good, which, however, is so slight, that when

<sup>131</sup> Ib. 42, seqq.<sup>132</sup> De Off. 1, 2.<sup>133</sup> Ac. i. 5, 10.<sup>134</sup> De Fin. iii. 3; iv. 20, seqq. 26.

put in the balance with virtue, it weighs as nothing, the Stoics absolutely deny the desirableness of what are called external advantages.<sup>135</sup> And between the two his own decision fluctuates. The view of the Peripatetics especially, in the form in which it was adopted by Antiochus, is censured by him as an inconsistency, since he says, they at one time assign a value to external and corporeal advantages, and at others, reckon them as nothing. When they maintain that man may be happy without them, but that, nevertheless, happiness dwells only with him who possesses them in addition to virtue, they appear to suppose a gradation in a notion which admits not of degrees—that is, they suppose that there can be a more happy than a happy life.<sup>136</sup> He does not hesitate to say, the Peripatetics and the Old Academy ought to cease from such idle talk, and take courage to say distinctly, that a happy life may be passed, even in the bull of Phalaris.<sup>137</sup> He declares his determination to follow the Stoics, whose doctrine appears more consistent and more exalted.<sup>138</sup> But it is to be feared, that this enthusiasm, kindled by the more elevated theory of morals, is a mere transient fervour, and that the aspirations of a mind keenly alive to every exalted and magnanimous impression, have raised him to a height beyond his power to sustain. For he is not long unmoved by the many objections to which the doctrine of the Stoics is open. He is astounded by their paradoxes,<sup>139</sup> although he looks upon them as Socra-

<sup>135</sup> *Ib.* v. 30, seqq.<sup>137</sup> *Ib.* 26, fin.<sup>138</sup> *De Fin.* iv. 19.<sup>136</sup> *Ib.* v. 27; *Tusc.* v. 8, 16.<sup>139</sup> *De Off.* iii. 4; *Tusc.* v. 1.

tical, and believes that they admit of defence.<sup>140</sup> Their doctrines are ill-suited for active life and the Forum ;<sup>141</sup> they contradict the testimony of his own experience of human nature, which, however, he is unwilling to trust implicitly, since he is conscious that he is not free from the vices of his age, which, perhaps, disqualify it for being the standard of virtue.<sup>142</sup> His doubts are expressed in the very spirit of a man of the world ; he is almost disposed to doubt if there is such a thing as virtue.<sup>143</sup> Influenced by such reflections, he again approximates to the Peripatetic doctrine,<sup>144</sup> or at least confesses that at one time the Peripatetic, at another the Stoical, ethics appear to him to be most consonant with truth.<sup>145</sup> He even finds reason for accusing the Stoical principles of incongruity. For as they enjoin man to follow nature, they ought not to forbid him to pay regard to his body, since man's nature consists both of soul and of body.<sup>146</sup> After the manner of the Peripatetics, he reminds them that virtue is impossible without an outward world, as the scene of its occupation and as the basis of its existence ;<sup>147</sup> and he compares their doctrine to the

<sup>140</sup> *Parad. Proœm.*

<sup>141</sup> *De Fin. iv. 9 ; de Am. 5.*

<sup>142</sup> *Tusc. v. 1.* Equidem eos casus, in quibus me fortuna vehementer exercuit, mecum ipse considerans huic incipio sententiæ diffidere, interdum et humani generis imbecillitatem fragilitatemque extimescere. Vereor enim, ne natura, cum corpora nobis infirma dedisset iisque et morbos insanabiles et dolores intolerabiles adjunxisset, animos quoque dederit et corporum doloribus congruentes et separatim suis angoribus et molestiis implicatos. Sed in hoc me ipse castigo, quod ex aliorum et ex nostra fortasse mollitia, non ex ipsa virtute de virtutis robore existimo. *Parad. vi. 3.*

<sup>143</sup> *Tusc. i. 1.* He only excepts the virtue of Cato in order to say something flattering of Brutus.

<sup>144</sup> *De Fin. v. 26.*

<sup>145</sup> *De Off. iii. 7.*

<sup>146</sup> *De Fin. iv. 91, 13, 14.*

<sup>147</sup> *Ib. 15.*

overhasty views of certain philosophers who, because they have discovered a principle of knowledge higher and more divine than sensation, think themselves justified in rejecting the latter altogether.<sup>148</sup>

Thus, then, even in the theory of morals, do we see Cicero reverting to the sensible, in the same way that in physical investigations he ascribed greater certainty to what is sensuously apparent than to the conclusions of science. But we are now evidently touching upon his logical opinions, from which we may hope to discover the scientific grounds on which his theory of probability rested. However, upon a review of his logical principles, this part of his philosophy will be found even more vague and defective than either his physics or ethics.

In this domain of inquiry all turns upon the criterium of truth. Now, agreeably with what we have just remarked of his adherence to the sensible, we must expect to find him placing his chief reliance on the senses. Nevertheless, he does not do this so unconditionally as not to concede to the intellect an independent action in the formation of knowledge. The sensuous impression he looks upon simply as an inchoate cognition.<sup>149</sup> It is not the senses that see and hear, but the mind, availing itself of the senses to procure information, combines and compares and

<sup>148</sup> L. I. Ut quidam philosophi, cum a sensibus profecti majora quædam ac diviniore vidissent, sensus reliquerunt, sic isti, cum ex appetitione rerum virtutis pulchritudinem adspexissent, omnia, quæ præter virtutem ipsam viderant, adjecerunt, &c.

<sup>149</sup> De Legg. i. 10. Inchoatæ intelligentiæ.

judges.<sup>160</sup> And if, notwithstanding, Cicero does at times concede to the senses a power of judging, its operation, nevertheless, is confined to sweet and bitter, near and distant, rest and motion, but not to good and evil.<sup>161</sup> According to the position which we lately noticed, he was willing to admit this much with those who wholly rejected the testimony of sense, that there is a higher and a diviner nature than can be known by the senses. Even that which by its nature is sensuous must occasionally be submitted to the cognition of the intellect, because it is either so minute or so unsteady as to elude the dulness of the senses. Moreover, he was disposed to concede to the intellect the judgment on genera and species, and the formation of notions which are to represent things.<sup>162</sup> But all the operations which he thus ascribes to the intellect are very vaguely conceived, and his doctrine concerning them very carelessly and imperfectly worked out. He neither disputes the opinions of Plato, or of Aristotle, or the Porch, nor yet decidedly rejects them; he merely adduces them narratively, and scarcely seems to be sufficiently aware of their respective differences.<sup>163</sup> Of the exercise of the intellect by dialectic, he merely observes in general that it is far from effecting that which the Stoics make its principal merit; it does not serve as a criterium of truth and falsehood; it is unable to decide of any other truth than its own;<sup>164</sup> indeed it furnishes cases itself of which it finds it impossible

<sup>160</sup> Tusc. i. 20.<sup>161</sup> De Fin. ii. 12.<sup>162</sup> Ac. i. 8; ii. 7.<sup>163</sup> Cf. Ac. i. 8, 9; ii. 46, sq.<sup>164</sup> Ac. ii. 28.

to discover the solution ; as for instance, the sophisms of the heap and the liar.<sup>155</sup> But on this side the Scepticism of Cicero is very weakly supported.

With greater diligence does he apply himself to the investigation of the elements of human thought which are furnished by sensation, both because he felt his own mind to be more strongly convinced by them, and because he posited it as in general certain that all human cognition commences with the senses. In this discussion he followed the New Academy, to which he had attached himself, and in the main his controversy is directed against the Stoics and Antiochus, who pretended that certainty might be deduced from the sensuous perception. His arguments against the Peripatetic view of the certainty of knowledge are not, he admits, very forcible.<sup>156</sup> So moderate is his doubt. Even the assertion of Epicurus, that every sensuous impression is valid and true, is briefly passed over with the remark, that it is refuted by the illusions of the senses.<sup>157</sup> But as to the Stoics ; if, as they admit, the senses sometimes deceive man, how is it possible to distinguish true and false impressions ? The Stoics assume, indeed, that there are certain sensations which exhibit objects in their truth, such as could not arise from anything unreal, and these they make to be the criteria of truth. Cicero, however, adheres to the Academicians, who held that such impressions cannot be clearly shown to exist.<sup>158</sup> For even though it should be admitted, what however cannot be proved, that there is not a

<sup>155</sup> Ib. 29, seqq.<sup>157</sup> Ac. ii. 25..<sup>156</sup> Ib. ii. 35; de Fin. v. 26.<sup>158</sup> Ib. 26, 35.

perfect identity of things, and that therefore the impressions of all things are, according to their several differences, different; yet, on the other hand, the apparent resemblance of things is so great, that we are often deceived by it, and cannot distinguish the objects. Now if a deception of this kind be possible, perception becomes doubtful in every case, because it may happen to all equally.<sup>159</sup> Cicero is here very skilful in fighting the Stoics with their own weapons. He urges, that even if it be conceded that an individual, by art and exercise of his ingenuity, may arrive at a power of discerning the nicest shades of difference, this only serves to prove more clearly the weakness of the senses, so long as they are not strengthened by the aid of art.<sup>160</sup> When the Stoics advanced the possibility of apprehending a thing so accurately as to preclude the chance even of delusion, they ascribed this infallibility to the sage alone. This, therefore, is only another way of denying certainty to man in general; for they are unable to point out who is or ever has been a perfect sage; they declare the whole world to be foolish, and consequently deny wisdom to the whole world.<sup>161</sup> To such height of wisdom Cicero does not aspire; for he maintains that even the fool knows something, since he has a conviction of the truth of sensible phenomena,

<sup>159</sup> Ib. 126. *Negat tantam similitudinem in rerum natura esse. Pugnas omnino, sed cum adversario facili. Ne sit sane, videri certe potest; fallit igitur sensum et si una fefellerit similitudo, dubia omnia reddiderit.*

<sup>160</sup> Ib. 27.

<sup>161</sup> Ib. 47. In this among other passages, he says, *nos enim defendimus etiam insipientem multa comprehendere.* In other places, however, Cicero denies to men the power "comprehendere." Ib. 26. His phraseology is by no means fixed.

without, however, being able fully to place a reliance upon them. It is his opinion, that there are certain sensuous impressions which, in consequence of their moving his senses strongly, man may confide in, although he cannot hold them to be perfectly true.<sup>162</sup> This is his theory of probability. He does not wish to eliminate the difference between truth and falsehood. We have good reason to regard one thing as true, and to reject another as false; but there is no sure standard of truth and falsehood.<sup>163</sup> He thus meets the objection, that the denial of all certainty by assuming its own truth implies a certainty, by maintaining that this position itself is at most only probable.<sup>164</sup> And by a similar expedient he gets rid of the further objection, that a doctrine which teaches that all things are uncertain is inconsistent with the wise conduct of life, for this, he argues, never looks beyond the probable, and most of the arts of life themselves admit that they are conversant about conjectures rather than science.<sup>165</sup> He sees no other difference between his own view and that of the Dogmatists, than that while the latter doubt the truth of nothing which they act upon, he himself looks upon much as probable which yet he may well follow, without, however, venturing to assert its complete certainty.<sup>166</sup>

<sup>162</sup> Ib. 20. *Visa enim ista, cum acriter mentem sensumve pepulerunt, accipio, iisque interdum etiam assentior, nec percipio tamen.*

<sup>163</sup> Ib. 34 fin.; de Nat. D. i. 5. *Non enim sumus ii. quibus nihil verum esse videntur, sed ii. qui omnibus veris falsa quædam adjuncta esse dicamus, tanta similitudine, ut in iis nulla inest certa judicandi et assentiendi nota. Ex quo existit illud, multa esse probabilia, quæ quanquam non perciperentur, tamen quia visum haberent quendam insignem et illustrem, iis sapientis vita regetur.* De Off. ii. 2.

<sup>164</sup> Ac. ii. 34, 48.

<sup>165</sup> Ib. 31, 33.

<sup>166</sup> Ib. 3.



Such a doctrine was well adapted to recommend itself to a man of the world, who, availing himself readily of the doctrines of philosophy, without thoroughly investigating the scientific grounds on which they rest, considered them simply as results of the general enlightenment, of the history of mankind, and of his own personal experience. It is manifest that this doctrine of probability deviates in some degree from that of the New Academy, at least in the form in which the latter was advanced by Carneades ; for the former does not labour to make out that all is equally probable and improbable, but holds one thing to be probable and another improbable. Cicero himself acknowledges that in this point he had receded from the doctrine of his teachers. He confesses, indeed, that he is not bold enough to refute the Scepticism of the New Academy upon ethical questions, but he expresses a wish to silence it.<sup>167</sup>

When we review the physical doctrines of Cicero, it is necessary to bear in mind that he regarded this part of philosophy in particular as most uncertain, and its subject matter as too sublime for the human mind to apprehend it with certainty. But even this very sublimity attracted him to physical investigations, although with a modest consciousness of human weakness. For it was a feature not only of his personal but also of his national character to be attracted by the great, the brilliant, and the sublime.

<sup>167</sup> De Legg. i. 13 fin. *Perturbatricem autem harum omnium rerum academiam, hanc ab Arcosila et Carneade recentem, exoremus, ut sileat. Nam si invaserit in hæc, quæ satis scite nobis instructa et composita videntur, nimias edet ruinas. Quam quidem ego placare cupio, submovere non audeo.*

He compares the investigations into nature to a natural food of the human mind, which is not only agreeable but exalting, making it modest, and impressing it with a lowly but just appreciation of human life.<sup>168</sup> Agreeably with this part of his character, his philosophical investigations for the most part engage in the sublimest objects of science which the Stoics had previously drawn into the domain of physics, such as the investigation into the divine nature, and its relation to the world, and the immortality of the human soul. Other physical questions are either wholly passed over by him, or else but cursorily touched upon in an historical notice. It is thus that he treats not merely the inquiry into the elements, and especially the fifth element of Aristotle, but even the question of the relation between form and matter, notwithstanding the important bearing of it in all the earlier systems upon the idea of God. In the same hasty manner does he notice the opinions of the old Pythagorean and Ionian philosophy concerning the prime essence. This cursorness with which Cicero discusses the fundamental principles of physics, in order to hasten to their results, has naturally influenced his view of the latter. A vague principle leads necessarily to vague consequences. Moreover, the results which Cicero drew from his doctrine of nature, and the

<sup>168</sup> Ac. ii. 41. Neque tamen istas quæstiones physicorum exterminandas puto. Est enim animorum ingeniorumque naturale quoddam quasi pabulum consideratio contemplatioque naturæ. Erigimur, elatiores fieri videmur, humana despiciamus, cogitantesque supra atque cœlestia hæc nostra ut exigua et minima contemnimus. Indagatio ipsa rerum tum maximarum, tum etiam occultissimarum habet oblectationem. Si vero aliquid occurrerit, quod verisimile videatur, humanissima complectur animus voluptate. De Fin. iv. 5 in.

view which he entertains of nature in general, lie so wide apart, that it is manifest in this part of his doctrine, that not scientific reasons but the personal bias and sentiments of the writer have ultimately led him to a conclusion which even the consciousness that its scientific basis was hardly tenable, could not repel. This would still more be the case in proportion as the decision itself strove, as we shall presently see, to combine the most contradictory elements.

The points which he is most anxious to establish firmly, respect, in the main, the doctrines of God and the human soul. He was sensible of the influence which the conviction of a divine, providential care both of the good and the bad, and of the primary legislation of God in our soul, exercises on human conduct. Religious convictions appear highly important for the government of a state, and he therefore accedes to the position of Plato, that divine worship ought to be the first object of legislation to secure.<sup>169</sup> These doctrines were further recommended to his attention by their suitability to elevate man to a proper sense of his true dignity, which consists chiefly in this, that man alone, of all earthly animals, has the notion and a knowledge of God—that his reason is of a divine origin, being implanted in him as an immortal essence by God.<sup>170</sup> For it is not the visible but perishable form of the body that constitutes the man, but his mind; this it is that constitutes personality, and by it each person becomes as it were a god, moving

<sup>169</sup> De Legg. i. 7, 11; ii. 7.

<sup>170</sup> Ib. i. 8.

his own body in the same way that the supreme God moves the world.<sup>171</sup> This illustration at once gives us to understand in what sense he conceived of the human soul. He would have it acknowledged to be a free and immortal essence, which exercises an independent power over the body, and consequently external things also: in short, an essence which is of a divine nature.

But these opinions, however fondly Cicero may dwell upon them, are little supported, or rather called in question, by the principles of his philosophy. In the treatise "*De Naturâ Deorum*," Cicero submits the doctrines of the Epicureans and Stoics alike to the sceptical objections of the Academy; and while he accuses the former of a covert atheism, he rejects as insufficient the arguments by which the latter prove the existence of the gods; and ultimately concludes by representing the belief or disbelief of a divine being to be altogether dependent on the personal sentiments of individuals. But at the same time he does not scruple to avow for his own part a predilection for the opinions of the Stoics over the doubts of the Academy; and if he does not consider their arguments demonstrative, he yet claims for them the merit of probability.<sup>172</sup> We must therefore condemn as unjust the doubt which has been raised against his own belief in a

<sup>171</sup> *De Rep.* vi. 24. *Nec enim tu es, quem forma ista declarat, sed mens cujusque id est quisque, non ea figura, quæ digito monstrari potest. Deum te igitur scito esse, si quidem deus est, qui viget, qui sentit, qui meminit, qui providet, qui tam regit et moderatur et movet id corpus, cui præpositus est, quam hunc mundum ille princeps deus.* *Tusc.* i. 22.

<sup>172</sup> *De Nat. D.* iii. 40 fin. *Hæc cum essent dicta, ita diacessimus, ut Vellejo Cottæ disputatio verior, mihi Balbi ad veritatis similitudinem videretur esse propensior.* Cf. *de Div.* i. 5; ii. 72.

God or gods, drawn from his objections to the Stoical reasoning. We are disposed to think that, on the whole, he was of the opinion which he has put into the mouth of Cotta, that a man ought to believe in the religion of his fathers; but that philosophy, not contented with such traditional belief, demands a proof of the existence of the gods.<sup>173</sup> The attempts of the Stoics to satisfy this demand, he considers so weak as to render doubtful a point which in itself is not so.<sup>174</sup> In a certain sense he allows the demonstrative force of the Stoical arguments in general, and especially of that which was drawn from the general agreement of all nations and individuals.<sup>175</sup> For although he questions the stringency of this argument likewise,<sup>176</sup> yet on the whole he is disposed to admit an affinity between the divine and the human intellect as the basis of all that is great in human nature,<sup>177</sup> and which in general reveals itself to man in the innate idea of a divinity. But there is one point particularly to be noticed in his objection to the reasoning of the Stoics, which, as it proceeds from his general view of nature, has, on that account, very great weight with him. Cicero is accustomed so to oppose the natural to the divine as to appear to admit, on the one hand, a natureless God, and on the other a godless nature. This contrariety was formed in his

<sup>173</sup> De Nat. D. iii. 2, 3.

<sup>174</sup> Ib. 4. *Affers hæc omnia argumenta, cur dii sint, remque mea sententia minime dubiam argumentando dubiam facia.* Cf. ib. i. 1.

<sup>175</sup> He brings this frequently forward. Tusc. i. 13; de Legg. i. 8.

<sup>176</sup> De Nat. D. iii. 4. Cf. i. 23.

<sup>177</sup> Ib. ii. 66. *Nemo igitur vir magnus sine aliquo afflatu divino unquam fuit.* Tusc. i. 26.

mind by his steady adherence to the general principle that nothing in nature is produced without a cause, but that all is effected by a constraining necessity of a series of causes in which no rational reflection or design can produce a change. By nature, accordingly, he understands a necessary but irrational development; and to the Stoics, who seek to exhibit the regular events of the natural world as a development of divine and rational force, he objects, as a fair inference from their own principles, that fevers and other diseases which return at regular intervals, must be looked upon as strictly divine.<sup>178</sup> To the inference from the order and beauty of the universe to the existence of a rational divine first cause, he opposes the view that all is reduced under eternal laws by the power of nature, according to the gravity and necessary motion of bodies, and confesses that his own mind wavers between the view of the Stoics and the doctrine of Strato.<sup>179</sup>

Duly to estimate the weight which this view of nature necessarily had upon his mind, we must wait until we shall have examined his view of divinity. It is true, he sometimes admits the opinion, that man is unable to know what or of what kind God is, both because he eludes human sense, and the highest perfection of virtue which we are able to conceive cannot aptly be attributed to him;<sup>180</sup> still it

<sup>178</sup> De Nat. D. iii. 10. He here also objects to the Stoics, that they neglected the opposition between reason and nature: *quid enim sit melius, quid præstabilius, quid inter naturam et rationem intersit, non distinguitur.*

<sup>179</sup> Ib. 11. *Naturæ ista sunt, Balbe, naturæ non artificiosæ ambulantis, ut ait Zeno, quod quidem quale sit, jam videbimus, sed omnia cientis et agitantis motibus et mutationibus suis, &c. Ac. ii. 38.*

<sup>180</sup> Tusc. i. 22. *Nisi enim, quod nunquam vidimus, id, quale sit, intelligere*

is impossible for him, as he does entertain the idea of God, not to form of it some particular conception so as to distinguish the idea of God from all others by some special characteristics. Of course, it is not to be expected that Cicero should have reduced these characteristics into a precise and scholastic formula: they are found scattered through his works, and expressed, moreover, with great reserve and indecision. In the first place, although, with the ancients, he usually speaks of the divine generally, or of a plurality of gods, he acknowledges the necessity of assuming one supreme God as the creator, or at least as the ruler of all things.<sup>181</sup> This supreme God, he considers, in the second place, as a spirit which is free and remote from all mortal mixture, perceiving and moving all things, and endued with eternal motion in himself.<sup>182</sup> This view of God, rests on the conviction which Cicero everywhere avows, of the affinity subsisting between the human mind and the divinity, and also on his disposition generally, to consider God as the soul of the world, combining with this view that which is ascribed to Aristotle, that God is the remotest sphere of the heavens, which contains in itself and regulates the motions of all the others.<sup>183</sup> It is clear therefore, that when Cicero calls God a spirit, he is far from understanding thereby a purely

*possumus, certe et deum ipsum et divinum animum corpore liberatum cogitatione complecti non possumus.* De Nat. D. iii. 15.

<sup>181</sup> Tusc. i. 28; de Legg. i. 7.

<sup>182</sup> Tusc. i. 27. *Nec vero deus ipse, qui intelligitur a nobis, alio modo intelligi potest, nisi mens soluta quædam et libera, segregata ab omni concretionem mortali, omnia sentiens et movens ipsæque prædita motu sempiterno.*

<sup>183</sup> De Rep. vi. 17, 24; Ac. i. 7.

intellectual or incorporeal essence. God and his spiritual nature being once admitted, he leaves his readers at liberty to consider him either as fire, or air, or the æther,<sup>184</sup> and generally we find him adopting the common opinion of his contemporaries, which was derived from the materialism of the Stoics, and represented the intellectual as nothing more than a special kind of the corporeal.<sup>185</sup> With this conception of the divine mind, he naturally hesitated whether he ought not also to admit that the divine itself is, equally with all other things, subject to the universal and necessary laws of nature. For however accustomed he may be to regard the divine as the opposite of the natural, he nevertheless appears occasionally to look upon it as a natural entity, and therein even subjects it to the infinite series of causes and effects which he elsewhere declares to be irreconcilable with the freedom of the rational will.<sup>186</sup> It is inconceivable how the doctrine of a divine providence could be reconciled with such views; and Cicero does not hesitate to avow that the proposition, that all has been wisely ordered by the gods, and that the good of man has been in all things provided for by them, is open to many and serious objections. When they gave reason to man, they must have known how dangerous a weapon they were putting in his hands.<sup>187</sup>

<sup>184</sup> Tusc. i. 26, 29.

<sup>185</sup> De Fin. iv. 5, 11. *Cujuscunque enim modi animal constitueris, necesse est, etiam si id sine corpore sit, ut fingimus, tamen esse in animo quædam similia eorum, quæ sunt in corpore.* Thus Cicero invariably refers Aristotle's doctrine concerning the fifth nature to the nature of the soul. Tusc. i. 10, 26.

<sup>186</sup> De Fato 9, 10. He opposes the natural to the free will.

<sup>187</sup> De Nat. D. iii. 27, 32, 33.



Even the Stoic, he says, would not assert that all things, even the most insignificant, equally indicate the care of the gods. It is only for the greater ones that they have cared, the little they despised.<sup>188</sup>

Now as Cicero, even while he discovered in philosophy probable grounds at least for the belief in the existence of a divine power, evinced, at the same time, a great deference to the opposite view, which rejected such a belief; we might suppose that, agreeably to the general bent of his character, he would even on this account have attached himself the more closely to the national religion. But it must be remembered that the religion professed by his own people, and by all others with whom he was acquainted, was of such a nature that it was impossible he could believe in it with perfect reliance. As an enlightened statesman he must have come to the conclusion that, however advantageous religion in general may be to a state, it is highly prejudicial that vice and evil should be worshipped as gods.<sup>189</sup> On this ground he found it impossible to agree with the Stoics who adopted the popular faith with all its fables, to which they pretended to give a rational interpretation. On the contrary, as an enlightened and intelligent man of business, and possessed of no small share of wit, he openly evinces a disposition to turn into ridicule the absurd conceptions of the people and the fables of the poets, concerning the gods and divine things.<sup>190</sup> In this sceptical spirit he was but complying with

<sup>188</sup> Ib. ii. 66. *Magna dii curant, parva negligunt.*

<sup>189</sup> *De Legg.* ii. 11; *de Nat. D.* iii. 17.

<sup>190</sup> Particularly *de Nat. D.* iii. 15, seq.

the general movement of mind in his age, which was already preparing the way for the final overthrow of paganism. With this prevailing tendency the treatise on Divinity agrees, in which Cicero expressly rejects a portion of the popular faith although in other places he briefly speaks of it as an institution politically useful.<sup>191</sup> It is evident that he is disposed to view religion as a political engine which, however, in all probability has its foundation in a certain degree of truth; but to communicate the truth simply and purely to the people he holds to be inexpedient, since with all the light of philosophy it had at best but worked on his own mind a weak and hesitating conviction.

We have already noticed the close connection which in his opinion subsisted between the divine nature and the human soul, the latter being regarded as a part of the divine in the world: and accordingly, all the doubts also, which beset his mind as to the nature of the gods, equally affect his view of the human soul. He by no means thinks it to be a pure, incorporeal substance, and asserts that it is vain to inquire into its nature, form, or seat;<sup>192</sup> nevertheless he hazards the conjecture, that its seat may be either in the head, or perhaps in a peculiar matter distinct from the earthly elements.<sup>193</sup> But however it ought to be thought of, this one point is sure, that it does actually exist and exhibit itself by its action in the same way that God does in

<sup>191</sup> Particularly *de Legg.* ii. 13, where Cicero advances the opinion that the art of divination is perhaps lost. There cannot be a doubt what was the true opinion of Cicero.

<sup>192</sup> *Tusc.* i. 27, 28.

<sup>193</sup> *Ib.* 29.

his works. As a portion of the divine and rational principle, Cicero is disposed to ascribe to it immortality; and in support of this probability uses, with delight, all the arguments adduced by Plato,<sup>194</sup> without, however, being fully convinced by them. For he recommends that implicit credence should not be given to them,<sup>195</sup> and thereby in order to assure himself against the fear that death is an evil, he adopts the ambiguous conclusion which Socrates comes to in the *Apology*, that even in the case of the soul's ceasing to exist at death, death cannot be an evil; for he who exists not, and has neither sense nor perception, cannot have any experience of evil. Even on this point we are disposed to hope the best of his own personal conviction; for the lofty moral views entertained by Cicero impelled him to take a worthy idea of the nature and destination of humanity, wherewith the conviction of the soul's immortality is so closely interwoven.<sup>196</sup> Accordingly, he spontaneously and frequently expresses his persuasion of the soul's immortality in those works which were designed to be generally intelligible rather than philosophically accurate.<sup>197</sup> Now among the arguments which in such works he adduces for a belief in the soul's immortality, the leading one turns upon the common religious belief and the universal consent of all nations and ages.<sup>198</sup> On this point he might well agree with the ancestral faith of his countrymen, since he found it to be in unison with the opinion of the most eminent philosophers. Yet, even here he meets with difficulties

<sup>194</sup> *Ib.* 12, sqq.<sup>195</sup> *Ib.* 32, in.<sup>196</sup> *De Legg.* i. 22, 23.<sup>197</sup> *De Sen.* 21, sqq.; *de Am.* 3, 4.<sup>198</sup> *Tusc.* i. 12, sqq.

which repel his perfect assent, being unable, for instance, to regard the account of the punishments of the lower world in any other light than fables.<sup>199</sup> It is only the possibility of greater happiness of the soul after death that admits of hope; he refuses to be terrified by the superstitious horrors which render death terrible.<sup>200</sup>

Among the doctrines connected with the nature of the soul, that of free will was to Cicero's mind of particular importance. It is at once conceivable that his predominant bias for the practical, would induce him to defend this doctrine against all objections which might be derived from the supposition of an inflexible destiny: he accordingly expresses, in the strongest terms, a disposition to maintain it. He would rather admit that a proposition can be neither true nor false than that all is obedient to fate;<sup>201</sup> yet he hopes not to be driven to this extremity:<sup>202</sup> but how he avoided the difficulty we are unable to see, since unfortunately the MS. of his work on Fate is defective in the very place which probably contained his own views on the subject.<sup>203</sup> The way in which he has explained himself on the necessity of fate, and on freedom, does not, however, afford much hope that he attained to a radical solution of the difficulty: it is true that he skilfully meets the objection that the freedom of the will would destroy the natural enchainment of cause and effect, by asserting that the free determination of the will is such, that although it is in a man's own

<sup>199</sup> Tusc. i. 21.

<sup>200</sup> Hortens. ap. August. de Trin. xiv. 19. de Senect. 21, sqq.

<sup>201</sup> De Fato, 10. <sup>202</sup> Ib. 11, 16. <sup>203</sup> Between the chapters 19 and 20.

power, and obeys him, it does not do so without a cause; but that there is a cause of the volition in the nature of the free will itself—that it is not absolutely without a cause, but merely without an outward and predisposing cause:<sup>204</sup> and if, when he confesses that he is claiming no other liberty for the will than that which according to the Epicurean view belongs to the atoms, he may justly boast that he had no need, in order to defend the doctrine of free will, to have recourse to the Epicurean assumption that atoms arbitrarily deviate from the perpendicular;<sup>205</sup> still we hardly allow him the merit which he claims, of having successfully resolved all objections against the question. For what is to be understood by his rejecting, in the case of free will, all external and antecedent causes, as if it were possible to entertain the idea of a free being apart from such antecedent and external causes? And who will concede to any nature a liberty which is irrespective and absolute? These are not objections which could be easily overlooked; and we do not see how Cicero could have believed that he had satisfactorily established the freedom of the will, independent and in spite of the external enchainment of cause and effect. It would almost seem as if he had relied ultimately on the view that free will is indispensable to morality, since an inflexible necessity would destroy all

<sup>204</sup> Ib. 11. *Motus enim voluntarius eam naturam in se ipse continet, ut sit in nostra potestate, nobis pareat, nec id sine causa; ejus enim rei causa ipsa natura est.* He seems to have borrowed his view from Carneades, to whose authority he here appeals.

<sup>205</sup> L. i; ib. 20.

responsibility, and praise or blame, reward or punishment, be equally unjust.<sup>206</sup>

On a general review of these physical investigations, it is plain that they are connected with his own moral convictions. When we treated of the features of his Scepticism in general, we observed that Cicero wavered between the Peripatetic and the Academic views of morals, but that he was opposed, as decidedly as it was possible for one of his frame of mind to be, to the Epicurean doctrine. It now remains for us to point out this fact in detail.

As an objection of great force to the Epicurean doctrine, he urges the dignity of human nature. Nature, he argues, formed man for some higher object than for the merely sensuous pleasures and corporeal gratifications which alone the genuine Epicurean recommends. Even man's natural self-love, he remarks, is not directed to pleasure; for we love pleasure not for itself but for our own sakes.<sup>207</sup> Science and virtue are in themselves a source of pleasure, and cannot be recommended simply as means to the attainment of corporeal gratifications. Nature has laid duties upon man; she has implanted in him, as a sign of his divine origin, a love of friends, of family, of country, of all mankind of which he is a member.<sup>208</sup> In the presence of God, i. e. before his own divine mind, man irresistibly feels a reverence and respect.<sup>209</sup> Nothing can be esteemed as good which does not

<sup>206</sup> Ib. 12, 17.

<sup>207</sup> De Fin. v. 11.

<sup>208</sup> De Fin. i. 7; ii. 24; De Leg. i. 7.

<sup>209</sup> De Off. iii. 10. Cum vero jurato sententia dicenda sit, meminerit deum se adhibere testem, id est, ut arbitror, mentem suam, qua nihil homini dedit deus ipse divinius.

make its possessor good ; Socrates, that genuine philosopher, was right in condemning those who were the first to draw a distinction between the useful and the good, which by nature are bound together.<sup>210</sup> The sinful man punishes himself by the evil sentiments which he cherishes within his own mind ;<sup>211</sup> duty is not to be discharged for the sake of any advantage that may possibly accrue, but the rewards of duty are to be sought in duty itself.<sup>212</sup> In these and like propositions Cicero attacks the pursuit of pleasure and selfishness of the Epicurean theory of morals, and avows his own aspirations for a purer morality.

Nevertheless, he will not give in his adhesion to the Stoical theory, which acknowledges no other than moral good. Moderate pleasure, he says, is not to be condemned ;<sup>213</sup> pain even when it is endurable without necessarily disturbing the equanimity of the sage,<sup>214</sup> must yet be viewed as an evil, inasmuch simply as it hinders the practice of virtue.<sup>215</sup> Virtue itself could not exist unless there were external good things, among which it is to make its choice, and a nature for virtue from which it proceeds, and which it labours to preserve and improve.<sup>216</sup> The sage, therefore, cannot be happy without the aids of fortune.<sup>217</sup> The position of the Stoics is intolerable, which declares that the sage alone is good, but that all other men are equally bad, and all transgressions equal ; as if the good

<sup>210</sup> Parad. i. ; De Off. ii. 3, ; iii. 3. 5.

<sup>211</sup> De Off. iii. 8.

<sup>212</sup> De Fin. ii. 22.

<sup>213</sup> De Sen. 14.

<sup>214</sup> Tusc. ii. 18.

<sup>215</sup> Ibid. 13.

<sup>216</sup> De Fin. iv. 15 ; v. 23, 24.

<sup>217</sup> Ibid. v. 26 ; Tusc. v. 25, 26.

things which are put in peril by their respective vices were of equal worth, and a distinction was not to be drawn between those who obstinately devote themselves to ignorance and vice and deliberately do ill, and those who on a sudden impulse, which is usually but transitory, are carried away to wrong.<sup>218</sup> In this, and other points connected with it, Cicero attacks the Stoical doctrine, because it appears to him to be opposed to the practical wisdom which it was his object to attain to, since the sage for whom such precepts are applicable is nowhere to be found in the world, and consequently there is no one to whom good can be attributed, or of whom it can be demanded.<sup>219</sup> On the other hand he gladly adopts the Stoical division of duties into middle and perfect, in order that by so doing he may, in some degree, set himself in unison with their doctrine, since its principles have probability at least in their favour. He admits it to be quite clear that the perfect sage alone can act perfectly well and perfectly perform his duty, but he states that his own purpose is to treat only of such imperfect duties as can be discharged by the ordinary upright man, who at most possesses a certain resemblance to the sage. In such a character there is a virtue, even though it may be in a very imperfect measure.<sup>220</sup>

<sup>218</sup> De Fin. iv. 28; de Off. i. 8 fin.; Cf. de Fin. iv. 20.

<sup>219</sup> De Am. 5. Sed hoc primum sentio, nisi in bonis amicitiam esse non posse; neque id ad virum rescio, ut illi, qui hæc subtilius disserunt; fortasse vere, sed ad communem utilitatem parum. Negant enim quemquam virum bonum esse, nisi sapientem. Sit ita sane. Sed eam sapientiam interpretantur, quam adhuc mortalis nemo est consecutus. Nos autem ea, quæ sunt in usu vitæque communi, non ea, quæ finguntur aut optantur, spectare debemus. The words "fortasse vere" reveal Cicero's indecision, and explain how it was possible for him to speak differently on other occasions; but we must follow that which he gives us to understand as his predominant opinion.

<sup>220</sup> De Off. iii. 3, 4.



The more Cicero departs from the Stoics, the more he approximates to the Peripatetic doctrine of morals, which while it maintains that corporeal and external advantages, when put into the scale against virtue, weigh nothing; and that therefore they ought not for a moment to be placed in the same rank with it, nevertheless, regard them as in themselves of value to man.<sup>221</sup> Health, property, honours, friends, country, appear to him worthy objects of desire, even though a man should not be able to rise to that rigour of virtue which regards all such things as unnecessary to happiness, and feels assured that, even within the bull of Phalaris, it should be able to find and maintain the extreme good. But as he did not fail to discover that the Peripatetics did not unhesitatingly ascribe this sustaining energy to virtue, Cicero felt it to be impossible to adhere in all points to their moral theory. Thus he occasionally complains of the laxity of the Peripatetics, as doing dishonour to the majesty of virtue. Moreover, as we previously remarked, he found it difficult to justify the pre-eminence which they gave to the theoretical over the practical. But his opposition was not confined to these points, but he even directly attacks the fundamental principle of the Aristotelian ethics, and expressly declares that he cannot assent to its definition of virtue. On the contrary, he agrees with the Stoics in regarding the passions and emotions of the soul as vices; as he believes it to be his duty to labour after the highest courage, and that absolute self-command of the soul, which finds all its comfort in itself, he refuses to admit the idea

<sup>221</sup> De Fin. v. 23; de Off. iii. 3.

that virtue can consist in the moderation of such states, and in a mean between too much and too little of the mental emotions.<sup>222</sup> He demands how it can be possible to restrain or to moderate the passions when once room has been given to them in the mind.<sup>223</sup> If the Peripatetics praised them as the motives to action and to every kind of practical virtue, he objects that in so doing the Peripatetics, after the manner of orators, did but adorn irrational matters with fine names, while the Stoics, on the other hand, who represented these passions as violent desires, opposed both to nature and to reason, gave things their right names.<sup>224</sup> This remark coincides with all his speculations on the subject of virtue. For he agrees with Zeno in opposing the Peripatetic doctrine, that there is a real virtue of nature and of habit, and insisting that reason alone<sup>225</sup> is the principle of virtue, and accordingly he denies that the virtues are really distinct from each other, and asserts that when they are so spoken of it is merely in compliance with ordinary language and the popular notions on the subject. By the precept that man ought to live agreeably to nature, as understood by Cicero, it is not meant that the corporeal nature, which is the basis of human life, is to be neglected, but that the essential object of man's

<sup>222</sup> Tusc. iv. 17. Quocirca mollis et enervata putanda est Peripateticorum ratio et oratio, qui perturbari animos necesse esse dicunt, sed adhibent modum quandam, quem ultra progredi non oporteat. Modum tu adhibes vitio? &c.

<sup>223</sup> Ibid. iv. 18; de Off. i. 25.

<sup>224</sup> Tusc. iv. 19. sqq.

<sup>225</sup> Ac. i. 10. Quumque superiores (sc. Peripatetici) non omnem virtutem in ratione esse dicerent, sed quasdam virtutes natura aut more perfectas, hic (sc. Zeno) omnes in ratione ponebat. In a non-ethical sense other kinds of virtue were also admitted. De Fin. v. 13.

pursuit is inward perfection or virtue.<sup>226</sup> For in man's nature the soul plays the chief part, and all must obey it; but in the soul the reason holds the first rank, as the part which is to be improved by human volition.<sup>227</sup> Whatever in the soul is formed by nature, must obey reason, as is evident from every one seeking to be able to give to himself a probable reason for all his moral actions. The desires, therefore, which belong to nature, must be in subjection to the reason.<sup>228</sup> From these principles it is clear that Cicero makes the moral character of an action to be founded on reflection and reason, and that he consequently rejected in the consideration of morality, any dependence of the reason on the natural tendencies of the soul.<sup>229</sup>

An attentive examination of the mode in which Cicero endeavours to combine the Stoical with the Peripatetic theory of morals, will convince us that he had formed on these subjects a peculiar view, which originated not so much in any scientific and rigorous connection of ideas, as in the natural and individual characteristics of the man. These prevented him from adhering entirely either to the Peripatetic or to the Stoical notion of good, and led him insensibly to form a different idea from either, of the proper end of human exertion. This will be distinctly manifest in the general ideas under which he conceived all morality. If the Greek philosophers had asserted that the beautiful alone is good, Cicero, on the contrary, influenced by the phraseology of his native tongue, maintains that the honour-

<sup>226</sup> Ac. i. 1; de Off. ii. 10.

<sup>228</sup> De Fin. v. 12.

<sup>227</sup> De Off. iii. 3.

<sup>229</sup> Ibid. 13; de Off. i. 28, 29.

able alone is good,<sup>230</sup> and holds that his own proposition is identical with that of the Greeks. This is his usual language: for where we should speak of moral good, he speaks of the honourable, and simply shows that by the term honourable, nothing is to be understood but what is truly deserving of praise, even though it be not praised; in a word, virtue.<sup>231</sup> Virtue is to his mind pre-eminently distinguished from every thing else by the splendour of its worth.<sup>232</sup> If he wishes to show how man is impelled by nature to pursue moral good, he appeals to the emulation displayed by the young, their competition with their fellows for pre-eminence, and to the labour and pains they willingly undergo for the sake of praise.<sup>233</sup> To the honourable, he opposes the base, as the evil which all men ought to avoid.<sup>234</sup> True honour he makes to be equivalent with virtue; he distinguishes it, it is true, from glory, but at the same time acknowledges that it has a resemblance to it.<sup>235</sup> On this account he considers the resemblance between the good and the becoming, to be so close as to justify him in placing the terms side by side as equivalent.<sup>236</sup> A difference may perhaps be found between them, but it is such as hardly to

<sup>230</sup> The heading of the first paradox is, ὅτι μόνον ἀγαθὸν τὸ καλόν. Quod honestum sit, id solum bonum esse.

<sup>231</sup> De Fin. ii. 14. Honestum igitur id intelligimus, quod tale est, ut detracta omni utilitate sine ullis præmiis fructibusque per se ipsum possit laudari. Ibid. 15; de Off. i. 4 fin. Quod etiam si nobilitatum non sit, tamen honestum sit, quodque vere dicimus, etiam si a nullo laudetur, natura esse laudabile. De Fin. v. 21. Itaque omnis honos, omnis admiratio, omne studium ad virtutem et ad eas actiones, quæ virtuti sunt consentaneæ, refertur, eaque omnia, quæ aut ita geruntur, uno nomine honesta dicuntur. Ibid. 23.

<sup>232</sup> De Fin. v. 22 fin.

<sup>233</sup> De Fin. v. 22 in.

<sup>234</sup> L. 1; de Off. iii. 8.

<sup>235</sup> De Fin. v. 24 in.

<sup>236</sup> De Fin. ii. 14. Quia decet, quia rectum, quia honestum est.

admit of being expressed in words.<sup>237</sup> The becoming, is ever in close attendance on the good, and is evinced principally in the deference which in all our actions we show towards others, diligently seeking to obtain their good opinion, and to avoid whatever may give them offence.<sup>238</sup> Thus does the moral theory of Cicero strive after the approbation of men. Indeed, the very notion of the becoming, appropriately expresses this tendency of his moral precepts. In all points he demands, that due regard should be paid to the circumstances of life of the individual, his relation to others, and what is agreeable to them, and calculated to win their applause.<sup>239</sup> In these requisitions, Cicero manifestly recedes from the severe tone of the Stoical ethics, which elevated the sage too high above his fellow-men to pay any regard to them. At the same time it is also strikingly apparent that his theory of morals was designed for the upper classes, by whom alone it was likely to be read, and that it has consequently been accommodated to their position and circumstances in life.<sup>240</sup> As he himself was passionately fond of glory, he sought to employ and recommend it as a powerful stimulus for good.

<sup>237</sup> De Off. i. 27. *Qualis autem differentia sit honesti et decori, facilius intelligi, quam explanari potest.*

<sup>238</sup> De Off. i. 28. *Adhibenda est igitur quædam reverentia adversus homines et optimi cujusque et reliquorum. Nam negligere, quid de se quisque sentiat non solum arrogantis est, sed etiam omnino dissoluti. Est autem, quod differat in hominum ratione adhibenda inter justitiam et verecundiam. Justitiæ partes sunt non violare homines, verecundiæ non offendere, in quo maxime perspicitur vis decori.*

<sup>239</sup> Ibid. 35.

<sup>240</sup> Cf. de Off. i. 42. The notes of Garve to his translation of the De Officiis throw much light on this subject.

He was unable to sympathise with the Grecian philosophers, who, as writing for the school, placed all pleasure in the retired life of scientific reflection, or in the self-sufficient independence of the sage. If Plato was of opinion that the sage would take no part in state affairs except of necessity, because he has higher objects of his own to pursue, Cicero taught, on the other hand, that the ruler of a state ought to be fed with glory, and the desire of distinction animate him to laudable deeds.<sup>241</sup>

It will hardly be expected that we should give all the details of Cicero's moral theory, for it presents but few and occasional traces of original thought, and on the whole is the result of observation rather than of any philosophical principle. His particular precepts are in general founded on the patriotic wish of the statesman to benefit his people and his contemporaries, and it would be vain to expect very strict rules for the regulation of life to be laid down by a man of the world. In this direction also his views of the honourable and the becoming naturally worked. It is true that the conduct which he enjoins is not limited to what the law simply demands; on the contrary, a true spirit of morality leads him to forbid much that the laws neither prohibit nor punish.<sup>242</sup> Indeed, he even goes so far as to acknowledge that a man ought not to look so much to the approbation of the multitude, as to the testimony of his own conscience; but that still he ought

<sup>241</sup> De Rep. v. 7. The fragment is not very clear, but its opposition to the theory of Plato is obvious.

<sup>242</sup> De Fin. ii. 18; de Off. iii. 17. Relative to this point is his distinction between the *lex naturæ* and the *jux civile*. On this point cf. de Legg. i. 5; iii. 20 fin. But the contrariety is understood by Cicero in a variety of senses.

not to deviate far from the common walks of life, and from the circumstances which society may seem to demand, even though they should not be strictly reconcilable with morality.<sup>243</sup> Thus he agreed with Panætius, that an advocate may justly lend his eloquence to an unjust cause; adding, however, the remark, that he was here speaking as a philosopher only, though at the same time he gladly availed himself of the authority of the Stoics to justify an opinion which he himself had often enough acted upon.<sup>244</sup> Thus, too, he thinks, that what it would not be honourable to do in our own case we may justly undertake for the sake of a friend, on whose behalf also it would be right to depart, in a critical emergency, from the straight path of justice.<sup>245</sup> His works are full of such rules of expediency, although in general he will not admit that the useful ever comes into collision with the moral.

To the regard which Cicero paid to the results of experience and observation we must probably ascribe the fact, that he has insisted, to a greater degree than any other philosopher with whom we are acquainted, that due respect should in every matter be paid to the peculiar disposition of the individual. When he gives his opinions on the subject of the becoming, he expressly asserts the principle that in the conduct of life every one ought to look to his

<sup>243</sup> Tusc. ii. 26 fin. Nullum theatrum virtuti conscientia majus est.

<sup>244</sup> De Off. ii. 14.

<sup>245</sup> De Am. 16. Quæ in nostris rebus non satis honeste, in amicorum fiunt honestissime. Ib. 17. Ut etiam si qua fortuna acciderit, ut minus justæ amicorum voluntates adjuvandæ sint, in quibus eorum aut caput agatur aut fama, declinandum sit de via, modo ne summa turpitudine sequatur.

own nature ; which he does not regard as defective, or as conflicting in any degree with the universal nature of man. He does not even consider it as a direct limitation of nature, even while he admits that it may occasionally prevent a man from pursuing a high and noble end, which is beyond his natural capacity, since there can be no moral obligation for an impracticable pursuit. On the contrary, he simply holds that the natures of individual men may be distinguished from each other by peculiar characteristics, and that according to this difference, which has its foundation in nature, every one has his part in life to play, if he would follow a consistent course and avoid all ridiculous imitation.<sup>246</sup>

This conclusion gives rise to the precept, that every one ought to choose a mode of life and vocation agreeable to his natural disposition ; that one will rightly devote himself to philosophy, another to war, a third to oratory, and others to such occupations as they may severally deem to be becoming a free citizen. Blindly to follow a paternal profession, or to do a thing because it is the general fashion, is highly foolish.<sup>247</sup> He admits, it is true, that external circumstances must influence in some degree the choice of a profession, but insists that individual character ought here to be of the greatest weight, since circumstances are more liable to change than nature, and consequently a plan of life adopted from a due regard to the latter will be more consistent than one accommodated to the former.<sup>248</sup> And thus he arrives at the view, that in the exten-

<sup>246</sup> De Off. i. 31.<sup>247</sup> Ib. 32, 33.<sup>248</sup> Ib. 33.



sive field of moral duty a multitude of particular paths may be traced out, of which one may be appropriately followed by one individual, and another by a second. When, however, he carries this view so far as to maintain that different individuals are calculated to shine in different virtues,<sup>249</sup> he again falls off from the Stoics to adopt the Peripatetical doctrine; a circumstance which affords an explanation of his having failed to see distinctly the difference between the choice of a profession and the choice of moral principles.<sup>250</sup>

Of one who, like Cicero, had grown grey, and attained to the highest distinction, in public affairs, we might perhaps expect that he would have entered upon a philosophical investigation into the principles of government and law, in which his own experience would have furnished him with much that was both novel and true. But we should remember that it requires one quality of mind to determine what in given circumstances is advisable and practicable, and to devise the means of carrying it into execution, but another to induct general laws from given particulars. It should also be borne in mind, that many doubts would naturally suggest themselves to the mind of a politician, who had not entirely withdrawn from public life, of the expediency of promulgating his own opinions of the constitution of his country and its administration, and deter him from expressing openly and unreservedly the peculiar, instructive, and valuable

<sup>249</sup> *Ib.* 32.

<sup>250</sup> This is proved at length by Garve in the notes to his translation of the *De Officiis*, &c. p. 165, sqq.

conclusions which his long experience had enabled him to form. It is, therefore, with very little hope of information on these points that we take up Cicero's two treatises, *De Republicâ* and *De Legibus*. And yet we cannot but feel surprise and disappointment when, after the promise he gives of a treatise on the Republic, which, as founded on the results of his own experience and the recorded opinions of earlier statesmen, should far surpass all similar works of the Greeks,<sup>261</sup> he yet reveals but few traces either of peculiar opinions, or of original and independent ideas upon the subject. The philosophical parts of these works are even more than usually weak. It is true that we only possess some fragments of the treatise on the Republic, but these are sufficient to enable us to judge of the philosophical character of the whole. He avows that his own is an imitation of Plato's work on the same subject, but on a larger basis; while his essay on the Laws was on the model of a similar treatise of the same philosopher. Many passages, indeed, are apparently based on the Platonic notion of justice; nevertheless, on a closer examination of his work, it is evident that his idea of a state was not formed after the opinions of Plato, but after one which, originally introduced by Aristotle but greatly modified by subsequent historians, was now, we may believe, pretty widely diffused. The changes which this opinion underwent in its general features may be learned from Polybius,<sup>262</sup> with whom Cicero has in

<sup>261</sup> *De Rep.* i. 22, 23.

<sup>262</sup> *Polyb.* vi. 5. We are referred to Polybius by Kühner also. (*M. Tullii Ciceronis in philosophiam ejusque partes merita.* Hamb. 1825.) p. 264, 267,

common (which, however, he declares to be the peculiar novelty of his own work) attempted to develop the principles of political government by the instance of the Roman constitution.<sup>53</sup> But when he took the republic as a model,<sup>54</sup> and sought to show by its progressive history what was the best basis for the foundation of a state, he but flattered the prejudices of his countrymen and his own patriotic spirit, more than one who despaired of the fortunes of his country could justify even to his own mind. Accordingly, he was not so blind a worshipper of the Roman constitution as not to find much to censure. He does perhaps paint it somewhat in ideal colours, but still he owns much remains for the improving hand of statesmen. Thus we find him again, even in this domain of inquiry, distracted by conflicting tendencies, and it is manifest that this must have greatly increased his sceptical habit of thought.

A few traits will be sufficient, if we bear in mind the earlier doctrines of the Greek philosophers on the subject, to make ourselves acquainted with his general views. Of the pure forms of polity he most disapproves of the democratic, because it does not concede to its more distinguished citizens any

271. Yet Cicero seldom mentions Polybius, and only twice in the fragments of the *De Republicâ*, ii. 14 et iv. 3, but so that we are able to see that he had not omitted to peruse the parts of Polybius' work which related to his subject. Two other passages, *de Off.* iii. 32, *ad Att.* xiii. 30, also belong to these parts *cf.* Polyb. vi. 58. Cicero mentions two Stoics who had treated at length of politics, Dion, a contemporary of Chrysippus (*Diog. L.* vii. 190, 192), unless the conjecture is correct which would substitute Diogene for Dione, and Panætius. *De Legg.* iii. 5, 6. *Cf.* also *Diog. L.* vii. 131.

<sup>53</sup> *De Rep.* ii. 11, 30.

<sup>54</sup> *Ib.* i. 46; *de Legg.* i. 6; ii. 10.

superior degree of dignity;<sup>255</sup> but a monarchy is his favourite, which he compares to the rule of the one reason over the multitude of passions.<sup>256</sup> But he observes that in all purer forms of polity, there is both generally a tendency to corruption, and also a peculiar fault in each. For in a monarchy the simple citizens are without a due share of true freedom, of common rights, and general deliberation. In an aristocracy, the same is the case with the majority; while on the other hand the general equality of a democracy, which denies all distinction even to its most illustrious citizens, is unjust;<sup>257</sup> on this account his ideal of a government is a mixed form in which all the three pure forms are combined.<sup>258</sup> This view he applies to the Roman polity, in which he finds all the three elements combined: the monarchical element in the authority of the consuls, the aristocratic in the senate, and the democratic in the share which the people, either directly or indirectly through the tribunes, had in the administration of the state.<sup>259</sup> He also boasts of the magnitude of the Roman power in comparison with the petty states which Plato had for his model; and justifies the sway of the Roman people over the conquered provinces, on the same principles that enable him with Plato and Aristotle to justify slavery.<sup>260</sup> In the same spirit of deference to what was actually existing in the Roman state, he approves of an elective rather than an hereditary monarchy,<sup>261</sup> and extols the prudence of their ances-

<sup>255</sup> De Rep. i. 26, 27.<sup>256</sup> Ib. 38.<sup>257</sup> Ib. 27, 28, 31.<sup>258</sup> Ib. 29, 46.<sup>259</sup> Ib. ii. 23, 32, 33.<sup>260</sup> II. 30; iii. 24, 25.<sup>261</sup> Ib. ii. 12.

tors in limiting the consular power to a year, in order that it might not be too strong for all others. But if with this general approbation of the Roman constitution, he yet found some particular institutions or customs to blame, these, nevertheless, are very unimportant. Thus he even finds reasons to commend the tribunate, which had cost himself so dear, and maintains, that though it may contain much that is evil, it still is the source of this incalculable good—that it gave the people a guide which might be put down more easily than the unrestrained power of the multitude.<sup>262</sup> It is clear that his object is rather to restrain than to enlarge the power of the people. But he goes still further. The treatise *De Legibus* contains many passages, which advise that the semblance alone of liberty should be granted to the people, but in fact all real power be denied to it. He even approves of Plato's proposition: That the authorities are on some occasions justified in deceiving the people.<sup>263</sup> This advice was not thrown away; but it was not to profit the elective authority of the consuls, as Cicero intended, but the stern domination of a Cæsar.

Our examination of the philosophy of Cicero may perhaps appear to have been carried to a length disproportioned, both to the results which we have obtained by it, and to the object of our work. For properly, it does not indicate any progress of philosophy. Whatever we have advanced as the opinions of Cicero, is merely a repetition of earlier doctrines, with an attempt to adjust them to each other, and to accommodate them to the national

<sup>262</sup> *De Legg.* iii. 10.

<sup>263</sup> *E. g. de Legg.* iii. 12, 17.

character, in which both principles and consequences lose something of their scientific vigour. But even in this blunted form they worked, perhaps, the more efficiently in subsequent ages, which derived their civilization from the Latin literature. In this respect we may consider the philosophical writings of Cicero as the foundation, not merely of the subsequent Roman philosophy, but also, in part, of the philosophy of the Latin fathers of the Christian church in the middle ages, and even of the philosophy which was diffused after the revival of letters. If they have been little valued by profounder philosophers, they have, on the other hand, had a greater influence on the general enlightenment, and we ought never to forget what a powerful, although secret influence the general enlightenment exercises on the development of philosophy.<sup>264</sup> He therefore, who wishes to understand the history of philosophy, must turn his eye not only to what has been taught by the greatest philosophers, but must also attend to the manner in which the extreme conclusions of a vigorously developed philosophy are softened down, partly by mutual collision, and partly by the opinions which the enlightened experience of practical men has raised to the form of general results; and how these modified conclusions leave ultimately to science on the whole a somewhat wavering, yet on some points decided view, which,

<sup>264</sup> From such a point of view, Herbart in his treatise on the philosophy of Cicero, in the *Königsberger Archiv für Philosophie u. s. w.* Jahrg. 1811. 1. Stck. has recommended the writings of this author as a popular introduction to the study of philosophy. This essay is a noble composition, and contains much that is worthy of grave reflection.

however, is well calculated to stimulate subsequent inquiry. We ought, therefore, to regard it as a piece of good fortune, when in these periods of transition we occasionally meet with such skilful expositors of the prevailing opinions, as Cicero was for those of his own age and country.

## CHAPTER III.

### PRACTICAL TENDENCY OF PHILOSOPHY—NEW CYNICS AND STOICS.

THE influence of the Roman character on the practical tendency, is particularly noticeable in a series of philosophers, who, although they are usually ascribed to separate schools, so closely resemble each other in the nature of their labours, that it appears ill-advised to separate them in our notice. The mere circumstance that the discourses and writings of some were in Greek, and of others in Latin; that the former was the vernacular tongue of some, and the latter of others, is of little importance in an age in which national peculiarities were being rapidly confounded. And as the truth is, that while a gradual development and diffusion of such doctrines is distinctly traceable, nothing like a regular succession of the different schools can be discovered; the order, therefore, which we propose to observe in this exposition is, to mention in the first place the less important undertakings of this kind, and then its more fully developed forms. Agreeably with this plan, the Stoics, under the Roman emperors, will form its close.

As in our review of Cicero's philosophy we found that among the Romans independence of thought was, for the most part, confined to making a selection



from the various doctrines of the Greek philosophers, so we meet with a similar phenomenon in the case of Sextius. Quintus Sextius lived at Rome in the times of Julius Cæsar and Augutsus. A residence of his at Athens is also mentioned.<sup>1</sup> Having a distaste for politics, he devoted himself to philosophy,<sup>2</sup> and he founded a school at Rome, which appears to have attracted many disciples.<sup>3</sup> This school is expressly styled a new one,<sup>4</sup> even by those who acknowledged its pre-eminently Stoical character.<sup>5</sup> But on account of the Pythagorean doctrines, which he unquestionably adopted, he was placed in that school also by many in later times. His works were written in Greek, but in a style which at once reveals a Roman spirit and Roman habits.<sup>6</sup> For these are manifestly seen in the prevailing object of his works, which was to improve the state of morals and to substitute for the morbid supineness of his contemporaries a more manly spirit. For although he did not

<sup>1</sup> Sen. Ep. 98; Plin. Hist. Nat. xviii. 28.

<sup>2</sup> Sen. l. 1; Plut. de Prof. in Virt. 5.

<sup>3</sup> Sen. Qu. Nat. vii. 32. In addition to his son and Sotion, rhetoricians and grammarians are named as his disciples. Suet. de Clar. Gramm. 18, where for Q. Septimii, we must probably read Q. Sextii, Sen. Controv. ii. Præf. cf. Ep. 40, 100; Quint. x. 1, 124.

<sup>4</sup> Sen. Qu. Nat. vii. 32. in opposition to the Pythagorean school.

<sup>5</sup> Sen. Ep. 64.

<sup>6</sup> Sen. Ep. 59. *Græcis verbis, Romanis moribus. Quæst. Nat. vii. 32. Sextiorum nova et Romani roboris secta.* The dispute whether the collection of sentences given by Th. Gale (*Opusc. Mythol. Phys. et Eth. Amstel. 1688, p. 645—656.*) is to be considered as a Latin translation of those of Sextius, or the work of some Christian, is of little importance to us. It appears, it is true, that the groundwork of them belongs to a certain Sextus, but whether he is our Sextius is doubtful, and there is evidently so much of Christian sentiments mixed up with the rest as to render it utterly useless as a source of history. The traces of Pythagoras to be discovered in it are very slight indeed. Cf. Orelli *Opusc. Græcorum Veterum Sententiarum et Moralia*, i. p. 14, sqq.

wholly neglect physics, yet it was only to his ethical treatises that any importance was ascribed. These manifestly enjoined a very rigorous practice of virtue. Virtue he depicts as truly great and sublime; yet he gives a hope to man that he may attain to such excellence, if he will but strive after it with right earnestness.<sup>7</sup> Such earnestness is necessary; for there are too many things to seduce man to luxury, effeminacy, and vice. Man's life is one constant struggle; he ought incessantly to hold himself prepared.<sup>8</sup> Now the means which Sextius recommends for the attainment of virtue, are self-knowledge and temperance. He exhorts every one at the close of each day to examine himself as to the good he may have done, the vice he may have resisted, or the improvement he may have made.<sup>9</sup> He recommends the passionate man to look at himself in a mirror during his paroxysm, and he will then perceive the hatefulness of anger.<sup>10</sup> He advances, moreover, a precept which strongly savours of Pythagorean doctrines—he requires of the virtuous a total abstinence from animal food. But the reasons he gives, for such a practice are not Pythagorean, for he founds it on an opinion that variety of food is unhealthy and prejudicial to the body. It is also necessary to deprive luxury of its incentives, and men ought not to habituate themselves to cruelty.<sup>11</sup> These precepts bear a severe and rigorous character, and in agreement with their

<sup>7</sup> Plin. l. 1.<sup>8</sup> Sen. Ep. 59, 64.<sup>9</sup> Sen. de Ira, iii. 36.<sup>10</sup> Ib. ii. 36.<sup>11</sup> Sen. Ep. 108. But Sextius does not unconditionally forbid the use of animal food; he only declares it to be advisable to abstain from it. Orig. c. Cela. viii. 30; Sextii Sent. p. 648.

spirit, Sextius refused to accept the dignity of a senator. Seneca boasts of him as an example of old Roman habits; but it is not for the old political virtue of his nation, but for the severity and sanctity of his life, which led him to despise the duties of a citizen, in order to elevate the philosopher the more highly.

His school appears to have been continued in a similar spirit by his son of the same name, and by Sotion of Alexandria.<sup>12</sup> The latter, however, approximated to the Pythagoreans, by using the doctrine of the Metempsychosis as an argument for temperance and self-denial.<sup>13</sup> Yet, as the teacher of Seneca, Sotion is a proof how greatly the Stoical doctrine was indebted to the school of the Sextii for its diffusion.

The same direction was pursued by the Cynics of this time, who occasionally are confounded with the Stoics,<sup>14</sup> and whose doctrines so greatly resembled those of the New Stoics, that the latter painted the picture of a true Cynic, as the model of a truly philosophical life.<sup>15</sup> And in fact the later Cynics appear to owe their origin to the diffusion of Stoical principles of morals. As formerly, the Stoical philosophy resulted from the Cynical school, and derived its ethical rigour from it, but yet deviated from it, in order that by forming a doctrine of the grounds of all things, it might satisfy the requisitions of

<sup>12</sup> This is apparently proved by the Fragments which Stobæus has preserved for us from the work of Sotion on anger. They do not exhibit any originality.

<sup>13</sup> Sen. ep. 108.

<sup>14</sup> Thus Musonius is called a Cynic, Eunap. v. Soph. Proœm. p. 6.

<sup>15</sup> Arrian. Diss. Epict. iii. 22.

science; so now, conversely, the Cynical doctrines were naturally revived by the Stoical, when the latter had abandoned the more general scientific element, and confined themselves to merely practical exhortations to virtue. Now the New Cynics are not distinguished from the New Stoics otherwise than by their greater disposition to extravagance and extremes. This tendency led them to adopt much that was even positively bad, for which the corrupt character of the age afforded a rich aliment. With respect to philosophical development, the school of the New Cynics was of little importance, notwithstanding the number of its adherents, who were distinguished by a simple, not to say sordid, manner of living, by satirical mocking of the prevailing corruption of morals, and sometimes enforcing, by a propriety of life and manners, their exhortations to a simple and natural life. In the latter respect they have been not unjustly compared with the Christian monks.

The first Cynic of this age that is known to us, is Demetrius, the friend of Thræseas Pætus and of Seneca, who appears to have enjoyed a high reputation at Rome in the time of Nero and Vespasian.<sup>16</sup> The praises which have been lavished upon him, prove that he supported his contempt of all the outward advantages of life, by an inward independence and strength of mind, and boldly invited every visitation of the gods, and every blow of fate,

<sup>16</sup> Tac. Ann. xvi. 34; Hist. iv. 40; Suet. Vesp. 13; Sen. Ep. 62. In all probability the Cynic Demetrius whom Philostr. v. Apoll. iv. 25, mentions as living at Corinth, and as the teacher of the younger Menippus is the same as our Demetrius.

in order to display his courage and energy in his struggle with misfortune. It was thus that he sought to exhibit in his own person, a contrast to the moral supineness of his contemporaries.<sup>17</sup> As the disciples of Antisthenes regarded nothing but the establishing a simple rule of life, and despised the scientific rules of other philosophers; so did Demetrius extenuate the value of wisdom in general,<sup>18</sup> especially despising a knowledge of physics, and contented himself with simply inculcating such rules as might be useful for the conduct of life. It is better, he asserted, to hold fast to a few precepts of wisdom, which are of practical application, than to learn much, which not only has no reference to, but is wholly useless in practice. Man ought not to bewail the limits of human knowledge, for whatever has a use beyond the mere gratification of curiosity is easily learned; whatever is necessary for a good and happy life, has by nature herself been laid open, and is at the command of all. In this class of necessary knowledge he reckons these propositions: nothing is to be feared, and little to be hoped for, since the true treasures which every one ought to seek, may be found within himself; death is not an evil; man has little to fear from his fellows, and nothing from God; the mind ought to be dedicated to virtue, which everywhere leads man along an even road; men, as born for society, must look upon the world as their common habitation;

<sup>17</sup> Sen. de Prov. 3, 5; de Vita Beat. 18; Ep. 67; de Benef. vii. 8. *Quem mihi videtur rerum natura nostris tulisse temporibus, ut ostenderet, nec illum a nobis corrumpi, nec nos ab ullo corrigi posse.*

<sup>18</sup> Sen. de Benef. vii. 8. *Virum exactæ (licet neget ipse) sapientiæ.*

that we ought to lay open our conscience to the gods, and always live as if we were observed by the eye of all men, for we ought to dread our own selves more than any other. All knowledge beyond this he regards as merely the amusement of our leisure.<sup>19</sup>

From the time of Demetrius, Cynics are more frequently mentioned. However, they seldom came forward as authors; most of them, like Demetrius, seem to have made themselves remarkable by their lives, chiefly by their pursuit of independence, or their rejection of all social restraints, and by their expostulations and satire. Such was the character, for instance, of Demonax of Cyprus, who lived at Athens in the second century, and whose fame is preserved by a treatise of Lucius expressly devoted to him.<sup>20</sup> His exhortations to a moral life, which he supported by the example of his own conduct, appears indeed to have proceeded from a philosophical view, in adopting which, however, he was hardly true to the old Cynical doctrine. For we are expressly told that he formed his philosophy by a combination of the opinions of several.<sup>21</sup> If,

<sup>19</sup> *Ib.* vii. 1. Plus prodesse, si pauca præcepta sapientiæ teneas, sed illa in promptu tibi et in usu sint, quam si multa quidem didiceris, sed illa non habeas ad manum.—Nec de malignitate naturæ queri possumus, quia nullius rei difficilis inventio est, nisi cujus hic unus inventæ fructus est, invenisse.—si sociale animal et in commune genitus mundum ut unam omnium domum spectat et conscientiam suam diis aperuit semperque tanquam in publico vivit, si se magis veritus quam alios, subductus ille tempestatibus in solido ac sereno stetit, consummavit (scientiam utilem atque necessariam. Reliqua oblectamenta otii sunt.

<sup>20</sup> An opinion has occasionally been advanced that Lucian intended to paint in his *Demonax* the ideal of a Cynic; but the sketch contains too many characteristic features to justify such an opinion.

<sup>21</sup> *Luc. Demon.* 5.

as we are told, he sought to reconcile Socrates with Diogenes and Aristophanes,<sup>22</sup> the attempt seems to indicate a very loose Eclecticism, but which, however, may have been confined to a selection of the practical precepts of these philosophers. His Cynical character of thought, therefore, rested chiefly on a wish to promote the self-sufficiency of the sage, and to raise him to an independence of all external advantages,<sup>23</sup> which, however, he did not, like other Cynics, disdain to enjoy. At all events, he frequently censured the extravagances of the sect to which he belonged.<sup>24</sup> Of Demetrius, we see that he honoured the gods indeed, but yet sought to free himself and his disciples from all fear of them. This was an important point of the self-dependence which it was the object of the Cynics to attain to. In Demonax, however, this feature of the Cynical cast of view appears still more prominent; for, being accused of impiety, he defended himself in a manner that is far from concealing his contempt for the established worship.<sup>25</sup> And further, many expressions of his have been adduced full of contempt for religious ceremonies, and denying even the immortality of the soul.<sup>26</sup>

This tendency of the Cynical habit of thought to oppose the popular religion, is found in Ænomaus of Gadara, who lived in the time of Hadrian or somewhat later,<sup>27</sup> who was also distinguished

<sup>22</sup> Ib. 62.

<sup>23</sup> Ib. 3, 4.

<sup>24</sup> Ib. 19, 21, 48, 50.

<sup>25</sup> Ib. 11.

<sup>26</sup> Ib. 27, 32, 34, 66.

<sup>27</sup> The first according to Syncell. p. 349; the second according to Suid. s. v. *Διονύμαος*, who makes him but a little older than Porphyry.

as a writer.<sup>28</sup> The work of his most frequently quoted, is one in which he ridicules the oracles, and which was, in all probability, principally directed against the frauds and tricks of superstition.<sup>29</sup> To judge from the extant fragments, Cenomaus carried to great length the Cynical habit of deriding what was generally regarded as holy, and their disregard of decency, beauty, and other external advantages. On the other hand, he preached repentance and reformation, and the emancipation of the soul from all idle prejudices, and in this spirit declared that true Cynicism was not to be confounded with a slavish adherence to the opinions of Antisthenes or Diogenes.<sup>30</sup> His attack on the oracles was founded principally on the ground that, as they imply predestination and a universal necessity, they are consequently destructive of human liberty. But even the lowest animal possesses liberty; for vitality is the principle of motion. If man were not free he could do nothing of himself, and could not with justice be either praised or blamed. It is only by a free will that he can be good, and by it he may become the master of even his natural wants.<sup>31</sup> Thus we find even in this quarter, the question mooted, which

<sup>28</sup> A catalogue of his works in which, however, the best known to us are omitted, is to be found in Suid. l. 1.

<sup>29</sup> According to Euseb. Pr. Ev. v. 18. the title appears to have been *Φωρά Γοήτων*, the title *Kατὰ τῶν Χρησθηρίων* probably belongs only to a portion of the entire work. Iulian. Orat. v. 209, ed. Spanh.

<sup>30</sup> Iulian. Orat. vi. p. 187. *ὁ κυνισμὸς οὔτε Ἀντισθενισμὸς ἴστιν οὔτε Διογενισμὸς.*

<sup>31</sup> Euseb. Pr. Ev. vi. 7. *Ἡ ἐξουσία, ἣν ἡμεῖς μὲν αὐτοκράτορα τῶν ἀναγκαιοτάτων τιθίμεθα.* Theod. Gr. Aff. Cur. vi. p. 849, ed. Hal.



subsequently became the subject of profound philosophical investigation; and it is here associated with a controversy which shook the olden faith to its foundations, and thereby opened the way for a new cast both of thought and feeling.

This notice of the extremes into which the Cynics of this period fell, far surpassing all that we have heard of their earlier school, is sufficiently ample. They are indeed so far instructive, as they show how the evil elements of society usually attach themselves to every species of extravagance. And in such elements the present age was far more abundant than that of the earlier Cynics.<sup>32</sup> But there is another connected with them deserving of notice, and this is, that the Cynical sect was the nucleus of a growing attachment to the enthusiasm of Oriental Mysticism, notwithstanding the counter-acting disposition evinced by those Cynics, whom we have already noticed by name, to oppose the national superstition. We find an early instance of this oriental tendency in Demetrius, so highly celebrated in the time of Lucian for his magnanimous friendship, who at last, if the statement be deserving of credit, joined the Brahmins.<sup>33</sup> But still stronger traces of it are found in the history of Peregrinus Proteus, as it is given us by Lucian.<sup>34</sup> There was

<sup>32</sup> Ridicule of the corrupt habits of the Cynics forms, it is well known, a principal portion of the works of Lucian. As a specimen of such descriptions we may refer to the dialogue entitled *Ἀπαιρία*.

<sup>33</sup> Luc. Toxar. 27, sq. 34.

<sup>34</sup> This description cannot, it is true, pass for an historical document; nevertheless, on the authority of Gell. viii. 3; xii. 11, we must allow that it is founded upon historical traits, and the whole description proves, that Lucian believed this direction to be generally followed by the Cynics of his time.

undoubtedly one point in which Cynicism was closely related to Oriental ideas; viz. the contempt for all external good things, and of the occupations of life which are conversant about them; and from this point the development of the Oriental philosophy sprung up as it were naturally. But the extravagance of the Cynical rule of life appears to have brought the whole school into such disrepute that it gradually died away. It is true that in the fourth and fifth century Cynics are occasionally mentioned, but it is only as passing phenomena, which cannot be taken as furnishing a characteristic of the times. But of all the sects at Rome whose views of philosophy were pre-eminently practical, no one enjoyed a more lasting consideration than that of the Stoics. This, perhaps, was in some measure to be accounted for by the Roman love of political freedom, which passion alone kept alive more generous sentiments in their minds. To the later Romans, yet animated with a love of freedom, the example of the younger Cato shone forth as a brilliant model, to whose ideas and philosophy they ought to conform. The ill will with which the more tyrannical of the emperors viewed their doctrine could not suppress it; it had its martyrs, a Caius Julius, a Thræseus Pætus, an Helvidius Priscus, whose sufferings and death ennobled their philosophy.

At Rome, moreover, there were never wanting teachers of this philosophy, of whom, however, we shall only mention Athenodorus of Tarsus,<sup>35</sup> teacher

<sup>35</sup> In consequence of this individual being frequently confounded with others of the same name, and especially Athenodorus Cordylion of Tarsus, the

of Augustus, and Attalus, who taught at Rome under Tiberius,<sup>36</sup> and had Seneca for his disciple. This disciple, however, deserves a fuller notice.

L.

Annæus  
Seneca

~~M.~~ Annæus Seneca was born at Corduba in Spain, son of a Roman knight,\* who by his forensic eloquence had risen to distinction, and in the time of Augustus took up his residence at Rome. At this date Seneca was very young. He was intended for the profession of an advocate by his father, against whose will he zealously embraced the study of philosophy, and, after the precepts of the Stoics Attalus and Sotion, exercised himself in strict self-denial, for which in later times, when he took a part in public life, he thought it good to relax a little.<sup>37</sup> His fortune and fate perhaps have contributed no less than his writings to the reputation which he enjoys. Banished by Claudius, he was recalled by Agrippina, and appointed teacher of Nero, whom in the commencement of his reign he completely ruled, and whose violent and dissolute temper he laboured for many years, though not always with success, to temper and control. Such an appointment, in a court familiar with every vice, was too ambiguous not to cast an unfavourable shade on the character of Seneca, especially as he made it the means of acquiring immense wealth, and lived in the height of splendour and power, at the very time when he did not cease to claim credit for a Stoical contempt for all the good things of life in

president of the library at Pergamus, and teacher of Cato of Utica, it is impossible to give a very accurate account of his literary activity. But that he also wrote on philosophical subjects is clear from Cic. de Div. iii. 7.

<sup>36</sup> Sen. Ep. 108; Suasor. 2.

<sup>37</sup> Ep. 108; cf. cona. ad Helv. 16.

the finest flowers of an elaborate eloquence.<sup>38</sup> Nevertheless, his death has shed a softer light over the ambiguity of his conduct, and has hindered even stern judges from subjecting him to all the rigour of their censure. For Seneca did not escape the sanguinary cruelty of his imperial scholar; and having received a command to prepare for death, he contemplated its approach with calmness and fortitude, and sought by his last moments to attest the truth of the doctrines which he had avowed in life. To see in these moments of fortitude nothing but the dexterity of a skilful actor, appears to us to fall short of the measure of human charity.

But however Seneca may have conducted himself in the last moments of his existence, nothing shall deter us from imputing to the philosophical writings which he has left behind him, an extravagance which only too often transcends the limits of natural feeling and real conviction. His style has been justly censured for a brilliancy little suited to his subject, as displaying wit oftener than good sense; nevertheless, it is perfectly agreeable to the character of his ideas, and to the object he had in

<sup>38</sup> The contradiction between the theory and practice of Seneca has frequently been the subject of severe censure. See especially Dio Cass. lxi. 10. But Tacitus paints in a milder light the public character of Seneca, and in such it naturally appears if we contrast it with the madness of Nero, and the general corruption of political men at this date. Tacitus, however, is very far from exempting Seneca from the charge of flattery, and all the mean and little arts of a courtier. Cf. especially Ann. xiii. 3; xiv. 2, 7. Indeed the letters of Seneca furnish ample proof that he did not possess that firmness of mind which was indispensable to the profession of the Stoical philosophy in such an age. His *Consolatio ad Polybium* speaks strongly against him on this head. Against the reproaches which were made against him on account of his wealth, he defends himself, *de Vitâ Beatâ*, 21, sqq.

view. He would in vain disown the school of oratory in which he was formed; it is with him of little moment to convince, provided that he can dazzle and surprise by pointed antitheses and the elaborate ornament of his diction. For this purpose he is ever labouring to give some practical rule of life in a terse and pregnant form, with which every one of a long series of letters is closed, in order that, as the writer retires, he may be followed by the admiring plaudits of his reader.<sup>39</sup> Accordingly, he declares that a flowing, calmly advancing style is unsuited to philosophy,<sup>40</sup> although he could not fail to see that such elaborate care to throw out, as it were, in relief some pointed proposition, is a fault of composition; for he lays down the rule, that in correct writing each part should agree with the rest, and nothing by its especial brilliancy exclusively attract the eye to itself. But this rule he so misunderstands as to think that every sentence throughout should glitter;<sup>41</sup> and hence that overloading of ornament which makes his style so uniform. As we formerly observed in general, that the tendency of the Roman mind to the great and sublime assorted well with this rhetorical mode of treating the sciences, we must allow that Seneca's opinions of a correct style were not inconsistent with the Roman character; they are but its extreme and corrupt fruits. The sub-

<sup>39</sup> The first letters of Seneca, almost without exception, close in this manner with some sentence from the writings of Epicurus. He says himself: *Sed jam finem epistolæ faciam, si illi signum suum impressero, id est aliquam magnificam vocem perferendam ad te mandavero.* Ep. 13.

<sup>40</sup> Ep. 40.

<sup>41</sup> Ep. 33.

lime has been replaced by inflation, and grandeur degenerated into exaggeration. Of such exaggeration the precepts of Seneca are full; full, not merely of such unqualified dogmas as might easily grow out of the Stoical theory of ethics, but also of such as could only have flowed from a wish, by pronouncing such decided opinions, to gain credit for noble sentiments. It is not possible to overlook this bad taste in those passages where Seneca defies fortune, and challenges her to combat with himself. He is prepared; he only wants the opportunity of proving his strength and displaying his virtue.<sup>42</sup> When he praises friendship he is not content with conceding to it the merit that it makes every good possession still more valuable; but he must maintain that without a friend, no good, however great, is even agreeable; even wisdom herself has no charms for him if she must be enjoyed alone.<sup>43</sup> And then how inconsistent is the declaration which he presently makes, that whoever is a friend to himself can never be alone. When, however, he is praising wisdom, his words again assume a different tone. The sage is all-sufficient for himself; he is in want of nothing besides; if he is alone, he lives as Jupiter will when the world has ceased to be.<sup>44</sup> Nay, he is not satisfied with setting the sage on a level with the gods; he is even superior to them; they are wise by the gift of their nature, he by his own; they are free

<sup>42</sup> Ep. 64.

<sup>43</sup> Ep. 6. Si cum hac exceptione detur sapientia, ut illam inclusam habeam, non enunciam, rejiciam. Nullius boni sine socio jucunda possessio est.

<sup>44</sup> Ep. 9.

from suffering, but he is indifferent to it.<sup>45</sup> Thus he scarcely refrains from any self-contradiction, so long as he may set in the brightest light the precept which for the moment he is anxious to enforce. Thus, in order to recommend the profitable employment of time, he does not scruple to say, All is strange to us, time alone is our own.<sup>46</sup>

From the above particulars, it will be clear that Seneca gave his chief attention to the matters of morals. Nevertheless, they did not engage him exclusively, for physics also occupied him in some degree, but logic he almost wholly neglected. The opinions which he advances on the mutual relations of the three parts of philosophy, and of the importance of philosophy in general, are worthy of notice, as they serve to indicate the tendency of Roman ideas generally, and his own sentiments also. Throughout the philosophy of Seneca, it is apparent that however strictly he may have been formed in the study, he invariably assumes the character of a man of the world, and seeks therein to rise superior to the prejudices of the school. This gives him a certain resemblance to Cicero, with whose views his own frequently coincide so closely that the influence which that model of eloquence exercised on the mind of the Stoic is obvious. He dissuades men from seeking to gain the name of philosophers by assuming a particular dress or mode of life; the name of philosophy, he says, is already sufficiently odious wherever it is not recommended

<sup>45</sup> De Prov. 6; Ep. 53. Est aliquid, quo sapiens antecedit deum; ille naturæ beneficio non timet, suo sapiens.

<sup>46</sup> Ep. 1.

by moderation. Rudeness of manners, and filthiness in food or dress, ought to be avoided; no contempt for riches ought to be shown, but in all things man should proceed with due measure.<sup>47</sup> But a fondness for the captious disputes of philosophers he particularly reproves; the first thing to be studied, is, how to live and how to die;<sup>48</sup> and every part of philosophy must be brought to bear upon morality.<sup>49</sup> By this position, Seneca does not intend, it is true, absolutely to reject logic and physics, but yet, in the same manner as Cicero, he makes them entirely subordinate to ethics. Perhaps, however, Seneca goes further than Cicero in one respect, while on another he is drawn from following him by the influence of his school. He goes further, in giving a wider extent to what Cicero calls the captious and idle subtilties of philosophy. Among these he expressly names Dialectic, which is occupied in the detection of false arguments.<sup>50</sup> Even though he adopts the Stoical division of philosophy into Logic, Physics, and Ethics, it is nevertheless clear from his description of Logic, that he does not distinguish between Logic and Dialectic, and therefore must have regarded the former also as idle and superfluous.<sup>51</sup> Accordingly we do not meet in his works with any investigations into the criteria, and the discovery of truth. But he does not stop even here: on the contrary, his zeal to attain to a science at once simple, and adapted to the merely practical end of moral purity, carries him to the length of

<sup>47</sup> Ep. 5.<sup>48</sup> Ep. 45.<sup>49</sup> Ep. 89.<sup>50</sup> Ep. 45, 49, 82.<sup>51</sup> Ep. 89. *Proprietates verborum exigit et structuram et argumentationes, ne pro vero falsa surrepant.*



denying the utility of the liberal sciences and of philosophical physics also, so far at least as they do not bear upon moral questions. In his zeal he allows opinions to escape him which can scarcely be reconciled with a scientific range of ideas. To desire, e.g., to know more than is necessary, belongs to immoderation ; such knowledge serves only to engender pride, and the desire of it is but a part of the prevailing luxury.<sup>52</sup> Against the utility of physics, or the investigation into the supreme cause of all things, he adopts the remark of Cicero, which he advances, without any attempt at proof, as an admitted verity, that on those points man must be content with the probable ; since to arrive at a right understanding of these things is as far beyond human power as is the cognition of truth itself.<sup>53</sup> All that he is willing to admit, and here also he speaks on the authority of Cicero, is, that investigations of this kind may perhaps be not without their use as exercises of the mind, and as calculated to raise it above the sensible, and as admitting also of a moral application, since they enforce the truth that the soul ought to regulate the body, as God rules matter.<sup>54</sup> No one can fail to see that in all these points Seneca widely deviated from the opinions of the old Stoical sect ; frequently, indeed, he expressly contradicts some of its most special

<sup>52</sup> Ep. 88. Plus scire velle, quam sit satis, intemperantiæ genus est. Ep. 106 fin. Non faciunt bonos ista, sed doctos. Apertior res est sapere, imo simplicior. Paucis opus est ad mentem bonam litteris. Sed nos ut cætera in supervacuum diffundimus, ita philosophiam ipsam. Quemadmodum omnium rerum, sic litterarum quoque intemperantia laboramus ; non vitæ, sed scholæ discimus.

<sup>53</sup> Ep. 65.

<sup>54</sup> E. 1 ; Ep. 117.

principles, and censures it as fostering unprofitable and subtle disquisitions.<sup>55</sup> He wishes to keep himself free from all sects, and refuses to swear after the words of any master; he will use the good wherever he may find it, either with a Zeno or an Epicurus; he belongs to no one, but is common to all: the earlier teachers had investigated, not exhausted philosophy; he, too, will inquire, and perhaps will be bold enough to confide a little in his own judgment.<sup>56</sup> In this manner does he hope to free himself from the school, and to philosophize for life. But he trusted too much to his own powers when he hoped to equal the success of Cicero in such a design; he was anything but able to mould with the same bold and free hand, and to adapt the Greek philosophemes to his own views. He interweaves, it is true, occasional apophthegms of Epicurus with his own reflections; but he vainly endeavours to emancipate himself from the distinctions of the older Stoics. On the contrary, whenever he enters upon any deeper question, it is at once manifest that he is indebted to the school for nearly the whole of his ideas. He pretends, it is true, to despise the subtle distinctions of the Stoics; but if so, why does he enter into them? Why does he explain them to us or his friends?<sup>57</sup> It is difficult to free him from the reproach of taking a pride in his acquaintance with all the technicalities of the school. If he had been in earnest in the contempt which he

<sup>55</sup> E. g. Ep. 113, 117. Among these I notice the deviation of his opinions concerning the comets, which, however, evinces the correctness of his judgment. *Quæst. Nat.* vii. 19, sqq.

<sup>56</sup> Ep. 12, 16, 45; *de Vita Beata*, 3.

<sup>57</sup> E. g. Ep. 113.

expressed for all knowledge which did not bear immediately upon the conduct of life, we should find it difficult to explain his object in writing in his old age seven books on Natural Phenomena, which he dedicated to the same Lucilius as he inscribed his Moral Treatises, and which being mostly meteorological, have assuredly little reference to practice. In these, however, he appears entirely to have forgotten his boasted simplicity of philosophy, his independence of all school, and bitterly complains that the schools of philosophy stood empty when so much still remained to be discovered, and that even old discoveries had been lost or forgotten.<sup>58</sup> And so little does he appear to remember that he had elsewhere denied the value of natural science, except so far as it had influence on the improvement of manners, that, in perfect conformity, it is true, with the doctrines of his school, he eulogizes physiology as the chief of physical sciences, on the ground that it is occupied with the investigation into the divine nature. It stands, he says, in the same relation to the other parts of philosophy, that philosophy in general does to the liberal sciences; it is as far above ethics, as the divine is above the human; if man does not penetrate into the profound subjects of natural science, it is as well he might never have been born; virtue is undoubtedly a matter of the highest and gravest interest, but merely so far as it emancipates the mind from the corporeal, and prepares it for the cognition of heavenly things.<sup>59</sup> When we read

<sup>58</sup> Quæst. Nat. vii. fin.

<sup>59</sup> Quæst. Nat. i. Præf. Nisi ad hæc admitterer, non fuerat nasci.——

such opinions, it is difficult to believe that the same person is still writing. This inconsistency is not to be explained simply by Seneca's persuasion that at all times the particular subject that he may happen to treat of ought to be extolled above all others, but in some degree also by the fact that Cicero had advanced a somewhat similar opinion; Seneca, however, has omitted to add with Cicero, that although the doctrine of the divine is the most beautiful and the most sublime truth that man can contemplate, yet the cognition of what is human is nearer and more appropriate to him.

But our astonishment at such rhetorical encomiums of physical speculations, greatly increases as we observe how little applicable they are to the particular topics which Seneca selected for investigation. For in these Seneca does not treat of the supreme cause of nature, but merely of the stars, the elements, and natural phenomena. Whatever he has to say on these subjects, is merely the result of reflection on the observations of experience which lay before him, and which he estimates by the standard of the general ideas of the Stoics. Of philosophy they contain absolutely nothing. What were his thoughts therefore on this head, must be traced in his moral treatises. But from the specimen we have given of his mode of handling philosophical questions, no one will expect to glean even from these much of a very decided character. After the Stoics, he distinguishes two kinds of moral

*Virtus enim, quam affectamus, magnifica est, non quia per se beatum est malo caruisse, sed quia animum laxat ac præparat ad cognitionem cælestium, dignumque efficit, qui in consortium deo veniat.*

doctrines, the one being engaged about the general principles of conduct, the other laying down rules for special cases.<sup>60</sup> He attempts to prove that both are equally necessary ; but the latter is most to his own taste. He remarks that it is not enough to know generally what may be right and according to nature, but man must enter into nice discriminations of special circumstances, in order to have a rule of action ready for every possible emergency. It is useful, therefore, frequently to ask one's self, what ought, in this or that, case to be done. It is with this part of ethics that Seneca is almost exclusively engaged, and he therefore highly extols those brief maxims which come home at once to the heart, and attract it to good, and do not allow us to ask for further reasons for trusting to them, so evidently does their truth shine upon the soul.<sup>61</sup>

Such a method of treating the question of morals precludes almost all hope, either of method in investigation, or of a precise determination of the limits within which alone each principle maintains its validity. It gives room for the frequent repetition of the same precept, in order that it may be impressed more indelibly on the memory. Now what we have to remark on the character of his moral doctrine, is confined to a few general principles, which indicate his mode of apprehending the Stoical ethics. In general, it is undeniable that all his moral requisitions are tempered with moderation. He follows, it is true, the Stoical custom of delineating the character of the sage as an ideal ; but at the same time he is conscious of his own

<sup>60</sup> Ep. 94, 95.<sup>61</sup> Ep. 94

weakness ; he numbers himself with those who are merely on the road to good, as indeed all men are ; he may be justified in urging them to assimilate themselves to the gods, but human and mortal nature in general, only admits of this assimilation in a certain degree,<sup>62</sup> and, in particular, each individual has his own faults which wisdom may diminish, but never eradicate.<sup>63</sup> He, therefore, declares it to be but just, in judging the transgressor, to call to mind one's own weakness ;<sup>64</sup> and he labours to promote a general love of mankind, by insisting on the due remembrance of the maxim, I am a man, and I consider nothing human to be indifferent to myself.<sup>65</sup> However, he is unable exactly to reconcile this moderation with his Stoical principles. Thus he will not admit, that it is justly objected to the Stoics that they exact too much of men when they require that they should emancipate themselves from all mental emotions, for it is only our weakness that still clings to them ; we fight for them because we love them ; because we are not willing to abandon them, we allege that it is impossible to get rid of them.<sup>66</sup> Indeed he even goes further. In order to excite men to virtue, he refuses to remit the rigour of the Stoical maxim, that the supreme good—the end of human life—is really attainable. In man a god resides, a perfect reason ; it is our

<sup>62</sup> De Benef. i. 1. Hos (sc. deos) sequamur duces, quantum humana imbecillitas patitur. Ep. 57. Quædam enim, mi Lucili, nulla virtus effugere potest ; admonet illam natura mortalitatis suæ. The sage is here intended.

<sup>63</sup> Ep. 11. Nulla enim sapientin naturalia corporis aut animi vitia ponuntur ; quidquid infixum et ingenitum est, lenitur arte, non vincitur.

<sup>64</sup> De ira i. 14.

<sup>65</sup> Ep. 95.

<sup>66</sup> Ep. 116. Nolle in causa est, non posse prætenditur.

nature. If only we will devote ourselves entirely to virtue, what can be wanting to our success? It is a very easy matter to follow nature; and it only becomes difficult through the universal folly of mankind.<sup>67</sup> Yet in spite of all these assertions of Seneca, one can scarcely believe that this virtue, this perfect innocency of life, is so very easily acquired; for in other passages, even Seneca himself does not seem to regard it as free from all difficulty. He evidently supposes that there is a tendency in man's nature to the madness of vice, since he is driven to confess, that even after a destruction and renovation of the world, the new race of men will soon lose its innocence. Moreover, he declares, that virtue is difficult, and not to be attained without the aid of education, while vice is learned without a master.<sup>68</sup>

There is yet a point of Seneca's doctrine which we must not wholly omit to mention. His pious and religious sentiments have been the theme of frequent praise, and in fact, his exhortations to virtue are generally based on a respect to the divine laws, divine providence, and the God who rules within man. And again, whenever he appeals to the example of great and exalted men, he considers them as the best proof of the presence of a divine mind in the world. A reverence, a child-like love, of the gods ought in this life to be our guide,

<sup>67</sup> Ep. 41. *Animus et ratio in animo perfecta. Quid est autem, quod ab illo ratio hæc exigit? Rem facillimam: secundum naturam suam vivere; sed hanc difficilem facit communis insania*

<sup>68</sup> *Quest. Nat. iii. 30. fin. Sed illis quoque innocentia non durabit, nisi dum novi sunt. Cito nequitia subrepat; virtus difficilis inventu est; rectorem ducemque desiderat; etiam sine magistro vitia discuntur.*

and teach us to regard the accidents of life as gracious dispensations of the gods.<sup>69</sup> That these precepts are not wholly conceived in the spirit of the ancient Stoics will, perhaps, appear to many to be a merit. Seneca is very far from defending the fables of the olden religion, by giving them, after the manner of his sect, a philosophical interpretation: on the contrary, he composed a work against the superstitions of the old religion, in which he attacked not only the foreign rites, which in his day found admission into Rome, but also the Roman ceremonies themselves. It was only on the plea of a long prevailing custom, that he wished them to be spared.<sup>70</sup> In this feeling he agreed with all the enlightened Romans of his day. The religion which he recommended, was simply a veneration of the divine power, which is revealed in the universe, and in man as the intellectual and animating principle; but he condemns the religious practices of the people—all supplication to the gods, and uplifting of the hands to heaven.<sup>71</sup> Seneca affords an unquestionable proof, that the ancient patriotic sentiment which formerly expressed itself in veneration for the national gods was long since dead. This fact is still more strongly evinced in his estimate of public life. He does not, it is true, wholly condemn it, but still he is of opinion, that the sage

<sup>69</sup> De Benef. vii. 31; De Prov. 2. Patrium habet deus adversus bonos viros animum et illos fortiter amat et, operibus, inquit, doloribus ac damnis exagitantur, ut verum colligant robur.

<sup>70</sup> Ap. August. de Civ. D. vi. 10. Omnem istam ignobilem deorum turbam, quam longo ævo longa superstitio congecit, sic, inquit, adorabimus, ut meminerimus cultum ejus magis ad morem, quam ad rem pertinere.

<sup>71</sup> Ep. 41.



will withdraw from it so long as he is not constrained by urgent reasons to an opposite course; he extols a retired life as more consonant to the intellectual character of the sage. Philosophy is not a foe of princes and kings; on the contrary, she is grateful to them, she honours them as parents, because they secure leisure and security to the sage.<sup>72</sup>

We have dwelt on the doctrine of Seneca at some length, because it was calculated to show how little talent the Romans possessed for philosophy. From him we shall proceed to mention another Roman Stoic, who at this time enjoyed considerable reputation among the members of his school. L. Musonius Rufus,<sup>73</sup> a native of Volsinii in Etruria, and of the Equestrian order, who taught at Rome in the time of Nero, by whom he was banished, but, returning after his death, flourished under the emperors Vespasian and Titus.<sup>74</sup> The influence which he gained was dependent on his avocations as a teacher, for he does not appear to have come forward as a writer. We must therefore form our judgment of his philosophy from the *Memorabilia* of Musonius,<sup>75</sup> which

<sup>72</sup> *De Otio Sapientis* (de Vit. Beat.) 29, sqq. Ep. 19, 36, 73.

<sup>73</sup> More particulars may be found in an *Essay of Moser's* in Daub's u. Creuzer's *Studien* Bd. 6 S. 74, sqq., who has partially drawn from a treatise of Rieuwland's de Musonio Rufo Philosopho Stoico. Amstel. 1783, which I have not been able to consult.

<sup>74</sup> Tac. Ann. xiv. 59; xv. 71; Hist. iii. 81; Themist. Or. p. 173, Hard.; Suid. s. v. Μουσώνιος.

<sup>75</sup> Suid. s. v. Πωλίων, Plin. Ep. vii. 31. According to this passage Musonius is also called Bessus. There is a slight variation in the inscription of the fragment given by Stob. Serm. Append. p. 385 (15). Another source apparently for the philosophy of Musonius is furnished by the *Discourses* and *Extracts* of Stobæus, which frequently bear the title, 'Ρούφου ἐκ τῶν Ἐπικτήτου περὶ φιλίας. Probably maxims of Musonius Rufus, which passed from the mouth of Epictetus into the works of Arrian. See Schweighæuser *Epict. Phil. Monum.* iii. p. 195.

were written in Greek by Claudius Pollio, after the model of Xenophon's *Memorabilia* of Socrates, and of which no inconsiderable fragments remain.

If we compare Musonius with Cicero, or even with Seneca, we are immediately struck with the great change which in the interval has been affected in the mode of treating philosophy among the Romans. If in the time of Cicero it was cultivated partly as an accomplishment of the man of the world, partly as a want of man generally as a comfort in the storms of life, in Musonius it has already assumed the form of a mere wisdom of the schools. It is true that Musonius pretended to form men not for the school, but for life; yet what Musonius understood by this, was merely the life of a philosopher, who, in order to gain a maintenance, may indeed occupy himself with other affairs, but yet with such only as will allow him leisure and opportunity for studying and teaching philosophy.<sup>76</sup> To this pursuit he exhorts all men with all his powers, but the young particularly, and even the female sex, because without philosophy no one can be virtuous and fulfil his duties.<sup>77</sup> To a king of Syria, who frequented his school, he strives by every means to demonstrate that philosophy which he had previously neglected was indispensable for the right conduct of his affairs, and among other arguments he particularly insists upon this, that philosophy is a better teacher of eloquence than rhetoric.<sup>78</sup> All

<sup>76</sup> Stob. Serm. lvi. 18. Δεινὸν γὰρ ἂν τοῦτο τῷ ὄντι ᾔην, εἴπερ ἐκώλυνεν ἡ ἐργασία τῆς γῆς φιλοσοφεῖν ἢ ἄλλους πρὸς φιλοσοφίαν ὠφελεῖν.

<sup>77</sup> Stob. Serm. App. p. 415 (51), 425 (62).

<sup>78</sup> Stob. Serm. xlviii. 67.

this might have been advanced by other philosophers less scholastic, and especially by Stoics, but with Musonius it is the chief point; it is not the exaggeration of a theoretic view, but the conviction of his life. We see in him a man, who, knowing little of the pursuits of the rest of the world beyond what he may have heard from his Stoical masters, believed that all other men are evil, but philosophers alone good,<sup>79</sup> who therefore placed a rural life in an ideal light of excellence as compared with the corrupt habits of the city, who loved to paint the philosophical peasant giving at the plough lessons and examples of wisdom to his disciples;<sup>80</sup> and who placed the case of a son who should be forbidden by his father to pursue philosophy, on a level with one whose parent should command him to commit a theft.<sup>81</sup> Moreover, the philosophy which he would have every one to cultivate, is not a mere matter of words, of instruction, or of the school; but he is of opinion that every one by his own reflection and practice may pursue it for himself, but at the same time he considers it becoming in a philosopher to wear the philosopher's robe, to allow the hair to grow, and to retire from the general society of men.<sup>82</sup> At the same time he is full of the power of philosophy over the minds of men; by it he hopes to heal all the

<sup>79</sup> Ib. lxxix. 51. Τὸ δὲ γε ἀγαθὸν τῷ φιλόσοφον εἶναι ταύτῳ ἐστίν.

<sup>80</sup> Ib. lvi. 18. Τί δὲ τὸ κωλύον ἐστὶ καὶ ἐργαζόμενον μετὰ τοῦ διδασκάλου τὸν μαθητὴν ἀκοῦειν τι ἄμα περὶ σωφροσύνης ἢ δικαιοσύνης ἢ καρτερίας λέγοντος;

<sup>81</sup> Ib. lxxix. 51.

<sup>82</sup> L. i. 8n. Καὶ οὕτε τρίβωνα πάντως ἀμπίχισθαι δεήσει σε, οὕτε ἀχίτωνα διατελεῖν, οὐδὲ κομᾶν, οὐδ' ἐκβαίνειν τὸ κοινὸν τῶν πολλῶν. πρέπει μὲν γὰρ καὶ ταῦτα τοῖς φιλοσόφοις· ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐν τούτοις τὸ φιλοσοφεῖν ἐστίν, ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ φρονεῖν ἃ χρὴ καὶ διανοεῖσθαι.

corruption of the human mind. His general manner has been portrayed to us in a single trait by Tacitus, better than by all the maxims recorded by his credulous disciple. When the parley was held before the city between the party of Vitellius and the army of Vespasian, we are told by the historian that the philosopher visited with the agent of Vitellius the hostile camp, and mingling among the angry soldiery began to speak to them of the blessings of peace and the perils of war. Naturally enough, such exhortations met with no favour. Being received with mockery and threatened with rough treatment, the philosopher was forced to desist from his unseasonable display of wisdom.<sup>83</sup>

In other respects the doctrines attributed to Musonius greatly resembled those which Xenophon has put into the mouth of Socrates not only in his *Memorabilia*, but also in the *Symposium* and the *Economics*. The philosophy which he recommended was a very simple doctrine, consisting entirely of rules for the conduct of life. Far removed from that admiration of logic or dialectic which animated the older Stoics, he required for philosophy neither fulness, nor accuracy, nor clearness of language; but, he said, all knowledge ought to be serviceable to

<sup>83</sup> Tact. Hist. iii. 81. *Intempestivam sapientiam*. Tacitus, although favouring a stern philosophy, not unfrequently dissents from the favourable judgment of philosophers of his day, which the prejudices of their fellows have led them to pass upon them. On the occasion of his mentioning the action of Musonius, which gave him the greatest applause—his accusation of Publius Celer, also a Stoic,—Tacitus gives us to understand that it was not the philosophers, but the leading senators, that played the principal part in this affair. Hist. iv. 10, c. not. Lips. On the same occasion he severely censures, Ib. 40, the Cynic Demetrius, who defends Celer, whom, however, Seneca could hardly praise sufficiently.

action.<sup>84</sup> It is true he does not, in that unscientific spirit which is so blameable in Seneca, entirely reject dialectical investigations, but on the contrary regards it as a proof of a weak mind to decline to examine the fallacy which perplexes it;<sup>85</sup> yet at the same time he expresses his disgust at the multitude of dogmas wherewith the Sophists fed their own vanity.<sup>86</sup> But as he paid little value to logic, so he seems to have given but slight attention to the physical doctrines of the Stoics. Very little belonging to this field of inquiry is touched upon at all by him. And this, for the most part, relates to the doctrine of the gods in which he ordinarily follows the practice of the Stoics, and adopts the national religion,<sup>87</sup> and even speaks of the nurture which the gods derive from the vapours of the earth and water.<sup>88</sup> His views, however, occasionally rise a little higher, and he asserts that the gods know all things without need of reasoning, since to them nothing can be obscure or unknown.<sup>89</sup> Connected herewith are his views of the soul of man, which he considers to be akin to the gods'; but yet at the

<sup>84</sup> Stob. Serm. App. p. 418 (55), 427 (65). 'Ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅσους μεταχειρίζονται λόγους, τῶν ἔργων φημί δεῖν ἵνα μεταχειρίζεσθαι αὐτούς.

<sup>85</sup> Arrian. *Diag. Epict.* i. 7, p. 46, Upton.

<sup>86</sup> Stob. Serm. lvi. 18. Πολλῶν μὲν γὰρ λόγων οὐ δεῖ τοῖς φιλοσοφῆσαι καλῶς, οὐδὲ τὸν ὄχλον τούτων τῶν θεωρημάτων ἀναληπτίον πάντως τοῖς νίοις, ἐφ' ᾧ φυσωμένους τοὺς σοφιστὰς ὀρῶμεν.

<sup>87</sup> *Ib.* lxvii. 20; lxxix. 51; lxxxv. 20, fin. I will take advantage of this opportunity to mention that a grammarian and rhetorician of this time, L. Anneus Cornutus, also gave an interpretation of mythology in the spirit of the Stoical philosophy. This work, written in Greek, is still extant, under the erroneous name of Phornutus. Th. Gale *Opusc. Myth. Phys. et Eth.* p. 139, sqq. In it most of the physical doctrines of the Stoics are hinted at, but no more. It contains, however, nothing in any way useful to our purpose.

<sup>88</sup> *Ib.* xvii. 43.

<sup>89</sup> *Ib.* App. p. 420 (57).

same time he agrees with his sect, in supposing it to be a body, which after being corrupted by corporeal influence, may be again purified and cleansed.<sup>90</sup> But the liberty of the rational soul (διάνοια) is strongly asserted by him in a manner utterly opposed to the Stoical principle, for he makes the reason to be wholly free from necessity.<sup>91</sup> But these opinions are but occasional remarks; his views as otherwise expressed excite a doubt whether he ever bestowed any especial attention on logic and physics; for he held that philosophy is nothing else than an investigation and practice of what is becoming and obligatory;<sup>92</sup> and philosophy, he says, is merely the pursuit of a virtuous life.<sup>93</sup>

His rules of conduct are far removed from most of the extravagancies of the Stoics. It is only from the extreme view, that philosophy is the only sure road to virtue, that he cannot emancipate himself; and on this account he requires of all, both men and women, that they should cultivate it. On the other hand, virtue does not stand so high with him as with the ancient Stoics, who ascribed her to the sage alone, whose existence, however, among the sons of men they were disposed to question. The doubts which such a view gave rise to among men of the world, of the reality of virtue, Musonius

<sup>90</sup> Ib. xvii. 43.

<sup>91</sup> Ib. lxxix. 51. a. fin. 'Ανάγκης πάσης ἐκτὸς ἐλευθέραν καὶ αὐτεξούσιον.

<sup>92</sup> Ib. lxvii. 20, fin. Οὐ γὰρ δὴ φιλοσοφεῖν ἕτερόν τι φαίνεται ὅν ἡ τὸ ἄ πρέπει καὶ ἄ προσήκει λόγῳ μὲν ἀναζητεῖν, ἔργῳ δὲ πράττειν. Cf. App. p. 425 (63).

<sup>93</sup> Ib. App. p. 419 (55). 'Ἐπειδὴ καὶ φιλοσοφία καλοκαγαθίας ἐστὶν ἀπιτήδευσις καὶ οὐδὲν ἕτερον.

sought to remove by the remark, that it is only from seeing virtuous men that we form the notion of virtue.<sup>94</sup> In the same spirit he does not stretch to its usual extreme the requisition of the Stoics, that man should live agreeably to nature; on the contrary, he agrees with Seneca in considering it as easy to follow one's own nature,<sup>95</sup> and the only great impediment which he can find to a truly moral life is, the prejudices with which the mind is filled from childhood, and the evil habits confirmed by practice.<sup>96</sup> On this account he regards philosophy as a mental art of healing, and lays a greater stress than the older Stoics did on the practice of virtue, without however adopting the view of the Peripatetics, who insisted that practice must precede knowledge. On the contrary, while he insists that instruction in the nature of good is indispensable, he is so far from ascribing to the knowledge of good, unassisted by practice, sufficient power to lead man to virtue, that he lays greater stress on practice than on precept.<sup>97</sup> He distinguishes two kinds of practice; the exercise of the mind in reflection and the adoption

<sup>94</sup> Ib. cxvii. 8. Καὶ μὴν οὐκ ἀδύνατον γενέσθαι τοιοῦτον ἀνθρώπον· σὺ γὰρ ἐτίρωθ' ἐν ποθὲν ταύτας ἐπινοῆσαι τὰς ἀρετὰς ἔχομεν ἢ ἀπ' αὐτῆς τῆς ἀνθρωπείας φύσεως, ἐντυχόντες ἀνθρώποις τοῖς δὲ τισιν, οἷους ὄντας αὐτοὺς θεῖους καὶ θεοειδεῖς ὠνόμαζον.

<sup>95</sup> L. 1.

<sup>96</sup> Ib. xxix. 78. Οἱ δὲ φιλοσοφεῖν ἐπιχειροῦντες ἐν διαφθορᾷ γεγεννημένοι πρότερον πολλῇ καὶ ἰμπελησμένοι κακίας, οὕτω μετῴσι τὴν ἀρετὴν, ὥστε καὶ ταύτῃ πλείονος δεηθῆναι τῆς ἀσκήσεως.

<sup>97</sup> L. 1.; Ib. App. p. 387 (17). Συνεργεῖ μὲν γὰρ καὶ τῇ πράξει ὁ λόγος διδάσκων, ὅπως πρακτικόν, καὶ ἐστὶ τῇ γάξει (c. Conj. Wyttenb.; Codd. πράξει) πρότερος τοῦ ἔθους· οὐ γὰρ ἰθυσθῆναι τι καλὸν οἷόν τι μὴ κατὰ λόγον ἰθιζόμενον· δυνάμει μὲντοι τὸ ἔθος προτερεῖ τοῦ λόγου, ὅτι ἐστὶ κυριώτερον ἐπὶ τὰς πράξεις ἀγεῖν τὸν ἀνθρώπον ἢ πρὸς ὁ λόγος.

of good rules of life, and the endurance of corporeal pains which affect both the soul and the body.<sup>98</sup>

The sum of the several rules of life given by Musonius may be briefly comprised in this,—that a life according to nature consists in social, friendly sentiments and temper, and in contentment with what will simply alleviate the first wants of nature. The social and friendly character of his sentiments is seen in this, that he combats all selfishness, and regards marriage not merely as the only becoming and natural gratification of the passions, but looks upon it as the principle of the family and state, and the preservation of the whole human race.<sup>99</sup> Accordingly, he zealously protests against the exposure of children as an unnatural custom,<sup>100</sup> and seizes every opportunity to recommend the practice of benevolence.<sup>101</sup> His precepts to be observed for a simple life enter into great particularity of details, in which he gives nice regulations for diet, the care of the body, clothing, and furniture.<sup>102</sup> These precepts are not without their singularity. Thus he recommends that the hair should be allowed to grow long and not cut too close; and the beard he had in honour, on the ground that the hair was given us by nature for the covering of the body. Like the modern Pythagoreans, he forbids all animal food, and prefers the aliments which are furnished and offered by nature sufficiently dressed to those which require the aid of art and cooking.<sup>103</sup> Such precepts serve,

<sup>98</sup> Ib. xxix 78.

<sup>100</sup> Ib. lxxv. 15; lxxxiv. 21.

<sup>102</sup> Ib. i. 84; vi. 62; xvii. 43; lxxxv. 20.

<sup>99</sup> Ib. vi. 61; lxvii. 20.

<sup>101</sup> E. g. ib. i. 84.

<sup>103</sup> Ib. vi. 62; xvii. 43.



at least, to show the diversified applications of which the vague term "agreeable to nature" admits.

If the Stoics, whom we have just noticed, possessed at most but moderate talents, we must concede to Epictetus, the disciple of Musonius, profounder ideas, and a more complete and regular system. Even in these times the superiority in point of science is still on the side of the Greeks. Epictetus, whose name is justly eminent among the Stoics, was born at Hieropolis of Phrygia, a slave of Epaphroditus one of the freedmen of Nero, whom in his writings Epictetus described as a courtier and flatterer.<sup>104</sup> How Epictetus acquired his liberty is unknown. He lived a considerable time at Rome and attached himself as a disciple to Musonius Rufus, but was probably a hearer also of another Stoic, Euphrates by name.<sup>105</sup> When, however, the philosophers were banished Rome by Domitian, he removed to Nicopolis in Epirus, where he taught philosophy. The nature of his instructions has been recorded by his scholar, Arrian, in the same manner that Xenophon has given us the doctrines of Socrates. The lessons, of which Arrian gives the subject-matter, do not date before the time of Trajan,<sup>106</sup> when Epictetus must have been far advanced in years, and it is therefore improbable that he returned to Rome in the reign of Hadrian.<sup>107</sup> He was poor and lame, but bore his lot with Stoical

<sup>104</sup> Arrian. *Diss. Epict.* i. 19, p. 107, Upton.

<sup>105</sup> He mentions this individual with very distinguished respect. Arrian. *Diss.* iv. 8, p. 636. Rufus is frequently mentioned by him as his teacher. *Diss.* i. 1, p. 10; 7, p. 46; 9, fin.; iii. 6, 15, fin.

<sup>106</sup> *Diss.* iv. 5, p. 602.

<sup>107</sup> This it has been sought to infer from Spartian. *Hadr.* 16, sq.

fortitude,<sup>108</sup> and is in general painted as furnishing a model of a wise life.<sup>109</sup> As he did not leave behind him any philosophical treatise, we are indebted for all that we know of him to Arrian, who not only published a long work compiled from his notes of the lectures of Epictetus,<sup>110</sup> but also gave a brief compendium of the principal maxims of his teacher, which is known under the title of the *Enchiridion* or *Manual* of Epictetus.<sup>111</sup>

The designation of Stoic which is usually given to Epictetus is justified by the fact that in the general notions which form the groundwork of his moral theory, he attaches himself to the Stoical school, and that, for the most part, he employs its technical language. But this Stoical element forms not the essence of his doctrine, and it is even far from free from all intermixture with other doctrines which he apparently held in equal esteem. He shows a disposition for Eclecticism which cannot be mistaken. Socrates and Diogenes are esteemed by him not less than Zeno:<sup>112</sup> all these he says played well the

<sup>108</sup> The story that he was lamed by the severity of his master (Orig. c. Cels. vii. c. 7), finds some confirmation from Arrian. *Diss.* i. 12, p. 76; 19, p. 105. But a different cause is likewise assigned for his lameness. Simpl. cius, in his commentary on the *Enchiridion* of Epictetus, 9, p. 102, Heins., says that he was of a weakly constitution and lame from his youth.

<sup>109</sup> For the life of Epictetus, cf. Suid. s. v. 'Επικτήτης. Gell. ii. 18; xv. 11.

<sup>110</sup> These are the *Διατριβαὶ τοῦ Ἐπικτήτου*, of which four books are still extant.

<sup>111</sup> Simpl. in Epict. *Enchir. Præf.* The relation which the *Manual* bore to the *Diatribæ* cannot be accurately determined, since the latter no longer exist in completeness. The same is probably the case with the *Manual*, since many maxims are quoted as from it, which are not now to be found in it. The two works follow a different order, or rather disorder, but they agree occasionally with each other, word for word.

<sup>112</sup> *Diss.* iii. 21, p. 441.

parts that they had severally to play ; they ought to serve as an example to us. Plato also is revered by him as a model for philosophers, and his opinions are frequently adopted, especially such as originally propounded by Socrates were first set in their full light by Plato. Thus Epictetus maintains that the foundation of all philosophy is self-knowledge, that is, the conviction of man's ignorance and weakness when measured by the standard of good, which is the idea of God ; and God, therefore, whose essence is goodness, ought to be the first subject of instruction.<sup>113</sup> At the same time he remarks, that all instruction must set out with an understanding of the term—the notion,<sup>114</sup> and he looks upon hypotheses as steps to knowledge.<sup>115</sup> Perfectly in the spirit of Socrates and Plato, but somewhat inconsistently with the principles of his sect, he claims compassion for the vicious, on the ground that it is through ignorance alone that they do evil.<sup>116</sup> We might still swell the number of such quotations, were it not clear from the whole tenor of his doctrine rather than from any detached opinions that he had applied with a real love to the study of the Platonic philosophy. It is only for Epicurus, the New Academy, and the Pyrrhonists that he evinces an aversion, and these he seeks to refute by a few simple remarks. They even who contradict the truth maintain its reality, and this simply is the best refutation of such objectors. Whoever denies that there is a universal truth advances this very

<sup>113</sup> *Ib.* ii. 8, 11, 14, p. 243.

<sup>115</sup> *Ib.* i. 17, p. 44.

<sup>114</sup> *Ib.* i. 17 ; ii. 14, p. 244.

<sup>116</sup> *Ib.* i. 18, 28 ; ii. 22, *fin.*

denial as a universal truth. Although Epicurus held that there is no fellow feeling or sympathy between man and man, we yet find him refuting himself by teaching others, and thereby seeking communion with them. To the Sceptics he objects that it is impossible to be guided entirely by custom or by circumstances.<sup>117</sup> On the other hand he avows a decided predilection for the Cynical habits of life, and in the sketch that he gives of a Cynic he is manifestly delineating his own ideal of a manly and blameless character. The genuine Cynic is given by God to the rest of mankind as an example.<sup>118</sup> He admits, indeed, that all cannot lead a Cynical life; it is only strong minds that can elevate themselves to the height of such a model.<sup>119</sup> After this encomium of the Cynical life it cannot be wondered that Epictetus should occasionally have been classed with the Cynics, and he himself would not perhaps have refused this title if he had not extended his view of philosophy to a wider range than either the Cynical or Stoical schools.

In one respect, however, the philosophy of Epictetus does not go beyond the range of the Cynical doctrine of his age. He is so far from refusing to imitate them in giving an undue preponderance to Ethics over the other parts of philosophy, that we find him adhering to the direction which all the other Stoics were pursuing. He does not, indeed, consider logical investigations to be wholly useless, but, with his master Musonius he represents it even as a duty of the philosopher to solve the fallacies which present

<sup>117</sup> Ib. i. 5, 27, 28; ii. 20.

<sup>118</sup> Ib. iii. 22.

<sup>119</sup> Ib. iv. 8, p. 640.

a difficulty.<sup>120</sup> But, at the same time, he makes them subordinate to practical purposes, and a useful instrument for ethics. At times, indeed, he seems to look upon the solution of sophistical arguments as a matter for which man was not made,<sup>121</sup> and to class them among those questions which it is not in his nature to solve, and in which he ought to confess his ignorance as readily as he would his inability to number the stars of heaven; but still he does not mean by these propositions absolutely to deny the importance of such questions; they have their use in all cases where they admit of being employed.<sup>122</sup> Hence arises, according to Epictetus, the duty of pursuing logical investigations. The gift of clear language must be esteemed as a gift of the gods; men ought to seek to improve it, and not be idle or remiss in the work from any fear of the difficulties which it may present. Only it must not be regarded, as it is by Dialecticians, as the end of existence;<sup>123</sup> it is only as a means that it has any value; it is subservient to reasoning, and to the distinguishing between true and false arguments.<sup>124</sup> But it is not merely in this sense alone that he wishes logic to be cultivated; he also assigns to it another office, that of affording proof of valid reasoning, and certainty in judgment.<sup>125</sup> But with all this, he does not forget to exhibit in the strongest light the subordination of logic to practical ends. The first and most necessary part of philosophy respects the application of doctrine, for example,

<sup>120</sup> Ib. i. 7, p. 46.<sup>121</sup> Ib. ii. 19.<sup>122</sup> Ib. ii. 21, p. 308.<sup>123</sup> Ib. ii. 23.<sup>124</sup> Ib. i. 4; ii. 12, 23.<sup>125</sup> Ib. iii. 2; *Manuale*, 52 Schweigh. (51 Upt.)

that man should not lie; the second is conversant about reasons, e. g. why man should not lie; while the third, lastly, examines and establishes the reasons. This is the logical part which finds reasons, shows what is a reason, and that a given reason is a right one. This last part is necessary, but only on account of the second, which again is rendered necessary by the first.<sup>126</sup> It is manifest that this division is devoid of value in a scientific point of view, and generally we must confess that the weakest part of the system of Epictetus is its scientific form, which, however, is such as strikingly to attest the character of the man. With him philosophy is, in its end at least, a wisdom of life; all else in it is merely a means. He is, we occasionally see, fully aware that in the rational life scientific investigation may have its determinate place and obligation; he bursts out with the demand, What can be better for a man than to sing the praises of God? If I were a nightingale I would do it as the nightingale. What can I, a lame old man, do better than to pour forth such a song of praise in behalf of all mankind?<sup>127</sup> God made man to contemplate and to explain himself, and the order and design of his works.<sup>128</sup> But now we may ask, why does not

<sup>126</sup> Man. l. 1. Ὁ πρῶτος καὶ ἀναγκαῖος τόπος ἐστὶν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ ὁ τῆς χρήσεως τῶν θεωρημάτων· οἷον τὸ μὴ ψεύδεσθαι· ὁ δεύτερος ὁ τῶν ἀποδείξεων· οἷον, πόθεν ὅτι οὐ δεῖ ψεύδεσθαι; τρίτος ὁ αὐτῶν τούτων βεβαιωτικός καὶ διαρθρωτικός· οἷον, πόθεν ὅτι τοῦτο ἀπόδειξις; τί γάρ ἐστιν ἀπόδειξις; τί ἀκολουθία; τί μάχη; τί ἀληθές; τί ψεύδος; οὐκοῦν νὸς μὲν τρίτος τόπος ἀναγκαῖος διὰ τὸν δεύτερον, ὁ δὲ δεύτερος διὰ τὸν πρῶτον. Diss. i. 4. 7.

<sup>127</sup> Diss. i. 16.

<sup>128</sup> Ib. i. 6. Τὸν δ' ἀνθρώπον θεατὴν εἰσάγαγεν αὐτοῦ τε καὶ τῶν ἔργων τῶν αὐτοῦ· καὶ οὐ μόνον θεατὴν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐξηγητὴν αὐτῶν.

Epictetus apply himself more industriously to this task? Why is he content with merely giving a very general representation of the order of nature, and of the intelligence which she displays in all her providential developments? Their reason was undeniably this, that he esteemed something more highly than this scientific contemplation, and that was the duteous regulation of human actions in the world in which man is placed, and of his feelings towards himself and towards others. Therefore he teaches that every philosophy must realize itself in deeds; and as sheep show by the quality of their milk and fleece, that they have properly digested their fodder, so the philosopher shows by his works that he has well digested the principles of his science.<sup>129</sup> Accordingly he sets little value on the scientific culture which logic received at the hands of Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics; he objects to the logicians of his day that they are unable to apply it to the improvement of the populace, and that it had become a mere science for the learned of the school. He holds up for imitation the example of Socrates, who was able to lead every one to the application of the rules of logic.<sup>130</sup>

The foregoing remarks have probably given rise to an expectation, that Epictetus would naturally look upon physics in no other light than as a means to ethics. It is, however, surprising that he should never mention it as a special part of philosophy, but should class all its investigations with those of ethics. If we assume that the division above given is in-

<sup>129</sup> Man. 46; Diss. i. 4.

<sup>130</sup> Diss. ii. 12.

tended to represent the old division of philosophy, then to physics would fall the duty of furnishing the reasons of particular actions. And this, indeed, would not ill-assort with the Stoical principle, that the moral obligations of life ought to be regulated by the law of nature. For such a principle would naturally give rise to an attempt to determine what the law of nature exacts in general, and what it prescribes to men in particular. To this attempt Epictetus frequently returns, yet we cannot say that he has limited the domain of physics simply to this. He might well have accorded to it a more important rank, after he had acknowledged the study of nature to be the worthiest occupation of the sage. Yet all the doctrines delivered in his discourses which, agreeably to the Stoical division of philosophy, must be referred to physics, those for instance, which regard the divine nature and the constitution of the universe, the nature of man and his limbs, are treated throughout in an exclusive reference to ethics. That they did not possess more than a very subordinate interest in his mind, is most clearly seen from his method of treating them as doctrines already perfect, and of adopting, without further investigating them, the opinions of the Stoics or other philosophers. Of his physical tenets, therefore, there is little worth mentioning, and this can be incidentally noticed in our review of his ethical doctrines.

The peculiar characteristic of the moral theory of Epictetus, which makes it at once impressive and instructive, and procures for it the love and admiration of many, is its simplicity, the grandeur



of the sentiments on which it is founded, and the rigour of consequence which to a certain point it maintains. Its simplicity is most evident in the short Manual, which has therefore always been a greater favourite than the larger treatises of Arrian. We shall hereafter be able to explain, how it was that the doctrine of Epictetus did not admit of a more detailed exposition, without weakening itself by manifold repetitions.

Both works begin, not inappropriately, by a distinction between what is, and what is not, in the power of man. According to Epictetus, that alone is in man's power, which is his own work ; and in this class he reckons his opinions, his impulses, his desires, and his aversions. What, on the contrary, is not in the power of man, are his body, his possessions, glory, and power. Any delusion on this point leads to the greatest errors, misfortunes, and troubles, and to the slavery of the soul.<sup>131</sup> Thus does Epictetus at once maintain and limit the notion of human liberty. He maintains it so firmly as to build upon it his whole doctrine. Even Jupiter himself cannot conquer the will of man, for he would never wish to do so.<sup>132</sup> If God had subjected to necessity that part of his own essence, which he took from himself and gave to man, he would not be God, and would not have had due care for man.<sup>133</sup> But he also limits the idea

<sup>131</sup> Man. 1. Τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν ἔστιν ἐφ' ἡμῖν, τὰ δ' οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν. ἐφ' ἡμῖν μὲν ὑπόληψις, ὀρμή, ὀρεῖς, ἐκκλισίς καὶ ἐνὶ λόγῳ ὅσα ἡμέτερα ἔργα, οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν δὲ τὸ σῶμα, ἡ κτῆσις, δόξαι, ἀρχαὶ καὶ ἐνὶ λόγῳ ὅσα οὐχ ἡμέτερα ἔργα. Diss. i. 1.

<sup>132</sup> Diss. i. 1, p. 10 ; iii. 3, p. 365.

<sup>133</sup> Ib. i. 17, p. 96. Εἰ γὰρ τὸ ἴδιον μέρος, ὃ ἡμῖν ἔδωκεν ἀποσπᾶσας ὃ

of human freedom, by refusing to admit, that man has power over anything beyond himself, his conceptions, and the direction of them. The ruling idea of his whole theory is, that in this world man is as it were a spectator—an observer of God and his works, and an expounder of them, but nothing more.<sup>134</sup> This is the part which man has to play in the world, and more than this he ought not to desire; and by so limiting his desires, he will best preserve his liberty. To desire more, would be to become a discontented observer of the works of God.<sup>135</sup> But were the gods unwilling to grant more to man? No, for they would assuredly have done more, if it had been in their power. For as we exist on the earth, and are bound to the body as an assistant in all our work, it is impossible that we should not be impeded in our activity by these external things.<sup>136</sup> Epictetus accordingly adheres strictly to his own idea of reason, which to his mind expressed nothing more than the faculty of using or applying ideas.<sup>137</sup> Man has power over his ideas, all else is beyond his control.

Θεός, ὅπ' αὐτοῦ ἢ ὑπ' ἄλλου τινὸς κωλυτὸν ἢ ἀναγκαστὸν κατεσκευάκει, οὐκ ἔστι ἂν ἦν Θεός, οὗτ' ἐπεμελείτο ἡμῶν, ὃν δεῖ τρόπον.

<sup>134</sup> Ib. i. 6, p. 35. Τὸν δ' ἀνθρώπον θεατὴν εἰσήγαγεν αὐτοῦ τε καὶ τῶν ἔργων τῶν αὐτοῦ, καὶ οὐ μόνον θεατὴν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐξηγητὴν αὐτῶν. διὰ τοῦτο αἰσχροὺς ἔστι τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ἀρχεσθαι καὶ καταλήγειν, ὅπου καὶ τὰ ἄλογα· ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἐνθεν μὲν ἀρχεσθαι, καταλήγειν δ' ἐφ' ὃ κατέληξεν ἐφ' ἡμῶν καὶ ἡ φύσις. κατέληξε δ' ἐπὶ θεωρίαν καὶ παρακολούθησιν καὶ σύμφωνον διεξαγωγὴν τῇ φύσει.

<sup>135</sup> Ib. iv. 1, p. 558.

<sup>136</sup> Ib. i. 1, p. 7. Ἀρά γε ὅτι οὐκ ἤθελον; ἐγὼ μὲν δοκῶ, ὅτι εἰ ἠδύναντο ἀκκέϊνα ἂν ἡμῖν ἐπίτρεψαν. ἀλλὰ πάντως οὐκ ἠδύναντο. ἐπὶ γῆς γάρ ὄντας καὶ σώματι συνδεδεμένους τοιούτῃ καὶ κοινωνοῖς τοιούτοις, πῶς οἴοντο ἢ εἰς ταῦτα ὑπὸ τῶν ἐκτὸς μὴ ἰμποδίζεσθαι;

<sup>137</sup> Ib. i. 1. Ἡ χρηστικὴ δύναμις ταῖς φαντασίαις. Ib. i. 12, fin. 20, p. 110, 30; ii. 8, in. Man. 6. τί οὖν ἐστὶ σὸν; χρήσις φαντασιῶν.

From this, the principle, the general law of moral practice flows spontaneously; viz. whatever is not in your power, that do not ever wish for. One thing only is in your control—your thoughts; keep these within due limits, and conform them to nature.<sup>138</sup> This you may accomplish, if you will always bear in mind that you have no power over external things, and that therefore the good which ought to be the object of your earnest pursuit, is to be found within yourself. You will then be only following the intelligible idea, which declares to you, that good and evil lie simply in that alone which is subject to the will, while all that accrues from without, is neither good nor evil, and therefore ought not to move your soul to complain against either God or men.<sup>139</sup> You will not be troubled at any loss, but will say to yourself on such an occasion; “I have lost nothing that belongs to me; it was not aught of mine that has been torn from me, but a something which was not in my power has left me.” Nothing beyond the use of your ideas is properly yours. Every possession rests on ideas. What is to cry and to weep? An opinion. What is misfortune, or a quarrel, or a complaint? All these things are but opinions; opinions founded on the delusion, that what is not subject to our own will, can be either good or evil, which it cannot. By rejecting these opinions, and seeking good and evil in the will alone, a man may confidently

<sup>138</sup> Diss. ii. 1, p. 167. Ἡ οὐσία τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἴστιν ἐν χρήσει φαντασιῶν, καὶ τοῦ κακοῦ ὡσαύτως, τὰ δ' ἀπροαίρετα οὔτε τῇ τοῦ κακοῦ δέχεται φύσιν, οὔτε τῇ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ.

<sup>139</sup> Diss. iii. 8. Οὐδέποτε γὰρ ἄλλῃ συγκαταθροσόμεθα, ἢ οὐ φαντασία καταληπτικῇ γίνεται.

promise to himself peace of mind in every condition of life.<sup>140</sup>

It is evident that this moral theory is one of complete self-denial. Its object is not merely a limitation of desire to the first or most necessary wants of nature, but its complete mortification. This demand is supported by the view that reason alone can be regarded as good, and that the irrational is evil. The irrational alone is intolerable to the rational.<sup>141</sup> The matter on which the good man labours is chiefly his own reason; to perfect this is in the power, as also it is the proper avocation of the philosopher.<sup>142</sup> To repel evil ideas by the good is the noble contest in which man has to engage; it is not a light one indeed, but it promises true freedom, repose of mind, and a divine command over the emotions of the soul.<sup>143</sup> It is not easy, because every one has his enemy within his own bosom;<sup>144</sup> because man is wont to look abroad for good and evil, and to trouble himself with externals; whereas the true philosopher must see that the real improvement of the inner man requires a renunciation of all outward things; between the two no one ought to hesitate.<sup>145</sup> There is this further danger, lest

<sup>140</sup> Man. 6; Diss. iii. 3, p. 367, sq.

<sup>141</sup> Diss. i. 2. Τῷ λογιστικῷ ζῷῳ μόνον ἀφόρητόν ἐστι τὸ ἄλογον· τὸ δ' ἐῤλογον φορητόν.

<sup>142</sup> Ib. iii. 8. Ὑλῃ τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ ἀγαθοῦ τὸ ἴδιον ἡγεμονικόν. Man. 29, fin.; 48.

<sup>143</sup> Diss. ii. 18, p. 280, sq.; iii. 3, p. 367.

<sup>144</sup> Man. 48. Ἐνὶ δὲ λόγῳ ὡς ἐχθρόν ἑαυτὸν παραφυλάσσει καὶ ἐπίβουλον (sc. ὁ προκόπτων).

<sup>145</sup> Ib. 13. Ἴσθι γάρ, ὅτι οὐ ῥᾶδιον τὴν προαίρεσιν τὴν σιαυτοῦ κατὰ φύσιν ἔχουσιν φυλάξαι καὶ τὰ ἐκτός· ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἐτάρου ἐπιμαλούμενον τοῦ ἐτάρου ἀμελῆσαι πᾶσα ἀνάγκη. Ib. 29 fin.

the evil conceptions which struggle mightily and strongly against the reason should gain the upper hand ; not twice, nor even once, ought man to submit to them ; otherwise they create an inclination for themselves, an evil habit (ἔξις). This combat no one will decline who would acquire the true nerve and energy of the philosopher.<sup>146</sup> But it is especially against the notion of pleasure that man ought to be on his guard, because it wins him by its apparent sweetness and charms.<sup>147</sup> In order to become good a man must first of all arrive at a conviction that he is evil.<sup>148</sup> Man must be circumspect in whatever is subject to him, but bold with the external, and what is not in his own power.<sup>149</sup> The first object of philosophy, therefore, is to purify the soul ; and there are two things principally from which it is necessary to emancipate mankind :—the presumption which believes that it stands in need of nothing ; and the distrust which considers its own strength insufficient for the attainment of the soul's quiet, and which will not see how many and great means are provided for man's safety.<sup>150</sup>

The more difficult Epicurus believed it to be to purify the soul, the more he would naturally labour to confirm men in good by clear notions and a right intelligence. On this point he teaches generally that the general notions (προλήψεις) of good and evil are common to all, and so far that

<sup>146</sup> *Diem.* ii. 8, 18.<sup>147</sup> *Man.* 34.<sup>148</sup> *Fragm.* p. 741, ap. *Stob.* *serm.* i. 48.<sup>149</sup> *Diem.* ii. 1, p. 167.<sup>150</sup> *Ib.* iii. 14, p. 416, sq. Δύο ταῦτα ἔξελεῖν τῶν ἀνθρώπων, οἷσιν καὶ ἀπιστίαν· οἷσιν μὲν οὖν ἴσθι τὸ δοκεῖν μηδενὸς προσδεῖσθαι, ἀπιστία δὲ τὸ ὑπολαμβάνειν μὴ δυνατόν εἶναι εὐρεῖν σε τοσούτων περιμετρηότων.

there can be no dispute. But on this subject he not only asserts that every one acknowledges that the good alone is profitable and to be desired, and that evil is hurtful and to be avoided; but maintains even that every one will admit that the just is also beautiful and becoming.<sup>161</sup> It is only when there is a question as to the application of these general notions to particular cases that a diversity of opinion arises, and it is then that the darkness of ignorance, which blindly maintains the correctness of its own opinion, must be dispelled.

This the philosopher attempts to do by showing that the individual entertains different and conflicting opinions of good in particular, and that every individual, in his judgment of particular good, frequently contradicts himself. This is the refutative art of Socrates, who by this method led men to a sense of their own ignorance.<sup>162</sup> This must be acknowledged before a man will wish to learn how the good may be distinguished from the bad. In the same way as geometry and music furnish measures for magnitudes and tones, so philosophy ought to provide a standard for good and evil. What is required is, from the physical notions of good and evil as certain general principles, and by assuming correct middle terms, to arrive at valid conclusions concerning good and evil in particular. This process is greatly facilitated by a conviction that the will and the works of the will are alone in

<sup>161</sup> Ib. i. 22; ii. 11, assumes *ἐμφυτός ἐννοία* of goodness, justice, and felicity, as opposed to acquired notions: e. g. the mathematical.

<sup>162</sup> Diss. ii. 11, p. 224, sq.; 17; iii. 14, p. 416, sq., 21, p. 441. *Σωκράτης συνεβούλευε (sc. ὁ θεός) τὴν ἡλεγκτικὴν χάραν ἔχειν.*

man's power, whereas all external things, which are the helps of life, are beyond his control. In order, however, that the correct conclusion, that good consists in nothing but the works of the will, may be steadily maintained, Epictetus allows of recourse being had to many other considerations.<sup>153</sup> And to this point refer his special moral maxims, all of which repeat the same thesis in a different form, and go to prove that man's internal happiness—the good of his soul—cannot be destroyed except by his own fault.

It is unnecessary to give a complete review of these special propositions, since they are devoid of all scientific form and method. We shall only adduce a few as striking characteristics of the whole. That Epictetus would abound in the grounds of consolations usual with the Stoics, was to be expected. Every one who finds his life intolerable is free to quit it. But the sage will not easily, and without sufficient reason, or without sure signs of the will of the gods, quit his body and his appointed station in the world.<sup>154</sup> In short, he will never find life intolerable; he will complain of no one, either God or man. If any one should unjustly deprive him of aught, he will thus think: it was only lent to me, it is now taken away;

<sup>153</sup> Ib. i. 22, p. 116. *Τί οὖν ἐστὶ τὸ παιδεύεσθαι; μανθάνειν τὰς φυσικὰς προλήψεις ἐφαρμόζειν ταῖς ἐπὶ μέρους οὐσίαις καταλλήλως τῇ φύσει· καὶ λοιπὸν διελεῖν, ὅτι τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν εἰσιν ἐφ' ἡμῖν, τὰ δὲ οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐφ' ἡμῖν μὲν προαίρεσις καὶ πάντα τὰ προαιρετικὰ ἔργα, οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν δὲ τὸ σῶμα, τὰ μέρη τοῦ σώματος, κινήσεις, γονεῖς, ἀδελφοί, τέκνα, πατρίς, ἀπλῶς οἱ κοινωνοί.* Hereupon follow long dissertations designed to remove the objections to this doctrine.

<sup>154</sup> Ib. i. 29, p. 155; iii. 25, p. 510, sq.

what matters it to me by whom the loan is reclaimed? As long as it is allowed him he uses all things as good indeed, but as not belonging to himself; he looks upon himself as a traveller in an inn, as a guest at a stranger's table; whatever is offered to him, he takes it with thankfulness, and sometimes, when the turn comes to him, he refuses; in the former case he is a worthy guest of the gods, and in the latter he appears as a sharer in their power.<sup>155</sup> For the same reason he will never injure his enemies, but will rather do them good; for he feels that contempt belongs much less to him who is unable to do evil, than to him who is not able to do good.<sup>156</sup> Those who go wrong we ought to pardon and to treat with compassion, since it is from ignorance that they err, being as it were blind.<sup>157</sup> We moreover ought to be cautious how we blame others, for the question is really as to principles, and of these actions form no just criterion.<sup>158</sup> When we feel ourselves unhappy we have no one to condemn but ourselves, we alone are to blame; for it is only our ideas and principles that can render us unhappy. It is only the ignorant that finds fault with another; he who has begun to cultivate his mind sees that none but himself is to blame; but the truly educated man blames neither himself nor others.<sup>159</sup> Every desire degrades us, and renders us slaves of that which we

<sup>155</sup> Man. 11, 15.<sup>156</sup> Stob. Serm. xx. 61.<sup>157</sup> *Diag.* i. 18, 28.<sup>158</sup> *Ib.* iv. 8 in.

<sup>159</sup> Man. 5. "Ὅταν οὖν ἐμποδιζόμεθα ἢ ταρασσώμεθα ἢ λυπώμεθα, μηδέποτε ἄλλον αἰτώμεθα, ἀλλ' ἐαυτούς, τοῦτ' ἐστὶ τὰ ἐαυτῶν δόγματα. ἀπαιδεύτου ἔργον τὸ ἄλλοις ἐγκαλεῖν, ἐφ' οἷς αὐτὸς πράσσει κακῶς, ἡργμίνου παιδεύεσθαι τὸ ἐαυτῷ, πεπαιδευμένον τὸ μῆτε ἄλλω, μῆτε ἐαυτῷ."



desire. We put ourselves in subjection to that which we prize, whatever may be its nature; we ought therefore to strive after honours and office as little as we do after leisure and learning.<sup>160</sup> To enable man to arrive at this freedom from desire, Epictetus advances a long series of considerations intended to awaken him to a right understanding of the real nature of that which is desired, and its relation to our desires. Thus Epictetus observes, that if we love either a wife or a child we ought to bear in mind that they are but human and mortal, and thus we shall be prepared for the affliction of their death.<sup>161</sup> We ought not to forget the transitory character of all external advantages, even in the midst of our enjoyment of them; but always to bear in mind that they are not our own, and that therefore they do not properly belong to us. Thus prepared, we shall never be carried away by ideas. Whatever happens, we shall then consider what is our capacity in respect to it. In regard to the pleasurable we have the capacity of self-denial, and in respect to the painful and laborious we have the capacity of endurance.<sup>162</sup> If a pleasure presents itself invitingly, man ought not to yield to it inconsiderately, but to remember that he will either have to rejoice at his self-denial, or to repent his want of temperance; then the idea of pleasure will not hurry him away.<sup>163</sup> Nothing is thus purchased in vain. When you lose anything, think that you have thereby purchased the self-possession of your

<sup>160</sup> *Diss.* iv.<sup>162</sup> *Man.* 10.<sup>161</sup> *Man.* 3; *Diss.* iii. 24, p. 506, sq.<sup>163</sup> *Ib.* 34.

soul, which you may henceforth maintain.<sup>164</sup> In every undertaking impress upon your mind that it is not the object itself, whatever it may be, that you are to carry out, but even the maintenance of your own will in conformity with nature. If any obstacle should present itself to your design, you will not be ill-tempered, but will say to yourself, I did not wish success merely, but I also wished to maintain my own will agreeably to reason ; but this I should not do if I were to be annoyed at the result.<sup>165</sup> For the attainment of this self-command Epictetus does not disdain to propose certain moral exercises. Thus he recommends that all natural and inherent inclinations and aversions should be overcome by practices of a contrary tendency, in order to set the will free from their control. But at the same time he disapproves of all unnatural discipline which seeks to excite admiration by its singularity and severity.<sup>166</sup> In short, the moral maxims of Epictetus may be briefly summed up in this, that man should know how to be free, that every one should live after his own will. This, however, is not attainable except by the good, who alone have their will in their power ; the bad do not live as they wish, they are constrained by their passions and their ideas, and fall into fear and agony, into mental trouble, which they are far from wishing.<sup>167</sup>

But this calm, this freedom from all impediment, which Epictetus promises to all his disciples who are animated with these sentiments is, however, subject to a difficult condition. This arises from

<sup>164</sup> Ib. 12.<sup>166</sup> Diss. iii. 12.<sup>165</sup> Ib. 4.<sup>167</sup> Ib. iv. 1.

the necessity of renouncing not only all desire, but even all attachment to outward things. Among the emotions of the soul which Epictetus apparently regards as enemies of mental tranquillity, he even places the love of friends and even of human society in general. Believing it necessary to forbid these also, Epictetus evinces that tendency to selfishness which we have already found occasion to notice in the Cynical and Stoical schools. Thus when he proceeds to enumerate the outward things which a man ought not to trouble himself about, he places among them parents, brethren, and children, and even country.<sup>168</sup> It is only for ourselves that we ought to take care.<sup>169</sup> It is folly to wish that our children should not do wrong: it is not in our power to effect this object, and by desiring it we are striving after the impossible. If they have given themselves up to vice, what is past cannot be undone; and we ought not to vex ourselves on that score.<sup>170</sup> To the question, ought a man to fear that if he does not punish his child it will grow up evil-disposed and wicked? he replies, it is better that thy child should be bad than that thou shouldest be unhappy.<sup>171</sup> It would be folly if I should trouble myself about the outward good things of others; shall I neglect my own good in order to get for another that which is no good to him?<sup>172</sup> Such is

<sup>168</sup> Ib. i 15; 22, p. 116; iii. 3, p. 364, sq.

<sup>169</sup> Man. 14.

<sup>170</sup> L. 1. Οὕτω κὰν τὸν παῖδα θέλῃς μὴ ἀμαρτάνειν, μωρὸς εἶ, θέλεις γὰρ τὴν κακίαν μὴ εἶναι κακίαν, ἀλλ' ἄλλο τι. Diss. iv. 5. "Ἄν δὲ θέλῃς τὸν υἱὸν μὴ ἀμαρτάνειν ἢ τὴν γυναῖκα, θέλει τὰ ἀλλότρια μὴ εἶναι ἀλλότρια.

<sup>171</sup> Man. 12. Κρεῖττον δὲ τὸν παῖδα κακὸν εἶναι ἢ σὲ κακοδαίμονα.

<sup>172</sup> Ib. 24; Diss. iii. 3, p. 364. 'Ἄλλ' ἐγὼ τὸ ἐμὸν ἀγαθὸν ὑπερίδω, ἵνα σὺ σχῇς, καὶ παρὰχωρήσω σοι;

the tendency of the principles of Epictetus which we have hitherto considered. Still we are far from denying, therefore, that it was in such a spirit that he propounded them; for we even find proofs to the contrary: for when, conformably to the former tendency, he forbids all commiseration for the misfortunes of others, he yet permits an exhibition of sympathy, insisting, however, that inwardly we ought not to feel any distress.<sup>173</sup> It is singular to see Epictetus more willing to allow man to soothe another's pain by a show of sympathy than to feel a real compassion.

If now in this indulgence we have to trace another feature of his cast of thought, it may well be expected of one who like Epictetus had so thoroughly examined the tendencies of his own mind, that he would have given in his doctrine a general expression to this trait. Accordingly he requires of the sage something more than the insensibility of a statue. We ought, he says, to conduct ourselves through life agreeably to our natural and social position, observing piety towards the gods, and fulfilling all our duties as children, brothers, parents, and citizens.<sup>174</sup> For our country or friends we ought to be ready to undergo or perform the greatest difficulties and

<sup>173</sup> Man. 16. "Ὅταν κλαίοντα ἴδῃς τινὰ ἐν πίνθει ἢ ἀποδημοῦντος τέκνου ἢ ἀπολωλεκότα τὰ ἑαυτοῦ, πρόσεχε μὴ σε ἡ φαντασία συναρπάσῃ ὡς ἐν κακοῖς ὄντος αὐτοῦ τοῖς ἐκτός· ἀλλ' εὐθὺς ἔστω πρόχειρον, ὅτι τοῦτον θλίβει οὐ τὸ συμβεβήκες· ἄλλον γὰρ οὐ θλίβει· ἀλλὰ τὸ δόγμα τὸ περὶ τούτου· μέχρι μίντοι λόγου μὴ ὕκνει συμπεριφέρεισθαι αὐτῷ, εἰς οὗτω τύχῃ, καὶ συνεπιστενάξαι· πρόσεχε μίντοι, μὴ καὶ ἔσωθεν στενάξῃς.

<sup>174</sup> Diss. iii. 2, p. 359. Οὐ γὰρ δεῖ με εἶναι ἀπαθῆ ὡς ἀνδριάντα, ἀλλὰ τὰς σχέσεις τηροῦντα τὰς φυσικὰς καὶ ἐπιθίτους, ὡς εὐσεβῆ, ὡς υἱὸν, ὡς ἀδελφόν, ὡς πατέρα, ὡς πολίτην.

sufferings.<sup>176</sup> If the sage has chosen the vocation of philosophy, he may doubtless have had in view the tranquillity of his own mind, but at the same time he looked to be a model and a guide to good unto the young.<sup>176</sup> There is, he finds, such a close dependence of man upon man, that whoever wishes to live tranquil and content, must endeavour to make his neighbours also virtuous men.<sup>177</sup> How inconsistent is this with a former declaration, that a man ought to care for his inward self alone, and wholly to disregard all external advantages! Epictetus finds indeed a means to reconcile them in the Stoical doctrine, which, however, might assuredly have taught him that what we call external is not so thoroughly extrinsic as it may seem.

When Epictetus reflects upon the difficulty of conquering the natural inclination to evil ideas, he takes care not only to remind us of what is in our power and what not, and to impress on us all kinds of good rules for the right appreciation of things, but he also permits us to invoke the divine aid.<sup>178</sup> Herein indeed his moral theory raises itself to a freer flight, which, while it adopted indeed the olden piety of the Stoical doctrine, did not belie the prevailing tendency which had alienated his age from a superstitious reverence ~~from~~ the ancient deities.<sup>179</sup> When, ~~he~~ <sup>for</sup> says, we come to think that God is the

<sup>176</sup> Man. 32; Diss. ii. 7.

<sup>176</sup> Diss. iii. 21, p. 441.

<sup>177</sup> Stob. Serm. i. 57. *Εἰ βούλει ἀταράχως καὶ εὐαρίστως ζῆν, πειρῶ τοὺς συνοικοῦντάς σοι σύμπαντας ἀγαθοὺς ἔχειν.*

<sup>178</sup> Diss. ii. 18, p. 281. *Τοῦ θεοῦ μέμνησο· ἐκτεῖνον ἱπικαλοῦ βοηθὸν καὶ παραστάτην.*

<sup>179</sup> Epictetus speaks, it is true, occasionally of the gods; he recommends sacrifices, and to make offerings agreeably to ancestral customs with exactitude

father of gods and men, that we are his sons, how highly does the idea exalt us? This thought admits of nothing ignoble, nothing sordid.<sup>180</sup> The essence of God is goodness; he has given us all good that could be given, a part of himself—that god, that demon which dwells within us; close the door, exclude the outward light; thou wilt not be alone, thou wilt not be in darkness, but thou wilt find God within there, and a light which illuminates all thy deeds.<sup>181</sup> We owe all to God; all is his gift, and we ought therefore to use it agreeably to his will. The senses and all their attendant mechanism were not given us without a design; this therefore we ought earnestly to try to fulfil. But the present for which we ought most to thank him, and which we ought to be most anxious to use rightly, is his highest gift of reason, which is to estimate all things agreeably to his will; to which all else is subservient, while it alone rules freely, and by means of our other faculties accomplishes all its works.<sup>182</sup> The gods too gave us our bodies, a small part undoubtedly of the whole, and which, compared with the magnitude of the world, can be scarcely reckoned as anything. But they have also given us the greatest treasure that

and piety; he even admits the veracity of the oracles. But, for the most part, he speaks of God or Zeus; he derides all respect for the teaching of the fibres, and will not acknowledge the punishments of Tartarus: two points which had been assailed for a long time. But above all, he gives no countenance to the hope of immortality. *Man.* 31, 32; *Diss.* i. 19, p. 104; 22, p. 118; ii. 7; iii. 13, p. 413.

<sup>180</sup> *Diss.* i. 3.

<sup>181</sup> *Ib.* 14, p. 83. "Ὡσθ' ὅταν κλείσῃτε τὰς θύρας καὶ σκότος ἔνδον ποιήσῃτε, μέμνησθε μηδέποτε λίγειν, ὅτι μόνοι ἰστί, οὐ γάρ ἰστί· ἀλλ' ὁ θεὸς ἔνδον ἰστί, καὶ ὁ ὑμῖτερος δαίμων ἰστί· καὶ τίς τούτοις χρεία φωτὸς εἰς τὸ βλέπειν, τί ποιῶντες;

<sup>182</sup> *Ib.* ii. 23.

we possess, the soul and reason, which is not measured by breadth or depth, but by knowledge and sentiments, and by which we attain to greatness, and may equal even with the gods. We ought, therefore, to cultivate it with especial care, and to place in it all our good. If God has deemed us worthy of this most excellent gift, we may also be confident that he has arranged all things in the best manner, if only we will duly apprehend their real value.<sup>183</sup> From this position he proceeds to draw the consequence that we ought not to seek to alter the external relations in which we find ourselves, since we cannot make them better than what they are as arranged by God; but we must make our sentiments suitable to our given relations.<sup>184</sup> If we wish for nothing but what God wills, we shall be truly free, and all will come to pass with us according to our will; and we shall be as little subject to restraint as Jupiter himself.<sup>185</sup>

In this religious exaltation, Epicurus<sup>tt</sup> finds the means of connecting every individual with the rest of the world, whom, however, he appeared to wish to separate from the rest so long as he was striving to instruct him in the moral shaping of his sentiments alone. But the whole world is equally a work of God; he has fashioned it for universal harmony. The wise man, therefore, will pursue, not merely his own will, but as in all things he submits himself to due measure, so also he will be subject to the

<sup>183</sup> Ib. i. 12, p. 77. Οὐκ οἶσθα, ἡλίκον μέρος πρὸς τὰ ἅλα; τοῦτο δὲ κατὰ τὸ σῶμα. ὡς κατὰ γε τὸν λόγον οὐδὲ χεῖρων τῶν θεῶν, οὐδὲ μικρότερος. λόγον γὰρ μέγεθος οὐ μήκει, οὐδ' ὕψει κρίνεται, ἀλλὰ δόγμασιν. οὐ θέλεις οὖν καθ' ἃ ἴσος εἰ τοῖς θεοῖς, ἐκεῖ που τίθεται τὸ ἀγαθόν;

<sup>184</sup> Ib. p. 75; Man. 31.

<sup>185</sup> Diss. ii. 17, p. 270.

rightful order of the world.<sup>186</sup> The whole is better than the part, the state than the single citizens. Thou, O man, art but a part of the whole, a citizen of the universal state; submit thyself therefore to the whole; wish not the best for thyself, but for the state, to which thou belongest. Remember that thou hast to maintain a determinate position in the world; thou oughtest therefore to live conformably therewith; for it comprises all duties towards parents, brethren, country, and friends: all that is required in order to a perfect unison with the world, is to know and to perform this. The good man, if he were able to foresee the future, would even peacefully and contentedly help to bring about his sickness, maiming, and even death, knowing that these have been allotted him in the order of the universe.<sup>187</sup> We ought therefore to acknowledge that we have all a certain part to play in the world, and no one ought to wish for a part greater than he can fulfil: he has done enough when he has performed what his nature admits of.<sup>188</sup>

Every one will naturally ask, how a man is to know what is his allotted part in the world? When this question presented itself to Epictetus, he was at no loss for an answer. He says: as the ox in the herd knows what his office is, so each one may know from the endowments which he has received

<sup>186</sup> Ib. i. 12, p. 72, sqq.

<sup>187</sup> Ib. ii. 9, p. 195; 10, p. 215, sqq. *Διὰ τοῦτο καλῶς λίγουσιν οἱ φιλόσοφοι, ὅτι εἰ προῦδει ὁ καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθὸς τὰ ἰσόμενα, συνήργει ἂν καὶ τῷ νοσεῖν καὶ τῷ ἀποθνήσκειν καὶ πηροῦσθαι, αἰσθανόμενός γε, ὅτι ἀπὸ τῆς τῶν ὅλων διατάξεως τοῦτο ἀπονέμεται. κυριώτερον δὲ τὸ ὅλον τοῦ μέρους καὶ ἡ πόλις τοῦ πολίτου.*

<sup>188</sup> Ib. i. 2; Man. 24, 37.



from nature what he ought to perform; only he will remember that no man, any more than an ox, can arrive at once and without practice to his full force.<sup>189</sup> In the exercise therefore of our powers, we may become aware of the destiny which we are intended to fulfil. Thus, then, on this point also Epictetus refers every man to himself—his own peculiar consciousness; we can therefore no longer feel surprised if Epictetus was unable to give a general and scientific exposition of his ethical doctrines. With him all came ultimately to this: that every one must discover in himself his moral destination; accordingly, his doctrines naturally had no other end than to stimulate the will to this discovery, and to strengthen it by exhortations. His whole doctrine necessarily assumed an ascetical form.

The moral theory of Epictetus has at different times been compared with the Christian; and no one can deny that, with many essential differences, there are also many points of resemblance between them. The latter consist chiefly in the religious direction, which the precepts of Epictetus have taken. In following this direction, they have risen superior to that philosophical pride, which in the case of many others of its members, has proved a fruitful ground of reproach against the Stoics. Not only does Epictetus forbid his sage to indulge a proud

<sup>189</sup> *Diag.* i. 2, p. 18. Ἐπὶ τοῖς τοῖς, πόθεν οὖν αἰσθησόμεθα τοῦ κατὰ πρόσωπον ἑκάστου; Πόθεν δ' ὁ ταῦρος, ἔφη, λείοντος ἐπελθόντος μόνου αἰσθάνεται τῆς αὐτοῦ παρασκευῆς καὶ προβίβληκεν ἑαυτὸν ὑπὲρ τῆς ἀγίλης πάσης; ἢ δὴλον, ὅτι εὐθὺς ἅμα τῷ τὴν παρασκευὴν ἔχειν ἀπαντᾷ καὶ αἰσθησὶς αὐτῆς; καὶ ἡμῶν τοίνυν ὅστις ἀνέχεται τοιαύτην παρασκευὴν, οὐκ ἀγνοήσει αὐτήν, κ.τ.λ.

demeanor towards others; but he also insists in general, on the principle that no man should judge his fellow, on the ground that internal motives, which constitute the morality of all actions—principles, that is—are difficult to be discovered.<sup>190</sup> Not only does he recommend patient endurance of the scorn of men,<sup>191</sup> but he likewise insists on humility of thought towards God. Banish, he says, all high-mindedness. All the good which thou possessest, and all that thou knowest, was given thee by God alone. Your position in the world is assigned you by him. Everything, in short, is the gift of God.<sup>192</sup> These reflections which pervade his whole doctrine, absolutely forbid anything like haughtiness or pride.

The principles of Epictetus had a very great influence on the sentiments of many of his contemporaries, and also on later generations. Whatever of a Stoical character is to be found in the moral doctrine of succeeding times, emanates from him, and is at most, but the echo of his sentiments and opinions. In this light we have to regard the philosophy of the emperor M. Aurelius Antoninus. In the brief maxims contained in his work 'To Myself,' he gratefully acknowledged the advantage of having been made acquainted, by his teacher Rusticus, with the doctrines of Epictetus,<sup>193</sup> and whose earlier precepts his own closely resemble, with this

<sup>190</sup> Man. 33, 42; Diss. iv. 8.

<sup>191</sup> Man. 13.

<sup>192</sup> Man. 22. Σὺ δὲ ὁφρὸν μὲν μὴ σχῆς τῶν δὲ βελτίστων σοι φαινομένων οὕτως ἔχου, ὥς ὑπὸ τοῦ Θεοῦ τεταγμένος εἰς ταύτην τὴν χώραν. Cf. Marc. Anton. xii. 26. Οὐδὲν ἴδιον οὐδενός, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ τέκνον καὶ τὸ σωματίον καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ψυχάριον ἐκείθεν (ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ) ἐλήλυθεν.

<sup>193</sup> I. 7. Epictetus is also mentioned, iv. 41; vii. 19; xi. 34, 36—38.

difference only, that for the most part they have a special and personal relation to himself, while those of Epictetus were designed for his disciples generally. This is particularly noticeable, when the virtuous and noble emperor limits the general precept, "trouble not yourself about others," by conditions, providing that public advantage does not suffer, or that a man's demon be not destined to a Roman and political life, or to the functions of a sovereign.<sup>194</sup>

Such being the nature of his moral maxims, we might pass them over without further observation, if they did not afford occasion to some remarks, which will strikingly elucidate the direction pursued by the later Stoics.<sup>195</sup> These, when compared with the earlier members of the Porch, appear singularly defective in science. Whatever bears a scientific character is repugnant to them; and accordingly it is the favourite practice of the later Stoics, to express their opinions in brief, unconnected maxims. Antoninus formally censures all researches into natural objects, in which man forgets to be alone entirely with himself, and to be devoted to his inner demon.<sup>196</sup> This censure forcibly calls to mind the injunction of Epictetus, to shut up the senses, which are as it were doors leading outwards, in order to enjoy the

<sup>194</sup> III. 4, 5. Cf. ix. 29.

<sup>195</sup> For more precise information of the special doctrines of Antoninus, we refer to De Marco Aurelio Antonino imperatore philosophante ex ipsius commentariis scriptio philologica. Instituit Nic. Bachius. Lips. 1826. 8.

<sup>196</sup> II. 13. Οὐδὲν ἀθλιώτερον τοῦ πάντα κύκλῳ ἐκπεριερχομένου καὶ τὰ ἄρθρα γὰρ, φησὶν, ἱρευνῶντος καὶ τὰ ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς τῶν πλησίων διὰ τεκμάρσεως ζητοῦντος, μὴ αἰσθομένου δέ, ὅτι ἀρκεῖ πρὸς μόνη τῷ ἑνδον ἑαυτοῦ δαίμονι εἶναι καὶ τοῦτον γνησίως θεραπεύειν.

internal light of our demon. Such, assuredly, were not the ideas of the older Porch, which taught, that all knowledge of truth must be drawn from sensuous perception. Antoninus, however, is full of such injunctions. As the sum of all morality, he insists that we should preserve our demon pure and incorrupt, that we should turn into ourselves, there renew ourselves, and there find repose.<sup>197</sup> He draws a broad distinction between what we are in ourselves—our reason, and what our lot in life has joined to us, and then he requires that we should entirely purify ourselves from the latter, if we would lead a free and peaceful life.<sup>198</sup> When we thus see the Stoics desiring nothing beyond peace of mind, which they hope to attain by withdrawing entirely from the external world, and considering themselves as nothing more than indifferent instruments of the divine will, in the stream of the vain and outward life, we lose sight for ever of the old doctrine of the Porch, which placed all excellence even in the life of the world, in the constant flux of vital activity. The later Stoics wished, it is true, to form a bold and manly spirit, but it is a passive rather than an active courage that they enforced; their great object was, to learn to bear exile and death. The earlier Stoical doctrine undeniably contained the germ of this view. But there it was adopted, rather as a counteractive

<sup>197</sup> III. 12; iv. 3. *Συνεχῶς οὖν δίδου σεαυτῷ ταύτην τὴν ἀναχώρησιν καὶ ἀνανίου σεαυτόν.* VII. 28, 59. His forms of expression are, *εἰς ἑαυτόν ἀναχωρεῖν, εἰς αὐτὸν συνελείσθαι, ἑνὸν βλέπειν.*

<sup>198</sup> XII. 3.

<sup>199</sup> The vanity of all things is a favourite topic with Antonine; see for instance in the tenth book 11, 18, 31 (*οὕτως γὰρ συνεχῶς θεάσθαι τὰ ἀνθρώπινα καπνὸν καὶ τὸ μηδὲν.* Cf. xii. 27, 83), 34.

of the growing effeminacy of the age, than as a result of the scientific direction, which the first Stoics followed; and as the tendency of this was, to consider all in its co-ordination to the universe, they necessarily abstained from requiring such an unconditional retiring of the rational soul within itself as Antoninus does. The latter in fact exhibits the rational soul in a wholly peculiar light, and is disposed to represent it apart from all connection with the world. External things, he holds, do not affect the soul in the least; they have no admission into it; they cannot move or change the soul; it alone moves itself.<sup>200</sup> The liberty which he ascribes to reason is so unconditional, that it cannot be disturbed by any outward impediment in its natural movement, whereas all else, as Aristotle teaches, may be moved against and contrary to its nature.<sup>201</sup> This is truly a singular and foreign interpolation in the nature of the whole. As Antoninus rejects with contempt all the perishable and vain things of life, so philosophy even has no other value in his eyes, than as it is calculated to preserve unimpaired the purity of his demon,<sup>202</sup> and apparently forgets that this demon also is, in his opinion, as perishable as the other elements of the body.<sup>203</sup>

But while we censure this development of the

<sup>200</sup> V. 19. Τὰ πράγματα αὐτὰ οὐδ' ὁπωσιῶν ψυχῆς ἄπτεται· οὐδὲ ἔχει εἰσοδὸν πρὸς ψυχὴν· οὐδὲ τρέψαι οὐδὲ κινῆσαι ψυχὴν δύναται· τρέπει δὲ καὶ κινεῖ αὐτὴ ἑαυτὴν μόνη. This is singular since the soul is merely ἀναθυμίασις ἐφ' αἵματος, lib. 33.

<sup>201</sup> X. 33. Νοῦς δὲ καὶ λόγος διὰ παντὸς τοῦ ἀντιπίπτοντος οὕτως πορεύεσθαι δύναται, ὥς πίπτει καὶ ὡς θίλει.

<sup>202</sup> II. 17.

<sup>203</sup> He usually expresses himself ambiguously on the immortality of the soul. The assertion in the text rests on iv. 21.

Stoical ethics, as widely deviating from the scientific direction of the old Porch, we must remember, on the other hand, that it compensated for this fault, in some degree, by its more religious character. Out of the latter arose that love in which it comprised the whole external world, at the very time that it thought it necessary entirely to withdraw from it. Nevertheless, it was by internal meditations that it most loved to feed this religious sentiment. And Antoninus invokes the inner demon, the reason, the god within us, still more frequently than Epictetus.<sup>204</sup>

The predominant tendency of this mode of thinking, is to effect a separation of the individual from the general—a life of seclusion. There is undoubtedly a point in the religious sentiment which grew out of it, which was calculated to unite again the particular and the general—internal contemplation and active life. For as it supposes that our part in the world is assigned us by the universal, divine nature, of which we partake, it accordingly looks upon the conscientious discharge of it as the duty of man ; but at the same time it is manifest that in fact, an idea was thus introduced into the doctrine which did not admit of being reconciled with its direct tendency, which was to concentrate the soul wholly on itself. For as, agreeably with this tendency, the soul is painted as an essence which cannot be disturbed in its proper pursuit by

<sup>204</sup> Cf. ii. 13 ; iii. 3, 6, 7, 12, 16 ; v. 27 ; xii. 3, 19, 26. Bach. *ibid.* p. 34, n. 99, considers the demonology of the Stoics to be perfectly agreeable with the ancient faith of the Greeks. It differs, however, from it in this essential point, that the former refers to demons within and not without men, and which are not distinguishable from the human soul.

outward things, and also as devoid of all power over them, what can it have in common with the life of others? what service can it render them? Thus then their religious sentiment also reduces itself to the view, that it is the wisdom of man to allow nature to proceed in its own course, convinced that all is good as it is arranged by divine providence. The wish would be impious, even if we had the power, to interfere in these arrangements.

It is of great importance for the march of our history, to call attention to the manner in which this religious sentiment brought the new Stoics nearer to the Græco-Oriental philosophy. It prepared the way for the spread of neo-Platonism, by representing the withdrawing from all pollution by the outer world as the road to union with the divine, and by requiring, as the neo-Platonists also did, severe practice of virtue as a means of attaining to peace of mind in the first instance, and then to the contemplation of the divinity within man. Thus Antoninus requires man to simplify himself, wherein he agrees with the neo-Platonists even in language.<sup>205</sup> But undoubtedly the Stoics do not as yet exhibit a perfect accordance with the neo-Platonists, and on two points especially we discover an essential difference between them. The first is, that they evince but little attachment to the old religion and for the superstitious observance of its outward ceremonies, which, if they do not directly attack, they at most but barely tolerate. Its religious sentiment has the character of the devoutness of a separating sect, and it also exhibits itself in a strong opposition

<sup>205</sup> IV. 26. "Ἀπλῶς σεαυτόν.

to the ideas of the common people. It has given a peculiar tone to their phraseology, which in gentle-wise extenuates whatever to the general conception appears important; and employs diminutives to excess, in order to convey its contempt for property, arts, the soul, and other like matters. The second point of difference between these Stoics and the neo-Platonists is, that the former are wholly indisposed to philosophical investigations into the nature of things, and to everything which has not some immediate reference to the practical; the theoretical is regarded merely as a means to the practical; while the Platonists reversed the relation of the two, and enthusiastically revived the old theoretical investigations. This, as well as the recurrence to the old national religions, gave great influence to the neo-Platonists in their attempt to defend the worth and merit of the olden nationality, against the hostile encroachments of the Christian religion.

After Antoninus we meet with no Stoic of a practical tendency who was of any great consideration. The chief and most important portions of their moral theory passed over to the neo-Platonists. That the latter did not neglect the maxims of Epictetus is fully proved by the accounts which Simplicius has given of the neo-Platonists; and it would not be difficult to adduce ample proof in detail to the same effect.<sup>206</sup>

<sup>206</sup> I shall merely mention the maxims of Porphyry in his letter to Markella, the recommendation of Pythagorean dogmas of a like nature, and Theosebius, on whom Suid. a. v. *Ἐπίκτητος*, vel Phot. bibl. c. 242, p. 339, a Bekk. may be consulted.



## CHAPTER IV.

### ERUDITE PHILOSOPHY, AND THE NEW SCEPTICS.

THE value of the erudite philosophy of this age, and its relation to the Roman, have already been determined precisely enough to make it clear that the further development and life of this period did not proceed from this side. Nevertheless the ancient, even when it is effete, still continues to live on with us, and still enters into our development, though it be with only a counteracting influence. It is therefore necessary to examine these traditions in the extent and form in which they were delivered to those times of which it is our object to investigate the character.

We have already traced the propagation of the Epicurean and Stoical doctrines. Of the latter we have yet to notice another branch which carried forward, as mere matters of history, the ancient doctrines of the Porch, and proceeded collaterally with the other, which took a decidedly moral direction. Its existence is evinced by the frequent outbreaks of the Stoics already mentioned, and of Epictetus in particular, against contemporaneous philosophers, who were for the most part employed on logical questions;<sup>1</sup> and still more clearly proved

<sup>1</sup> Epict. Diss. iii. 2, p. 359. Οἱ δὲ νῦν φιλόσοφοι.

by the polemic of the Peripatetics, Sceptics, and even of the neo-Platonists against the old Porch. Of this mere erudite branch of the Stoical school scarcely any notice has reached us, but fortunately the loss may easily be borne. The Basilides, who is mentioned among the teachers of Marcus Antoninus, and of whose doctrines an account is given by Sextus Empiricus,<sup>2</sup> may probably have belonged to it.

We possess more complete information of the activity of the Platonic and Peripatetic schools of this date. These were unquestionably more considerable, as they had an important task to perform. The chief feature and the peculiarity of the Stoical system and method, had never fallen into such complete oblivion as at one time overwhelmed the true subject-matter and form both of the Platonic and the Aristotelian philosophy. In order to gain a sure footing on which they might withstand the pressure of a new doctrine and a new direction of life, the Academicians and Peripatetics had either undesignedly or else consciously disguised or disfigured themselves. What was required, therefore, was nothing less than a restoration of these doctrines—these old forms of scientific thought. But undertakings of this kind are never perfectly successful, they invariably end in a modification of the old.

The earliest attempt to restore the Platonic philosophy probably belongs to the time when the Romans were turning their attention to the older literature of Greece. The Academician Areius Didymus, who wrote on the doctrines of Plato and

<sup>2</sup> Adv. Math. viii. 258.

other Grecian philosophers, does not perhaps date much later.<sup>3</sup> It was now that the Platonic Dialogues were first arranged and divided, for convenience of reference in the teaching of philosophy—on which subject many different opinions are yet extant.<sup>4</sup> What we know of the labours of this Platonic school, of the division of the Dialogues into tetralogies (which is perhaps to be ascribed to Thrasyllus of the time of Tiberius, or else to Dercyllides, which is contained in the introduction of Albinus, and the short compendium of the Platonic doctrine which is usually assigned to one Alcinous), excites in us no very high opinion of their philosophical enlightenment. And if we find a little more of mental fertility in the philosophical treatises of Maximus Tyrius, who flourished under the Antonines, even these are not so much proofs of thorough philosophical intelligence, as of certain rhetorical dexterity formed by the study and imitation of the ancients.

If in this school of the Platonists we were to look for a pure and fundamental transmission of the Platonic doctrine, we should expect what was beyond the power of this age to furnish. Yet a breath at least of the Platonic spirit blows upon us, when Maximus Tyrius bids us look for a knowledge of God in the multiplicity of the shape of the beautiful, to whose pure and simple forms, divested of all matter, we have but to recur, in

<sup>3</sup> Euseb. Pr. Ev. xi. 23; Suid. s. v. *Δίδυμος*. Cf. Jona. de Script. Hist. Phil. iii. 1, 3. This Areius Didymus was of great use to later writers, as we see from Eusebius, *ib.* compared with Alcinous (*de Doctr. Plat.* c. 12).

<sup>4</sup> Albinus *Isag.* 6; Diog. L. iii. 49, *sqq.* The Alexandrian philologists, and especially Aristophanes, had undoubtedly preceded them in this course.

order to behold the divine.<sup>5</sup> And the same spirit breathes in the declaration of Alcinous, that God in and by himself cannot be known, that his essence is inexpressible, and that therefore we must simply strive by negation or analogy, or by rising from the lowest to the highest, to exhibit the transcendent idea of God ; in which attempt the mathematical sciences are steps in the ascent to a knowledge of ideas.<sup>6</sup> In truth these reminiscences of the Platonic theory are but weak ; yet, on the whole, they appear to have preserved a mild and serene view of things in the Academic school. The same spirit is distinctly traceable in the view that the worship of images and sanctuaries is not necessary, indeed, for those who possess a sufficient remembrance of the once enjoyed view of the divine ; yet that such persons are very few, and hence the custom common to all nations, to worship the divinity under different forms. In these customs, as derived from long antiquity, no change ought to be made ; the images of the gods serve to remind us of what we once beheld, and as such are necessary to weak men.<sup>7</sup> This same spirit, moreover, is mildly expressed in the determination by this school of the dispute, as to the value of virtue and pleasure. The first rank is adjudged to the former ; for this ought to rule over the latter, as the soul over the body ; but this decision does not forbid all pleasure in the beautiful ; for this is declared to be necessarily connected in the soul with the beautiful itself.<sup>8</sup> It may therefore justly

<sup>5</sup> Max. Tyr. *Diss.* i. p. 14, sq. ed Heins.

<sup>6</sup> Alcín. *de Doctr. Plat.* 7, 10.

<sup>7</sup> Max. Tyr. *Diss.* xxxviii.

<sup>8</sup> *Ib.* *Diss.* xxxiv.

be asserted, that every virtuous pursuit is at the same time a pursuit of pleasure ; and that consequently Diogenes the Cynic had only taken the shortest way to pleasure, and that the legislative enactments of Lycurgus and the Athenians had the same end in view.<sup>9</sup>

If now the rhetorical treatises of Maximus Tyrius afford proofs of this moderate sentiment, so on the other hand, the undoubtedly dry and uncouth work of Alcinous is of value, as proving decisively the disposition of the later Platonists, to claim for their master the inventions and discoveries of subsequent philosophers. The divisions of philosophy which were given by Peripatetics and Stoics, Alcinous transfers without remark to the Platonic philosophy ;<sup>10</sup> he ascribes to Plato an acquaintance with all the figures of the syllogism, because he uses them ; he also finds the ten categories in the Parmenides and other dialogues of Plato ;<sup>11</sup> the contrariety of energy and potentiality is quite current with him.<sup>12</sup> In the same manner, he does not hesitate to make virtue to be the faculty of finding the mean between two opposite passions.<sup>13</sup> In these and similar instances, Alcinous inconsiderately follows the inclination of philosophical schools, to ascribe to their founders every particular of knowledge which a later age may have acquired. In such an attempt, it could not but happen that doctrines and modes of thinking would be assigned to the Platonic philosophy totally foreign to it, and

<sup>9</sup> Ibid. Diss. xxxiii.

<sup>10</sup> Cap. 3, 4.

<sup>11</sup> Ib. 6.

<sup>12</sup> E. g. ib. 2, 8.

<sup>13</sup> Ib. c. 29; cf. also, Calvisius Taurus, b. Gell. i. 26.

of which it did not even contain the germ. The views of the universe and of science, which were thereby diffused, altogether assumed a new shape. The most opposite doctrines to the Platonic now cease almost to differ from it, when we find the term or idea of matter everywhere equated with that of God. Not only does Maximus Tyrius refer the cause of all evil which does not flow from the human will, to matter which could not be formed by the fashioning energy of God, for the supreme artist was unable to form it, without, as it were, sparks from the anvil, or smuts from the furnace, flying about ; but<sup>14</sup> Alcinous even supposes the eternity of the world to be reconcilable with the doctrine of Plato ; nay more, he holds that the soul of the world also, and its reason is eternal, as well as matter. It is only improperly that it can be said of God, that he made this soul ; since he only improved, or as it were awakened it out of a profound sleep, and by exciting in it the desire to know its own ideas—the objects of intellectual cognition—permitted forms and ideas to arise in it.<sup>15</sup> Now the ground of this view is in short an opinion, that the ideas are the thoughts of God, which served as models for the artistic activity of the world-forming God, and of which, therefore, it is man's object to gain a knowledge ; but at the same time, it does not exclude the doctrine, that they are also substances in

<sup>14</sup> Max. Tyr. Diss. xxv. p. 256.

<sup>15</sup> Alcin. 14. *Καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν δὲ αἰεὶ οὖσαν τοῦ κόσμου οὐχὶ ποιῇ ὁ θεός, ἀλλὰ κατακοσμεῖ, καὶ ταύτῃ λίγοιτ' ἂν καὶ ποιῇν ἰγείρων καὶ ἐπιστρέφων πρὸς αὐτὸν τὸν τε νοῦν αὐτῆς καὶ αὐτὴν ὥσπερ ἐκ κάρου τινὸς ἢ βαθείας ὕπνου, ὅπως ἀποβλίπουσα πρὸς τὰ νοητὰ αὐτοῦ δέχεται τὰ εἶδη καὶ τὰς μορφὰς ἐφειμένη τῶν ἰκείνου νοημάτων.*

and by themselves.<sup>16</sup> But as the leading thought of the Platonists of this age was, that ideas are the eternal archetypes of the universal laws of nature, which in the formation of particular kinds of matter underwent particular changes, most of them arrived at far too limited a notion of what Plato himself understood by ideas. They assumed ideas of the general laws, and the permanent genera and species of things alone, and not of individual objects, or of monstrous and unnatural phenomena; even the creations of art, the notions of relation, and whatever seemed to be small and contemptible, were considered unworthy of ideas,<sup>17</sup> however strongly both the particular assertions of Plato, and his general ideas, of science might be opposed to such a view. Another and more considerable confusion of different opinions is, we think, discoverable in the distinction which Alcinous draws, between the idea and species, holding with Aristotle, that the latter cannot be separated from matter.<sup>18</sup>

But on this head we must not forget to mention, that this medley of opinions was not universally approved of by the Platonists of this age. We are told of one Calvisius Taurus, who taught at Athens in the reign of Antoninus Pius, and wrote a treatise on the differences between the opinions of Plato,

<sup>16</sup> Ib. 9. "Ἔστι δὲ ἡ ἰδέα ὡς μὲν πρὸς θεὸν νόησις αὐτοῦ, ὡς δὲ πρὸς ἡμᾶς νοητὸν πρῶτον, ὡς δὲ πρὸς τὴν ἕλην μέτρον, ὡς δὲ πρὸς τὸν αἰσθητὸν κόσμον παράδειγμα, ὡς δὲ πρὸς αὐτὴν ἰξεταζομένη οὐσία.

<sup>17</sup> L. 1. "Ὅριζονται δὲ τὴν ἰδέαν παράδειγμα τῶν κατὰ φύσιν αἰώνιον. οὔτε γὰρ τοῖς πλείστοις τῶν ἀπὸ Πλάτωνος ἀρίσκει τῶν τεχνικῶν εἶναι ἰδέας, οἷον ἀσπίδος ἢ λύρας, οὔτε μὴν τῶν παρὰ φύσιν, οἷον πυριτοῦ καὶ χολέρας, οὔτε τῶν κατὰ μέρος, οἷον Σωκράτους καὶ Πλάτωνος, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τῶν εὐτελῶν τινός, οἷον ῥύπου καὶ κάρφους, οὔτε τῶν πρὸς τι, οἷον μείζονος καὶ ὑπερίχοντος.

<sup>18</sup> Ib. 4. Τῶν νοητῶν τὰ μὲν πρῶτα ὑπάρχει ὡς αἱ ἰδέαι, τὰ δὲ δεύτερα ὡς τὰ εἶδη τὰ ἐπὶ τῇ ἕλῃ ἀχώριστα ὄντα τῆς ἕλης.

Aristotle, and the Stoics.<sup>19</sup> Of this teacher his disciple Gellius has related much which appears to prove that his commentaries on the writings of Plato were at least remarkable for good judgment;<sup>20</sup> but we have no information as to the points on which, as a Platonist, he opposed the Peripatetic and Stoical doctrines. We are better informed as to the manner in which another Platonist, Atticus, who was a little later in date than Taurus,<sup>21</sup> and composed a treatise against Aristotle, explained the difference between him and Plato. The fragments of his work, preserved by Eusebius,<sup>22</sup> refute with some warmth the Aristotelian theory. Atticus condemned the lax principles of other Platonists, who, to support their own views, did not scruple to avail themselves of the arguments of Aristotle; and believed that the eternity of the world is consistent with the doctrine of Plato.<sup>23</sup> Aristotle is censured as having differed from Plato merely from a love of novelty. His hypothesis of a fifth element is represented as arising from his having confounded together the doctrine of Plato concerning the unchangeable ideas, and of the immortal but created gods, by which he was led to form the monstrous absurdity of an impassible body.<sup>24</sup> Even in his cosmogonical theory Aristotle is charged with having introduced many arbitrary and untenable novelties;<sup>25</sup> but he is most severely

<sup>19</sup> Gell. xii. 5; Suid. s. v. Ταῦρος.

<sup>20</sup> See especially Gell. i. 26; vi. 13, 14.

<sup>21</sup> According to Eusebius he flourished in the 16th year of Marcus Aurelius. Syncell. p. 281, Ven.

<sup>22</sup> Præp. Ev. xv. 4—9, 12, 13.

<sup>23</sup> Ib. 7.

<sup>24</sup> Ib. 5, 6.

<sup>25</sup> Ib. 8.





attacked for holding that virtue is insufficient for happiness, and for denying the immortality of the soul, of heroes and of demons, rejecting the providential care of the gods for men and things in the sublunary world, and for limiting the power of God by the denial that he cannot preserve the world from decay, although it was created by him.<sup>26</sup> This controversial attack upon Aristotle exhibits a certain pious enthusiasm; for Atticus refuses to regard his opponent in a better light than Epicurus, because he had denied the most essential principle of providence for us, viz. the providential care of man; but it cannot be said of it that it evinces a right understanding, or even an ingenious apprehension of the doctrine; and so, perhaps, even here we may trace in the tendency of these times a decided preponderance towards a mixture of schools.

Some other Platonists of this time would now demand our attention if it did not appear to us more advisable to postpone our notice of them to the time when we shall have to treat of the mixture of Oriental ideas with Grecian philosophy; for, as we formerly observed, it was chiefly to the Platonic philosophy that these attached themselves. We shall therefore close our remarks upon the neo-Platonists, who by their leading features belong to the erudite tendency of this age, with a few observations calculated to elucidate their relation to other phenomena of the time. The manner in which the Platonists already mentioned introduced the Roman element into this mixture, was chiefly by the pre-eminence they gave to ethics over the other

<sup>26</sup> Ib. 4, 5, 6, 9, 12.

parts of philosophy. Logical investigations they lightly esteemed. If philosophy consisted in logic there would, they argued, be no want of teachers of it. No philosopher would deign to pay any attention to dialectic if it were not necessary. But the most important business of philosophy is to acquire a knowledge of the gods and to lead man to virtue.<sup>27</sup> There is yet another remark connected with this subject, and suggested by the treatises of Maximus Tyrius: in the dogmatical review of the Platonic doctrine which Alcinous laboured to give, the opinions of the school were naturally exhibited as free from all difficulty; nevertheless, it was impossible even here to suppress all doubt as to the sense of the Platonic theory of ideas; and moreover as it was firmly believed, that the good did not admit of being expressed directly, and without the aid of figures, this was also a fertile source of dispute as to what in the Platonic doctrine was to be taken in a figurative and what in a literal sense. How near akin to the doctrine itself, and to what lengths this doubt was calculated to lead, we know too well from the fact that the New Academy was the offspring of the Old. Now if we further reflect, that a mere literary handling of philosophy, whenever it is pursued with freedom, and not closely shackled in the fetters of school forms, naturally feeds a certain Eclectical questioning, our wonder will cease at finding in the mode of thought and conceptions of Maximus

<sup>27</sup> Max. Tyr. *Diss.* xxxvii. p. 873, sqq., Alcin. 3, 27; Attic. ap. Euseb. *Pr. Ev.* xv. 4. That Maximus (*Diss.* vi.) and Alcinous (c. 2.) preferred theory to practice does in no wise militate against this. The work of Maximus already quoted throws light upon this point.

many subjects treated in the mere light of probable opinions. He is fond of opposing different positions of philosophy to each other, not merely in order to display his rhetorical facility, but rather as if he had to decide upon them from the tribunal, and in the hope of coming to a just decision. To indicate his agreement with Plato he usually closes the deliberation by adducing his opinion as that of philosophy herself. But still he is far from concealing the fact, that as in judicial affairs so in philosophy also, there is much of probability to be advanced in support of conflicting opinions. Philosophy he wishes to consider as the oracle of the beautiful and the good, and the way to happiness; but he confesses that he has found the oracle too ambiguous, and too many parties among philosophers for her responses to be implicitly obeyed. In this respect philosophy is unlike the other sciences, the farther they advance the more nearly they approach the end; but philosophy, the richer she is in ideas, exhibits a greater number of conflicting but nicely balanced claims to truth, and judgment becomes the more difficult.<sup>28</sup> How happily has he here expressed the fate, not indeed of philosophy herself, but yet of the Grecian philosophy of his day. It had become old; it wanted courage for youthful renovation, for vigorous progress, in which alone it could find security and increase. The riches

<sup>28</sup> Diss. xix. p. 199, sq.; Diss. xxiv. in. Καλεπὸν εὐρεῖν λόγον ἀληθῆ. κινδυνεύει γὰρ ἡ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ψυχὴ δι' εὐπορίαν τοῦ φρονεῖν τοῦ κρίνειν ἀπορεῖν. καὶ αἱ μὲν ἄλλαι εἶχαι πρόσω τοῦσαι κατὰ τὴν εὐρεσιν εὐστοχώτεραι γίνονται ἐκάστη περὶ τὰ αὐτῆς ἔργα. φιλοσοφία δὲ ἐπειδὴν αὐτῆς εὐπορώτατα ἔχῃ, τότε μάλιστα ἐμπίπλεται λόγων ἀντιτασίων καὶ ἰσορρόπων.

which the old systems displayed did but perplex those who wished to use her as a perfect science. Such a state of things must manifestly have greatly favoured Scepticism. And, in fact, a Platonist of this age, Favorinus, the favourite of Hadrian, appears to have been but little removed from Scepticism, or at least from the view of the New Academy. His penetration, his varied and available stores of learning, served only to furnish him with doubts whether man could or not be certain of anything.<sup>29</sup>

In a somewhat different relation to the development of our period stood the Peripatetic philosophy. Of it we have observed that it never found much favour with the Romans; and on the other hand we may remark, that it exercised but little influence on the form of the Græco-Oriental philosophy. Consequently it retained greater purity of doctrine than any other system of philosophy. For, as it did not promise to its followers any great influence either in the world or with its contemporaries, it was the more likely to remain pure from all foreign admixture.

In fact, however, among the learned men who lived at the beginning of this period, not a few were Peripatetics. We have already mentioned Staseas, the teacher of Piso, and Cratippus, the friend of the older and teacher of the younger Cicero. Yet these persons, of whom nothing is quoted but practical precepts,<sup>30</sup> are less important for characterizing the

<sup>29</sup> Galen. de Opt. Disc. c. 1. Philostratus (Vit. Soph. i. 8) praises his work on the Pyrrhonic Tropes as his masterpiece.

<sup>30</sup> We must here class the question of divination which Cratippus discussed. Cic. de Div. i. 32, 50; ii. 48, 52. That he combined together the Peripatetic and the Platonic philosophy apparently follows from Cic. de Off. ii. 2, fin.

Peripatetic doctrine of this date than those who attached themselves to Andronicus of Rhodes. The valuable labours of this individual, who was a contemporary of Cicero in elucidation of the works of Aristotle and Theophrast have been already noticed. He arranged the works of these two philosophers on the principle of similarity of subjects, examined the genuineness of those current in Aristotle's name, gave explanations of them and also composed an original treatise on logic. These learned pursuits were continued by his scholars, among whom we have to reckon Boethius of Sidon, and Sosigemes, who was employed by Julius Cæsar to assist in the correction of the calendar. Contemporary with these were Xenarchus, who, although he proclaimed himself a Peripatetic, nevertheless wrote against the fifth element of Aristotle, and Nicolaus of Damascus, the friend of Augustus and of Herod, who is known for his historical works, and also for certain philosophical treatises in exposition of Aristotle. To a rather later date, probably, belong Alexander Ægeus and Adrastus of Aphrodisias, whose treatises on the categories, and on the order of the Aristotelian works in general, are frequently appealed to by subsequent writers on the subject. It would render our work too bulky were we to enter into many such remarks on the commentators of Aristotle.<sup>31</sup> It will be sufficient to observe that the learned works of these individuals are lost in con-

<sup>31</sup> All further details may be found, if required, in Fabricius. Generally there is little certainty either in the chronology or biography of these individuals, and this appears to confirm our opinion that the Peripatetic doctrine was in favour chiefly with the learned who exercised little influence in public life.

sequence of later writers of the same class, who trod in their footsteps, having both made use of and thrown their predecessors into the shade. A series of these writers may be traced down to Alexander of Aphrodisias, who pre-eminently enjoys the title of the expounder of Aristotle, in consequence of his writings having superseded all earlier commentaries. There is one remark with respect to the older commentators which we must not omit, and that is, that they all evince, more or less, a disposition to combine the Aristotelian philosophy with the Platonic. Ammonius of Alexandria, the teacher of Plutarch, is generally given as the first who favoured this new species of Eclecticism; but on the one hand, this statement is only an inference from the manner in which Plutarch proceeded with philosophy, and on the other hand, there are many traces of even earlier commentators having made, not only Aristotelian, but also Platonic writings the common object of their learned expositions. This procedure is but a part of the general tendency of the age.

Of the commentators of Aristotle, none deserves a detailed notice more than Alexander of Aphrodisias, although even his merits are not very great. He rarely furnishes the necessary aids to the right understanding of Aristotle's works, since he was devoid of that large and liberal view of the Aristotelian philosophy which was requisite to remove such obscurities of expression as originated in the indistinctness of the idea. Enthusiastic in his admiration of his author, he seeks to show the perfect agreement between Aristotle's mode of conception and that of the existing age, with a view to

establish the pre-eminence of the Peripatetic doctrine. Accordingly he attacks all the leading schools, especially the Platonists and Stoics, but only occasionally deigning to notice the Epicureans, whose opinions he regards as too sensuous and unlearned to call for a serious refutation. Against the Stoics he composed the treatise, dedicated to the emperors Severus and Caracalla, on Destiny, and on that which is in man's power,<sup>32</sup> which affords the best specimen of his manner. It proves that its author ascribed considerable authority to the ordinary notions of mankind, since he asserts that man generally does not greatly err from the truth,<sup>33</sup> and connects this position with the dogma of his school, that whenever a truth has become sensuously evident, it overbears any weight of probability in favour of its opposite.<sup>34</sup> In agreement with this view, his reasonings against the Stoical doctrine of an all-determining force of necessity, go simply to show that in support of it, the Stoics wrest and give a new interpretation to the terms which stand for general notions.<sup>35</sup> In this line of argument he faithfully preserves his character of an interpreter, and confines himself to giving the right explanation of general language. All men, he argues, assume

<sup>32</sup> *Questiones Naturales, de Anima, Morales, iii. 12.* Towards the end the Epicureans are described as *βραχεία τινι πιθανότητι ἐνδόντες*.

<sup>33</sup> *De Fato, 2.* Τὸ μὲν οὖν εἶναι τι τὴν εἰμαρμένην καὶ αἰτίαν εἶναι τοῦ γίνεσθαι τινα κατ' αὐτὴν ἱκανῶς ἢ τῶν ἀνθρώπων συνίστησι πρόληψις· οὐ γὰρ κενὸν οὐδ' ἄστοχον τάληθοῦς ἢ κοινὴ τῶν ἀνθρώπων φύσις. *Ib. 14.* He also assumes a *πρόληψις τῶν θιῶν*. *Qu. Nat. ii. 21, fol. 17, a.*

<sup>34</sup> *De Fato, 26.* Ἰκανωτέρα γὰρ ἢ τοῦ πράγματος ἐνέργεια πρὸς συγκατάθεσιν πάσης τῆς διὰ λόγων ἀναιρούσης αὐτὸ πιθανότητος.

<sup>35</sup> On this point cf. *Quest. Nat. iii. 11.*

the existence of the contingent, and suppose there may be a something which, while it is possible, must not of necessity happen; a something which is in human power; and experience justifies this assumption.<sup>36</sup> It is not everything that comes to pass that is pre-determined by fate, but that alone which is accomplished in obedience to the laws of nature; and even these laws are subject to exceptions; there is much that can only be said to happen generally but not universally. Nature does not always attain to her end; on the contrary, there is much that happens in direct contravention of her laws.<sup>37</sup> Now the use which Alexander makes of this Aristotelian view in order to refute the Stoical theory of an unbroken and eternal chain of causes, is not calculated to raise a high opinion of the profoundness of his judgment. For we actually find him appealing in confirmation of it to the seeming fact, that much is often without its natural and proper consequences, of which he gives as instances that every man does not propagate the species, and that every flower does not nurture its fruit.<sup>38</sup> He is evidently introducing extraneous considerations here into the argument, as he does where he contends that man is endued with powers of deliberation, which, however, would be useless if he were not free to act according to his deliberate judgment; but nature produces nothing in vain.<sup>39</sup> For it is evident that the proper object of Alexander was to point

§. <sup>36</sup> De Fato, 8, 10, 14, 26.

<sup>37</sup> De Fato, 6. The notion of chance refers namely to that which happens—that of necessity even to that which is. Ib. 3; Qu. Nat. li. 5.

<sup>38</sup> De Fato, 23.

<sup>39</sup> Ib. 11.



out and insist upon, the distinction between natural and rational causes. He does not, it is true, absolutely neglect this topic. Indeed, a very superficial acquaintance with his master's doctrine must have taught him it was exactly at this point that the Aristotelian and Stoical systems diverged; the latter neglecting the distinction, which the former had so strongly insisted upon, between natural and rational motives, and making the rational to be merely a higher form of the natural.<sup>40</sup> But still he does not insist upon it strongly enough, but is pre-eminently occupied with other, less essential and vaguer points of the theory. We must also observe, that it appears very surprising that Alexander makes not the slightest allusion to the opinions of the later Stoics, notwithstanding the important modifications which they had introduced into the doctrine of human liberty. His controversy is confined to the older Stoics. For generally the schools of this period paid less attention to contemporaneous than to ancient opinions.

There is but one point more in connection with this controversy between the Peripatetics and Stoics that appears to call for remark. Alexander of Aphrodisias objected to his adversaries, that by teaching a universal necessity they imperilled all feeling of piety and religion. For such a doctrine, he says, is irreconcilable with that of a particular providence, which supposes that the gods take care of individuals, both providing for their welfare and recompensing them after their deserts. How can the gods reasonably be accounted worthy of worship,

<sup>40</sup> *Ib.* 33; *Qu. Nat.* iii. 13; iv. 29.

even on the supposition that they deign to reveal themselves, and to give assistance to man, if it is to be thought that their aid and revelation are the unavoidable result of certain predetermining causes? Again, he urges that even while the Stoics defended sooth-saying, as part of religion, they yet deprived it of all its importance, since in consistency they must fain admit that it is unavailing, since no impending misfortune could be avoided by its means.<sup>41</sup> With this objection he combines the Aristotelian theory of the several kinds of good, by attempting to show that a divine providence is only important to those who admit the existence of a corporeal and external good ; since whoever holds that the beautiful alone is good, places all good in his own power.<sup>42</sup> But upon this point it was necessary for him not only to refute the Stoics, but also to defend the positions of his own school. The singular doctrine of the latter concerning the distinction between the worlds above and below the moon, which, associated as it was with many ancient conceptions, had spread far and wide, was also a fruitful occasion of disbelief in a divine providence. We formerly remarked, that this doctrine of Aristotle had been attacked by Atticus, as denying a providence for men and things under the moon, since in this domain all was abandoned to the powers of nature and the human soul.<sup>43</sup> And on the other hand, the Aristotelian system has been charged with rendering a divine providence impossible even in the sphere above the moon ; inasmuch as it taught that all there moves in certain

<sup>41</sup> De Fato, 17.<sup>42</sup> Qu. Nat. i. 14.<sup>43</sup> Euseb. Pr. Ev. xv. 5, 12.

necessary courses.<sup>44</sup> Now against these objections Alexander defends the doctrine of his school by remarking, that the idea of providence may be taken in two different senses: in one, everything set in motion and changed by another, for the sake of some particular end, is considered as a work of providence; and in the other, that alone is ascribed to providence which is brought about in one body by a second, and for the sake of a third. In the former sense, all may be said to be subject to the providence of God, since God moves all for the sake of some end. He it is who gives to the stars their revolutions, in order that therein they may not indeed attain to the divine nature, but yet in their several degrees assimilate themselves to it. But in the second and narrower sense of the word the providence of God rules only the sublunary world; inasmuch as the motions of the stars are so ordered for the best, that those of the earth are dependent upon them.<sup>45</sup> But the Platonists assailed the Peripatetics with a further objection, and this was, that although Aristotle did attribute providence to the gods, yet the providence he ascribed was not absolute and essential to them, but merely incidental (*κατὰ συμβεβηκός*). For that, according to Aristotle, the end of their activity is not the welfare of mankind, but that while they merely exercise it for their own sakes, they collaterally promote at the same time

<sup>44</sup> Atticus says, *Τῶν μὲν γὰρ οὐρανίων ἀεὶ κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχοντων αἰτίαν τὴν εἰμαρμένην ὑποτίθῃσι, τῶν δὲ ὑπὸ σελήνην τὴν φύσιν, τῶν δὲ ἀνθρωπίνων φρόνησιν καὶ πρόνοιαν καὶ ψυχὴν*. The term *πρόνοια* can only mean here, consistently with the other expressions of Atticus, a providential care of mankind.

<sup>45</sup> Qu. Nat. i. 25.

the good of man.<sup>46</sup> In answer to this objection Alexander attempted to show that the relation between God and man would be completely reversed if providence for man were made a part of the very essence of Godhead. It is inconsistent with the notion of divinity to maintain that its activity is for the sake either of the preservation or for the benefit of man; for this would be the same as to hold, that the master is for the interest of his slave. Whatever exists for the sake of others is inferior to that for whose sake it exists. The gods, therefore, cannot be for the sake of man, but they have their proper activity in themselves, and for their own sakes.<sup>47</sup> It is manifest, that the great object of these thoughts is to maintain the notion of the natural agency of the most general forces in the world, absolutely and distinct from any special reference to human life. If then Alexander inferred accordingly, that the gods' providential care of man does not indicate the essence of their activity, still he could not allow, therefore, that it is merely an unessential reference of this activity, or merely collateral to it. And he accordingly denied that the disjunctive proposition applied to the question in hand. For to assert of the divine nature that it exercises a providence for man only collaterally and incidentally would not be justifiable, except it could be shown that the welfare of man

<sup>46</sup> Ib. ii. 21. From the conclusion of the *Essay* it is evident that it is directed against the Platonists also.

<sup>47</sup> L. i. fol. 17, a. 'Ἀλλ' εἰ τὰς οἰκείας τὸ θεῖον ἐνεργήσει ἐνεργείας τῆς τῶν θεῶν σωτηρίας, οὐχ αὐτοῦ (ed. οὐκ αὐτοῦ) χάριν, παντάπασιν αὐτὸ ὁξεῖ τῶν θεῶν εἶναι χάριν.

results from its activity indeed, but without its knowledge and will, and without design (*παρὰ λόγον*). For it is thus only that it can be said of a man, that he has accidentally or collaterally invented a matter, if, without knowledge and without will, and beginning his plan with a wholly different design, he has stumbled upon it. But now such is not the nature of the divine providence; but it is both with will and knowledge that they care for man, and are the sources of all the good things of life, and of all that he stands in need of, although it is not simply for man's sake that they exercise and perfect their activity. There must, therefore, be a mean between absolute providence and mere contingent providence.<sup>48</sup>

In these reasonings of Alexander of Aphrodisias upon providence, he manifestly evinces a strong desire to adopt and set himself in unison with the pious sentiment, which in his times began to prevail in philosophy, without, however, remitting in any degree the principle of his school, which pre-eminently insisted upon the due recognition of the natural connection of all forces and phenomena. Accordingly, he does not allow himself to be carried away by the polemic of the Platonists into the admission that the world, although it must have been created in time, may, nevertheless, by the will of God, be rendered indestructible; for, he argues, that what according to its nature belongs to a thing, cannot even by God be separated from it; and in support thereof, he appeals to the assertion of Plato, that evil is necessary in the world, because evil

<sup>48</sup> L. i. fol. 16 b.

belongs to the nature of perishable things.<sup>49</sup> Equally unwilling is he, in deference to these opponents, to remit anything from the strict principle of the Aristotelian theory of the soul; on the contrary, a leading point in his controversy with the Platonists is, that the soul is not a self-moving essence, but that it is a materialized form (*ἐνυλον εἶδος*), and that consequently it cannot be in and by itself immortal.<sup>50</sup>

Now the more zealously that this erudite philosophy occupied itself with scholastic controversies, the more closely that it confined its labours to the exposition of the doctrines of the several schools, and the elucidation of the works of their respective founders, attaching itself, for the most part, with a narrow-minded servility and superstitious respect to the written letter; and the more consequently it was driven to forced meanings, and the less it was able to seize the spirit of an entire system, and to exhibit it from a comprehensive point of view, which is almost universally wanting in the summaries composed for the use of students;—the more food was furnished to the rapidly growing spirit of Scepticism.

Before, however, we can enter upon the history of the later Sceptics, we have yet to mention a learned individual of this age, who, although he chiefly employed himself with a widely different branch of science, is nevertheless, of considerable importance for the history of philosophy. We

<sup>49</sup> Ib. i. 18.

<sup>50</sup> Ib. ii. 14; de Anima, i. fol. 126, a. "Ὅτι ἀχώριστος ἡ ψυχὴ τοῦ σώματος. οὐ ἐστὶ ψυχὴ."

allude to the famous physician Claudius Galenus, who was somewhat older than Alexander of Aphrodisias, and flourished in the period which extends from M. Aurelius to Severus. The end which this individual had proposed to himself in his literary labours was, upon the basis of his own experience and a few traditionary principles of the school of Hippocrates, to erect a perfect system of medical science by the application of certain logical rules and ideas derived from the older philosophy. How far he may have been successful in this attempt, and the degree of skill which marked his execution of it, lies not in our province to determine. But, on the other hand, Galen properly falls within our notice, so far as he laid claim to be a teacher of philosophy, and diffused it both in works exclusively philosophical, and in others designed to establish his own medical theories. Now the nature of these attempts is far from being a matter of indifference ; both because, generally, the medical profession on which the writings of Galen primarily acted, was in high estimation, and consequently necessarily exercised a great influence on the philosophical opinions of the age, and also because in particular, the development of a learned art of medicine is intimately connected with the history of the late Scepticism.

Even before the time of Galen, a philosophical habit of thought, as was naturally to be expected, had established itself among medical men, and Dogmatical schools had arisen among them, which either advocated the Epicurean theory of atoms, or professed Stoical dogmas, as did the so-called Pneu-

matici. But these schools have no claim to our notice, as they did not introduce any change in philosophy. But in opposition to these Dogmatical physicians, and to the confusion in which their preconceived interpretations of experience threatened to involve medical science, another party arose, whose purpose it was to adhere strictly to experience, without entering upon any philosophical investigation of principles. Galen, however, refused on the one hand, to join these pure Empirics in absolutely abandoning such speculations; while, on the other, he was far from satisfied with the views and conclusions of the more philosophical. He accordingly adopted a course of his own; and for the purpose of his own explanations, adopted an Eclectical method, which although for the most part it drew from the doctrines of Plato and Aristotle, did not nevertheless disdain to avail itself of certain Stoical opinions, which at this time had gained general currency in science. By the very nature of his profession Galen was naturally led to look to experience as an unerring source of knowledge. In this he had such confidence, that he never entered into any controversy in which, as a preliminary point, the belief in the truth of phenomena had to be established.<sup>51</sup> By this method he escaped the necessity of a thorough examination into the significance of phenomena, and of the higher ideas on which their explanation is dependent. But according to his opinion, the phenomenon must form the basis of all reasoning designed to

<sup>51</sup> The doubters of the truth of phenomena he calls ἀγνοικοι τῶν φαινομένων. De Prænot. ad Poeth. 5, p. 628, Kühn.



establish a correct knowledge of the non-apparent, as the ground of the apparent. Accordingly he compares those who neglect proofs and the theory of proofs, with those who would wish to understand astronomy without having studied mathematics and geometry.<sup>62</sup> He therefore insists upon the necessity of logical exercises as essentially necessary to the accurate formation of any science,<sup>63</sup> and he himself appears to have devoted no little industry to this branch of philosophical inquiry, if we consider the long list of logical writings which are given in the catalogue of his works. He awakens our sympathy when he declares, that in his youth he wished for nothing so much from philosophers, as that they should furnish him with an unerring theory of reasoning, but that his hope had been disappointed. For even on this subject he finds among them, he says, a variety of opinions and discrepancies, not to say manifestly false doctrines. He says, therefore, that the praise is not due to his teachers, if he did not abandon himself to the doubts of the Pyrrhonists; but that he is indebted to the mathematical sciences, the old and hereditary study of his family, for his confidence in science, and that consequently he attempted to sketch for himself, a theory of proofs in the manner of geometry.<sup>64</sup> It is a trait in his character deserving of notice, that he was less favourable to the Platonic and Stoical logic than to the Aristotelian.<sup>65</sup> In his extant writings, Galen,

<sup>62</sup> De Constit. Art. Med. 8, fin. p. 254.

<sup>63</sup> De Elem. ex Hipp. i. 6, p. 460; quod opt. med. sit quoque phil. p. 60.

<sup>64</sup> De Libr. Propr. 11.

<sup>65</sup> L. i.; ib. 16. He writes, "Ὅτι ἡ γεωμετρικὴ ἀναλυτικὴ ἀμείνων τῆς τῶν Στωϊκῶν."

however, is far removed from the short and accurate method of geometry, and this is the case not merely with such works as, belonging by their subject to experience, do not admit of any great rigour of demonstration; but even in works especially of a philosophical character, he abandons himself without restraint to rhetorical prolixity, and it is only seldom that, under the swell of sounding words, a correspondingly important idea is found. That he is deficient in that rigour of regulated thought, which alone can make logical investigations of a subtler kind fruitful, is proved clearly enough by his work on 'Sophisms,' in which he attempts to furnish the proof which is wanting in Aristotle, that no more than the six fallacies adduced by the latter, are possible, and this he hopes to effect by a division which he has borrowed from another source, and very awkwardly applied.<sup>56</sup>

The philosophical works of Galen are not very numerous, except upon ethical subjects. The study of ethics he strongly recommended to physicians, not merely on the ground of the connection subsisting between the body and the soul, but even in a lofty tone bade them to consider the dignity of their avocation, and exhorted them, therefore, to practise morality and to suppress all low passions, in order that they might cultivate their profession more zealously and successfully.<sup>57</sup> Of this part, however, of

<sup>56</sup> The principle which forms the groundwork of his division is this: that every sophism is founded on a verbal ambiguity: that this may either lie in single, equivocal terms, or else arise from the structure of the proposition; that further, the ambiguity may be either real, or possible, or conceptional. Of the first, he admits two kinds, three of the second, but only one of the third. *De Sophism.* c. 2.

<sup>57</sup> *Quod opt. med. sit quoque phil.* p. 60, sq.

the philosophy of Galen; we have nothing further to remark than that it attached itself entirely to the Platonic doctrine.

Physical investigations, as immediately connected with his profession, naturally attracted no inconsiderable portion of his attention. Nevertheless, we do not think it necessary to give a lengthy exposition of his physiology, since in details it is based upon experience, and in its general principles fluctuates indifferently between Plato and Aristotle, and the Stoics. A few instances will suffice to convey an idea of his physical Eclecticism. His profession led him by preference to the investigation of organic nature. Accordingly he pursued no branch of physical inquiry with more industry than the discovery of design in the structure of the several members. In these inquiries he adopted the teleological views of Plato and Aristotle, without, however, slavishly adhering to either, since his independent researches into the structure of the human frame necessarily led him to peculiar results. This part of physics he estimated so highly, that he believed it to be the introduction to a true theology.<sup>58</sup> He is consequently full of praises of the divine wisdom, which is so manifestly traceable in the formation of living creatures. However, this tendency of his philosophical view is little in unison with the basis of his medical theory, which reduces everything to a combination of the elements, and pays but little regard to the power which forms and sustains the

<sup>58</sup> De Usu Part. xvii. 1, p. 360. 'Ἡ περὶ χρείας μορίων πραγματεία θεολογίας ἀκριβοῦς ἀληθῶς ἀρχὴ καταστήσεται, πολὺ μείζονός τε καὶ τιμιωτέρου πράγματος ὕλης τῆς ἰατρικῆς.

living creature. For he sets out, from the composition of the four elements—on which his ideas are nearly coincident with those of the Stoics<sup>59</sup>—from the composition and due mixture of these the humours are formed;<sup>60</sup> and of these, in the next place, the homogeneous, and lastly the heterogeneous, parts of the body. Accordingly the object of all his medical precepts is to promote or to restore in all parts a due mixture; and in agreement with this fundamental view he must necessarily have conceived his whole theory. In general, it is manifest that his investigations throughout are dependent on the practical end of his art. Indeed, he is far from concealing his conviction that all investigations which go beyond the practical—such as speculations on God's nature, his relation to the world, and the question whether the world is eternal or created, and the like—are useless displays of ingenuity; and in support of such a view, appealed to the authority of Socrates, Xenophon, and even Plato.<sup>61</sup> No art which does not promote the ends of existence, is deserving the name.<sup>62</sup> Now the doctrine of the soul might perhaps appear to him to be of more value than investigations into the mutual relations of the highest ideas; but, as we formerly hinted, he entered into this subject less fully than

<sup>59</sup> De Elem. ex Hipp. i. 6, p. 468. He considers them as extremes of the simple qualities.

<sup>60</sup> This is grounded on the principle that the living body must contain all the simple elements. Ib. 6, fin. Equally impossible is it for the body to contain any element in purity; for it does not admit of extreme purity. De Temp. i. 1.

<sup>61</sup> De Hipp. et Plat. Plac. ix. 7, p. 779, seqq.

<sup>62</sup> Adhort. ad Art. Add. 9. Ὅποσοις τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων οὐκ ἔστι τὸ τίλος βιωφελές, ταῦτ' οὐκ εἰσὶ τέχναι.

into that of the material composition of the body. This explains at once the Eclectical and Sceptical manner in which he treats of the soul. He evinces, indeed, a disposition to adopt the Aristotelian definition of it, for he declares that the Platonic doctrine, that the soul is incorporeal, is unintelligible, since in that which is incorporeal, no distinctions are discoverable; whereas souls are evidently different one from another; and because it is difficult to see how the soul can diffuse itself over the body if it had no part in body.<sup>63</sup> For the same reason he denies the cogency of Plato's arguments in favour of its immortality,<sup>64</sup> and thinks that the essence of the soul has never been scientifically determined, and consequently that it is impossible to form even a probable opinion on the subject.<sup>65</sup> And he at the same time expresses his dissent from the opinion of the Platonists, that the soul, which is diffused over the whole world, is the source of all living things; since, to his mind, it closely borders upon impiety to suppose that the divine essence would place its formative energy in the lowest kinds of animal life, even loathsome vermin.<sup>66</sup> But, if in these points he differs

<sup>63</sup> Quod Animi Mor. Corp. Temp. Sequ. 3, p. 776. Διὰ το μὴ γινώσκειν με τὴν οὐσίαν τῆς ψυχῆς ὅποια τίς ἐστιν, ἐκ τοῦ γίνους τῶν ἀσωμάτων ὑποθεμένων ἡμῶν ὑπάρχειν αὐτήν. ἐν μὲν γὰρ σώματι τὰς ἐράσεις ὁρῶ πάμπολύ τε διαφερούσας ἀλλήλων καὶ παμπόλλας οὐσας· ἀσωμάτου δ' οὐσίας αὐτῆς καθ' ἑαυτὴν εἶναι δυναμένης, οὐκ οὐσης δὲ ποιότητος ἢ εἶδους σώματος οὐδεμίαν νοῶ διαφοράν, καίτοι πολλάκις ἐπισκεψάμενός τε καὶ ζητήσας ἐπιμελῶς· ἀλλ' οὐδέ, πῶς οὐδὲν οὐσα τοῦ σώματος εἰς ὅλον αὐτὸ δύναι' ἂν ἐκτείνεσθαι. Ib. c. 5, p. 785, sqq.

<sup>64</sup> Ib. c. 3, fin.

<sup>65</sup> De Fact. Format. 6, p. 700. 'Αλλ', ὑπερ ἔφην, οὐδεμίαν εὐρίσκων δόξαν ἀποδειγμένην ἐπιστημονικῶς ἀπορεῖν ὁμολογῶ περὶ ψυχῆς οὐσίας, οὐδ' ἄχρι τοῦ πιθανοῦ προελθεῖν δυνάμενος.

<sup>66</sup> L. 1.

from the Platonic doctrine, he, on the other hand, concurs with it in the classification of the faculties of the soul, and in the theory of the organs upon which they are dependent. In this respect he very warmly controverts the opinion of Aristotle, which makes the heart to be the seat of the soul, and the design of the brain to be the cooling of the heart; for in this he could appeal to his own anatomical experiments, which had proved to him the connection between the nerves of the brain and the organs of sense.<sup>67</sup>

Galen had employed more learnedly than any of his predecessors the doctrines of the earlier philosophy, for the scientific embellishment of the medical art; and according to the judgment of eminent physicians, he has also brought to bear on this end no inconsiderable treasures of experiment: and to make all his learning tell, he had the command of a rhetorical flow of language, which was sometimes indeed prolix, but yet well adapted to the demands of his age. Accordingly we cannot wonder that his opinions should have been favourably received and found many advocates; while, on the other hand, it is as little suprising that his medical contemporaries should have exhibited a great indisposition to indulge in the application of philosophical ideas to their practice, since they might have had good reason to fear that such an attempt, whether made by Galen himself, or by the Dogmatists, would only lead to a distortion and complication of the results of pure experiment. It is true that the earlier physicians of the school of Epicurus and the

<sup>67</sup> De Usu Part. viii. 2, 3; for the last point particularly see p. 623, seq.

Stoics, may have set to work more off-hand than Galen; but it is not improbable that their philosophical attempts had the advantage over his of greater rigour of consequence;<sup>68</sup> and the more Galen was distracted by the conflicting results of experience, and the more clearly the further prosecution of experiment brought to light the unsatisfactory nature of the older physiological doctrines, the more perhaps would physicians, who saw that experiment alone was the safe road of their art, be disposed to enter upon a general testing of the whole body of the earlier philosophy.

These remarks naturally introduce to us the Sceptics of this period. According to the traditional statement, the Sceptical habit, which we found existing in the second period of our history, was never absolutely without a representative. We have a catalogue of Sceptics, from Timon downwards, in which, however, there <sup>are</sup> ~~is~~ evidently several gaps;<sup>69</sup> unless, perhaps, we are justified in supposing with Menodotus, one of the later Sceptics, that the succession of the school was broken for a time, until it was again revived by Ptolemy of Cyrene, to whom two disciples are given, Heraclides and Sarpedon. Of these three, however, nothing further is known; and it was Ænesidemus, a disciple of Heraclides, who first gave to the Sceptical system a new and solid foundation. The series of

<sup>68</sup> For further information on the singular Eclecticism of Galen, we refer to Kurt Sprengell's, *Beiträge zur Gesch. der Medicin*. 1. Bd. 1. Stck. s. 117, seq.

<sup>69</sup> *Diog. Laërt.* ix. 115, 116. According to this statement there are but four generations from Timon to Ænesidemus, which are unquestionably not enough for 100 years.

the Sceptics from Ptolemy appears to be without any chasm;<sup>70</sup> but our information concerning them is so very scanty, that we know scarcely anything of their biography, and even of their dates we can only form a tolerable conjecture. It was customary, indeed, in this period for the several schools to stand apart, and for each to trouble itself little, if at all, about the teachers of all the rest, and for every one to look more to the old than to the new; still there must have been some special reason for the total neglect of the Sceptical school by all the others, notwithstanding that it possessed a very important literature. Cicero considered the Sceptical school as extinct in his time;<sup>71</sup> Seneca is ignorant of any contemporaneous teacher of Pyrrhonism.<sup>72</sup> Scarcely any mention is made of it except by such as write directly of the sects, or of the history of philosophy, or by physicians. We doubt not that its influence on medical science was considerable; indeed we are disposed to believe that the New Sceptics collectively were physicians, since all those of whose circumstances in life we know anything, and these form by far the majority, were so.<sup>73</sup> Of the time when they lived we have no precise account, but it

<sup>70</sup> This we conclude from the fact that the statement in Diogenes *ib.* appeals to the authority of Menodotus, one of the heads of the Sceptical school. That Agrippa is not mentioned in this line may be explained, by supposing him to belong to one of the subordinate branches of the school.

<sup>71</sup> *De Orat.* iii. 17; *de Fin.* ii. 11, 13.

<sup>72</sup> *Quæst. Nat.* vii. 32.

<sup>73</sup> From *Ænesidemus* to *Saturninus*, inclusive, we count nine Sceptics, of whom six are physicians and writers of repute, viz.:—*Sextus Empiricus* and *Saturninus*, who are named as such by *Diog. L.* ix. 116.; *Herodotus*, the teacher of *Sextus* the son of *Areius*, who was likewise a physician, whose teacher *Menodotus*, as well as *Theodas* or *Theudas*, were among the most famous of the Empirical physicians, *Galen. de Libr. Prop.* 9; *de Comp. Med. Sec. Loc.*



may be pretty nearly guessed. In the works of Sextus, surnamed Empiricus, we may clearly see, from the character of the Sceptical controversy against the Dogmatists, that it must have been formed at a time when the Stoical school exercised the greatest influence on scientific thought. For although the other Dogmatical sects are not spared by the Sceptics, although, indeed, it is a leading characteristic of the sect to contrast with their own views the opinions of every considerable school of philosophy, whether half extinct or still flourishing, nevertheless the Stoical school is the chief object of their attacks. No doctrine is examined with so much strictness as theirs, and their forms and terminology are almost generally taken as the forms of science in general. But the Stoical philosophy began to decline about the close of the second century, A.D., and by the middle of the third neo-Platonism attained to a consideration which quickly overshadowed every other system of philosophy. Now the Sceptical disquisitions of Sextus do not contain even the slightest allusion to the latter, although it would have furnished as ample materials as any other for doubting the validity of all philosophical knowledge.<sup>74</sup> From this fact we may with

iii. p. 636; v. p. 834; de Simpl. Medic. Temp. i. p. 432. Also Heraclides of Tarentum, who is called an Empirical physician, was probably the teacher of Ænesidemus. I take this occasion to mention that it was usual to ascribe the Sceptics to the Empirical physicians, to which Sextus objects, and asserts that they would be more justly reckoned among the more methodical. Hypot. Pyrrh. i. 236, sqq.; cf. Adv. Math. viii. 327. However his distinction between Empirical and Sceptical physicians is untenable, and he himself soon abandons it, Ib. 191. Galen admits that they belonged to different schools. De Simpl. Med. Temp. l. 1.

<sup>74</sup> Sextus expressly asserts that he has worked out the history of philosophy from the physiologists to the latest philosophers, i. e. the Stoics. Adv. Math.

tolerable certainty infer, that if not Sextus himself, yet at least the individuals whose Sceptical arguments he had collected into a body, lived at latest in the first half of the second century. And a more precise result seems attainable from the works of the Greek physicians. The works of Galen against the Empirics are only directed against Menodotus and Theudas; while in a later work he mentions Herodotus, the scholar of Menodotus; while it has no allusion to Sextus Empiricus, the disciple of Herodotus, although in a later medical work he is named as one of the heads of Empirical physicians.<sup>75</sup> Such a man as Sextus, who had collected into a body the whole of the Sceptical doctrines, could not have been passed over by Galen, if in his time he had already published any one of his works. From this silence, then, we must conclude that Herodotus was really the contemporary of Galen, but that Sextus lived in the first half of the third century. Now reckoning backward from this time Ænesidemus may perhaps have lived about the commencement of our present era.<sup>76</sup>

viii. 1; Pyrrh. Hyp. i. 65. Κατὰ τοὺς μάλιστα ἡμῖν ἀντιδοξοῦντας νῦν δογματικοὺς τοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς. He seldom mentions philosophers of his own, and generally not those of a late date; nevertheless he has a notice of the Stoic Basileides abovementioned, who is usually regarded as the teacher of M. Aurelius. Adv. Math. viii. 258, c. not. Fabr.

<sup>75</sup> Namely, in the Introductio, which is falsely placed among the works of Galen, c. 4.

<sup>76</sup> On the authority of Fabric. ad Sext. Emp. Hyp. Pyrrh. i. 235, it is usually assumed that Ænesidemus was a contemporary of Cicero. This assumption rests mainly on his having said of the Academicians of his time, that they sometimes agree with the Stoics, and appear like Stoics quarrelling with Stoics; for this observation has been supposed to apply to Antiochus. But it is not improbable that many of the Academicians followed in the steps of Antiochus. Nothing can be inferred from the statement of Aristocles ap. Euseb. Pr. Ev. xiv. 8,

Now of the series of the New Sceptics down to Sextus, we have little of personal information. The most remarkable was *Ænesidemus*, who was originally of Gnosus, and taught at Alexandria. But of him it is, however, far from certain, that he belonged by his style of thought to the Sceptical school, although indeed he appears to have contributed greatly to the dissemination of Sceptical doctrines. For we are told, that having devoted himself to the works of Heraclitus, he considered Sceptical researches as a means of attaining to a right understanding of his favourite author. Now in this respect he appears to be in perfect agreement with the spirit of the age, which delighted chiefly to renew olden doctrines, and to combine them together. As to the nature of the connection between the two, he appears to have spoken very expressly. For he asserts that in the first place, a man must, after the manner of the Sceptics, acknowledge that opposite appearances are presented by the same object, before he can arrive at an understanding of the Heraclitic principle, that opposites are in all.<sup>77</sup> But from this it appears scarcely questionable, that he did not intend to

that *Ænesidemus* attacked, *ἐχθὲς καὶ πρῶν*, the Sceptical doctrine. A very different chronology would be determined if we take the Sceptic *Zeuxis*, who was second in succession from *Ænesidemus* to be the same with the Herophilite physician of the same name, whom Strab. xii. 8, fin. mentions as his contemporary. This is the opinion of Diog. L. ix. 106; but it appears to me to be very questionable.

<sup>77</sup> Sext. Emp. Pyrrh. Hyp. i. 210. 'Ἐπεὶ δὲ οἱ περὶ τὸν Αἰνησίδημον ἔλεγον, ὁρῶν εἶναι τὴν σκεπτικὴν ἀγωγὴν ἐπὶ τὴν Ἡρακλείτειον φιλοσοφίαν, διότι προηγείται τοῦ τάναντία περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ὑπάρχειν τὸ τάναντία περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ φαίνεσθαι· καὶ οἱ μὲν σκεπτικοὶ φαίνεσθαι λέγουσι τὰ ἰναντία περὶ τὸ αὐτό, οἱ δὲ Ἡρακλείτειοι ἀπὸ τούτου καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ ὑπάρχειν αὐτὰ μετέρχονται.

adopt the Sceptical habit of thought, simply because it refused to pass any judgment as to the nature of that which is the ground of all phenomena; and this Ænesidemus has himself acknowledged.<sup>78</sup> For the Sceptic would not admit that it is possible to predicate of entity that it may have opposite accidents, and Ænesidemus was so little deceived on this head, that on the contrary, he remarked that the Sceptic would not even say, whether there is or not a real entity.<sup>79</sup> Others of his principles are equally irreconcilable with this pretended Scepticism. Thus he taught that being, or the essence (*οὐσία*) is a body, and indeed the prime body,<sup>80</sup> which implies a distinction between the prime body which is the ground and principle of all, and the phenomenal or manifest body; and he assumed, too, that air is the principle of all things.<sup>81</sup> In these assertions he might seem in some degree faithful to the doctrine of Heraclitus, but this was certainly no longer the case, when he made the ground of all things to be time, which also is corporeal,<sup>82</sup> and especially when he connected this doctrine with other positions, which appear to indicate a very earnest endeavour to combine and get rid of all contrarieties in the idea of the first prime cause. In this sense undoubtedly, must be understood his positions, that not only the whole time, unquestion-

<sup>78</sup> Phot. Cod. 212 p. 281, Hæsch. Σημεῖα μὲν, ὥσπερ τὰ φανερὰ φάμεν τῶν ἀφανῶν, οὐδ' ὅλως εἶναι φησι, ἡπαρῆσθαι δὲ κενῇ προσπάθειᾳ τοῦς οἰομένους.

<sup>79</sup> Ib. p. 280.

<sup>80</sup> Sext. Emp. Pyrrh. Hyp. iii. 138; Adv. Math. x. 216.

<sup>81</sup> Ib. 233.

<sup>82</sup> Sext. Emp. Pyrrh. Hyp. iii. 138; Adv. Math. x. 216.

ably the motion of the heavens, but also the now, the simple element of time, is the primary ground of all things; even as the unit, the simple element of number, is the prime substance; for it is by the multiplication of the "now" and of the unit that times and numbers are produced; the part, however, is undoubtedly both different from the whole, and yet also the same with it, because simply, the first essence is both whole and also part, whole i. e. in respect to the world, but part in respect to the nature of each determinate living creature.<sup>83</sup> It may well be doubted, whether these positions adequately express the Pantheistic view of the Heraclitic theory. According to it, the essence of all things—the unity of the whole world—is expressed, and perfectly contained in every several thing, as well in the part as in the whole; on this account every plurality in the world is but a repetition of the same unit, and in every moment of time the whole is completely present. Therefore Ænesidemus might well say, that in the same there are opposites. That he

<sup>83</sup> Ib. 216, sq. "Ὅθεν καὶ διὰ τῆς πρώτης εἰσαγωγῆς καθ' ἕξ πραγμάτων τετάχθαι λέγων τὰς ἀπλᾶς λέξεις, αἱ τινες μέρη τοῦ λόγου τυγχάνουσι, τὴν μὲν χρόνος προσηγορίαν καὶ τὴν μονάδα ἐπὶ τῆς οὐσίας τετάχθαι φησὶν, ἢ τίς ἐστι σωματικὴ· τὰ δὲ μεγέθη τῶν χρόνων καὶ τὰ κεφάλαια τῶν ἀριθμῶν ἐπὶ πολυπλασιασμοῦ μάλιστα ἐκφέρεσθαι. τὸ μὲν γὰρ νῦν, ὃ δὴ χρόνον μὴνυμά ἐστι, ἐπεὶ δὲ τὴν μονάδα οὐκ ἄλλο τι εἶναι ἢ τὴν οὐσίαν· τὴν δὲ ἡμέραν καὶ τὸν μῆνα καὶ τὸν ἑνιαυτὸν πολυπλασιασμὸν ὑπάρχειν τοῦ νῦν, φημί δὲ τοῦ χρόνου· τὰ δὲ δύο καὶ τρία καὶ δέκα καὶ ἑκατὸν πολυπλασιασμὸν εἶναι τῆς μονάδος. Ib. ix. 337. ὁ δὲ Αἰνησιδήμος κατὰ Ἡράκλειτον, καὶ ἕτερον, φησί, τὸ μέρος τοῦ ὅλου καὶ αὐτότὸν· ἡ γὰρ οὐσία καὶ ὅλη ἐστὶ καὶ μέρος· ὅλη μὲν κατὰ τὸν κόσμον, μέρος δὲ κατὰ τὴν τοῦδε τοῦ ζῶου φύσιν. The last position is ambiguous, both in my paraphrase and the original. The manner in which Sextus quotes what is utterly unintelligible, is somewhat singular. The beginning of the first passage clearly shows that Sextus endeavoured to give a systematic basis to the Heraclitic doctrine, by comparing the forms of entity with those of language.

should have called this primary unit air and time, seems to indicate that he regarded it as a living essence. Perhaps we shall not greatly err, if we assume, that this Materialistic Pantheism was closely connected with the medical science of the Sceptical school ; which connection may, probably, further account for the fact, that Ænesidemus explained, in a directly sensuous way, the opinions of Heraclitus, concerning the influx of the divine fire into the human soul.<sup>84</sup> Now in this direction of thought, Ænesidemus was not, in fact, far removed from the Stoics. If, therefore, he nevertheless argues chiefly against them, and objects to the newer Academy its agreement with the Stoics, he may have been looking merely to subordinate matters, or perhaps the ground of his objection may have been, that the Stoics did not appear to him sufficiently consequent in their Materialistic and Pantheistic tendency.<sup>85</sup>

If then in regard to this whole doctrine, we ought not to class Ænesidemus with the Sceptics, we must nevertheless observe, that it was of little influence on the further course of our history ; it is merely a trace of the Pantheistic ideas, which in his age showed themselves in different places, but principally in the East ; and as such, we consider them as an insignificant monument of the times, standing alongside of many more important ones.

<sup>84</sup> Sext. Emp. Adv. Math. vii. 349, 350.

<sup>85</sup> We formerly remarked that Sextus Empiricus evinced in his medical views, a preference for the methodical school ; so too, many of the earlier Sceptics may have inclined to the school of the Pneumatici without, however, adopting its philosophical grounds. Ultimately indeed, every Scepticism has a Dogmatism in the back ground.

There is nothing surprising in the union of such a Pantheism with Sceptical habits of thoughts, for the Pantheistic theory is invariably accompanied with a marked opposition to the intellectual development of science. Of this aversion we have already discovered many vestiges in the Eleatæ and the Megarians, and even in Heraclitus himself. The later Sceptics diligently searched for all these traces;<sup>86</sup> and if Ænesidemus considered this as the right road to the Heraclitic philosophy, it was only because it tended to overthrow the existing view of things, and by declaring it to be in itself a worthless representation of them, prepared the way to the Pantheistic doctrine. This is clearly the result also of his definition of Pyrrhonism. It, he says, is a recollection of phenomena, or of that, which is in some manner or other conceived, by which all is compounded with all, and being compared together, is found to contain much anomaly and complication.<sup>87</sup> However, this Pantheistic view of Ænesidemus does not constitute his historical importance, which consisted rather in the extensive influence he exercised by his Sceptical mode of teaching; for he is expressly named as one of the heads of the new Sceptical school,<sup>88</sup> to which however, he does not appear to have trans-

<sup>86</sup> Diog. L. ix. 72, 73.

<sup>87</sup> Ib. ix. 78. "Ἐστίν οὖν ὁ Πυρρόνιος λόγος μνήμη τις τῶν φαινομένων ἢ τῶν ὅπως οὖν νοουμένων, καθ' ἣν πάντα πᾶσι συμβάλλεται καὶ συγκρινόμενα πολλὴν ἀνωμαλίαν καὶ ταραχὴν ἔχοντα εὐρίσκεται, καθά φησιν Αἰνησιδήμος. Many substitutes have been proposed for *μνήμη τις*: it is however correct, for in *μνήμη*, all reason consists according to the Sceptics, Sext. Emp. Adv. Math. viii. 288.

<sup>88</sup> Sext. Emp. Hyp. Pyrrh. i. 222.

mitted the Pantheistic basis of his doubts, for we find no traces of it among the later Sceptics.

It is difficult to adduce any peculiar principle, as characteristic of the Sceptical speculations of Ænesidemus, since of the little even that we know of his reasonings, much may be justly claimed by the earlier Sceptics, and much is so closely mixed up with those of his successors, that it is almost impossible to separate them.<sup>89</sup> The latter is the case especially with the arguments which Ænesidemus employed to prove that the connection between cause and effect cannot be ascertained.<sup>90</sup> On this head, it is impossible to distinguish what is really his property from what belongs to the later Sceptics. The former remark, on the other hand, applies to the ten grounds of Scepticism, of which Ænesidemus is the reputed author,<sup>91</sup> but of which we showed on a former occasion, that they were current among the earlier Sceptics, so that at

<sup>89</sup> The ground of this was in part, the fact that Ænesidemus taught his Scepticism separately from his Heraclitic opinions. Accordingly Sextus frequently says, when speaking of the latter, *Αἰνησιδῆμος κατὰ Ἡράκλειτον*, and appeals to the works which he entitles *πρώτη εἰσαγωγή*. In the chief Sceptical work of Ænesidemus, *Πυρρώνειοι λόγοι*, in 8 books, of which Photius, cod. 212, has merely given too brief an extract, there is no detailed mention of any Heraclitic doctrine. Probably the *ὑποτύπωσις εἰς τὰ Πυρρώνεια* is the same as the first book of this work.

<sup>90</sup> That he argued against the notion of a causal connection is unquestionable from Phot. Bibl. Cod. 212, p. 280, 281; Sext. Emp. Hyp. Pyrrh. i. 180 sqq.; Adv. Math. ix. 218. There is, however, no ground for ascribing to Ænesidemus the opinions which follow the last passages 262, as Tenneman *Gesch. der Phil.* b. v. 5. s. 93. justly remarks, and therefore what next follows, cannot also be attributed to him. But the following passages go on indefinitely without marking the end of that which properly belongs to Ænesidemus. It appears, therefore, most advisable to regard the whole as the common property of the Sceptics. To support this view we meet, in s. 272, with a division utterly inconsistent with that ascribed to Ænesidemus by Sext. Adv. Math. x. 38.

<sup>91</sup> Sext. Emp. adv. Math. vii. 345; Aristocl. Ap. Euseb. Pr. Ev. xiv. 13.



most, he can only claim the merit of being the first to collect and arrange them. Whatever else we know of the doctrine of *Ænesidemus* is of little value, and utterly devoid of originality.<sup>92</sup>

But the simple fact that *Ænesidemus* collected the arguments of the Sceptics under these ten heads, affords a slight clue to guide us in tracing the progressive development of the Sceptical school, which otherwise is involved in the greatest obscurity. It exhibits, at all events, a desire to give something like a systematic order to the Sceptical doctrine, with a view to facilitate the survey of its multifarious objections to Dogmatism. A similar wish for the improvement and perfection of the Sceptical polemics is also traceable in his enumeration of the eight different cases in which the Dogmatists usually deceive themselves in their supposed investigation of causes.<sup>93</sup> For Sextus, in general terms, declares the distinctive character of the method of the later Sceptics, as compared with that of the New Academy, to consist in this, that the former confined themselves to a refutation of the leading and general principles of the Dogmatists, but neglected all particular doctrines and consequences as necessarily falling with the principles themselves.<sup>94</sup> Now it is in perfect unison with this statement that we find the successors of *Ænesidemus* assiduously

<sup>92</sup> Thus the statements of the moral purpose of the Sceptics, b. Diog. L. ix. 107; Phot. l. i, p. 281, which serves to explain Aristocl. l. i. the investigation of true and false phenomena, Sext. Adv. Math. viii. 8, the grounds against truth, ib. viii. 40, sq.; the grounds against the assumption that signs are sensuous, which is referred to the tenth ground, ib. 215; cf. 234; the distinction of the two kinds of motion, ib. x. 38, and the verbal explanation of the good, ib. xi. 42, and some others.

<sup>93</sup> Sext. Emp. Hyp. Pyrrh. i. 180, sqq.

<sup>94</sup> Adv. Math. ix. 1.

labouring still further to reduce the grounds of Scepticism.<sup>95</sup> Agrippa, a Sceptic, of whose personal history we only know that he lived after Ænesidemus,<sup>96</sup> admitted no more than five grounds of Scepticism;<sup>97</sup> of which the two first comprise, in part at least, if not quite completely, all the old ten, while the other three are quite new. The two first call in question the possibility of knowledge, on the ground that all human ideas, whether of life or science, are inconsistent with each other, and on the ground that they represent at most a mere relation. If now, under the head of inconsistency of ideas, we may include the objections which the Sceptics usually drew from the contradictory nature of sensuous appearances, this ground, taken with the second, undoubtedly comprises the former ten. The three new ones are remarkably distinguished from the older objections in this respect, that they do not relate to the matter but to the form of

<sup>95</sup> That this was continually carried forward we have sure grounds for inferring, from the manner in which Sextus mentions these later principles of Scepticism one after another. Pyrr. Hyp. i. 164, 178.

<sup>96</sup> Diog. L. ix. 18. What the *οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἀγρίππαν* may have taught here is ascribed by Sextus to the *τοῖς νεωτέροις σκεπτικοῖς*, in reference, no doubt, to Ænesidemus. On very insufficient reasons it has been inferred from Diog. L. ix. 106, that Agrippa was subsequent to the Sceptics, Antiochus and Apelles, of whom the former was the teacher of Menodotus. Cf. Fabric. ad Sext. Emp. Hyp. Pyrrh. i. 164.

<sup>97</sup> Diog. L. ix. 88. *Οἱ δὲ περὶ Ἀγρίππαν τούτοις ἄλλους πέντε προσεσάγουσι, τὸν τε ἀπὸ τῆς διαφωνίας καὶ τὸν εἰς ἀπειρον ἐκβάλλοντα καὶ τὸν πρὸς τι καὶ τὸν ἐξ ὑποθέσεως καὶ τὸν δι' ἀλλήλων.* Sext. Emp. Pyrrh. Hyp. i. 164, sqq. in the same order, and probably from the same source. We have not, however, adhered to this order, for it is evidently most unmethodical, and especially as our author (Sext. Emp. ib. 177) proceeds with so little judgment as to represent these five grounds as different from the earlier ten, which however are unquestionably, in part at least, contained in the former.

science. Accordingly, the bringing forward these objections indicates, in fact, a considerable progress in the development of the method of Scepticism. And in further prosecution of this direction, Agrippa sought to show that all the arguments of the Dogmatists are insufficient. The Dogmatists, he argues, must labour to prove everything, for without proof they will not believe anything. If, however, they maintain that from fixed premises a matter can be proved, these principles, it may be objected, are themselves but hypotheses, since they are not proved. But if they attempt to prove these principles—the premises of the syllogism—they must have recourse to new premises; and as this must take place in every argument, the endeavour to demonstrate everything would lead into endless demonstration. These are the first two formal grounds of Scepticism advanced by Agrippa. The third refers to a well-known paralogism, the so-called reasoning in a circle. As all the other Sceptical grounds of Agrippa relate to general principles, the conjecture is allowable that he also had a general view in his reference to this particular paralogism. Perhaps he intended by it to guard against the possible assertion of the Dogmatists, that the scientific form of syllogism only served to establish more fully principles of science, certain in themselves, by proving their mutual coherence. We are here thinking of the simile of Zeno, drawn from the closed fist, and compressed still more firmly by the other hand. That this conjecture is correct follows from the progress in the development of the Sceptical school.

For we see that still later Sceptics, Menodotus

especially and his school,<sup>98</sup> found occasion in the doctrine of Agrippa for still further simplification of the grounds of Scepticism. This they did by giving up all those that referred to the matter, with the exception of the one, derived from the disagreement of ideas, which they occasionally employed, in support of Agrippa's three formal grounds of doubt. These they also reduced to two, by comprising under a single and more general idea, that of the infinite process and that of the paralogism of the circle.<sup>99</sup> Thus they had left a simple dilemma by which they thought they could satisfactorily refute every pretension of the Dogmatists to scientific certainty. For, they argued, all that is known must either be known in itself or by inference; but that nothing can be known in itself clearly follows from the disputes of the Dogmatists as to principles; but if, on the other hand, it be maintained that a truth may be known by inference from another, then either the process of proof must be carried on to infinity, or else the paralogism of the circle will be incurred. Therefore, they concluded no knowledge can be demon-

<sup>98</sup> For Menodotus was unquestionably one of the most eminent of the later Sceptics; as such he is mentioned with Sextus. Pseudo-Galen. Introductio, c. 4, and in Sext. Emp. Hyp. Pyrrh. i. 222, with Ænesidemus, as Fabricius conjectures.

<sup>99</sup> Sext. Emp. Hyp. Pyrrh. i. 178, sq. Παραδιδάσκει δὲ καὶ δύο τρόπους ἐποχῆς ἐτέρους. ἑπεί γάρ πᾶν τὸ καταλαμβάνομενον ἤτοι ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ καταλαμβάνεσθαι δοκεῖ ἢ ἐξ ἐτέρου καταλαμβάνεσθαι, τὴν περὶ πάντων ἀπορίαν εἰσάγειν δοκοῦσι. καὶ ὅτι μὲν οὐδὲν ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ καταλαμβάνεσθαι, φασί, δῆλον ἐκ τῆς γεγεννημένης παρὰ τοῖς φυσικοῖς περὶ τε τῶν αἰσθητῶν καὶ τῶν νοητῶν ἀπάντων οἶμαι διαφωνίας. . . . διὰ δὲ τοῦτο οὐδ' ἐξ ἐτέρου τι καταλαμβάνεσθαι συγχωροῦσιν. εἰ μὲν γάρ τὸ ἐξ οὐ τι καταλαμβάνεσθαι, αἰ ἐξ ἐτέρου καταλαμβάνεσθαι δεήσει, εἰς τὸν διάλληλον ἢ τὸν ἄπειρον ἐμβάλλουσι τρόπον. Here also Sextus speaks of other tropes.

strated. As to form, these two methods are far superior to those of Agrippa, since they exhibit whatever occurs in the latter as a member of a whole, with exception, perhaps, of the argument of relation, which, however, might well be regarded as superfluous, after the discovery of a universal and infallible method of refutation: It is, therefore, impossible to deny to the Sceptics of this time the merit of having perfected a coherent development of their mode of thinking. In this respect they are meritoriously distinguished from the other sects of their day; and in this fact there is nothing surprising, since it only proves that in the prevailing weakness of the scientific spirit, a still surviving consciousness of the true requisitions of philosophy only served to strengthen the conviction of the existing incapacity to satisfy these demands.

If, however, we are able to trace the history of Scepticism in this period on the side of its formal development, we are not so fortunate with respect to its material grounds. Of these we have, indeed, a collection tolerably complete, but know nothing of their gradual formation. The collector is the famous Sextus, a Greek physician of the Empirical school, and on that account surnamed Empiricus. His fame rests on the circumstance of his being the only Sceptic of whom an entire work now exists.<sup>100</sup> His

<sup>100</sup> There are three works: The Pyrrhonistic Hypotyposes, that against the Encyclic sciences, and that against the philosophical sects. The last two are generally regarded as one work, and comprised under the title *Adversus Mathematicos*. Thus even Diog. Laert. ix. 116. But the beginning of the seventh book seems to prove that they were not designed to form a whole. Other works, occasionally quoted by Sextus but not clearly denoted, are lost. Cf. *Adv. Math.* v. 29; vi. 52, 55, 58; vii. 202; x. 284.

merits, as compared with the other Sceptics, cannot easily be estimated. They perhaps consist simply in this, that he gave the completest collection of Sceptical arguments against the Dogmatists, on which account his work has driven all others of the same nature into oblivion. For his talents are not great, and we cannot for a moment ascribe to him the merit of originality. On the other hand, he is diffuse even to tediousness in his controversy with the Dogmatists. The relevant and the irrelevant are equally adduced by him, and he appears scarcely able to estimate rightly the force of his own arguments. He does not, moreover, give his exposition of the Sceptical doctrine as anything new, but invariably speaks in the name of his school, whose common property he does little more than catalogue, and seldom mentions the author of a particular line of Sceptical thought. In short, it is at once manifest, that in his case Scepticism has followed in the wake of the other schools, and degenerated into a mere matter of erudite tradition. And in such a tradition it was even unavoidable that the fundamental idea should gradually lose its energy, and accordingly, as we previously observed, Sextus was unable to understand the true relation of the arguments invented by the later Sceptics. Indeed, he is often incapable of arranging these arguments in the most appropriate and lucid order; on the contrary, the looseness with which they follow each other sufficiently proves that his collection was made in haste, and with little of the industry requisite for such a work. But the length of his expositions particularly calls for notice.

Notwithstanding his frequent assurances of a wish to avoid prolixity and repetitions, his work is full of both. Indeed, such was the almost inevitable consequence of the plan of his work. For he prefers to begin with a refutation of the general principle, and remarking, that all particular cases are necessarily involved in it; nevertheless, for prudence' sake, he proceeds to controvert all particular cases, and this, of course, reproduces the question of the general principle. He himself admits that he is not over cautious in the choice of his weapons, but excuses himself on this head by his favourite comparison of the Sceptic to the physician. Pure philanthropy has made it his object to cure man of the disease of Dogmatism; and as the physician must use violent remedies for violent diseases, and gentle applications in milder cases, so the Sceptic has at hand strong medicines for all such as are violently attacked by the pestilence of Dogmatism; while for such as evinced but a slight tendency towards it, he would not hesitate to employ the weakest, and even most improbable arguments.<sup>101</sup> And indeed in many cases Sextus must have felt the weakness of his own reasoning; for he frequently made use of the emptiest sophisms; notwithstanding that one of his strongest grounds of objection to the Dialecticians was, that they entered upon the superfluous trouble of analyzing such fallacies.<sup>102</sup> But upon this point Sextus may perhaps be fairly excused by the practice of his school.

But perhaps the weightiest objection to which

<sup>101</sup> Pyrrh. Hyp. iii. 280, sq.

<sup>102</sup> Ib. ii. 239, sqq.

Sextus is exposed is that of being unable to keep his exposition of Scepticism free from all admixture with such extraneous elements as, correctly viewed, directly overthrow the very idea of it. In the controversy which the Sceptics carried on with the New Academy and the physicians of the Dogmatical school, they prudently disclaimed the intention of positively maintaining even that nothing can be known. Sextus, therefore, compared the Sceptical principle to fire, which, with the combustibles on which it feeds, consumes itself also; or to a guide, of whose assistance we are suddenly deprived by accident, after he has led us to a steep and precipitous eminence; or to strong drastic medicines, which, while they remove the bad humours of the body, are themselves also ejected.<sup>103</sup> But these illustrations are, to our surprise, followed by one of a directly opposite nature. For in reply to the objection of the Dogmatists, that the Sceptics, even while they sought to overthrow the possibility of all reasoning, furnished their own refutation by attempting to establish the validity of their own arguments, he observes, that the proposition, "That all proof is impossible," is only advanced in the same sense as it is asserted of Jupiter, that he is the father of gods and men; from which it is obvious, that he himself must be excepted, since he cannot be his own father. In the same manner the proposition, that demonstration is impossible, is universally true with the single exception of itself.<sup>104</sup>

<sup>103</sup> Ib. i. 206; ii. 188; Adv. Math. viii. 480. The illustration of the purifying physician is ascribed to the Sceptics principally. Diog. L. ix. 76; Aristocl. ap. Euseb. Pr. Ev. xiv. 18.

<sup>104</sup> Adv. Math. viii. 479. Πολλὰ γὰρ καθ' ὑπεξαίρεσιν λέγεται καὶ ὅτι



But this is not a solitary deviation from the Sceptical line of thought, but is connected with many other positions, of which, however, the blame may not perhaps attach to Sextus, but rather to the traditionary forms in which his doctrine had been worked out. Thus, in perfect agreement with the above mode of making the proof of the impossibility of demonstration to be only valid under a certain exception, Sextus denies generally that the moral regulation of life by any formal principles is impracticable, since the conduct of individuals is materially influenced by accident and circumstances;<sup>106</sup> and then makes an exception in favour of the rule, that in the conduct of life men must be guided by circumstances. It would evidently have been more conformable with the spirit of Scepticism to doubt even on this point. But he appears in a still more singular light when he makes it to be the exclusive privilege of Scepticism to render a happy life possible, as teaching that by nature nothing is either good or evil.<sup>106</sup> And with like inconsistency boasts, in one place, that the Sceptic invariably confines himself to the simple expressions and historical record of his present state,<sup>107</sup> and yet asserts in another, that any Dogmatical arguments which are of apparently constraining force, may be parried

τὸν Δία φημὲν θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων εἶναι πατέρα καθ' ὑπεξαίρεσιν αὐτοῦ τούτου, οὐ γὰρ δὴ γε καὶ αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ ἦν πατήρ, οὕτω καὶ ἕταν λέγωμεν μηδεμίαν εἶναι ἀπόδειξιν, καθ' ὑπεξαίρεσιν λέγομεν τοῦ δεικνύοντος λόγον, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις.

<sup>106</sup> Adv. Math. xi. 208.

<sup>106</sup> Ib. 140. "Ὅτι οὐτε ἀγαθόν τί ἐστι φύσει, οὐτε κακόν. . . . τὸ δὲ γε διδάσκειν τὸ τοιοῦτον ἴδιον τῆς σπείψεως. ταύτης ἄρα ἦν τὸ εὐδαιμόνα βίον περιποιεῖν.

<sup>107</sup> Pyrr. Hyp. i. 4, 15, 199, 200.

by the legitimate assumption that some one may perhaps be subsequently found able to refute them.<sup>108</sup> This objection is evidently founded on the assumption, that as hitherto every Dogmatical doctrine has been met by counter-arguments equally strong, this will also be always the case in future; a principle which is necessarily established wherever the experience of particular cases might justly lead to general conclusions, but which, however, was certainly inadmissible in the case of a Sceptic. Sextus, in all probability, was indebted for this proposition to the methodical sect to which he belonged.<sup>109</sup>

Of these contradictions a small part only, as already observed, are to be imputed to the want of skill in Sextus, while the greater number are attributable to the tendency of Greek Scepticism generally, or to the New Sceptics in particular. In our notice of the earlier Scepticism we were constrained to remark that its object was not, as has been indulgently supposed, to protect the investigation of truth from the overhasty assumptions of philosophy or general opinion, but that in fact it resulted in a conclusion which went to reject the investigation into the grounds of phenomena as transcending human powers, and by confining the knowledge of man to an immediate consciousness of his present state, made the pre-eminence of the sage to consist in nothing but his practical conduct, his fearlessness, and the mental fortitude whereby he rose superior to every emotion and passion. Similarly, the object of the later Sceptics is by no means by a

<sup>108</sup> Ib. 33, sq.

<sup>109</sup> Vide *supra*, p. 259, n. 73.

refutation of the Dogmatists to promote a new and profounder pursuit after truth; on the contrary, they held investigation to be already complete; of new grounds they refused to hear, being convinced beforehand that no objection can be raised sufficient to remove their own doubts; for even if a counter-vailing principle cannot be found immediately, yet before long it would sure to be discovered. On this point they fully agreed with the older Sceptics. With them they maintained also the practical end of all investigations, and the unshaken equanimity which arises from the suspension of judgment, and the temperate control of the passions.<sup>110</sup> But it would be erroneous to suppose that the doctrine of the later Sceptics was as intimately connected with this end as that of the elder Sceptics was. From such a supposition we are withheld simply by the consideration that the philosophy of the latter arose out of a peculiar position both of science and life. As this state was now changed, the tendency of modern Scepticism was naturally different, and from it the characteristics of their doctrine were immediately derived. In order, therefore, to apprehend its true character we propose to investigate, in the first place, whatever traces we can discover of its proper end, what the Sceptics had in view by it, and for what purpose alone they employed their doubts; for

<sup>110</sup> Pyrrh. Hyp. i. 8, 25, 30; Diog. L. ix. 107; cf. Phot. Cod. 212, fin. This does not agree with the assertion of Aristocles, ap. Eus. Præp. Ev. xiv. 18, that Ænesidemus regarded pleasure as the end of Scepticism. However, it is a matter as enigmatical as it is insignificant, and one may either adopt the conjectures of Siedler, *De Scepticismo* (Hale, 1827), p. 88, sq.; or refer this doctrine of Ænesidemus to the influence of his Heraclitic Pantheism, unless, forsooth, we are willing to reject altogether Aristocles. Vide *supra*, p. 260, 261.

of every species of Scepticism, it may be justly said that it had some object beyond itself. In this attempt we must assume that Sextus has on the whole rightly recorded the views of the New Sceptics, and this we are little disposed to doubt, as he exhibits but little powers of invention.

When we meet with the rule of the Sceptics, that no proof ought to be given of what is believed by common consent, but that the truth of whatever appears to be incredible should be maintained, in order that by adducing plausible grounds its authority may be made equal with that of the former, we are almost tempted to suppose that their favourite occupation had been to maintain paradoxes of philosophy against the objections of common sense. But, in truth, nothing was further from their practice. By the older Sceptics, indeed, such a course might perhaps have been followed, for they, as we before showed, opposed the grounds of reason to the sensuous apprehension, for which their own age showed a decided preference. And hence it was that the ten oldest grounds of the Sceptics were without exception directed against the sensuous presentation. But the New Sceptics, to judge from the exposition of their doctrine which Sextus has given, employed these objections only secondarily, while, on the contrary, those which they themselves brought forward, referred almost exclusively to the very form of doctrine, the scientific connection.<sup>111</sup>

<sup>111</sup> Sext. Emp. Adv. Math. vii. 443. 'Ῥητίον δὲ πρὸς μὲν τὸ πρῶτον, ὅτι σκεπτικόν ἐστι ἕθος τὸ τοῖς πεπιστευμένοις μὴ συνηγορεῖν, ἀρκεῖσθαι δ' ἐπ' αὐτῶν ὡς αὐτάρκει κατασκευῇ τῇ κοινῇ προλήψει, τοῖς δὲ ἀπίστοις εἶναι δοκοῦσι συνηγορεῖν καὶ εἰς ἰσοσθίνειαν αὐτῶν ἕκαστον ἀνάγειν τῇ περὶ τὰ παραδοχῆς ἡξιωμένα πίστει.

So also it is against the philosophers that their attacks were specially directed. Accordingly, in direct contradiction to their own rule, they even rejected Dialectic as a useless art, and opposed to its most intricate questions the obviousness of common belief.<sup>112</sup> And indeed from their whole procedure it is distinctly manifest that they were actuated by a strong inclination to maintain the truth of phenomena, and to reject as idle and vain all such scientific disquisitions as go beyond them. They did not, it is true, avow this intention openly; but, on the contrary, the more completely to conceal it they availed themselves of the distinction which we meet with among the earlier Sceptics between scientific certainty and the assumptions which are necessary for the conduct of life. For they asserted, that in order to determine with scientific accuracy that a particular matter is so or so, phenomena are not sufficient as a criterion of truth, although they are so for all practical purposes. With respect to the latter, they believed that if they would not suspend altogether the business of life, they must assume that things are really such as they seem to be.<sup>113</sup> But here perhaps the New Sceptics went further than was needful for the mere purposes of life; they were not content with the necessary only, but on the contrary, they had no thought of limiting the enjoyments of life, and were far removed from that abstinence which was so strictly enjoined by the older Sceptics. That they felt no unwillingness and had no reluctance to yield to phenomena, may be

<sup>112</sup> Pyrrh. Hyp. ii. 236, 244, 246.

<sup>113</sup> Adv. Math. vii. 29, sq.; Diog. L. ix. 106.

directly inferred from the character of their ethical precepts. Their moral view is, in fact, very low. They labour not to keep the sensual appetites under restraint, while of a rational insight into the nature of the good they are wholly destitute; for they would not free man from his evil impulses, but merely enable him to control them, although thereby man is placed in unrest and self-strife; happier, they declare, is the so-called wicked man who satisfies his impulses without deliberation.<sup>114</sup> Sextus goes so far as to hold that an irrational life is not evil, inasmuch as it has no sense or consciousness of itself, and feels no pain on its own account.<sup>115</sup>

But the view of the Sceptics concerning that which demands our assent in the conduct of life, calls for a more attentive consideration. They admitted a rule of practice based upon experience, and in this they probably adopted the distinction of *Ænesidemus* between appearances which occur only to individuals, and in an especial manner, and those which are observed generally, and by all alike; the former must be held to be false, the latter true.<sup>116</sup> Still they were indisposed to allow that there is any perfect universality in the perception of phenomena, but ascribed much to the dexterity of the experienced observer in reducing in a peculiar manner all

<sup>114</sup> Sext. Emp. Pyrrh. Hyp. iii. 273, sqq.; Adv. Math. xi. 213, 214.

<sup>115</sup> Adv. Math. xi. 92, sqq.

<sup>116</sup> Adv. Math. viii. 8. Οἱ μὲν γὰρ περὶ τὸν Αἰνησιδήμον λέγουσι τίνα τῶν φαινομένων διαφορὰν, καὶ φασὶ τούτων τὰ μὲν κοινῶς φαίνεσθαι, τὰ δὲ ἰδίως τινί, ὧν ἀληθῆ μὲν εἶναι τὰ κοινῶς πᾶσι φαινόμενα, ψευδῆ δὲ τὰ μὴ τοιαῦτα.

special experience to a general result. From this procedure they did not exclude the traditionary records of facts. It was by these means, that they hoped to establish a useful art of life based on the observation of several cases.<sup>117</sup> It was a useful art, since their readiness to admit the validity of any branch of knowledge, was determined by its beneficial influence on life.<sup>118</sup> In reference to this utility, they acknowledged a certain right reason which they looked upon as the distinctive property of man, and made it to consist in the recollection of past precedents in their order of succession.<sup>119</sup> Now this opinion furnishes us with the means of ascertaining the design of the New Sceptics in their attack upon the Dogmatists.<sup>120</sup> It must be remembered that all, or at least the majority, of the Sceptics were physicians who had to defend their Empirical mode of treatment against the attacks of the Dogmatists. For this purpose they required a certain theory which should be founded upon experience and practically useful. As then in defiance of the Sceptical character of their minds they were professionally driven to admit such an art to be possible, yet the same mental tendency led them to cultivate it with no other view than to controvert by aid of it every other theory which did not closely attach itself to experience, and admit of a like practical

<sup>117</sup> Ib. 291. 'Αγνοοῦντες ὅτι τῆς μὲν τῶν ἄλλων θεωρητικῆς τέχνης οὐδὲν ἴστι θεώρημα, καθάπερ ὑστερον διδάξομεν, τῆς δὲ ἐν τοῖς φαινομένοις στρεφομένης ἴστιν ἰδίον τι θεώρημα. διὰ γὰρ τῶν πολλάκις τετηρημένων ποιῶντα τὰς τῶν θεωρημάτων συστάσεις· τὰ δὲ πολλάκις τηρηθὲντα καὶ ἱστορηθὲντα ἴδια καθιστᾷται τῶν πλειστάκις τηρησάντων, ἀλλ' οὐ κοινὰ πάντων. Ib. v. 103. sq.

<sup>118</sup> Pyrrh. Hyp. ii. 246, 254; Adv. Math. v. 1, sq.

<sup>119</sup> Adv. Math. v. 2.

<sup>120</sup> Ib. viii. 288.

application. This mode of contemplating their special science led them to a view of science in general, which led them on one hand to reject all profounder scientific investigation, but on the other to undertake the defence of the practical arts, and all useful, experimental knowledge.<sup>121</sup> On this point, indeed, Sextus is not over-circumspect; he attacks not only philosophy, but the encyclic sciences also, which however he approves of, so far as they have in view either the alleviation of evil, or the attainment of the profitable, but finds fault with them so soon as they lose themselves in such unprofitable speculations, as, going beyond the limits of memory and tradition, attempt to discover the elements and causes of phenomena.<sup>122</sup> The ordinary practice of these arts is what he holds in esteem; this use is all that is important. To take a special instance, grammar is useful as teaching men to read and write, and thereby obviating that worst of all evils—forgetfulness; but it is a work of idle display, when it proceeds to distinguish the letters into consonants and vowels, and these, again, into long and short.<sup>123</sup> In the same spirit, he declares the study of rhetoric to be useless, because without it a man can learn to speak well by practice alone, and therefore the investigation of the principles which that practice proceeds upon is idle and superfluous.<sup>124</sup> Thus, again, in his depreciation of mathematics, he does not intend to deny the utility of arithmetic and mensuration;<sup>125</sup> his objections are confined to their

<sup>121</sup> *Pyrrh. Hyp.* i. 24, 237; iii. 151; *Adv. Math.* i. 50, 55, 172, 183, 241.

<sup>122</sup> *Adv. Math.* i. 49—56, 172.

<sup>123</sup> *Ib.* i. 55, 100, *sqq.*

<sup>124</sup> *Ib.* ii. 59.

<sup>125</sup> *Pyrrh. Hyp.* iii. 151.



scientific form, preliminary notions, the validity of arguing from hypotheses,<sup>126</sup> the definition of body,<sup>127</sup> the possibility of number,<sup>128</sup> and divisibility into equal parts.<sup>129</sup> Against the astrologers he has nothing to say, except so far as they pretend to predict the fortunes and characters of men,<sup>130</sup> and he gives himself the trouble, so unnecessary in a scientific point of view, of demonstrating the worthlessness of the principles and method of the Chaldeans. On the other hand, he is far from condemning the application of astronomy to the prediction of rain or drought, pestilence and earthquake, but even admits it to be serviceable to agriculture and navigation.<sup>131</sup> From such ideas it must be clear that the end of the New Scepticism was to get rid of every step in science and art which goes beyond the profitable, and to regard it as a baneful luxury calculated to complicate and involve in similar uncertainty with itself even useful doctrines. Accordingly the moral view of the Sceptics was extremely mean and low, and utility was the exclusive aim of their art of life.

With this low view of life and morality, there was connected the opinion that all that is requisite for the right regulation of conduct is a mere knowledge of phenomena, and accordingly the labours of the New Sceptics were directed to show that nothing which transcends experience can be known. They took a preliminary objection to the possibility of a higher science, on the ground that its object is to know the unknowable, which does

<sup>126</sup> Adv. Math. iii. 7, sqq.

<sup>127</sup> Ib. iii. 19, sq.

<sup>128</sup> Ib. iv. 14, sqq.

<sup>129</sup> Ib. iii. 109, sqq.

<sup>130</sup> Ib. v. 2, sqq.

<sup>131</sup> Adv. Math. i. 51; v. 1, 2.

not lie in the immediate consciousness of internal experience, but being extrinsical to it is the ground of all phenomena.<sup>132</sup> On this principle they disputed the criteria of truth, and even doubted the existence of truth itself. In the same spirit they called in question the value of reasoning as a method of arriving at the knowledge of what is not immediately known, and doubted whether there can be any sign of what is hidden, or the cause be learned from the effect. But in all these doctrines, the more they seemed to endanger every kind of knowledge, even experience itself, so necessary in their own judgment for the right conduct of life, the more care and diligence did they exhibit to place experimental knowledge beyond the reach of their own attacks. For this purpose they drew a distinction between the signs which are aids to a recollection simply of certain precedents, and those which are intended to indicate something occult and extraneous to phenomena. The latter they rejected as mere figments of the Dogmatists, but admitted the former as fully established by the testimony of life itself.<sup>133</sup> These, however, have not the power of revealing aught which by its nature is hidden from man, but merely a certain phenomenon, which, at the actual moment, is withdrawn from perception. Smoke, for instance, serves

<sup>132</sup> Pyrrh. Hyp. i. 13, 15, 208.

<sup>133</sup> Pyrrh. Hyp. ii. 99, sq.; 102. Διττῆς οὖν οὐσης τῶν σημείων διαφορᾶς, ὡς ἔφαμεν, οὐ πρὸς πᾶν σημεῖον ἀντιλίγομεν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς μόνον τὸ ἐνδεικτικὸν ὡς ἀπὸ τῶν δογματικῶν πεπλᾶσθαι δοκοῦν. τὸ γὰρ ὑπομνηστικὸν πεπίστευται ὑπὸ τοῦ βίου, ἐπεὶ καπνὸν ἰδὼν τις σημειοῦται πῦρ καὶ οὐλὴν θασάμενος τραῦμα γεγενῆσθαι λίγει. Adv. Math. viii. 151, sqq.; 288, 289.

to remind us of fire.<sup>134</sup> The use of such a supposition for establishing a kind of knowledge sufficient for all practical purposes is obvious, since to make it complete in this respect, nothing more was required than to assume that these signs are so closely associated, that the one is invariably closely attended by the other. For it would then follow that whoever understands the law of their association, can, by the production of one, cause the appearance of another. This was a sufficient foundation for such an art of life as the Sceptics of this age were content to be guided by; for all that they had in view was, by the production of one phenomenon to assist the appearance of another.

But agreeably to their very idea of useful knowledge, they would be driven to admit the possibility of a written and oral communication of experience, since they were far from being disposed to limit the knowledge of individuals to their own personal experience.<sup>135</sup> Now we might perhaps expect that they would have availed themselves of the means which the doctrine of suggestive signs so readily furnished, to prove the possibility of teaching oral and written instruction, since reading and writing

<sup>134</sup> Adv. Math. viii. 156. Ἄλλα γὰρ δυοῖν ὄντων σημείων, τοῦ τε ὑπομνηστικοῦ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν πρὸς καιρὸν ἀδήλων τὰ πολλὰ χρησιμεύειν δοκοῦντος καὶ τοῦ ἰνδεικτικοῦ, ὅπερ ἐπὶ τῶν φύσει ἀδήλων ἱκερίνεται, κ.τ.λ. Cf. the distinction between the unknown καθάπαξ, φύσει and πρὸς καιρὸν. Ib. 145, sqq.; Pyrrh. Hyp. ii. 97, sq. With the distinction drawn between the relative and memorial signs, compare that between dogmatical and practical (βιωτικαί) investigations, which are likewise called τηρητικαί. Diog. L. ix. 108.

<sup>135</sup> Pyrrh. Hyp. i. 24, 237; Adv. Math. i. 51, sqq. On this ground Sextus considered it advisable to solve the ambiguities that may possibly creep into the historical transmission of the fact. Pyrrh. Hyp. ii. 256.

naturally fall under the idea of signs. But we do not find this to be the case. On the contrary, Sextus argues against the possibility of teaching and learning<sup>136</sup> generally, and for this purpose employs for the most part such arguments as had been previously advanced by the Sophists. These arguments can be viewed in no other light than as a specimen of that raillery which Sextus held to be allowable in disputing with the Dogmatists.<sup>137</sup> But there was in truth a point in the general doctrine of the New Sceptics, which naturally withheld them from applying their theory of suggestive signs to the explanation of oral and written instruction. For although they have regarded writing and language as manifest phenomena, they were far from doing so in the case of the thoughts of the soul, which are represented by oral and written signs. Thought they classed with whatever is not manifest by nature. There cannot, therefore, they argued, be any suggestive signs either of the soul or of its thoughts,<sup>138</sup> and oral and written words consequently must be reckoned among the signs which are intended to indicate something occult.<sup>139</sup> We have here a proof how little the Sceptics were

<sup>136</sup> *Ib.* iii. 252, sqq.; *Adv. Math.* i. 9, sqq.

<sup>137</sup> *Pyrrh. Hyp.* i. 62; cf. ii. 211.

<sup>138</sup> *Adv. Math.* viii. 155. Ἡ ψυχὴ τῶν φύσει ἀδῆλων ἐστὶ πραγμάτων. οὐδέποτε γὰρ ὑπὸ τὴν ἡμετέραν πίπτει πίπτειν ἰνάργειαν· τοιαύτη δὲ οὐσα ἐκ τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα κινήσεων ἰνδεικτικῶς μὴνύεται. Cf. *Pyrrh. Hyp.* ii. 32.

<sup>139</sup> *Pyrrh. Hyp.* ii. 130, 131; *Adv. Math.* viii. 278, sqq. Some objections are advanced, and yet ultimately, p. 298, it is admitted that the arguments have the same force, if only it be conceded that those of the Sceptics are equally forcible.

able to reconcile their assumption of a particular, useful science with their own general Scepticism.

This doctrine of the soul, which we have here touched upon, forms an essential feature in the system of the late Sceptics. It is, moreover, closely connected with other views which we must now proceed to notice, as affording deep insight into the intrinsic character of the Sceptical habit of thought. It may perhaps appear singular that the same persons who maintained that the emotions of the soul alone could be asserted with certainty by man, should have regarded the soul itself and whatever is in it—its thoughts and states—as something unknown,<sup>140</sup> and eluding perception (*ἐνάργεια*). Nevertheless, the explanation of this seeming inconsistency is to be found in the opinion with which, as it was generally shared by their contemporaries, it would scarcely be just to reproach their system exclusively, that in perception nothing is apprehended but what exists outwardly and bodily. This view is strongly expressed in the proposition already adduced, that the soul is occult, and also in many others.<sup>141</sup> If then the soul was thus placed by the Sceptics in the obscure domain of the imperceptible, we might naturally expect that they would have looked upon it as incorporeal. But, in fact, as we clearly see in the case of Ænesidemus, they evince a decided ten-

<sup>140</sup> Cf. Adv. Math. vi. 55. 'Ὡς εἰ μὴ ἔστι ψυχὴ, οὐδὲ αἰσθήσεις. μίρη γὰρ ταύτης ὑπῆρχον.

E. g. Ib. Pyrrh. Hyp. iii. 51. "Ὁ τε φάσκων καταλαμβάνειν τὸ ἀσώματον ἦτοι αἰσθήσει τοῦτο παραστήσει καταλαμβάνειν ἢ διὰ λόγου· καὶ αἰσθήσει μὲν οὐδαμῶς, ἐπειδὴ αἱ μὲν αἰσθήσεις κατὰ ἐπίρρεισιν καὶ νύξιν ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι δοκοῦσι τῶν αἰσθητῶν. If the Sceptics maintained that body was not perceptible, this was a part of that chicane which in practice they found it impossible to carry out.

dency to Materialism. This, in all probability, the Sceptics in general derived from their medical pursuits. In Sextus it discovers itself in many of the propositions which in his Sceptical arguments he assumes as valid. Thus it is evidently on principles of Materialism, that he assigns real existence to nothing but sensible particles, i. e. (as clearly follows from his previous remarks), the corporeal properties of things, and makes all else to be mere relations.<sup>142</sup> And even when he is speaking of the occult object of Dogmatical research, all that he understands thereby is nothing more than a something corporeal, or what is relative to body, supposed to exist externally to man, such as atoms, invisible pores, and void space. The objects of pure intellection, on the other hand, he briefly and contemptuously dismisses; and justifies his rejection of them by the simple principle which he considers to be established by direct experience, that nothing can be known except through the senses, and that sensation cannot be produced except by the contact, either mediate or immediate, of an object with the senses.<sup>143</sup> On this subject he adopts, with a positiveness hardly to be expected of a Sceptic, the doctrine of the Stoics and Epicu-

<sup>142</sup> Adv. Math. viii. 161. Τῶν οὖν ὄντων, φασιν οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς σείψεως, τὰ μὲν ἴσθαι κατὰ διαφοράν, τὰ δὲ πρὸς τί πως ἔχοντα. καὶ κατὰ διαφοράν μὲν, ὅποσα κατ' ἰδίαν ὑπόστασιν καὶ ἀπολύτως νοεῖται, οἷον λευκόν, μέλαν, γλυκύ, πικρόν, πᾶν τὸ τούτοις παραλήσιον. ψυλοῖς γὰρ αὐτοῖς καὶ κατὰ περιγραφὴν ἐπιβάλλομεν καὶ δίχα τοῦ ἑτερόν τι συνεπινοεῖν. Ib. 206. Τό τε αἰσθητόν, ὃ αἰσθητόν ἴσθαι, κατὰ διαφοράν νοεῖται.

<sup>143</sup> Ib. viii. 56, sq. Οἱ δὲ περὶ Δημόκριτον καὶ Πλάτωνα ἀθετοῦντες μὲν τὰς αἰσθήσεις, ἀναιροῦντες δὲ τὰ αἰσθητά, μόνοις δ' ἐπόμενοι τοῖς νοητοῖς συγχίουν τὰ πράγματα καὶ οὐ μόνον τὴν τῶν ὄντων ἀλήθειαν σαλεύουσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν ἐπίνοιαν αὐτῶν. πᾶσα γὰρ νόησις ἀπὸ αἰσθήσεως γίνεται ἢ οὐ χωρὶς αἰσθήσεως καὶ ἢ ἀπὸ περιπτώσεως ἢ οὐκ ἀνευ περιπτώσεως, κ.τ.λ.

reans, that all human knowledge has its source in sensations, either primary or transformed. The same view is also the ground of the unqualified assertion which he makes, that the only object of the labours of the Dogmatists is the discovery of that which, existing without, is the ground of phenomena.<sup>144</sup> Accordingly one of the heaviest objections which he can bring against them is, that they are ignorant whether their ideas, as supposed to be images of external objects, truly represent their originals or not, as the soul cannot pass out of itself to compare the two; indeed, he urges that the Dogmatists must of necessity admit that conception in the soul is wholly different from the object conceived, since the conception of fire, for instance, does not burn like its object.<sup>145</sup> After such Materialistic principles we cannot well be surprised to find it asserted that the invisible soul also is in its nature corporeal. In every passage almost where Sextus treats of the soul in a Sceptical spirit, he adopts the Materialistic views of the Stoics.<sup>146</sup> Accordingly his doubts on the nature of the soul resemble those which we meet with in Cicero, Galen, and others, being confined to the question whether it be fire or air, &c.

When we proceed to examine all these traces of the particular cast of thought which indicates the proper end which the Sceptics had in view by their

<sup>144</sup> *Pyrrh. Hyp.* i. 15. Τὸ δὲ μέγιστον ἐν τῇ προφορᾷ τῶν φωνῶν τούτων τὸ ἑαυτῷ φαινόμενον λήγει (sc. ὁ σκεπτικός) καὶ τὸ πάθος ἐπαγγέλλει τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἀδοξάστωρ, μὴδὲν περὶ τῶν ἔξωθεν ὑποκειμένων διαβεβαιούμενος.

<sup>145</sup> *Pyrrh. Hyp.* ii. 74; *Adv. Math.* vii. 357. Καὶ μακρῷ διαφέρει ἡ φαντασία τοῦ φανταστοῦ. οἷον ἡ ἀπὸ πυρὸς φαντασία τοῦ πυρός· τὸ μὲν γὰρ καίει, ἡ δ' οὐκ ἔστι κανστική. *Ib.* 386.

<sup>146</sup> E. g. *Pyrrh. Hyp.* ii. 70, 81; iii. 188; *Adv. Math.* ix. 71, sq.

negative procedure, we immediately discover in all a certain intrinsic coherency, and are consequently able to determine without difficulty the value of this mental tendency in the period with which we are now engaged. Its object was simply to maintain the exclusive validity of those branches of knowledge which are necessary or profitable for the conduct of life. It was confined to furnishing such a system of knowledge as might be available as the handmaid of practice. With this view, it was necessary to demonstrate not only that there are in man certain phenomena which he must admit as necessary, but also that there holds among them a certain association which may be easily remembered, and of which it is the law that by the appearance of one the existence of the other may be safely inferred; that, moreover, man co-operates in the elaboration of phenomena, and by the eduction of one he can evolve its necessary concomitant. And further, as they allowed that all the branches of this useful knowledge cannot be acquired by any single individual, or in the brief observation of a single life, they were forced to concede, as a principle of experience itself, that individual experiences are capable of being recorded and transmitted for the use of others. Now in the absence of a clear distinction between that which is really furnished by experience, and what in the course of things attaches itself thereto (and such a distinction was scarcely to be expected of the New Sceptics), it was not easy to avoid the conclusion that the corporeal only is perceptible, since the useful arts are occupied with the corporeal alone; and, consequently, we are hardly surprised to find them, in spite of



their own opposition to the over-hasty inferences of the Dogmatists, with equal precipitancy arriving at the conclusion that all is corporeal. To the same charge of precipitancy they laid themselves open when they derived all human knowledge from sensuous perception, and considered every element of thought as at most but a modified sensation, and sought to explain reason and every other prerogative of human nature, as nothing more than a practised dexterity in calling to mind previous precedents, and limiting thereby absolute and actual existence to the sensible properties of things and reducing all besides to the merely relative. To the same charge they are further liable for their indisposition to every liberal pursuit, and for their doctrine that the composure of the soul which results from the gratification of the animal impulses, is of higher value than the noble pursuits of rational culture and intellectual pursuits. All these opinions seem to be firmly rooted in their minds, not, however, as results of scientific reflection, but rather as indispensable views of life. Such opinions have little if anything to do with philosophy; but the Sceptics thought differently, and believed the overthrow of philosophy itself to be indispensable, in order to establish the certainty of those ideas which are necessary to the practice of the useful sciences, and to keep them pure from all foreign admixture. This is the sole and proper object of the New Scepticism, which was directed against philosophy, and not against common sense, on the ground that the Dogmatists had needlessly mixed up the useful arts with certain scientific *ideas* and principles, which, however, the Sceptics

believed themselves bound to reject as going beyond the demands of practical utility and as unsupported by the testimony of experience. On this point the Sceptics constantly complain that the inconsiderate meddling of the Dogmatists had thrown doubt upon the best established principles, and the most certain doctrines; and that they were, therefore, compelled to raise their voices against them.<sup>147</sup> It was consequently their first object to get rid of the general philosophical ideas which had been tacked on to the common arts of life, and by this pursuit they did in fact enter actively into the development of their age. It is well known that all the sciences, especially the Encyclic of the Greeks, which are the chief objects of attack with Sextus, had either been nursed in the bosom of philosophy, or else were very closely related to it. This connection, indeed, was natural, so far as the general principles, method, and import of these sciences, were concerned; yet it must in truth be allowed that it had been drawn too close and carried too far. Philosophy, by meddling with the Encyclic sciences, had introduced many questions quite foreign to their proper object, which, as calculated to involve them in confusion, proved prejudicial to the stability of experimental progress. It was, therefore, a benefit to science to free it from such foreign elements, and to effect this important object was the mission of the Sceptics. But as their attempts were devoid of a correct insight into the true import of

<sup>147</sup> E. g. Pyrrh. Hyp. iii. 151. "Ὅσον μὲν γὰρ ἐπὶ τῇ συνηθείᾳ καὶ ἀδόξαστως ἀριθμεῖν τί φάμεν καὶ ἀριθμὸν εἶναι τι ἀκούομεν· ἡ δὲ τῶν δογματικῶν περιεργία καὶ τὸν κατὰ τοῦτου κεκίνηκε λόγον."

philosophy, and of science generally, it was not to be expected that they would always observe the right measure. On the contrary, they indulged without restraint a disposition to make the arts of life independent of philosophy, and carried it out to such a degree as utterly to lose sight of whatever in these sciences was of a general nature, and ultimately to leave them nothing but the character of utility. In this manner did the elements of the complex and harmonious unity of scientific life fall apart, and it began to exhibit symptoms of that decomposition which is the forerunner of death. But even amidst this decay the Sceptics still pursued, although without a clear perception of the tendency of their labours, an indispensable work of science, and this was the distinction of those branches of knowledge, which are formed by the common experience of life from the more general doctrines of philosophy. The two phenomena are naturally concomitant; for the decay of scientific life necessarily exhibits itself in a gradual rejection of such elements as it had previously endeavoured to fuse together and to bring into a forced union with itself; while these on their side, as soon as they are once set free, exercise themselves in an attack upon philosophy which had nurtured them, disputing with it a part of its privileges, and claiming for themselves an equal title to maturity and perfection. Such retribution does time work, calling in question even just rights, if abused by those who are rightfully entitled to them. Thus the later Scepticism forms a perfect contrast to the opinion of the olden philosophers, and denied that science is grounded in philosophy

exclusively. It was not content with proving that there is also an intellectual life besides philosophy, but taught, on the contrary, that it is only out of philosophy that it can be found; or, rather, that true philosophy must ultimately concede that all philosophy is but an irrational delusion.

But even if, as we believe, we have thus rightly characterized the general object and vocation of the New Scepticism, we have yet but partially discharged our task of exhibiting it under all its historical relations. Much in this respect is to be found in these several special objections with which it assailed the Dogmatists. These occasionally discover an acuteness and originality which we rarely meet with in this period. At times the Sceptics point out, clearly and acutely enough, the weakness of the earlier philosophy, and exhibit a critical understanding of it, which, in an age of greater originality, might perhaps have led to a fruitful revival of philosophical thought. In all these respects, the Sceptics are well worthy of being studied; for which purpose, however, it will not be necessary to analyze the whole mass of their arguments. For it would evidently be of little use to repeat here the arguments of the Eleatæ, the Sophists, and the Megarians and others, which have already been given in their proper places, but which the Sceptics made use of in their attacks upon the Dogmatists; or to follow them through their enumeration of the dissensions of the several Dogmatical schools which we have already touched upon; or, lastly, to give the arguments, which, by their own confession, they mixed with their more serious arguments, with no

other view than to ridicule or to expose the weakness of many of the Dogmatists. Accordingly we may confine our attention to a small portion only of their numerous arguments. Yet, in truth, it is not always easy to determine what they intended merely as ridicule or in earnest, and as lighter or weightier objections, since they are not always so distinguished by the authors themselves. Whenever, therefore, this is the case, we must test their reasonings by the view which they entertained of the necessary ideas of mankind. Thus, as Sextus himself avows, it is clearly nothing more than a mere Sceptical joke, when, on the occasion of comparing mankind with the irrational brutes, the question is mooted whether in truth man is really to be preferred to the brutes on account of his faculty of reason.<sup>148</sup> For, in fact, the Sceptics gave to man a real pre-eminence over other animals, which they founded on his faculty of remembering phenomena and their succession, and consequently of concluding by a certain art of practice from the suggestive signs themselves to the phenomena suggested. For the same reason it would appear to be mere raillery, when they questioned, on purely sophistical grounds, the possibility of instruction generally,<sup>149</sup> notwithstanding that they admitted of a certain traditionary communication of experience and the useful arts. So, again, when they explained language, the only medium of communication, to be an impossibility, on the ground that when the second part of a proposition is advanced,

<sup>148</sup> Pyrrh. Hyp. i. 62, seqq.

<sup>149</sup> Adv. Math. i. 9, seqq.; Pyrrh. Hyp. iii. 252, seqq.

the other has already ceased to be. And, lastly, not to dwell too long upon such instances, we may well consider it as a playful accessory to their general argument when they questioned the truth of corporeal appearances, on the ground that according to the view which makes body to consist of length, breadth, and thickness, which themselves are not corporeal, the corporeal would be made up of what is incorporeal,<sup>160</sup> for such doubts go beyond the limits of what, agreeably to their view, they designed to call in question.

On the other hand, there is much that is worthy of consideration in the objections advanced by the Sceptics against both the form and also the matter of science. We have already observed that the New Scepticism constitutes a certain degree of intellectual progress in respect of its attack upon the form of science.<sup>161</sup> But to what we have already advanced on this head we have much to add, derived chiefly from the writings of Sextus, of which, however, we scarcely dare to ascribe to him the invention. By the form of science, Sextus, in conformity with a prevalent opinion of his day, understood the syllogism; since, as we have often remarked, every thought which was not demonstrated was looked upon as one to which assent was not obligatory. But the Sceptics had certain general arguments against demonstration itself, which are of little value, and manifestly belong to their raillery or lighter arguments. Thus, for instance, demon-

<sup>160</sup> Adv. Math. viii. 132, sqq.

<sup>161</sup> Adv. Math. iii. 83, sqq.; cf. Pyrrh. Hyp. ii. 30. Of like nature are the arguments that body is not sensuously perceptible. Pyrrh. Hyp. iii. 47, sqq.; Adv. Math. ix. 437.

stration is classed with the non-existent, on the ground that it is composed of several thoughts, of which the first has passed away and is no more when the second comes to be considered;<sup>152</sup> and similarly they declare that it is merely relative, and that consequently real entity cannot be a property of it, since the relative has no other than an ideal existence.<sup>153</sup> These arguments were not ill-calculated to lead to profounder inquiry, and thereby to assume a deeper import; but the Sceptics, we are fully convinced, had no suspicion of their real value. Other arguments, on the contrary, which enter more into the details of the syllogism, were more fruitful and instructive. Thus, they observed, it is useless to advance the major premiss of the categorical and hypothetical syllogism, if it be evident that in the middle term the higher notion is contained; but that if this be not acknowledged, then the inference loses its demonstrative force.<sup>154</sup> It was against the syllogism also that they remarked of the definition of ideas, that it must proceed into infinity, and on that account cannot serve as a basis of knowledge or teaching.<sup>155</sup> But the edifice of science was still more forcibly shaken by their investigation of the relation between demonstration and induction. In this inquiry, their point of departure was the sensualistic notions, which prevailed very generally in their day, and to which they were themselves

<sup>152</sup> Pyrrh. Hyp. ii. 144.

<sup>153</sup> Adv. Math. viii. 453. We omit to notice other still more complicated reasonings drawn from the relativity of the syllogism, and which flow from an erroneous idea. Vide ib. 387, sqq.; Pyrrh. Hyp. ii. 174. sqq.

<sup>154</sup> Pyrrh. Hyp. ii. 159, 163.

<sup>155</sup> Ib. 207.

strongly attached. To these, induction naturally appears as the only means of arriving at a knowledge of the general. Now the general may be induced, either from all particulars, or from some only. But the latter, which is the imperfect induction, is inadmissible; it is uncertain, since if a single case of those which are omitted should deviate from the rest, it would be sufficient to destroy the universality of the induction; the former, on the other hand, is impossible, since the number of the particulars which make up a general, is indeterminable and infinite.<sup>156</sup> This argument must have appeared conclusive to Sextus, inasmuch as he considered the resolution of the general into its constituent particulars to be also impossible, and for the most part denied the possibility of a general, in the proper and strict sense of the term.<sup>157</sup> With such opinions, it was easy enough to show the syllogistic demonstration to be useless, and nothing more than reasoning in a circle. For, they would naturally argue, the general proposition, from which the conclusion is to be drawn, is itself derived in the first instance from a collection of many particulars, and therefore the particular truth which is to be inferred in the conclusion, must be previously contained among the individual cases on which the induction itself rested; so that it was not necessary to deduce it, as for the first time, from the general. When, however, the syllogism is employed for this purpose, we do nothing more than establish again the truth of a particular by means of the general, which derived its own authority from the truth of

<sup>156</sup> *Ib.* ii. 195, 204.<sup>157</sup> *Ib.* ii. 219, *sqq.*; *Adv. Math.* iv. 14, *sqq.*



all the particulars.<sup>158</sup> These objections to the form of science, were indeed well fitted to awaken attention to the errors which prevailed on this subject ; but it is obvious that they were formed in an age which was incapable of adopting, otherwise than partially, the earlier investigations of philosophy, since they were prosecuted without regard to the doctrines of a Plato and Aristotle, upon the independent activity of the reason in the cognition of principles and universals.

Apparently indeed, Sextus has fully attended to this side also of human thought, in his investigations into the criteria of truth : when, however, we examine them more closely, his ideas on this subject will be found to be very unsatisfactory. Indeed we must admit in general, that his treatise, "On the Criteria of Truth," labours under all the faults with which we have previously charged him, and on that account, we propose to examine it as furnishing a fair specimen of his general method. We have here a vast number of doubts, loosely and unmethodically heaped together, which are often contradictory and mutually destructive. This defect is at once apparent in the very opening of the inquiry. He adduces in the first place, his general grounds of doubt, and then proceeds to the more special, for the right appreciation of which, however, he finds it necessary to reproduce the former. But what is still worse, after declaring it to be impossible that there can be any such criterium, as accredits at once, both itself and something besides

<sup>158</sup> Pyrrh. Hyp. ii. 195, seqq.

it,<sup>159</sup> he nevertheless, adopts the principle of contradiction as an immediate and self-accrediting truth,<sup>160</sup> which may be rightly appealed to in a refutation of the contradictions of the Dogmatists. Now if the criterium of truth cannot accredit itself, the search after truth must proceed into infinity,<sup>161</sup> and at the same time, anything like independent activity of reason, which might serve as a basis for scientific investigation, would be rendered impossible.

But Sextus was not deterred by the weight of these general considerations, from examining in detail, every hypothesis on the subject of a criterium. His observations on this point, are based on a division, which leads him into a long and tedious digression, neglecting which, we shall confine ourselves to a few of the leading points. His division proceeds on the principle,—the question, what can serve for the standard of truth? must be answered by reference, either to the subject from whom the judgment is to proceed, or to that by and agreeable to which the judgment is to be made. Now the subject who passes the judgment, is man; that through which he judges, either the sense or the intellect; lastly, that according to which is human representation or conception.<sup>162</sup> It is manifest, that

<sup>159</sup> Adv. Math. vii. 445. *Νῆ Δία, ἀλλὰ δύναται τι καὶ ἑαυτοῦ εἶναι κριτήριον, ὥς ἐπὶ τοῦ κανόνος καὶ ζυγοῦ ἐγίνετο· ὅπερ ἐστὶ μαιρακῶδες, κ.τ.λ.*

<sup>160</sup> Ib. viii. 34. *Πάντων ὄντων ἀληθειῶν θήσομεν τὰ μαχόμενα ἀληθεῖ. τοῦτο δὲ ἐστὶν ἀτοπον.* Ib. 119.

<sup>161</sup> Pirh. Hyp. ii. 19, 20; iii. 36; Adv. Math. viii. 347.

<sup>162</sup> Pirh. Hyp. ii. 16. *Ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ λογικὸν κριτήριον λίγοι· ἂν τριχῶς, τὸ ὑφ' οὗ καὶ τὸ δι' οὗ καὶ τὸ καθ' ὅ. οἷον ὑφ' οὗ μὲν ἄνθρωπος, δι' οὗ ἡτοὶ αἰσθησις ἢ διάνοια, καθ' ὅ δὲ ἢ προσβολὴ τῆς φαντασίας.* Ib. 21; Adv. Math. vii. 35, 261.

the first member of this division comprises the other two, and Sextus himself confesses this, when he remarks, that it being once admitted, that man cannot serve as the criterium of truth, it is unnecessary to look for any other criteria, since this must be either part of man, i. e. his active or passive states. Nevertheless, even after this confession he proceeds to investigate separately, the claims of the other members of his division, to furnish the criterium of truth.<sup>163</sup>

In discussing the question, whether man can be the standard of truth, Sextus greatly lightens the labour of his task by taking an antecedent objection to such an hypothesis, on the ground, that man himself is inconceivable.<sup>164</sup> In support of this objection, he thinks it sufficient to appeal in his usual manner to the obvious fact, that the Dogmatists were unable to give any tenable definition of man, and that moreover, as must be manifest enough, any such definition is the end rather than the principle of philosophical knowledge.<sup>165</sup> This attack upon the Dogmatists, however unscientific, nevertheless contains a truly critical idea, which was directed against the carelessness of the earlier philosophers, in not sufficiently guarding against, or rather in some measure giving rise to, the delusion,

<sup>163</sup> Pyth. Hyp. ii. 21, 47 ; Adv. Math. vii. 263.

<sup>164</sup> Adv. Math. vii. 264. Οὐ γὰρ καταληπτὸς πάντως ἐστὶν ὁ ἄνθρωπος. ὃ ἔπεται τὴν τῆς ἀληθείας γνῶσιν ἀνέυρετον ὑπάρχειν, τοῦ γνωρίζοντος αὐτὴν ἀκαταλήπτου καθεστῶτος.

<sup>165</sup> Ib. 266. Οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἐκ προχείρου δώσει γινώσκεισθαι τὸν ἄνθρωπον ὁποῖός ἐστιν, εἰ γὰρ ὁ Πύθιος ὡς μίγιστον ζήτημα προῦθηκεν αὐτῷ τὸ γνῶθι σεαυτόν. εἰ δὲ καὶ ὅψῃ, οὐ πᾶσιν, ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἀκριβεστάτοις τῶν φιλοσόφων ἐπιτρέψει μόνον τοῦτον ἐπίστασθαι.

that man is the source of philosophical thought, instead of teaching, what is the fact, that it is grounded in an activity of the reason which is wholly independent of any definition of man. Otherwise the objections which Sextus urges against their definition of this idea, are for the most part directed against the outer form of its exposition, and as soon as he enters into their scientific view of human nature, he has recourse exclusively, to the general doubts which he ordinarily advances. Thus, when he comes to the view which regards man as consisting of body and soul, he attempts to refute it, by observing, that according to principles previously admitted, it is impossible to determine the nature of body, and still less that of soul; and in confirmation of this objection, appeals to the ancient disputes of the Dogmatists concerning the seat, existence, and essence of the soul.<sup>166</sup>

In the prosecution of this attempt to show that man cannot attain to a right knowledge of his own nature, Sextus proceeds to examine the organs by which, and the conceptions according to which, all knowledge must be formed. For, he argues, if self-knowledge be possible, then either the whole man must know and also be known by himself, or a part know a part, and this again be known by that part. The first case he at once rejects as manifestly involving an impossibility; if, viz., the whole man could know himself, then would the whole know, and nothing remain to be known; and on the other hand, if the man can be known wholly,

<sup>166</sup> *Pyrrh. Hyp.* ii. 29, *sqq.*; cf. *Adv. Math.* vii. 313.

then would the whole be known, and nothing remain to know.<sup>187</sup> We propose to dwell a little on this argument of Sextus's, as it involves one of the most general views of his philosophy. It is clearly grounded on the opinion which this Sceptic invariably avows, that every cognition implies as its object, a something different from itself, of which it is but the copy. It was impossible for him to admit the idea of a self-cognizant subject; self-cognition he was forced to deny absolutely, and in his mind there was an impassable gulf between thinking and being. But if he was indisposed to allow that the whole man can know or be known by himself, he was not less opposed to the hypothesis, that one part can know or be known by another. For the parts of man are simply body, senses, and understanding. Now it is obvious, that the body cannot know itself, or the senses, or the intellect. But even the senses are not in a condition to know the other parts, since in themselves they are wholly devoid of cognizant power. For they are simply passive, receiving impressions like wax, and knowing nothing beyond them, and utterly incapable of active research. The body they cannot know, since they have not its nature. The most that he affirmed of them is, that they perceive whatever accrues to body as its quality (*συμβεβηκός*); but body is not a mere collection of qualities; and even it were such, yet the senses cannot take cog-

<sup>187</sup> Adv. Math. vii. 284, sqq. 'Ἄλλ' εἰ μὲν ὅλος δι' ὅλου ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἑαυτὸν ζητοῖ καὶ σὺν τούτῳ νοοῖτο, σὺν τῷ ὅλῳ δι' ὅλου ἑαυτὸν νοεῖν οὐδὲν ἔστι· ἔσται τὸ καταλαμβάνομενον, ὅπερ ἀτοπον. εἰ δὲ ὅλος εἴη τὸ ζητούμενον καὶ σὺν τούτῳ νοοῖτο ὅλος σὺν τῷ ζητεῖσθαι, πάλιν οὐδὲν ἀπολειφθήσεται τὸ ζητοῦν.

nizance of any such collection, for it is not the senses that collect or combine, but the rational faculty.<sup>168</sup> But further, even these qualities themselves are unperceived by the senses, for they consist of a combination of parts, which pass from a beginning through a middle to an end, but the senses cannot produce such a composition.<sup>169</sup> Moreover, the senses are incapable of knowing themselves, either collectively, or individually, or mutually, since, for instance, the sight cannot see either itself or the hearing.<sup>170</sup> To these arguments, Sextus in the usual manner of the Sceptics, adds the further remark, that it is impossible to decide whether the senses present to cognition an actual impression, or nothing more than an empty conception; and he maintains, that even if this be not the case generally, it is not easy to determine what sensations ought to be trusted, and what rejected, since opposites are often perceived of the same object, and the same things are differently presented at different times.<sup>171</sup> Such is the reasoning by which Sextus sought to refute the opinions of the

<sup>168</sup> Adv. Math. vii. 287.

<sup>169</sup> Ib. 293, sqq. Καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ αἱ αἰσθήσεις· αὐταὶ γὰρ πάσχουσι μόνον καὶ κηροῦ τρόπον τυποῦνται, ἄλλο δὲ ἴσασιν οὐδὲ ἕν. . . τὸ ζητεῖν ἐνεργητικῶς οὐκ ἴσται ἰδιὸν αὐτῶν. εἴτα πῶς οἶόν τι ἴσται διὰ τούτων καταληφθῆναι τὸν ὄγκον οὐκ ἔχουσῶν τὴν φύσιν; . . . πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ ἰδεῖσθαι (cf. vii. 278), ὅτι οὐδὲ ἡ κοινὴ σύνοδος τῶν τινὶ συμβεβηκότων ἐκτεῖνός ἐστι τὸ ψῆ τινὶ συμβεβηκεν. . . ἀλλὰ τὸ συντιθεῖναι τι μετὰ τινος καὶ τὸ τοιόνδε μέγεθος μετὰ τοῦ τοιούδε σχήματος λαμβάνειν λογικῆς ἐστὶ δυνάμειος. . . καίτοι οὐ μόνον τὴν κοινὴν σύνοδον ὡς σῶμα νοεῖν ἐστὶν ἀφύκης (sc. ἡ ὕρασις), ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἐκάστου τῶν τούτῳ συμβεβηκότων κατάληψιν πεπῆρωται, οἷον εὐθίως μήκους. καθ' ὑπέρθεσιν γὰρ μερῶν τοῦτο λαμβάνεσθαι πίφκεν ἀπὸ τινος ἀρχομένων ἡμῶν καὶ διὰ τινος καὶ ἐπὶ τι καταληγόντων, ὅπερ ποιεῖν ἄλογος φύσις οὐ δύναται. Ib. 344, sqq.

<sup>170</sup> Ib. 301, 302.

<sup>171</sup> Pyrrh. Hyp. ii. 42, sqq.; Adv. Math. vii. 345.

Dogmatists, that the senses are aids to knowledge. A little ingenuity is undoubtedly shown in the way of employing the arguments which he adduces, but they are evidently not original ; for the germ of them, at least, was contained in the previous works of Plato and Aristotle.

We now come to the consideration of the third part of man's nature, and to the question whether it can know itself, or man, or, in short, anything else. We shall, for brevity's sake, abandon the order of Sextus, and comprise the whole of his arguments in one. The view, that the understanding is the cognizant principle, he holds to be involved even in greater difficulties than the others previously noticed. These difficulties, however, are of a very general nature, and, attaching themselves rather to the outward form than to the inner spirit, make us doubt whether Sextus really understood what the older philosophers meant by the notion of understanding. If, he argues, the understanding can know anything of man, it must be either his body, or the senses, or itself. In the first case, the body must impel the understanding to cognition, and the understanding be moved by the body ; but then as the body moves without reason, the understanding itself would be irrationally moved, i. e. would cease to be the understanding. The same objection, he asserts, applies with equal force against the hypothesis that the senses can be known by the understanding ; for they also are irrational ; and if they in their proper nature are apprehended by the understanding, then the understanding must receive into itself what is irrational, and cease to be under-

standing. In order to apprehend the senses, it must become of the same kind with them; and then there would not remain anything which could inquire, since the inquiring understanding will have passed into that which is the object of inquiry. It would be vain to try to get rid of this objection by asserting that the difference between the understanding and the senses is not essential, being exactly analogous to that between the concave and the convex surface of a sphere; for this explanation does not dispose of the question, how the same essence which is both understanding and sensation, can, so far as it is understanding, take cognizance of itself so far as it is sensation.<sup>172</sup> The only alternative therefore, is to suppose that the understanding is cognizant of itself; but this hypothesis is shown to be untenable in the same way that it was previously demonstrated, that man cannot know himself, since in that case there would be neither a knowing subject nor an object known.<sup>173</sup> These objections Sextus confirms by others drawn principally from the mutual contradictions of the Dogmatists, in their respective theories of the understanding. Thus, he observes, if the understanding could know itself, it must at least know where its proper seat is; for whatever is known, is known as existing in a certain place, and consequently the place itself also is known. If it be cognizant of itself, then must it also know its own nature, the substance of which it consists, the mode of its production,

<sup>172</sup> To this result, but in a different form, tends the investigation given, *Adv. Math.* vii. 359, sqq.

<sup>173</sup> *Adv. Math.* vii. 303, sqq.



and whatever else relates either to the principle or mode of its existence. Now upon all these points the Dogmatists are at issue with each other, and there is no hope of the controversy between them ever being decided ; indeed, it may even be doubted whether there is any principle of understanding different from and independent of the senses ; and consequently, in such a state of uncertainty, it is advisable to abstain from any positive opinion as to the understanding and its cognition.<sup>174</sup>

In discussing the criterium of judgment, Sextus opens the new question, whether the understanding is able, by the help of the senses, to know the truth. But this topic is far from profoundly investigated. He opens it with an attempt to show the impossibility of answering it in the affirmative, by remarking that the senses impart to the understanding nothing more than the impressions which they themselves have received, not that which external objects are ; he even doubts whether they can convey to it these impressions on the ground which he had already urged, that in the case of such a transmission the understanding must change itself into sensation. And he insists, even though it should be conceded that sensations do resemble external objects, still the like cannot lead to a knowledge of that which it resembles ; and especially since it is impossible, so long as we do not perceive the outward objects themselves, to say wherein the resemblance lies. But, lastly, objects give rise to opposite sensations, and therefore if the understanding is to judge of

<sup>174</sup> Adv. Math. vii. 313, 348, sqq. ; Pyrrh. Hyp. ii. 57, sqq.

things according to the sensuous impressions it receives of them, it must assert opposites of them.<sup>175</sup>

Lastly come the objections which Sextus urges against the supposition that man can judge of the truth according to his conceptions of things. These, so far as they have not been already noticed, must now claim our attention. His argument is directed, in the first place, against the usual idea of the sensuous presentation itself. The nature of this presentation, he says, is far from clearly determined. By some it has been described as an image of the external object, by others as a modification in the soul. But the soul, according to the Stoics, who give the former definition of sensation, is a breath, or even something more subtle than breath; how then can it receive an image or impression? But if the latter view, which makes sensation to be a modification of the soul, be correct, it is exposed to all the difficulties which are involved in the very notion of change in general. Moreover, how can the definition of sensuous presentation, either as a copy or change in the soul, be reconciled with the fact, that in the succession of presentations the earlier are not expelled and destroyed by the latter, but, on the contrary, are preserved in the memory, and form a treasure of ideas so valuable for the purposes of art? For the previous impressions must be obscured by the subsequent, and the earlier change modified by the later.<sup>176</sup> But he argues,

<sup>175</sup> Adv. Math. vii. 354, sqq.; Pyrrh. Hyp. ii. 63.

<sup>176</sup> Pyrrh. Hyp. ii. 70; Adv. Math. vii. 370, sqq., 373. *Εἰ γὰρ κηροῦ τρόπον τυποῦται ἡ ψυχὴ φανταστικῶς πάσχουσα, αἰετὶ τὸ ἰσχυρόν κίνημα ἐπισκορήσει τῇ προτέρᾳ φαντασίᾳ, ὥσπερ καὶ ὁ τῆς δευτέρας σφραγίδος*

that even if these difficulties could be got rid of, and it be admitted that presentation is distinctly conceivable, still it would be unintelligible. Sensation is no doubt explained as something which takes place in the dominant part of the soul; yet, as has been previously shown, philosophers are unable to agree as to the seat, the essence, and the nature of this ruling part of the soul, and no single opinion on this subject can be established with certainty.<sup>177</sup> Moreover, the difficulties already mooted here present themselves again, since the medium of the senses is indispensable for evolving a knowledge of things. Now if the representations of objects resemble the sensuous impressions, they must lie under equal difficulties in bringing things to cognition; and if they are not like them, then they must be exposed to still weightier objections.<sup>178</sup> But even granting that they are able to exhibit objects as they really are, the same doubts affect the presentations as the sensuous impressions—both are equally contradictory. How then can the true be distinguished from the false? If every truth must be decided by the presentation, then must the truth of the presentation itself be judged of according to a presentation, and this again by another, and so on in an infinite series.<sup>179</sup> Consequently all the explanations of the Dogmatists are

*τύπος εξαλειπτικός ἐστι τοῦ προτέρου. ἀλλ' εἰ τοῦτο, ἀναιρεῖται μὲν μνήμη, θησαυρισμὸς οὐσα φαντασιῶν, ἀναιρεῖται δὲ πᾶσα τέχνη· σύστημα γὰρ ἦν καὶ ἄθροισμα καταλήψεων. Ib. 377. Τὸ νῖον πάθος ἀλλάσσει τὸ ἀρχαιότερον καὶ οὕτως οὐκ ἔσται κατοχὴ τινος πράγματος περὶ τὴν διάνοιαν.*

<sup>177</sup> Pyrrh. Hyp. ii. 71; Adv. Math. vii. 380.

<sup>178</sup> Pyrrh. Hyp. ii. 72; Adv. Math. vii. 381, sqq.

<sup>179</sup> Pyrrh. Hyp. ii. 76, sqq.; Adv. Math. vii. 388, sqq.

insufficient, and perpetually revolving in a circle ; for the true representation is first explained to be such an impression on the soul of a real object as nothing which does not actually exist can produce ; and then a real object is defined to be one which imparts a true representation of itself to the soul.<sup>180</sup> Sextus then rejects the view, that the true representation is the criterium, not only of the represented object, but also of itself, on the ground that the existence of contradictory representations necessarily requires a distinctive criterium, which does not lie in the representation itself, and insists that a steady and self-evident representation can only occur in the unwavering and self-certain soul of the sage, although, according to the admission of the Stoics themselves, such a sage cannot be proved to exist.<sup>181</sup> Moreover, Sextus undertakes the almost superfluous task of refuting the opinion of the New Academy, that the representations of sense possess a sufficient probability for the conduct of life and the discovery of truth. He argues, that presentation alone is insufficient for the right conduct of life, which requires also observation and comparison. In the cognition of truth, the authority of the sensuous presentation is still less, however carefully it may have been arrived at, since it is impossible ever to feel confident that nothing has been neglected in the process : and as the Academicians will not admit any representation to be true, from cautious fear that there might possibly be a false one similar to the true ; so, according to Sextus, the same caution is requisite in case of the merely probable.<sup>182</sup> And

<sup>180</sup> Adv. Math. vii. 426.<sup>181</sup> Ib. 430, seqq.<sup>182</sup> Ib. 435, seqq.

in this way any such reliance on a criterium of truth as the Dogmatists insist upon, is asserted to be absolutely indefensible.

We have perhaps dwelt too long upon these arguments, inasmuch as they do not lead to any new or interesting results. Nevertheless, they serve to indicate the method of Sextus and his school, and convey an idea of the matter-of-course way in which the philosophers of this age gave currency to the ideas of the earlier philosophers, as so many duly stamped but well-worn coins. And to illustrate this fact by means of these, appeared particularly desirable, inasmuch as the Sceptics attributed great importance to their controversy on the criteria of truth. The same method that is found in these is discoverable in all the other labours of the Sceptics, which therefore it would be useless to trace out in their whole extent, especially as the connection of the several parts is extremely loose, and has no other foundation than the ancient divisions of philosophy.<sup>183</sup> And accordingly we propose to limit ourselves to a few only of the more special points of the doctrine.

This notice necessarily leads us back to the arguments by which they supported their denial of revealing signs. When we look at the essential character of the Sceptical habit of thought, it is evident that this subject would naturally attract their attention in a pre-eminent degree; for their sole object was to show, that no safe and certain conclusion can be drawn from phenomena to that which lies concealed beyond them. The Dog-

<sup>183</sup> Adv. Math. viii. 325.

matists, who sought to acquire a knowledge of the non-apparent, were by the Sceptics compared to men shooting in the dark, who may perhaps hit the mark, but certainly cannot tell whether they have succeeded or not.<sup>184</sup> Nevertheless, the Sceptics, for an obvious reason, were unwilling to maintain directly that no signs soever can reveal the non-apparent. For, for purposes of their own, they were forced to admit that words and arguments are signs which reveal a something which is concealed, the thoughts, viz. of the soul; and so long as they laboured to maintain the validity of the arts of life, they could not seriously call in question the communication of ideas by language. While, therefore, in the domain of history, at least, they admitted of certain revealing signs, still they did not abstain from raising against it those difficulties which the general idea of revelation involves; and among these we are naturally surprised to meet with many which apply as much to memorial as to revealing signs. Such, for instance, are the objections derived from the fact that this general idea is merely relative. For the idea of a sign, like all other ideas of relation, is inconceivable without the idea of that relatively to which it is an object of thought; i. e. without the idea of the object signified. But if the sign cannot be thought of without the object signified, it cannot be truly said that the idea of that which is signified

<sup>184</sup> Pyrrh. Hyp. ii. 130, sqq.; Adv. Math. viii. 278, sqq. See above, p. 296, sqq. The Sceptics objected, it is true, that language itself is but a memorial sign (Adv. Math. viii. 289), but still, as they could not deny the weakness of this objection, they were forced to allow (ib. 298), that the reasonings of the Dogmatists were probably not without force.

is first called forth by the signifying sign ; and yet it is directly involved in the very idea of a sign, that it is thought of before that which it signifies.<sup>185</sup> Sextus betrays a similar confusion of ideas when he urges, that the revealing sign cannot be thought of as anything sensuous, on the ground that the sensible is at once apprehended by all men without instruction ; whereas it is only by such an aid that the sign can be understood, which he confesses is the case with the memory also.<sup>186</sup> He is equally unwilling to admit that the sign can be reckoned among the objects of intellectual cognition ; for, he argues, it must first be shown that such objects exist ; but before this is proved, to require signs for them which are not sensible would be to seek to infinity.<sup>187</sup> \* The polemic of Sextus is directed exclusively against the Stoics, and consequently he confines himself to showing the inconsistency of their doctrine on this point. Through this part of his labours it is unnecessary for us to follow him. He was justified, no doubt, in appealing to the fact, that every sign must be manifest, and therefore come into appearance in order to reveal what is hidden, but that the non-sensible does not belong to the manifest.<sup>188</sup> But when he further argued that there cannot be such a thing as a revealing sign, because the sign can neither be sensuous nor yet an object of intellectual cognition, he here posited the contrariety of the sensuous and the intellectual, in all the rigour in which it was under-

<sup>185</sup> Adv. Math. viii. 163, seqq.. Pyrrh. Hyp. ii. 117, seqq.

<sup>186</sup> Pyrrh. Hyp. ii. 225, seqq. ; Adv. Math. viii. 203, 204, 242.

<sup>187</sup> Adv. Math. viii. 257.

<sup>188</sup> Pyrrh. Hyp. ii. 128.

stood by his contemporaries, without the slightest attempt to set forth and elucidate what is mutual and common to the two members of this contrariety.

If in the discussion of these questions the Sceptics touched upon a point which an age more distinguished for profound and original thought would have taken up immediately and fully elucidated, this was likewise the case with their investigations on cause and effect. We have already observed that Ænesidemus had specially occupied himself with this subject, and that the uncertain and imperfect state of our historical records alone prevents us from determining with accuracy the exact amount of his labours on this head, and the additions of his successors. The doubts which he raised against the Dogmatical doctrine of cause and effect fall readily under two heads; one class being designed to show that the Dogmatists were unable to indicate the causes of particular cases; the other to refute their general doctrine of cause and effect. The first class of objections he has in his usual manner reduced to several leading divisions, in which the several exceptions are grouped together in very loose connection.<sup>189</sup> Thus he urges, that the usual explanations of phenomena by their several assigned causes are but so many particular suppositions as to the nature of the elements, and not general reasons universally acknowledged; that the definitions they give do not always agree with phenomena, and that such cases alone are brought forward as will square with the definitions, while all

<sup>189</sup> They are given briefly, but not always very accurately. Pyrrh. Hyp. i. 180, 181.



exceptions are silently neglected, and that frequently phenomena which are of regular recurrence are referred to extraordinary causes, and that not unfrequently explanations are advanced in open contradiction with the opinions of their authors. He further reproaches the Dogmatists with seeking to account, by a single cause, for phenomena which admit of a variety of explanations, and with admitting what experience can never justify, known phenomena by unknown causes, or with assigning known causes to unknown events.<sup>190</sup> And lastly, he advances a suspicion that in all probability the hidden causes do not proceed in a course analogous to the manifest phenomena,<sup>191</sup> and by this objection throws a doubt upon the general principle of the Dogmatists, that the effects must correspond to their causes.

But the objections which the Sceptics took to the idea of causality in general, are much more serious than all these attacks upon the special explanation of phenomena. Accordingly we cannot but regret that our authorities on this head do not enable us to follow any certain method in our exposition of these doubts, and that we must consequently be con-

<sup>190</sup> It is thus, though certainly not with confidence, that I distinguish between the first and eighth ground of Scepticism. The following are the words of Sextus: *Ὅν πρῶτον μὲν εἶναι φησιν, καθ' ὃν τρόπον τὸ τῆς αἰτιολογίας γένος ἐν ἀφανίσιν ἀναστρεφόμενον οὐχ ὁμολογουμένην ἔχει τὴν ἐκ τῶν φαινομένων ἐπιμαρτύρησιν. . . . ὁγδοὺν, καθ' ὃν πολλάκις ὄντων ἀπόρων ὁμοίως τῶν τε φαίνεσθαι δοκούντων καὶ τῶν ἐπιζητουμένων ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίως ἀπόρων περὶ τῶν ὁμοίως ἀπόρων ποιοῦνται τὰς διδασκαλίας.*

<sup>191</sup> *Ib.* 182. *Τίταρτον, καθ' ὃν τὰ φαινόμενα λαβόντες ὥς γίνεται, καὶ τὰ μὴ φαινόμενα νομίζουσιν ὥς γίνεται κατεληφέναι, τάχα μὲν ὁμοίως τοῖς φαινομένοις τῶν ἀφανῶν ἐπιτελουμένων, τάχα δ' οὐχ ὁμοίως, ἀλλ' ἰδιαζόντως.*

tent to give the spirit without the form in which they were originally conveyed. They relate partly to the idea of causal connection, partly to the considerations which are necessary to such a connection. They touched upon, it is true, the question whether the incorporeal can be the cause of aught either incorporeal or corporeal, but merely in order to be able to answer it briefly in the negative; which they did partly on very general reasons, and partly on the assumed impossibility of the incorporeal either touching or being touched by aught, and thereby of being either active or passive.<sup>192</sup> In this objection it is evidently implied that the contact of two bodies is the necessary condition of causal connection. But the Sceptics argue, two bodies can never come into contact, for at most they only touch at their limits, i. e. their surfaces: the bodies themselves do not touch, but their surfaces only. But the contact of surfaces even is impossible; for if they touch, the touching limits or surfaces would unite, but the union of the limits is not contact.<sup>193</sup> Similar objections on the same ground are in the next place taken to the supposition of any mixture of bodies;<sup>194</sup> of their augmentation by addition, or diminution by subtraction; and, lastly, of any change of their qualities. These objections are evidently based on the assumption that the simple elements of corporeity are unchangeable, and that it is only by a transposition,

<sup>192</sup> Adv. Math. ix. 216. Τό τε γάρ ποιῶν θίγειν ὀφείλει τῆς πασχούσης ὕλης, ἵνα ποιήσῃ· ἢ τε πάσχουσα ὕλη θιχθῆναι ὀφείλει, ἵνα πάθῃ· τὸ δὲ ἀσώματον οὔτε θίγειν οὔτε θιχθῆναι πίπτει, τοίνυν οὔτε σῶμα ἀσώματον ἢ ἀσώματον σώματός ἐστιν αἴτιον. 1b. 223, 224.

<sup>193</sup> Pyrrh. Hyp. iii. 42, sqq.; Adv. Math. iii. 78, sqq.; ix. 258, sqq.

<sup>194</sup> Pyrrh. Hyp. iii. 56, sqq.; cf. Adv. Math. ix. 256.

compression, or an enlargement of these that any effect can be produced on the bodies composed of them.<sup>195</sup> It is clear, therefore, that the main stay of this later phasis of Scepticism is the material and mechanical theory of nature.

The investigation of the Sceptics into the notion of causal connection absolutely, is more profound than their special objections to the physical explanations of the Dogmatists. We must not be understood, however, as giving this character to those parts of it which touch upon the general question of becoming, for here the arguments are derived, almost without exception, from old authors, and for the most part very trite; such as that two things cannot come out of one, nor three out of two;<sup>196</sup> and, again, that a matter cannot come into being, neither when it does not already exist, nor even when it does. For such arguments had long before been amply discussed; whereas there is much in their analysis of the mutual relation of cause and effect, which demands our attention and profound respect for this subject, that had never before been fully examined, and was only imperfectly touched upon even by Aristotle himself.

The first questions which here present themselves are those which arise out of the similarity and the dissimilarity of the cause and the effect. The general ideas of the Sceptics on this subject are grounded on the view that a thing cannot produce an effect which does not lie within its proper nature, and is foreign to it; that, for instance, a horse can-

<sup>195</sup> Pyrrh. Hyp. iii. 82, sqq.; Adv. Math. ix. 278, sqq.

<sup>196</sup> Adv. Math. ix. 220.

not be produced from a tree, nor a man from a horse. But now if a thing cannot effect aught but that which is in its own nature, then nothing new, no effect, properly speaking, can ever result from it, but every thing must remain the same as it was before.<sup>197</sup> Of this argument the Sceptics made several other applications, and especially drew from it a subtle objection to the possibility of arriving at a knowledge of causal connection, even if it be itself possibly known. If, they argue, one thing can really be the cause of another, one of the following cases must take place; either the quiescent must be the cause of the quiescent, or the moved of the moving, or a moved cause produce a quiescent result, or a quiescent a moved effect. The two latter cases they reject, simply on the general principle, that like can only produce like.<sup>198</sup> Their adoption of the mechanical physiology, doubtless indisposed the Sceptics from wasting more words on the subject. The first two, on the other hand, required a more careful examination, since they were supported by the general belief that a moving body can impart its motion to another at rest, and a quiescent one, its rest to another in motion. But, against this belief, the New Sceptics alleged the similarity necessary to be supposed in every causal connection, and insisted that this prevents such a relation existing between them, since the cause of the result in either case might as well be referred to the one as to the other. This remark is undoubtedly not new; still this application of it by the Sceptics, made to prove that the cause can never be

<sup>197</sup> Ib. 225, 226, 230.<sup>198</sup> Ib. 230.

known, appears to be original.<sup>199</sup> Thus they held that if two bodies be together in motion or at rest, it is impossible to say which is the cause and which the effect. When a man by treading inside turns a wheel, it may as well be said that the wheel turns the man as the contrary; and so also of a column that supports a rafter, it may with equal truth be said, it is held at rest by, as that it holds the rafter at rest.

In all these arguments the ruling hypothesis is, that cause and effect must be contemporaneous; and this, by the Sceptics, is supported by grave considerations, which, however, only furnish occasions for further doubts. That the cause cannot be posterior to the effect is, they argue, self-evident; but it is equally impossible that the effect should be subsequent to the cause, for if the cause be anterior to the effect, it must remain for a while deprived of its effect; but a cause without an effect, or a cause which is not efficient, is inconceivable. And if again the effect be later than the cause, then it would exist when its cause no longer existed, i. e. it would be an effect without a cause, which is equally inconceivable. But generally both cause and effect are correlative, and therefore must of necessity be co-existent.<sup>200</sup> Now this point being

<sup>199</sup> Adv. Math. ix. 227, sqq. Τὸ μὲν οὖν μῖνον τῷ μίνοντι μονῆς καὶ τὸ κινούμενον τῷ κινουμένῳ κινήσεως οὐκ ἂν αἰτιον ὑπάρχοι δι' ἀπαρραλλᾶ-  
ξίαν. ἀμφοτέρων γὰρ ἐπίσης μενόντων ἢ ἀμφοτέρων κατ' ἴσον κινου-  
μένων οὐ μᾶλλον τόδε τῷδε ἐροῦμεν εἶναι αἰτιον μονῆς καὶ κινήσεως ἢ  
τόδε τῷδε.

<sup>200</sup> Ib. 234. Οὐδὲ τὸ πρότερον δὲ ἴσται τοῦ ὕστερον γενομένου ποιητι-  
κόν. εἰ γὰρ ὅτε ἴσται τὸ αἰτιον, οὕτω ἴσται τὸ οὐ ἴσται αἰτιον, οὐδὲ ἐκείνο  
ἴτι αἰτιόν ἴσται, μὴ ἔχον τό, οὐ αἰτιόν ἴσται· ὅτε τοῦτο ἴτι ἀποτίλειμα

once established, another difficulty of no less force arises, from the conception of the cause being at one and the same time with the effect. For as both cause and effect, if they be contemporary, must have the same existence, why, in that case, ought one rather than the other be considered the efficient? If the cause is to produce the effect, but that which becomes be produced by what is already in existence, then the so-called cause must itself become a cause before it can produce the effect.<sup>201</sup> As then the cause cannot be anterior to, nor contemporary with, nor even subsequent to the effect, it must be wholly inconceivable.

The difficulty which is here urged against the possibility of conceiving cause and effect as contemporary, arising from the equal reality of both, again recurs in another and, we think, clearer form. The idea of causal connection implies, as a fundamental hypothesis, that the cause is active and the effect passive, but that nevertheless they are necessary conditions of each other. Now this hypothesis may itself be called in question; yet if we do so, difficulties will arise which compromise the very idea of causal connection and its application to details. For if the cause produces its effect by the mere exertions of its own energy, without respect to any passivity, then it is hard to say why the cause is

*μη συμπαρόντος αὐτῷ τοῦ, οὗ ἀποτέλεσμα ἔστι. τῶν γὰρ πρὸς τι ἐκτε-  
ρόν ἔστι τούτων καὶ τὰ πρὸς τι κατ' ἀνάγκην δεῖ συνυπάρχειν ἀλλήλοις.  
Pyrrh. Hyp. iii. 25, sqq.*

<sup>201</sup> Adv. Math. ix. 233; Pyrrh. Hyp. iii. 27. 'Ἀλλ' οὐδὲ συνυφίστασθαι.  
εἰ γὰρ ἀποτελεσματικὸν αὐτοῦ ἔστι, τὸ δὲ γινόμενον ὑπὸ ὄντος ἤδη γίνεσθαι  
χρὴ, πρότερον δεῖ τὸ αἰτιον γενέσθαι αἰτιον, εἴθ' οὕτως ποιεῖν τὸ ἀπο-  
τέλεσμα.

not incessantly operating, since it is itself always, and bears in itself its proper energy, and consequently there is no reason why it should sometimes work and sometimes not.<sup>202</sup> But still more inexplicable is it that an object can operate differently at different times, and even occasionally produce opposite results; for if, according to its proper nature, it operates either variably or uniformly, then must it always operate in the same manner, whether it be uniformly or variably. But now the contrary is often found to be the case; the sun for instance, burns at one time, at another warms; at one time merely gives light, at another hardens, at another melts; we must therefore suppose that causes operate simply in obedience to their relation to the objects on which they produce their effects, i. e. to the passive matter.<sup>203</sup> But this supposition also involves great difficulties; for if the active and passive can be only conceived of as such when taken together, they in fact constitute but a single thought, however it may require to be expressed by two terms; and the passive is not really different

<sup>202</sup> Adv. Math. ix. 237. Καὶ μὴν εἰ ἔστι τι αἰτιον, ἦτοι αὐτοτελῶς καὶ ἰδίᾳ μόνῃ προσχρώμενον δυνάμει τινός ἐστιν αἰτιον, ἡ συνεργοῦ πρὸς τοῦτο δεῖται τῆς πασχούσης ὕλης, ὥστε τὸ ἀποτελεσμα κατὰ κοινὴν ἀμφοτέρων νοεῖσθαι σύνοδον, καὶ εἰ μὲν αὐτοτελῶς καὶ ἰδίᾳ προσχρώμενον δυνάμει ποιῶν τι πέφυκεν, ὥφειλε διὰ παντός ἐαυτὸ ἔχον καὶ τὴν ἰδίαν δύναντα πάντα ποιεῖν τὸ ἀποτελεσμα καὶ μὴ ἐφ' ὧν μὲν ποιῶν, ἐφ' ὧν δὲ ἀπρακτεῖν.

<sup>203</sup> Ib. 246, sqq. "Ἐν εἰ ἔστι τὸ αἰτιον, ἦτοι μίαν ἔχει τὴν δραστήριον δύναντα ἢ πολλὰς. . . μίαν μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔχει δύναντα, ὡς περ εἰ μίαν εἶχεν, ὥφειλε πάντα ὁμοίως διατιθέναι καὶ μὴ διαφερόντως. . . . καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ πολλὰς, ὡς περ ἔχρην πάσαις ἐπὶ πάντων ἐνεργεῖν. . . . ναί, ἀλλ' εἰώθασιν πρὸς τοῦτο ὑποτιγχανεῖν οἱ δογματικοὶ λίγοντες, ὅτι παρὰ τὰ πάσχοντα καὶ τὰ διαστήματα πέφυκεν ἐξαλλάσσεισθαι τὰ γινόμενα ὑπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ αἰτίου ἀποτελέσματα.

from the active. For the passive, in so far as without it no power to act resides in the active, possesses action as much as the active, and it is not so much the active that produces the effect as the concurrence of both the active and the passive, and it is therefore unreasonable to give the name of cause to one alone and not to both together.<sup>204</sup> This objection probably appeared the more forcible, the more the Stoics had insisted on the necessity of distinguishing the passive matter from the active cause. And it does not seem a far-fetched conjecture to suppose that this Sceptical remark, if it be rightly ascribed to Ænesidemus, was designed to favour his own Pantheistic tendency.

As the Sceptics adopted the view of the Stoics that God is the supreme cause,<sup>205</sup> the doctrine of the existence and notion of God is closely connected with the investigation into the idea of causal connection. We therefore propose to notice in this place the views of the Sceptics on this point, in order to show in what light they understood this highest problem of philosophy. The variety of opinions on the nature of God which the Grecian philosophy had advanced, naturally furnished the Sceptics with an occasion for manifold doubts; nevertheless, their general habit of thought probably disposed them to ascribe a certain weight of authority, if not of conviction, to the universal belief of all

<sup>204</sup> Ib. 240. Εἰ γὰρ τὸ ἕτερον πρὸς τῷ ἑτέρῳ νοεῖται, οὐ τὸ μὲν ποιῶν, τὸ δὲ πάσχον, ἴσται μία μὲν ἔννοια, δυοῖν δ' ὀνομάτων τεύξεται, τοῦ τε ποιῶντος· καὶ τοῦ πάσχοντος, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οὐ μᾶλλον ἐν αὐτῷ ἢ ἐν τῷ λεγομένῳ πάσχειν ἐγκρίσεται ἢ δραστήριος δύναμις. Ib. 251. Ὁὕτω δὲ ἀτοκον τὸ ἐκ συνόδου δυοῖν γενόμενον ἀποτέλεσμα μὴ τοῖς δυοῖν ἀνατιθέναι, τῷ δὲ ἑτέρῳ μόνῃ προσμαρτυρεῖν.

<sup>205</sup> Pyth. Hyp. iii. 2. Δραστικώτατον αἰτίον.



nations, that the gods rule over mankind.<sup>206</sup> This deference to general opinion was perhaps also the motive for the caution wherewith they sought to avoid the suspicion of impiety, by asserting that practically they believed and honoured the gods, although theoretically they felt themselves compelled to point out the doubts to which the hasty reasonings of the Dogmatists had exposed the subject.<sup>207</sup> Now these doubts were drawn, almost without exception, from the difficulties in which the mind is involved as soon as it proceeds to treat of the idea of God by the standard of its other notions and conceptions; and in the exposition of these difficulties, and especially in their refutation of the Stoical theory, the arguments they employed were such as had been already advanced for the same design. Now in the management of this controversy, the first object was, to controvert the doctrine that God is a living essence, by pointing out the difficulties it involved. Accordingly they argue, if a divine being exist, he must be either finite or infinite. But he cannot be infinite, for in that case he would be immovable, and consequently without a soul, for the infinite has no space beyond itself wherein it can move; and it has neither centre nor extremities from which and to which the ensouling force can move and attach itself. But it is equally impossible to suppose the divine being to be finite; for the finite would be a part of the infinite, and consequently less than it, but the deity cannot be conceived of as less than any other entity.<sup>208</sup> So, too,

<sup>206</sup> See especially, *Adv. Math.* ix. 30, *sqq.*; 40, 42.

<sup>207</sup> *Pyrrh. Hyp.* iii. 2.

<sup>208</sup> *Adv. Math.* ix. 148, *sqq.*

God cannot be thought of either as corporeal or as incorporeal, but besides these two there is no third term. He cannot be incorporeal, for the incorporeal is without soul or sensation, and is without capacity to effect anything; and, on the other hand, the consideration of corporeal things forbids us to think of God as corporeal. For the corporeal is either compounded of the elements, or else simple and elementary. If it be composite, it must admit of resolution, and therefore be perishable; but, on the other hand, if it be simple, then it must be either fire, or air, or water, or earth, all of which is inconsistent with the notion of God, because these elements are without soul and reason.<sup>209</sup> In this manner did the Sceptics attempt to refute the Stoical doctrine of God, appealing to the Stoics themselves against the doctrine of the incorporeity of God, and to general experience of the elements against his corporeity.

There are other objections applying to points of the Stoical doctrine of God, of a character still more special. On the authority of Carneades, the Sceptics observed that if God must be considered to be a living being, in that case, senses must be ascribed to him, which must be rather more than less in number than those of man, in order that his perception of things may be the more perfect. But upon the hypothesis that God possesses sensuous organs, many contradictions ensue, which may in general be resumed in this, that sensations cannot be thought of without a corresponding change of

<sup>209</sup> *Ib.* 151, 180, 181.

the sentient subject ; but such a change cannot be imputed to God, since he would then be subject to a change for the worse, and therefore to destruction even.<sup>210</sup> Moreover, God must be thought of as a perfectly happy living being ; and since felicity is impossible without virtue, therefore every virtue must be ascribed to him ; but how can such virtues as temperance, and fortitude, or courage, &c., be ascribed to God who has no desires, or pains, or fears to control ?<sup>211</sup>

Of all these objections it may be said, that they are mainly directed against the outward form, in which the idea of God was conceived or exhibited, both generally and by the Stoics especially, but that there is not one of which a refutation might not readily have been found in the earlier writings of Plato and Aristotle. On one point alone was the earlier philosophical doctrine of God attacked in such a way, as, upon due consideration, was calculated to overthrow the more ancient view. This relates to the doctrine of a divine providence. The necessity of universal providence embracing all the special cases of mundane existence was maintained almost universally by the Dogmatists. With good reason did the Sceptics attack the opposite opinion, by showing that it would imply a want of power or benevolence in God, if he did not provide specially for all.<sup>212</sup> But on the other side, a forcible objection presented itself, drawn from an attentive consideration of the actual state of things in the world, and especially as it appeared to the

<sup>210</sup> Ib. 139, seqq.

<sup>212</sup> Pyrrh. Hyp. iii. 10.

<sup>211</sup> Ib. 152, seqq.

eyes of the ancients. Who can deny that evil, both moral and physical, exists in the world? It is admitted on all sides; all is full of evil. Now of such God cannot be the cause, and therefore he cannot be regarded as ruling all things by his providence.<sup>213</sup> The Sceptics felt the full force of this objection. They sedulously availed themselves of it, in order to retort upon their opponents the reproach of impiety. For, they argued, whoever inhesitatingly admits the existence of a God, must either make God the cause of evil, by extending his providence over all; or else, by limiting or altogether denying his providence, hold him to be either capricious or powerless. But such opinions are manifestly impious. In the Græco-Oriental philosophy, as we shall presently find, investigations of a similar nature were leading to new views of the relation between God and the universe; and the fact that no attention was paid to the latter by the Sceptics, is a proof of the entire devotion to Romo-Grecian ideas, and in general of the degree of isolation, in which the different elements of civilization were separately cultivated.<sup>214</sup>

We have now indicated whatever was peculiar to the Sceptics, and characteristic of their distinctive method of treating established doctrines. It is not

<sup>213</sup> Ib. 9. 'Αλλ' εἰ μὲν πάντων προνοεῖ, οὐκ ἦν ἂν οὔτε κακὸν τι, οὔτε κακία ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ· κακίας δὲ πάντα μιστὰ εἶναι λίγουσιν· οὐκ ἄρα πάντων προνοεῖν λιχθήσεται ὁ Θεός.

<sup>214</sup> Ib. 12. 'Εκ δὲ τούτων ἐπιλογιζόμεθα, ὅτι ἴσως ἀσεβεῖν ἀναγκάζονται οἱ διαβεβαιωτικῶς λίγοντες εἶναι θεόν. πάντων μὲν γὰρ αὐτὸν προνοεῖν λίγοντες κακῶν αἰτίων τὸν θεὸν εἶναι φήσουσιν. τινῶν δὲ ἢ μηδενὸς προνοεῖν αὐτὸν λίγοντες ἤτοι βάσκανον τὸν θεὸν ἢ ἀσθενῆ λίγειν ἀναγκασθῆσονται ταῦτα δὲ ἴσθιν ἀσεβοῦντων προδήλως.

necessary to enter further into details. On the whole, their philosophy has but slight pretension to greater merit than any of the Dogmatical theories of an Eclectical character, which were contemporary with it. What distinguishes the New Scepticism from these, is merely a clearer consciousness of the invalidity of the scientific elements which were disseminated in the general civilization of their age. This conviction was the result of their having taken a more complete survey of the valuable results of earlier inquiry than the Dogmatists ever dreamed of, and consequently, of their being able to place in a stronger light, the inconsistencies in which the several schools were involved. But if the Sceptics had the advantage in this respect, they were, on the other hand, by a natural consequence of their more extensive knowledge, far inferior to the Dogmatists in profound and accurate perception of the true import of the earlier philosophical doctrines. For the desire of the Sceptics, to bring the particular doctrines of the several schools into collision with each other, disqualified them to seize the true spirit, and contexture, and general tendency of the several systems. Whatever, therefore, of truth they individually possessed, fell into the back ground of the Sceptical picture, and failed to effect that degree of conviction, which, if seriously examined, it was calculated to produce. With those minds which are incapable of mastering the manifold directions of scientific inquiry, and to discover their real agreement amid their apparent discrepancies, varied and extensive information is inevitably a

source of superficial smattering. This was the case with most of the learned men of this period, but it is in the writings of the Sceptics that it is most strikingly apparent. On this account we cannot feel surprised, that their objections against the Dogmatists were of so little avail, as scarcely at any time to have awakened attention. Even the points on which the Sceptics were really victorious, they scarcely understood; at all events they did not make the best use of them. Like generals, unable to profit by their victories, as soon as they had successfully contested any point, they immediately abandoned it. When the Sceptics had refuted a particular question on general grounds, they placed so little confidence in their own refutation, that they immediately began to consider anew all the special applications of the general principle. Moreover, their weightiest arguments were strangely mixed up with the most worthless subtleties and perversions of language. We cannot give them any credit for honesty, earnestness of purpose, and right insight into the grounds of their Scepticism. In short, we may well question whether they were even honest and serious in their doubts. We have seen that they ascribed to man the power of working out and establishing certain useful arts of life; these they wished not to disturb, and it is only when they pass beyond the domain of the sensible, that they would forbid man to confide in his powers of cognition and knowledge. Nevertheless, the doubts of the Sceptics go far to undermine the foundations, even of the useful arts and practical branches of science. But at the same time, some-

thing like a conviction of the validity, and a pretty strong belief in their own general principles, glimmers through the loose and unmethodical exposition of their Scepticism. They are, therefore, nothing less than Dogmatists of a more limited character than those whom they seek to refute ; and their contest with their opponents is merely about the greater or the less degree of certainty. Accordingly their labours did not exercise that influence which is the usual result of Scepticism, and they failed to furnish a powerful counteraction to the prevailing directions of thought, and thereby to prepare a new development of science.

## PART I.—SECTION II.

### ORIENTAL PHILOSOPHY, AND ITS INFLUENCE ON THE GRECIAN.

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#### CHAPTER V.

##### INDIAN PHILOSOPHY.

IF we again return to a consideration of the philosophical doctrines of the Hindoos, it is rather with the view of pointing out a deficiency in our historical knowledge, than with a hope of filling up the chasm. It is a thankless task to attempt to elucidate a matter of which our authentic knowledge is very imperfect, and on which every day almost throws a new light. It would, no doubt, be better to wait for more complete information. Nevertheless, when we have entered on the history of any subject, we ought to endeavour to portray it as correctly as possible, and for this end, avail ourselves of every means, however incomplete, which may furnish any information calculated to illustrate its mysteries, and to explain the means by which it attained to its ultimate character. Although it may probably happen that the opinions, which in the present obscurity of our subject, we advance to day, will be refuted to-morrow, we, nevertheless, cannot forbear passing judgment on

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a matter, however obscure, which is properly brought under our notice, and falls within the immediate sphere of our labours. Thus the Indian philosophy has an irresistible claim on our attention ; both because it is the only one by which we can hope to form an idea of the Oriental philosophy in general, and also because it is undeniable, that Oriental ideas exercised a considerable influence on the philosophy of this period. What properly constitutes the Eastern character of thought, or at least its ultimate tendency, cannot, in our opinion, be better shown than by the several systems of Indian philosophy.<sup>1</sup> The term Oriental, however, has so often been employed in a loose and indeterminate sense, that we must, in the first place, attempt, however imperfectly, to fix its meaning.

Modern investigations, and particularly those of Colebrooke, have placed beyond question, the fact of the systematic development of Indian philosophy. Even though in the exposition of the essence and import of science, it may exhibit a less accurate classification of ideas than the Grecian philosophy does, its various systems, nevertheless, deserves to be compared with the latter ; and if it attracts our attention in a less degree, this is only because its ideas have not entered in such extensive and therefore influential combinations into the present development of science. We cannot, therefore, but lament that the information on this point, which has hitherto been furnished by those acquainted with Indian literature, should be quite

<sup>1</sup> Transactions of the R. Asiatic Society, vol. i. p. 19—43, 92—118, 439—466, 549—579 ; vol. ii. 1—39.

inadequate to furnish more than an approximate estimate of the intrinsic value of Indian philosophy. Or, perhaps, what we really ought to regret is, that the mode in which the Indian philosophy was first propagated and ultimately reduced to writing, was little calculated to exhibit the movement of ideas to which it originally owed its existence. For an extended acquaintance with the philosophical writings of the Hindoos, daily establishes more completely the fact, that they consist of little more than a collection of aphorisms with accompanying commentaries. Of the former we may observe, that they are but so many results apart from the investigation by which they were obtained, while the latter as they are very recent, dating long subsequently to our era, are justly open to the doubt, whether or not they exhibit the true origin of the olden doctrines and the first principles of their development. The aphorisms themselves are doubly open to suspicion. Of these it may be urged, that either they belong to a later age, and were intended to form a brief compendium of the ancient wisdom, similar perhaps to that which Alcinous has furnished us with in the case of the Platonic philosophy, or that, if original, they were composed merely as manuals of philosophy by the founders of the several schools, who reserved to themselves the task of orally explaining the grounds on which the several axioms ultimately rested. The imperfect state of our knowledge of the primary sources, disables us from deciding between these two hypotheses, and we shall therefore only observe that the high estimation in which

the Indians held oral instruction, affords some support to the latter opinion.<sup>2</sup>

The several systems of Indian philosophy are divided by Colebrooke into those which are agreeable to the doctrines of the Vedas, and those which are irreconcilably opposed to them. To the latter belong principally the doctrines of the Buddhists and D'Schinists, and other sects, such as that of the Tscharvaka, the Sivaïtes, and some Vischnuites. The accounts, however, which he gives of these schools are very vague, and for the most part drawn from pretended refutations of them by their adversaries. Another and a still more essential difference appears to exist between them. The Vischnuites and the Sivaïtes, for instance, move nearly in the same paths as the sects which are considered orthodox, or semi-orthodox. Of the Sivaïtes, Hindoo writers themselves admit that they have borrowed largely from the Sankya; and, apparently, their system amounts to nothing more than a simplification of this philosophy;<sup>3</sup> while the Vischnuites,

<sup>2</sup> Several of the aphorisms or memorial verses are ascribed to the founders of the schools. But without commentaries they are unintelligible, and have been supposed to be the interpolations of commentators. Colebr. l. i. i. p. 93; ii. p. 5, 6. The later Indian philosophy has hardly remained free from Eclecticism. The same persons are sometimes commentators of different systems. Ib. p. 22, 23. Such an Eclectical procedure has been ascribed to works even which have the character of great age. Lassen *Gymnosophista*, vol. i. Fasc. i. p. 11. Atque obiter hoc moneo summa cum cautione utendum esse explanationibus, quæ a recentioribus philosophicorum librorum enarratoribus propositæ sunt, præsertim in eis libris, qui doctrinam profitentur aut minus orthodoxam, veluti Sankhyici, aut ad certam quandam scholam non accommodandam, quales sunt libri Bhagavadgita, Manu's leges, hisque antiquiores Upanishades. What Colebrooke says of the Bhagavad Gita *Transact* vol. ii. p. 39. seems to lead to the same conclusion.

<sup>3</sup> Colebr. l. i. p. 569, 570, 571, 572. According to Wilson even the Sivaïtes are pre-eminently orthodox, and followers of the Vedanta. *Asiat. Res.* xvii. p. 171, 174.

again, are regarded by the Hindoos as only partially heterodox.<sup>4</sup> The dogmas of the Tscharvakas, on the contrary, directly contradict all the fundamental doctrines of every orthodox and semi-orthodox sect, since they teach an unqualified sensualism and materialism, and make the nature of the soul to be corporeal.<sup>5</sup> The same cannot, however, be asserted so decidedly of the Buddhists and the D'Schinists. Nevertheless, they are, by their religious faith, and the difference of their general views, as shown in an earlier part of our labours,<sup>6</sup> widely separated from the orthodox believers of the Brahmannic schools. But into these heterodox sects we do not propose to enter, since our acquaintance with their doctrines is too imperfect to make us determine their character with any certainty.<sup>7</sup> Some of them, indeed, the Vischnuites and the Tscharvaites for instance, appear to have a very doubtful claim to the title of a philosophical school. These matters we must therefore be content to leave to further investigation.

But even with regard to the other Indian doctrines, our inquiries must be confined to what in our judgment is most indubitable and most important. Contenting ourselves, therefore, with pointing out the general tendency of the doctrines, and the course of inquiry which they indicate in

<sup>4</sup> Ib. 575, 577.

<sup>5</sup> Ib. 567.

<sup>6</sup> Vol. i. p. 94, sqq.

<sup>7</sup> Fuller's accounts of the D'Schinists have lately been published by Wilson. *Asiat. Res.* xv. p. 262, sqq. Nevertheless, we cannot allow ourselves to enter more at length into this doctrine, because it is apparently certain that they belong to a later age than it is our business at present to consider. Wilson places its rise in the sixth and seventh century of our era, but makes its importance to be at least two centuries later. Ib. 284, &c.

general, we shall be compelled to neglect much of what, although it is known to us indeed as a simple result, we are yet, by the fragmentary nature of all the notices of it that we possess, disqualified to determine the true spirit and import as a necessary member of the entire development.<sup>8</sup> Such as are convinced that the essence of philosophy lies not so much in special investigations as in general principles and tendencies, must regret that our knowledge of Indian philosophy seldom reaches to these points.

The division which Colebrooke gives of these systems into orthodox and heterodox, appears to us to rest on a very partial consideration. It is evidently taken from the Mimansa, which claims the character of being pre-eminently orthodox, and objects to all others, that whenever they differ from itself they depart from the true faith. It is very probable that this objection was retorted by the other sects.<sup>9</sup> For although the Mimansa, in all its principles ostensibly appealed to the authority of the Vedas, it was nevertheless forced to have recourse to very free expositions of the sacred writings, in order to reconcile the authority of the Vedas with its own doctrines. In this respect the Mimansa is not otherwise distinguished from other sects, except perhaps by the greater frequency of

<sup>8</sup> Not only the memoirs of Colebrooke, but even the works of the Hindoo philosophers themselves, contain a multitude of divisions for which no grounds are given. They must therefore be for the most part neglected by the history of philosophy, so long as we are unable to point out their mutual connection.

<sup>9</sup> I must here confess that I am not always consistent in my orthography of Sanscrit terms.

its appeals to the Vedas;<sup>10</sup> for those which are styled heterodox are equally zealous for the authority of these sacred writings. In confirmation of their own views, they frequently adduce passages of the Vedas, of which, however, for this purpose, they never scruple to the most forced and arbitrary interpretations. And here we must not omit to observe, that it is a very erroneous opinion which regards the philosophy of the Indians simply as a compilation of their religious doctrines and opinions. The former, undoubtedly, are in close connection with the latter, but not closer than that which is occasionally found to exist between the philosophy and polytheism of Greece, or that between our Christian philosophy and the articles of our faith. This fact we should be able to demonstrate more clearly, if we possessed a more precise knowledge of the heretical systems of the Indians. And, on the other hand, the very fact that the orthodox systems, as well as the heterodox, were driven to forced explanations of the religious books, is a proof that they were at least partially influenced by a different spirit from that which formed the predominant character of their religion.

Among the multitude of Indian systems, Colebrooke considers six to be especially distinguished; and these again he has classed together in pairs, so as to form only three principal divisions; viz. the first and the second Mimansa which is also called Vedanta, the Nyaya and the Vaiseschika, the

<sup>10</sup> I cannot conceive on what grounds Colebrooke reckons the Vaiseschika among the orthodox systems, since the Vedanta places the Atomic theory of Kanada even below the doctrine of the Sankhya. Vide *ib.* i. p. 557.

Sankhya and the Yoga.<sup>11</sup> The dualism of these systems is not, however, to be viewed from the same historical point of view, for each pair is connected together by a peculiar relation. The Sankhya and the Yoga, by their division of ideas, form but one and the same system, and only differ by giving different interpretations of the supreme idea from which the whole classification proceeds; and hence also, naturally enough, by taking a different view of the division itself. In its view of this subject, the Yoga approximates to the Vedanta; and is perhaps nothing more than an attempt to establish the authority of the Sankhya, but at the same time to reconcile it with the general view which forms the groundwork of the Mimansa. Very different from this is the relation of the two Mimansas. The first may be said to stand in the same relation to the latter that the practical does to the theoretical. The former is a simple enumeration of duties which are mostly of a religious nature. The precepts of the Vedas are regarded as the principles of ethical doctrine, but not exclusively; and occasionally, indeed, their authority is rejected, as conflicting with the immutable laws of morality.<sup>12</sup> In the discussion of these matters, however, the Mimansa has no better title to the character of philosophy than for the proofs it gives

<sup>11</sup> Colebr. l. 1. vol. i. p. 19. This is in accordance with the general review of it which Taylor has given in the appendix to his translation of the *Prabod Chandrodaya*. *The Rise of the Moon of Intellect*. Transl. by Taylor. Lond. 1812. 8. The Yoga, for instance, the doctrine of Patanjali is called by Taylor Patanjel, and the Nyaya is divided into the doctrine of Gautama and of Kanada, which is called *Vaiseschika*.

<sup>12</sup> *Ib.* p. 451, 452, 456.

of the necessity of a divine revelation of human duties, or its inquiries into the origin of language, and into the connection between the meritorious act and its invisible consequences.<sup>13</sup> The Vedanta, or the second portion of the Mimansa, possesses, on the other hand, a philosophical character, and will therefore justly call for a fuller examination. Lastly, the Nyaya and the Vaiseschika, according to Colebrooke, stand in the same relation to each other as metaphysics to logics and ethics; or, as he elsewhere more precisely expresses himself, the Nyaya is conversant about general ideas, while the Vaiseschika takes them indeed as its basis, but enters pre-eminently into details.<sup>14</sup> The two, therefore, may be regarded as forming one complete system.

As long as our knowledge of the first evolutions of these doctrines is imperfect, it is utterly useless to attempt to trace historically the order of their succession. Colebrooke, indeed, has ventured to assert, that the Sankhya was the latest formed, on the ground that the several other systems are constantly mentioned and refuted in the works of greatest repute among the followers of the Vedanta.<sup>15</sup> This argument, however, is inadequate, so long as a doubt exists that the existing work is the one in which the doctrine of the Vedanta was originally promulged.

<sup>13</sup> Ib. p. 445, 446, 455. The following is Colebrooke's remark of the founder of the Mimansa:—Jaimini's arrangement, however, is not philosophical; and I am not acquainted with any elementary work of this school in which a better distribution has been achieved. So too Windischmann in the *Philosophie im Fortgang d. Weltgeschichte*, p. 1766.

<sup>14</sup> Ib. p. 92. Taylor, on the contrary, makes the difference between them to consist in the difference of divisions.

<sup>15</sup> Ib. vol. ii. p. 4.



Probability, nevertheless, is in favour of the assertion of Colebrooke, for it is in some degree supported by the internal character of the doctrine itself. Our acquaintance, however, with the systems of Indian philosophy is as yet too imperfect to allow us to draw from internal evidences any decided conclusion as to their successive development and mutual relation. The order, therefore, in which we propose to notice them is by no means adopted as really according with their historical succession.

### 1. SANKHYA AND YOGA.

No system of Indian philosophy is in its main features so well known to Europeans as the Sankhya. And it is this acquaintance with it mainly that justifies the assertion that a true philosophical impulse existed among the Indians,—a spirit of inquiry which, being on the whole independent of religious opinions, did not appeal to sacred traditions, but followed out for itself a determinate line of thought. The Yoga, as already observed, grew out of, or attached itself to, this system. In what manner this was accomplished, it is impossible to determine in the existing state of our information. We therefore propose to examine, in the first place, the Sankhya itself, and then to add a few remarks as to the mode in which the Yoga probably became connected with it.

The Memorial Verses of the Isvara-Krishna, which is a leading work with the followers of the

Sankhya,<sup>16</sup> commence with the following attempt to prove the ground and necessity of philosophical science. The pressure of this world's ills gives rise to a desire of discovering some means by which they may be surmounted. Now no such remedy is to be found among visible things, for they are all equally perishable. Even religious duties are insufficient for such a purpose, for these are more or less mixed up with impurity, assailing the soul by exacting the sacrifice of animals. It is only the being able to distinguish the evolved from its principle, and that which is cognizant, that can lead to such an emancipation from the pains and evils of life.<sup>17</sup> All other means may be regarded as preparatives to science, but cannot effect the complete enfranchisement of the soul.<sup>18</sup> We have, in the next place, a distinction drawn between internal and external knowledge. The latter embraces a knowledge of the sacred writings, and every other branch of science, except self-knowledge, which alone constitutes the former, and is exclusively true knowledge, or the science which can deliver man from evil.<sup>19</sup>

After this introduction, there immediately follows the division on which, as its proper scientific foundation, the system of the Sankhya is raised. In the next place, we have an enumeration of the modes of cognition; and, lastly, the division is again taken up and pursued further. It is manifest

<sup>16</sup> *Gymnosophista sive Indicæ philosophiæ documenta*. Collegit, edidit, enarravit Chr. Lassen. vol. i. Fasc. i. *Iśvarakriahñ Sankhya* . . . Caricam tenens. Bonn. 1832. 4.

<sup>17</sup> *Iśvara-Crism*. 1, 2; *Colebr.* i. p. 27, 28.

<sup>18</sup> *Colebr.* i. p. 36.

<sup>19</sup> *L. l.*

that these Memorial Verses do not observe a very correct method. Now although it is not altogether justifiable to adopt, as the standard of Indian philosophy, the order of scientific exposition which Europeans have followed, or at least thought advisable, nevertheless, other considerations render it probable that the Sankhya was indebted to its disputes with other systems for a definite theory of the principles of knowledge, which has been inserted in a very inconvenient place, in consequence of not being essential to the original design. We shall therefore examine, in the first place, so far as appears necessary, the principles of knowledge according to the Sankhya, in order that we may be able afterwards to pursue, without interruption, its classification of objects.

Now the Sankhya assumes three kinds of knowledge; viz. perception, mediate knowledge, which is acquired by the several forms of syllogism, and tradition.<sup>20</sup> Under the last term was comprised not only what is ordinarily understood by the term, but also a holy tradition arising from the recollection of an earlier and holier state of existence.<sup>21</sup> Perception is cognizant of sensible objects, but in many cases is insufficient for its purpose,<sup>22</sup> and in these recourse must be had to mediate cognition or demonstration, which pretends to arrive at certainty, either by proceeding from the effect to the cause, or from the cause to the effect, or else by a comparison of two objects.<sup>23</sup> All intuitive knowledge

<sup>20</sup> Isvara-Criahna, 4; Colebr. i. p. 28.

<sup>21</sup> Colebr. i. p. 29.

<sup>22</sup> Isv. Criahn. 6; Colebr. i. p. 38.

<sup>23</sup> Isv. Criahn. 7; Colebr. i. l. 1.

of principles is positively denied by the adherents of the Sankhya; according to whom it is only a higher order of beings that may lay claim to such a faculty.<sup>24</sup>

The classification of the objects of knowledge on which the whole context of the Sankhya depends, possesses a very decidedly systematic form. Whatever is the object of science is either creative and not created, or both creative and created, or created and not creative, or neither creative nor created.<sup>25</sup> The first is naturally the root of all created things. It is asserted to be a subtle essence, sensuously imperceptible, but distinctly traceable in its operations in the world. The existence of such a being must of necessity be admitted, since the effects of his operation are acknowledged to exist.<sup>26</sup> Further, that this first cause is one and not multiple, the Sankhya argues from the fact, that all things in the world are homogeneous. For as all things pass easily into each other, and as ultimately all will be again united together when the world shall return again into its source, there must be one universal first cause in which nothing is distinguishable. The qualities which, in opposite and distinguishable ways reciprocate in things, pre-suppose a cause which comprises in itself all these qualities indistinguishably and unevolved; it is as it were water, which is susceptible of all modes.<sup>27</sup> Now the leading view in all these

<sup>24</sup> Colebr. i. p. 28.

<sup>25</sup> *Isv. Criahn.* 3; Colebr. i. p. 31. Colebrooke has also called attention to the singular correspondence between this and the doctrine of Johannes Scotus Erigena, which is carried through several minute points.

<sup>26</sup> *Isv. Criahn.* 3, 8, 9; Colebr. i. p. 30, 38.

<sup>27</sup> *Isv. Criahn.* 14, 16; Colebr. i. p. 39.

propositions is evidently the principle that the cause must resemble the effect. As, therefore, the world, the effect, exhibits itself as corporeal, the creative principle, as being the basis of the corporeal, is also conceived to be a body, but yet of so subtle a nature as to elude all human perception. The creative principle is consequently regarded as a blind force of nature ; and is indicated at one time as matter endued with formative energy, at another as nature.<sup>28</sup>

From the first member of this division we shall pass at once to the fourth, because it is from the union of these two that the origin of the others is derived. Now that which is neither created nor creates is the soul,<sup>29</sup> or rather the multitude of souls. The proof of the existence of a soul is drawn from several considerations. A certain compound structure of blind corporeal nature is found to exist, which may be compared to that of instruments or organs. Now such a construction is inconceivable without some other entity for whose advantage it has been made, but that for whose good it was designed must be a sentient being, i. e. a soul. Again, because there is that which is enjoyed, so there must be that which enjoys, and such is the soul. And even the blindly working forces of nature imply a being which guides and directs them, and from this consideration again the existence of a soul follows. Further, the pursuit of that supreme felicity which consists in the abstraction from all that is sensible and perishable must be looked upon as a proof of the existence of the soul,

<sup>28</sup> Ib. p. 30, 38, 39 ; *Isv. Crishn.* 11.

<sup>29</sup> *Isv. Crishn.* 3.

for it is only a soul that can be capable of such abstraction. Lastly, the Sankhya appears to have likewise maintained the principle, that the several members of a contrariety reciprocally necessitate each other,<sup>30</sup> and consequently to have argued that the existence of a force of nature which works blindly by impulsion, legitimates the inference that there exists an intelligent soul reposing within itself.<sup>31</sup> This last argument is evidently one that expresses the most distinctly the spirit of the Sankhya philosophy. For in it nature and soul, or the principles of corporeal and mental phenomena are as directly opposed to each other as their phenomenal appearance. The purely corporeal and its principle, therefore, are regarded as thoroughly unconscious and as blind, which, nevertheless, however unconsciously, acts outwardly, not indeed creating new things, but merely producing a constant change in relations and forms; while, on the other hand, the soul is its direct contrary, having nothing in common with the principle of the corporeal except that it is a principle, and like it increate and ingenerate. As nature or matter is blind, so the soul, on the other hand, is in its essence endued with intelligence; and as nature is active and producing,

<sup>30</sup> This principle is also maintained by the Vedanta. Taylor, p. 118.

<sup>31</sup> I shall here quote the Latin translation of the passage of the *Isvara Krishna* in which these proofs are given, in order to give an example of these Mnemonic Verses. It is the seventeenth Stoka. *Ideo quod consociatio propter alius causam fit, e contrario trium qualitatum et eas comitantium proprietatum, e moderatione, inde quod esse debet, qui fruatur, ex actione propter abstractionis causam (colligitur) esse Genium.* The explanation may be found in Lassen's note, and in Colebr. p. 40. I have changed the order of the proofs, as will easily be seen.

the soul is in its essence not a cause and not producing; it is merely a spectator of that which is brought about; it is as it were a stranger in the world.<sup>32</sup> The foundation of this doctrine, therefore, rests on the perception of the specific difference between the corporeal and the mental as transferred to their respective principles, and leads to a system of decided dualism. It is only by considering the principle of mental phenomena as multiple, while the principle of the corporeal is held to be simple unity, capable however of transmuting itself into many forms, that the Sankhya is distinguished from other dualistic doctrines which are based on the same contrariety. The multiplicity of souls is proved by the fact that the destiny of all souls is not the same, and that its pleasures and pains, and the occupation in which it participates, are various. When the one dies the other begins to live; one has this, another that body. This idea of a multiplicity of souls in one living body seems to be based on the view that the strict unity of each several soul does not admit of opposite, contemporaneous states. The unity of the corporeal principle, on the other hand, is not supported by any further argument than that already hinted at. Perhaps, indeed, the teachers of the Sankhya were more or less influenced by the idea that it is by mental reflection that things first attain to an absolute existence in and for themselves, and thereby also unity and plurality perceived in the world.<sup>33</sup>

<sup>32</sup> *Isv. Crishn.* 19. *Ex eadem contrarietate demonstratur Genium esse testem, abstractionis studiosum, arbitrum, spectatorem, agendi inopem.* *Ib.* 20.

<sup>33</sup> *Isv. Crishn.* 18; *Colebr. i.* p. 40.

It is by the combination of these two principles according to the Sankhya, that the world is produced; but in this production the two grounds play opposite parts agreeable to the peculiar nature of each. The idea which, in their passionate desire for inactive repose, the Orientals formed of the soul, was very different from that which the active and lively Greek entertained of it. With the former it is without all formative energy; it does not by activity produce order and beauty in the world, it rules not matter, and is not an ensouling force; on the contrary, they believed that it is without either pleasure or force to act, and that in its essence it is contemplative; it takes no other part amid the blind forces of nature than that of a spectator; it is neither created nor creative. It is a stable point in the theory of mundane things which the Sankhya advances, that in their production the soul effects absolutely nothing, but that it is simply passive in its relation to the phenomena which nature produces in combination with it. The soul is devoid of all activity or employment. A stranger in this world, it assumes, in its connection with nature, the appearance indeed of acting; in the same way as the corporeal nature, by its connection with the soul, puts on the semblance of sensation.<sup>34</sup> On the other hand, the active force in the formation of the world, is the principle which is increate and not creative. It is a living but blindly developing being. As the milk which affords sustenance to

<sup>34</sup> *Isv. Crishn.* 19, 20. *Inde fit, ut e conjunctione cum hoc (Genio) corpusculum, sensu destitutum, induat speciem sentiendi; et peregrinus ille (Genius) agentis instar compareat, agentibus solummodo qualitativis.* Colebr. i. p. 43.



the calf works blindly, so the producing force of nature operates unconsciously. It is as it were a dancing-girl, who dances in order to exhibit herself to a circle of spectators; so nature works in order that the soul may see her works; she pursues a business which cannot have been given her by the soul to perform, for it has no active qualities.<sup>35</sup> The Sankhya here makes use of a figure, which is employed in various ways by the Indian philosophy, to illustrate the relation of the soul to body. It illustrates the combination of the two principles of the world in the creation, by the society of the blind and the lame, the part of the one being to bear and to be guided, the other to be borne and to guide. The soul has no power to move or to act; nature is unable to see her way; what the one is destitute of is supplied by the other, and so by the union of the two the creation is developed in its mental and corporeal phenomena.<sup>36</sup>

When now we proceed to explain the derivation of mundane creatures which nature, by uniting itself with the soul, produces, we have to remark generally that the Sankhya is far from observing the same strict and scientific classification which it puts forward at the opening of its doctrine. Nevertheless, we must admit both that a pretty distinct view prevails throughout, and that the arrangement of its ideas is based on the results of experience, and not altogether devoid of a scientific character. These

<sup>35</sup> *Isv. Crishn.* 57, 59, 60; *Colebr.* i. p. 42.

<sup>36</sup> *Isv. Crishn.* 21. *Conjunctio Genii, (eam) conspiciere et dein sese abstrahere studentis, atque originis (Procreatricis) fit tamen, licet claudi veluti et cæci; hinc efficitur creatio.* *Colebr.* i. p. 32.

ideas moreover appear to have been generally adopted in the Oriental mind; whether or not they owed their prevalence to the Sankhya, we cannot venture to decide. This arrangement assumes the form of an ascending series, with respect to which we must here remark that on the whole it is subordinate to the two members of the fundamental division which we have not as yet considered, that viz. of the created which also creates, and the created which does not create. The latter is evidently of less value than the former. This distinction of degree in the consideration of mundane things is further implied by a division which prevails equally in the Sankhya and in all the other philosophical doctrines of the Indians, and whose great importance for a right estimate of the fundamental ideas of that philosophy, requires that we should immediately examine it. We allude to the division of qualities, as the original term is usually translated, or the degrees of mundane existence as we should prefer to call them, if we had only to consider the allocation of the several ideas.<sup>37</sup> These degrees are three in number. The highest is good, which tends upwards, as fire; it is the cause of virtue and felicity: the lowest is darkness, heavy as water and earth, the cause of dulness and deception: between these two extremes lies folly or passion, which is described as changeable and moveable, as air—the cause of evil. In the gods good prepon-

<sup>37</sup> The Sanscrit term is *guna*. Lassen says, p. 30: *Atque est sane guna apud Sankhyicos materiam innatam triplicem per tres gradus ascendens atque consideranda. Sunt tres materiae cum arcu vel lyra comparatae tensiones et reddi potest guna haud inepte per potentiam. Cf. Colebr. i. p. 35.*

derates ; passion and darkness being equally foreign to them, therefore they are supremely happy. In man passion preponderates ; good and darkness are strangers to him ; on this account he is pre-eminently miserable. Lastly, in the brutes darkness pervades, good as well as passion is alien to them, and therefore they are in the highest degree stupid.<sup>38</sup> These three grades of mundane existence appear by the Sankhya to be brought in connection with the production of the several subordinate principles, so that some indeed of the followers of this doctrine have even reckoned them as principles.<sup>39</sup> But on this point we require more complete and accurate information than as yet we possess.

The custom of the Sankhya, in the enumeration of these three grades, to descend from the higher to the lower, is in perfect accordance with the manner which it follows in its exposition of the derivatory principles. Indeed, it appears to be a general characteristic of the Oriental habit of thought to deduce gradually from the perfect, the more and more imperfect. It invariably regards the most perfect as the most intellectual. For although it usually paints the creative principle as a blind force, and even appears at times to equate its notion to that of the corporeal, by placing in it the principle of the corporeal, nevertheless its first productions are by no means of a grossly corporeal nature. This circumstance can only be explained by the

<sup>38</sup> Colebr. i. p. 35, 39, 40; Isv. Crishn. 13. Here the three grades are designated by *essentia*, *impetus*, and *caligo*, which Humboldt renders by *Wesenheit*, *Irdichheit*, and *Dunkel*. With respect to the Episode of the Maha-Bharata known as the Bhagavad Gita, see p. 28.

<sup>39</sup> Colebr. i. p. 35. Bergl. Isv. Crishn. 25; Humboldt, *ib.*

fact that the essential object of the Sankhya being to place the notion of the soul in the most direct opposition to all that is sensible, it was thereby driven to consider all internal sensuous motions as something unessential to the soul, and accruing to it from without, and therefore to be regarded as its body. That the Sankhya has followed out this tendency to its extreme consequences is at once manifest, from a consideration of those notions which are represented as the first to proceed from the productive energy of material nature.

Now the very first of these emanations is mind or reason, which, as the supreme principle of mundane things, is also called the great;<sup>40</sup> for it either produces all the others, or allows them to proceed out of itself. Such of the followers of the Sankhya as adopted the authority of the Vedas, regarded it also as the divine Trinity. In the view of these philosophers, all other rational entities are merely parts of and emanations from it;<sup>41</sup> and the notion of a supreme God signified simply the prime-created being. They expressly denied the existence of a God independent of nature, whether revealed by tradition, or perceived by the senses, or as demonstrated by argument. For, they asked, how could those effects, which seem to afford such a proof, have proceeded from a supremely perfect being? for independent of, and separate from, nature, and therefore uninfluenced by the movements of consciousness, such a being would not have had any motive for creation; on the other hand, if fettered by nature, he would not have been sufficient for it.

<sup>40</sup> *Isv. Crishn.* 22; *Colebr.* i. p. 30.

<sup>41</sup> *Colebr.* i. 1.

The guidance of events requires a kindred existence with that which guided, in the same way as iron is attracted by the magnet. Therefore no pure and perfect soul could have been the ground of the world's existence; reason alone which is produced by nature, must be considered as that on which all else is dependent. This great one, however,—this reason, is regarded by the Sankhya as the ground of all particular rational entities. It must be perishable, in the same way as all that is produced from it in the union of nature with reason is transitory; it is at most a finite and perishable reason.<sup>42</sup> This first production of nature is followed in the next place by the self-consciousness which attaches the idea of self or ego to all sensations and thoughts. It goes forth from the reason, and produces the other principles, which are the basis of all sensuous appearances. It contains, as we are authorized in inferring, the ground of the multiplicity of rational entity in the world; for by this self-consciousness, the rational entities are separated one from another, and each for itself. Selfishness, evil, and error, are by it brought into the world.<sup>43</sup> To this the sensible attaches itself, but not immediately; for the Sankhya goes very gradually to work with its descending series of the developments of nature, and consequently makes five imperceptible grounds of the five elements emanate from the self-consciousness previously to the production of the sensible. They are perceptible to higher existences, but not to man. Now as these five elementary principles exhibit themselves efficiently by allowing the five

<sup>42</sup> Colebr. i. p. 37.

<sup>43</sup> Colebr. i. p. 30; Isv. Crishn. 24.

perceptible elements to emanate from out of themselves, they belong to that member in the classification of this philosophy which comprises all that is both created and also re-creative.<sup>44</sup>

But this is all that belongs to this member of the series. In the next place follow the pure productions of nature, which further produce nothing, but are themselves merely the products of some other force or power. Of these, the first is the grossly sensible, which is perceptible to the human organs of sensation. According to the arrangement almost universally observed, these objects are grouped together in fives. There are five organs of sense, parallel to which stand the five organs of activity, viz.: the tongue, as the organ of speech, the hands, the feet, the entrails which carry on the alimentary and secretive action, and the organs of generation. In the next place, these five organs are made parallel to the five elements, since, according to the conceptions of the Sankhya, and generally of every Indian system, each element requires a separate sense for its perception. The fifth element of the Sankhya, which, by a very inappropriate comparison, is usually called ether, corresponds to the auditory organ. So far, then, these constituents of the sensible world are symmetrically arranged. But in agreement with other Indian systems, the Sankhya further appends to them another constituent, which is inserted between the five organs of sense, and the five organs of activity as constituting the point of union between, and effecting the unity of, the sentient person. This, in respect to the

<sup>44</sup> Colebr. i. p. 30; Isv. Crishn. 38.

senses, may be called the inner or common sense; but in relation to the organs of activity, as the collectivity of the sensual desires.<sup>45</sup> Now the distinction which the Sankhya draws between this sensuous consciousness and the self-consciousness, is a proof of a very strong disposition to refer the inner development of our sensuous conception to a higher and more general force, and thereby to separate it from man's true personality—from the essence of his soul. This effort is also strikingly apparent in the distinction which is drawn between a more subtle personality which is destined to be more enduring than the perceptible one, and the intellectual production of human representations.<sup>46</sup> In all probability, we shall not greatly err, if we suppose the relation subsisting between this more subtle and the sensual personality to be similar to that assumed between their imperceptible grounds and the elements themselves.

This is the systematic order in which the things of this world and their principles are exhibited in the Sankhya philosophy. It is intended to lead to the conviction that all that goes on in this world is not a work of the soul, but that the latter has absolutely no concern therein. This is the true science of the soul, by which it is freed from all mundane annoyance. For if it can but once attain to the conviction that all the phenomena of nature are neither brought about by, nor affect itself, it will be able to behold all things with indifference. It will then look upon

<sup>45</sup> Colebr. i. p. 30, sq. *Isv. Crishn.* 25, sqq. This unity of the sensuous person Lassen designates by 'animus'. *Isv. Crishn.* 27.

<sup>46</sup> Colebr. p. 32, 33. Alluded to also in *Isv. Crishn.* 46.

itself as perfectly free from all the chances and changes of nature, and as a self-existing and independent being. These, it is true, still continue to exist as they did before; the soul is still held in the body in the same way as the potter's wheel still continues to revolve, even when its revolutions are no longer useful; but the soul is no longer affected by them; they no longer possess any advantage for it; for they were originally designed merely for this object, viz. to lead the soul to a knowledge of itself.<sup>47</sup> Such an emancipation of the soul by science, the Sankhya assumes to be possible even in this world; nevertheless it seems to have regarded this attainment as merely transient, since it taught that the soul cannot in this life ever withdraw itself absolutely from its connection with the body. The emancipation, therefore, which the sage attains to after death, is alone perfect and without end; it is then only that he is freed from the necessity of the metempsychosis.<sup>48</sup>

This point of view undoubtedly presents a difficulty which is hard to overcome, but which, however, the Sankhya has, in common with all systems which in any degree advocate the doctrine of a pure semblance. The Sankhya makes the working of the soul, in reference to nature, i. e. its pain or passion, to be a pure semblance; but by so doing it involves itself in the difficulty of accounting for it. Now it assumes, indeed, that nature presents this semblance to the soul; it shows it to the soul in order that the soul may be awakened to a knowledge of itself. Nature does nothing but for the sake of

<sup>47</sup> *Isv. Crishn.* 67.

<sup>48</sup> *Ib.* 68.



the soul. But what does it effect within it? Nature is designed to emancipate the soul, to furnish it with science; but, as the Sankhya admits, the soul is bound by nothing; it is not so much it that comes into connection with nature, as nature, which, in connecting together different souls and running through the circle of emanations, binds and unbinds itself. The soul therefore cannot be free; the only science that can arise in it is merely one which teaches that it is of no use to be free.<sup>49</sup> How can such science improve the soul or change its nature? Thus, then, even in the soul, nature produces a certain result, which however may itself be described as a semblance. Thus, then, the action of nature on the soul, on which, however, the truth of all natural operations must rest, vanishes; and hence perhaps we may explain the fact, that so many of the followers of the Sankhya declared nature itself to be nothing more than an appearance.<sup>50</sup> Yet, undoubtedly, this view was not the primary sense of this philosophy, whose essential character was the assumption of the pure contrariety of body and mind. A partial resolution, therefore, of this contrariety by the annihilation of nature, was a very inappropriate means for removing the difficulties which the carrying out this contrariety ultimately leads to; for as, according to the Sankhya, the several souls have no common bond of union, this hypothesis could naturally have no other result than to destroy all unity in the system of the world. We are therefore disposed to ascribe

<sup>49</sup> *Ib.* 56.

<sup>50</sup> *Colebr.* i. p. 30. But of a late date only, for Colebrooke appeals to the *Puranas* for his authority.

to the Yoga, rather than to the Sankhya, the view which would reduce nature itself to a semblance.

Of this, the probable daughter of the Sankhya, we have a few remarks to make, which, from the scantiness of our information concerning it, will necessarily be very brief.<sup>51</sup> We scarcely know more of it than that, agreeing for the most part with the Sankhya, it differs from it by teaching the existence of a supreme God and governor of all things, who is a soul or a spirit, but different from other souls, and exempt from the ills to which the latter are exposed, and equally incapable of doing either good or evil, and therefore independent of their consequences, and without conceptions or fleeting ideas. This God, according to the Yoga, is infinite, without beginning or end, omniscient, and the teacher of those primal beings, the gods,<sup>52</sup> who, it would appear, are in their turn the teachers of men. As to the relations which the followers of the Yoga supposed to exist between this supreme being and the world, or between it and the individual soul, on this point we are wholly ignorant.<sup>53</sup> Thus, too, we are perfectly in the dark as to the questions, whether it considered nature itself merely as an emanation from this supreme soul, or as a mere semblance, a delusion which the individual soul is subject to

<sup>51</sup> I must here observe that the term Yoga (union, absorption), is of very extensive signification with the Hindoos. The doctrine of the Bhagavad-Gita also is termed Yoga. Here nothing more is meant than the Yoga of Patandschali.

<sup>52</sup> Colebr. i. p. 37, sqq.

<sup>53</sup> This view is adopted by Windischmann, *ib.* p. 1887, who, in his treatise on Indian philosophy, appeals to unpublished documents. According to this author, God is the unity of all souls. But elsewhere it is differently taken. See below.

by its separation from God, and whether it posited the several souls individually as emanations from, or parts of God. For the solution of all these, we must look to future research.<sup>54</sup> As the Yoga was more closely connected than the Sankhya with religious practices, and in some degree neglected scientific inquiries, we must suppose that, as it adopted the doctrines of the Sankhya in all other respects, it attempted to find a means by which it might, if not altogether get rid of, yet, at least, soften the rigour of the contrariety of soul and nature, as taught by the latter: and, in truth, such an attempt will very naturally account for the development of the Yoga<sup>55</sup> from the Sankhya.

In the state of doubt which envelops this subject, this alone is certain, that the Yoga made the attainment of that perfect repose, which it makes to be the end of philosophy, to be dependent on the absorption of the individual soul in God. This repose is a state of ecstasy, to be obtained by a withdrawal from the activity of thought, while the contemplator remains in his own proper mood; whereas in man's usual state of thought, his mental activity is continually in motion, either arguing or doubting, or the like.<sup>56</sup> Even from such a species of activity, man must emancipate himself by acquiring that perfect rest which is attainable by the contemplation of unity. In such a state of quietude, the differences between words and things, nature and mind,

<sup>54</sup> They are particularly difficult to solve, since it is not easy to keep distinct the Yoga of Patandschali and that of the Vedanta.

<sup>55</sup> Yoga Sutra, according to the translation of Rosen, in Windischmann, *ib.* p. 1880.

<sup>56</sup> *Ib.*

will be resolved; and all special existences vanish and pass over into God.<sup>67</sup> The means by which this ecstatic state is to be attained, are in general such as are agreeable to the view of the Sankhya, of the utter nothingness of all earthly things relatively to the soul; all hope of mundane felicity must be abandoned. But this apparently leads to the view that all semblance originates in the separation of individual things or souls. Further, all the means, with the exception of abstraction, which the soul ought to employ, are of a very sensuous nature, and of the same character as those which we meet with in other Indian schools. One class of these means consists of religious practices, such as sacrifices, and the like, while at the same time the absorption, as it were, of all these practices into God, who is the sole object of veneration in them, is strictly enjoined. Another is made up of certain outward practices of a peculiar nature; such as a quiet and unconstrained position of the body or a recumbent posture, a fixed law for the inhaling and exhaling the breath, and the direction of the attention to the roots or beginnings of sensation or thought, the point of the nose, of the tongue, &c., by all which it is intended no doubt, although in a very sensuous way, to indicate that a full knowledge of the principles of sensation and thought are necessary to the peace of the soul. But by a consideration of mundane things we can only see God in types, yet, at the same time, we can thereby prepare ourselves for that higher contemplation which shall reveal to us

<sup>67</sup> Windischmann, *ib.* p. 1881, for the most part after Indian commentators.

not types, nor rational activity, nor the ego, but the splendour of the divinity. In such contemplations we shall see through all things, both past and future, the course of all time, and the whole extent of nature; we shall attain also to the might which rules the corporeal world and effects the wonders of the Yogi. But even the divine splendour of God,—the world of light,—appears to be sensuously understood, and its contemplation does not apparently indicate the highest grade of human emancipation from evil. For the Yoga teaches that at last man shall learn to distinguish the world of light from intelligence, and that thereby the root of delusion and the cause of birth be destroyed in man. At this perfection, however, it is only gradually that man can arrive; it is only through birth and death, that, similarly to a seed of corn, human life is evolved step by step to this glorious fruit. Thus then the different steps which the Sankhya points out appear to form, as it were, the ladder by which man is to climb to this height of perfection.<sup>58</sup>

The insufficient and defective nature of our information on this subject cannot be better indicated than by a reference to the Bhagavad-Ghita, which, it is pretended, contains an exposition of the principles of this philosophy. For to judge from those scanty statements of its true nature which we have already recorded, and from other testimonies, it is impossible to admit that this poem contains the genuine doctrine of the Yoga. We must therefore wait until Sanscrit scholars, who have greater treasures at their command, shall have imparted to us

<sup>58</sup> Windischm. *ib.* p. 1881, seq.

some more correct and unquestionable<sup>59</sup> account of this system of philosophy.

The doctrine of this poem connects itself with that of the Sankhya, by placing soul and nature in direct opposition, and making the knowledge of the latter to be the condition of all ultimate emancipation from the law of metempsychosis. The several members of this contrariety stand opposed to each other in pairs, as matter and the cognizant of matter, the enjoyed and the enjoying, the agent and the spectator. But the poem also implies the hypothesis that the union of nature with the soul is the origin of all individual things,<sup>60</sup> with this difference, however, that this union is referred back to a superior mind, which, presiding over the world, is the principle both of it and of nature, and therefore also of their union. For although nature is designated in the Bhagavad-Ghita as eternal and without beginning,<sup>61</sup> still the predominant view of the poem is that God, the supreme mind or soul, is the creator of the world; so that by the doctrine that the world is without beginning, nothing more can be intended than that it was from all eternity in God, since it is assumed generally as a fundamental prin-

<sup>59</sup> W. Von Humboldt in several passages of the above-named treatise, has already called attention to this point. The division adduced, p. 19, is a very striking proof that the Sankhya is not delivered in this work without some admixture of very foreign ideas. Indeed not only the Yoga, but the Vedanta also is recommended by this poem. See the translation of, by Wilkins, p. 113; Schlegel (xv. 15), renders it by *doctrina theologica*.

<sup>60</sup> XIII. 26. Whatever truly arises whether solid or moveable, that becomes knowing by the union of matter, and what is cognizant of matter, O Baratas!—XIII. 33. As one sun emitting light irradiates the whole world, so, O Baratas! the cognizant of matter irradiates matter. According to Humboldt's version, *ib.* p. 20. cf. p. 27.

<sup>61</sup> XIII. 19.

ciple, that whatever exists must in its cause be eternal.<sup>62</sup> The action of God, therefore, in the creation, is nothing more than a suffering of things to go out of himself in order that they may come into being,<sup>63</sup> they all emanate from the bosom of God. In this description there is evidently room left for the idea of a difference of sex, or of active and passive causes, to suggest itself;<sup>64</sup> a view which is not unfrequent in theories of emanation, and at the same time the opinion is advanced that whatever is real in this world must be regarded as a part of God.<sup>65</sup> The contrariety between the principle and the emanated is expressed by the notions of simple and multiple.<sup>66</sup> And to this refers the distinction which is made between the supreme soul and the divided souls in the world. Between these two, however, a third member is inserted, viz. the undivided soul in the world which stands at the summit of perfection, by which we must understand the individual soul so soon as it has attained to a perception of its unity and identity with God, and thereby freed itself from the fetters of appearance.<sup>67</sup>

As then this doctrine differs from the Sankhya,

<sup>62</sup> II. 12. Never was there a time in which I was not, nor thou, nor these princes of the people; and never shall I not be; henceforth we all are.

<sup>63</sup> Humboldt, p. 23.

<sup>64</sup> Ib. p. 22; xiv. 3, 4. | *Christna* says: the great deity is my womb, in it I lay my fruit, and the origin of all things emanates therefrom alone, O *Baratas*; for where anybody springs out of a womb, O son of *Kunti*. The deity is the great womb; and I the seed-giving father.

<sup>65</sup> X. 41, 42.

<sup>66</sup> VIII. 3; xi. 37.

<sup>67</sup> XV. 16, sq. *Duo hi Genii in mundo exstant, tum dividiuus, tum individiuus; dividiuus est animantium universitas, individiuus in fastigio collocatus dicitur. Præter hos autem est alius Genius supremus, summi spiritus nomine designatus, qui mundo tergemino penetrato eum sustentat, incorruptibilis, princeps.*

by deriving phenomena from the supreme soul which is over and embraces all, and not from the individual soul in its union with nature, in whatever sense this union is to be understood, it must naturally follow a different road in order to arrive at the peace and emancipation of the soul. It is true that here also the cognition of principles is looked upon as essential to this emancipation;<sup>68</sup> but it is expressly admitted that by this term a very different science is meant from that enjoined by the Sankhya; it is not a knowledge of the soul merely as it is different from nature, but a knowledge of the one principle both of nature and of individual souls. Herein it adheres more closely than the Sankhya does to the religious doctrines of the Vedas, and accordingly faith even is reckoned by it among the means for attaining to the desired absorption in God.<sup>69</sup> By this absorption the Bhagavad-Ghita understood the union which the soul enters into with God; or rather, in which it passes over into the deity, in which state it is promised the enjoyment of supreme felicity and perfect repose,<sup>70</sup> which cannot be broken by the motion of the principles which continue to operate in nature. For these principles, as they emanate from God, are only present in us by the operation of God working conformably to his will, and it is therefore our duty to allow them to operate in us without apprehending from them any disturbance of our proper nature. God is in the offering, in the sacrifice, the fire of

<sup>68</sup> XIV. 11.<sup>69</sup> VI. 47; xii. 2.<sup>70</sup> IV. 10; vi. 15, sqq.; xviii. 53, sqq. "For recognizing me he passes without delay into me."



the altar; by God the sacrifice is perfected, and God is obtained by him who makes God the sole object of his labours.<sup>71</sup> The true moral duty of man therefore,—the true way to imperturbable repose, is to satisfy the duties of a man's station and religion, not from motives of passion, or any desire for, or looking to the consequences of his actions, but, without any regard to results, from implicit obedience to them as the commands of God, and as the proper end to which the principles which have emanated from God naturally tend. Thus man becomes free from the fetters of his actions, and even in acting, acts not. That which was from eternity in God becomes by this means alone apparent, and in all this man is but the instrument of the divine act.<sup>72</sup> He who holds himself perfectly indifferent to the circumstances with which he is in contact, who despises not the light of wisdom, nor attention to mundane things, nor the distraction of the attention when these things happen to him, nor desires them when they are absent, such a one has conquered the influence of circumstances, he is fitted to be absorbed in Brahm.<sup>73</sup>

#### THE NYAYA AND THE VAISESCHIKA.

No branch of Indian science has attracted the attention of Oriental scholars in a higher degree

<sup>71</sup> IV. 24. *Numen est in oblatione, numen in oleo sacro, numen in igne, numine litatur, ad numen iturus est ille, qui numen operando meditatur.* I have not omitted to compare here the version by Wilkins, p. 54.

<sup>72</sup> III. 8, sqq.; iv. v. xviii. 17; xi. 33, 34. "By me these are already stricken. Thou art but an instrument; whom I have stricken, do thou strike fearlessly."

<sup>73</sup> XIV. 22, sqq.; Wilkins's version, p. 110.

than the Nyaya.<sup>74</sup> A multitude of different modes of reasoning and refutation as taught by it have been enumerated with several precise terms of art, in such a manner, however, that it is impossible to form a correct estimate of their value, or to understand their relative bearing.<sup>75</sup> And from all the notices which we have received of this philosophy, nothing more can be inferred than that the philosophical science of the Hindoos has been developed with great subtlety and was gradually formed by a process of controversy in which, by manifold applications and refinements of its principle, it sought to maintain against all rivals its conclusive validity. As the translations and extracts which have hitherto been given to the world from the writings of the followers of the Nyaya furnish little better than a meagre enumeration of its parts and divisions, it is impossible to determine how far their investigations into the dialectical forms of scientific thought attained to precision and completeness. One point alone appears certain, and that is, that they can lay but slight claims to accuracy of exposition. This is proved clearly enough by the form of their syllogism, which is made to consist of five instead of three parts. Two of these are manifestly superfluous, while by the introduction of an example in the third the universality of the conclusion is vitiated.<sup>76</sup> Instances enough are to be met with in the

<sup>74</sup> Colebr. i. p. 94.

<sup>75</sup> Ib. p. 116, sqq. Windischmann, ib. p. 1904, gives us a translation of the first book of the Nyaya Sutra, and an extract from the second, but confesses that much has been only conjecturally given, as must be the case in the present imperfect state of our acquaintance with the Indian terminology.

<sup>76</sup> Colebr. i. p. 116, gives the following example to illustrate the technical phraseology of the Nyaya. 1. The hill is fiery. 2. Because it smokes.

philosophy of India, wherever descending to details it proceeds to give a proof of any particular matter. In its exposition the Nyaya is tedious, loose, and unmethodical. Indeed the whole form of this philosophy is a proof of the incapacity of its expositors to enter into the intrinsic development of ideas, whatever knowledge they may have possessed of the external laws of composition.<sup>77</sup>

As, then, we are unable to expose the method of formal logic as taught by the Nyaya, we must be content with the remark which it irresistibly suggests, that the human mind, under every variety of circumstances, employs the same way of developing its science, and that there is no necessity of ascribing this identity in either case to foreign communication. As Socrates and the Socraticists generally made the definition of the notion to be the only ground of true knowledge, so we find the Nyaya labouring to enforce the same principle. Every investigation of the latter commences with an examination of the word which is regarded as a revelation; it being an article of faith with the orthodox Hindoos that language is not a human invention, but a gift of divine revelation. Now the word must be so explained as to determine the

3. Whatever smokes is fiery, e. g. a kitchen hearth. 4. The hill also smokes. 5. Therefore it is fiery. Nyaya Sutra by Windischmann, 32, 38.

<sup>77</sup> According to Windischmann, the following is the division of the Nyaya Sutra; the first book contains a brief summary of the entire theory, and then the second treats of the difficulties of the proofs, the third treating of the probable, the object of knowledge, while the fourth is a continuation of the previous, and treats of the objects from which man is to emancipate himself and of emancipation itself, while lastly the fifth book examines the defective answer and refutation. This conclusion of the work is particularly deserving of attention. Windischmann also, p. 1910, concludes that the Hindoos possessed only the fundamental principles of the logic which the Greeks had cultivated.

essential character of the object, and this explanation is, in the next place, to be submitted to an examination as to its correctness and sufficiency, and the nature of the object itself.<sup>78</sup>

It appears that the necessary form of this explanation has given occasion to other investigations of the Nyaya, or at least of the Vaiseschika, which is immediately connected with it; for two of their so-called categories are occupied about the genus and the difference, as the two parts of a definition. Thus a controversy is opened with the Buddhists, who admitted of no existence but that of individuals, and declared all abstractions to be unreal and a delusion. By the Vaiseschika, on the other hand, generals are regarded as real. The generality of the genus is also distinguished by it from that of the species, and the several degrees of generality are traced from the lowest up to the highest. In this philosophy the highest genus is expressed by the idea of being, which is predicated of all things; while the lowest, on the contrary, is the unity of the individual object, which embraces every difference of modes and qualities.<sup>79</sup>

Now the proper end of this doctrine would seem to have been to investigate the differences of things, and to determine how many and what species of existence are correctly to be assumed. And such,

<sup>78</sup> Ib. p. 94. Windischm. ib. p. 1914, where it is said that, according to the Nyaya, the perfect notion is also possession and enjoyment of the object. This supposes a perfect union of thought and entity.

<sup>79</sup> Ib. p. 112. Windischmann, ib. p. 1905. Nyaya S. 6, p. 1910 (cf. Coleb. ib. p. 96), gives us the proof from resemblance on which the Nyaya thought it necessary to enter at length. I conjecture that it means the proof of the universal, for the resemblance is to be founded on similarity of properties.

in truth, is the actual tendency of its reasonings. Thus, in the first place, it is sought to show that the soul exists independent of and different from the body, on the ground that it possesses properties different from those of all other things. These peculiar properties of the soul are declared to be knowledge, desire, and aversion, pleasure and pain.<sup>80</sup> It is the object for whose sake and gratification body and the elements exist.<sup>81</sup> For the Nyaya and Vaiseschika agree with the rest of the orthodox philosophemes of India, in holding that body in itself is without sensation. The second object of investigation in these systems is the body, which is regarded as connected with the soul. This, they seek to prove, is the seat of activity and rest, of those labours which are undergone for the sake of whatever can furnish pleasure or gratification; it is, moreover, the seat of the sensuous organs, and of the perception of pleasure and pain.<sup>82</sup> We are not aware whether this last property was intended to furnish also the proof of its existence. At all events it is but very slightly hinted at; but at the same time it is evident that the idea which is the foundation of the attribution of this property to body, goes far to imply the necessity of some organization by and through which the soul may be qualified to work outwardly, and to perceive external objects. For the question here is not of the corporeal world absolutely, but merely of the body as an organ of the soul. We shall pass over the division of the several kinds of body which follow

<sup>80</sup> Ib. p. 97. Cf. Nyaya-Sutra, 10 b. Windischm. p. 1905.

<sup>81</sup> Ib. p. 97, 98.

<sup>82</sup> L. I.

hereupon, merely remarking that bodies are ascribed to plants. The proof of the existence of the organs of sense next follow. A proof of this kind was the more necessary to the philosophers of whom we are now speaking, the more their idea of sensuous organs differed from its common acceptation: for they taught that the organ of sight is not the eye, but the pencil of rays which proceed from it to the object; and the organ of hearing is not the ear but the ether (*acasa*), which, passing from the ear, comes in contact with the audible object. Now the existence of these organs is proved by that of perception; for perception, they argue, is an act, but every act implies an instrument by which it is performed. According to the *Vaiseschika*, the five outward senses are not, as the *Sankhya* assumes, modifications of the consciousness, but of a corporeal nature.<sup>83</sup> This doctrine gives rise to the necessity of their fourth proof, of which the object is to establish the existence of sensible objects.<sup>84</sup> Now to correspond with the five organs, a like number of objects—the five elements—are assumed; the fifth element, of which sound is the property, being allotted to the sense of hearing. It is here that we first of all enter properly into the domain of the purely corporeal. The corporeal, as it appears to the perception, is, by the followers of Kanada, i. e. the philosophers of the *Vaiseschika* school, considered as a compound—an intimate

<sup>83</sup> *Ib.* p. 99; Windischmann, *ib.* p. 1912.

<sup>84</sup> On the authority of a late commentator, Coleb. *ib.* p. 101, brings under this point the six categories of Kanada, the founder of the *Vaiseschika*. But this would lead to great confusion, and we therefore reject it.

compound of homogeneous parts alone; for it is a principle of this philosophy that heterogeneous parts cannot enter into an intimate composition.<sup>85</sup> Now in the same way that this philosophy sought to establish a highest and lowest genus in ideas, it similarly assumed an extreme limit, and the assumption of minute and indivisible corpuscles has been consequently imputed to the followers of Kanada. An extreme limit, they argued, must be ultimately arrived at, otherwise all investigation would be endless. If body be supposed to consist of infinite parts, then all must be infinite, and the greatest equal to the least.<sup>86</sup> All compounds exist by the union of corresponding parts, as for instance, cloth of threads; when, however, the separation of the parts ceases, we have an atom reduced to the ultimate limit of parvitude.<sup>87</sup> Hence it is inferred, that the world could not have arisen out of the living Brahm, for if it had, vitality must have been in all things.<sup>88</sup>

This Atomic theory of the Hindoos differs, however, in some essential points, from that of the Greeks. It attempts, in the first place, to determine the magnitude of the atoms by assuming, arbitrarily assuming, a definite law for the combination of the atoms. According to this law, the first and simplest combination consists of two parts; in the next place, these binary compounds enter into combinations three with three, and these again

<sup>85</sup> Ib. 98. Windischmann, *ib.* p. 1924, translates it: close relation.

<sup>86</sup> Colebr. l. l. p. 105. This Atomic doctrine is apparently adopted, but not expressly, by the Nyaya, *ib.* p. 1912.

<sup>87</sup> Windischmann, *ib.* p. 1924, after Sankara.

<sup>88</sup> Ib. p. 1921.

four by four form new compounds, and so forth, in an ascending series.<sup>89</sup> From this view the next step is to determine the magnitude of atoms, which is done upon the supposition that the smallest perceptible magnitude is that of the particles visible in the sun's rays, each of which is assumed to be a composition of the second class, consisting therefore of six atoms. The magnitude, consequently, of an atom, is the sixth part of a particle floating in the sunbeam. Now, although by all these suppositions the contingency in the combination of the atoms, which is admitted by the Grecian Atomists, is reduced to a certain law, it is nevertheless ultimately got rid of entirely by a hypothesis which forms another point of difference between the Grecian and Indian theories. And this is the assumption of a higher power which combines the atoms together. The intimate union of the atoms, which is the first condition of the formation of a body, must not be considered as a mere juxtaposition of atoms; on the contrary, those atoms alone can be intimately combined together which by their special properties have an affinity for each other. But, in the next place, in order that they may be actually combined together, some cause is requisite, whether this cause be a creative will, or however else it is to be explained.<sup>90</sup> Thus does the

<sup>89</sup> This view resembles, in some degree, the Pythagorean view of the composition of a line by the union of two points, and of a surface by that of three lines, &c. But it does not appear to have been carried out so mathematically.

<sup>90</sup> Colebr. i. p. 98. Concurrence of particles by an unseen or predestined cause and peculiar disposition of atoms. *Ib.* p. 105. Atoms concurring by an unseen peculiar virtue, the creative will of God, or time, or other competent cause.



Vaiseschika exhibit at once a tendency to the least in magnitude, and also to the necessity of uniting this again to a greater and a more general, and ultimately to the most general and the greatest. We cannot but regret, therefore, that the state of our information is inadequate for our pursuing with advantage these interesting matters.

So far a consistent method is perceptible in the proofs of the Nyaya or Vaiseschika philosophy. It is evidently founded on the view that the soul is the centre from which the universe must be comprehended; and the soul, therefore, is regarded, in comparison with corporeal nature, as a higher order of existence. Now the demonstrations of this philosophy proceed from the higher to the lower in an unbroken series, from the soul to the entire body as the organ of the soul, passing in the next place to the special organs of the senses, and ultimately descending to the inanimate objects of sensation—the elements, viz. and their most special constituents, which are also considered as the components of the living body.<sup>91</sup> In the succeeding arguments (which are given by Colebrooke still more briefly than the foregoing, and on the whole are treated in a very unsatisfactory manner), it is impossible to trace any similar principle of arrangement. Nevertheless we may observe, that here their arguments begin to remount to the soul again, and it would almost seem that their arrangement was implicitly based upon the idea of a series ascending from lowest to highest. This, however, is only advanced as conjecture.

<sup>91</sup> *Ib.* p. 98.

The first point here proved is the existence of mind, by which term we are to understand right and false notions, correct and false memory. Perhaps we ought also to understand under this term the consciousness of eternal existence.<sup>92</sup> For this is carefully distinguished from the internal consciousness, the self-consciousness, which is regarded as a sixth sense. By Kanada the mind is looked upon as an essence in itself, and is regarded as an atom. It is the organ of the sensation of pleasure and pain. By its connection with the outward senses it effects the cognition of the external world, and represents the unity which collects in itself the different sensations of the several senses. It is distinct from the soul and yet united with every single soul, and for every individual soul is supposed to possess an individual consciousness of this kind. Its existence as a unity is proved by the fact, that the same soul is never at the same time conscious of several independent sensations. When, indeed, several sensations follow in rapid succession, an appearance of their contemporaneous existence arises in the soul, while in fact they are successive; and the mental delusion may be compared to the ocular illusion, similar to the manner in which a burning brand rapidly revolved appears as a circle of fire.<sup>93</sup> Now the consciousness of pleasure and pain impels man to activity, and this forms the next subject of investigation. For, it argues, the object of all activity is to secure pleasure and to avoid pain.<sup>94</sup> In the act, however, mistakes arise, by which term

<sup>92</sup> Nyaya S. 15. b. Windischmann, *ib.* p. 1905.

<sup>93</sup> Colebr. p. 99, 100, 104, 113.

<sup>94</sup> *Ib.* p. 110, 113.

every species of error and passion are designated. Hence the soul becomes fettered to the body, and of this the metempsychosis is the consequence; since every soul which has committed any sin or fault is, after death, united again to a body. And herein consists the retribution both of good and evil. Nevertheless, according to this philosophy, the very pleasure which is the reward of good deeds is itself but sorrow. For it is presumption in man to suppose that his pleasure can ever be exempt from instability, which during the migrations—the unrest of the soul—is inseparable from all that either belongs or accrues to it. Human pleasure may aptly be compared to honey mixed with poison.

The last subject of these dissertations is the total emancipation of the soul from evil. Now under this term, evil, was comprised whatever is foreign to the soul, and happens to it in consequence of its union with a body. The body is evil; the senses and their objects, the elements without exception, the consciousness of external objects, of self even, of actions, and of pain and pleasure, are all equally evil. From all these kinds of evil the soul must free itself in order to arrive at a pure knowledge of itself, and realize its proper essence by means of the holy science.<sup>95</sup> In this way does the Nyaya promise the attainment of what the Indians regard as the highest end of human pursuit—the supreme felicity which consists in the perfect rest of the soul.

We cannot take our leave of this system of Indian philosophy, which evidently possesses a

<sup>95</sup> *Ib.* p. 114; Windischm. *ib.* p. 1912, note.

scientific character, without noticing a few points on which our information is singularly defective. Of one point in particular, the existing notice is undeniably imperfect. Colebrooke informs us, that by the soul, in reference to which the whole dissertation is conducted, must be understood the living soul of the individual, and which animates the body. On this account it is expressly said, that there are many souls. From these, however, the supreme soul is distinct, which is the seat of eternal science, which is without passivity, and is indicated as the creator of all things, in the same way as we have already seen the creative will declared to be the power by which the atoms are combined together.<sup>96</sup> But neither the argument by which a creator is inferred from the creation, nor the relation in which the creator is supposed to stand to other things, and to the soul, either in its enslaved state or in its emancipation, are further followed out. The vague expression, Creator of all things, is not satisfactory. Equally inadequate is what is said of the doctrine of the Nyaya, that it promises to its followers, by the knowledge it furnishes, entire and supreme felicity. We are told undoubtedly, that the soul is freed from all evil by becoming cognizant of the fact, that evil attaches itself to every object, and by thereby divesting itself of all passion ; by reflecting on itself, and in the maturity of self-knowledge, realizing its own essentiality, and being thereby warned against uniting itself again with external objects, and contracting from the union with them either merit or demerit, joy

<sup>96</sup> Colebr. 1. 1.97, 110

or suffering.<sup>97</sup> Nevertheless, we are not furnished with any satisfactory information as to the means by which the soul is enabled to set itself free from this dreaded contact with external objects. It almost seems that for these means the Nyaya was reduced to the necessity of adopting the view of the Sankhya or the Yoga; of maintaining, viz. that the external fortune of our soul is an extrinsical matter, and therefore ought not to trouble us. By such a conviction, a perfect calm of mind is ensured to man as soon as he shall have arrived to a right insight into his own nature. However, it is difficult to see how this view can be reconciled with the principle of the Nyaya, that the soul is an atom. For consistently with the principles of this Atomical theory it would follow, that by means of external causes, the soul can be brought into an intimate connection with other atoms, but as to the way in which this is to be dissolved by science, not the slightest allusion to this point is to be found in any of the authentic sources of this philosophy. Another point on which we are wholly without information in respect to the Nyaya or Vaiseschika philosophy is, whether it promised or not a contemplation of and union with God.

#### THE VEDANTA PHILOSOPHY.

This school comprises a variety of doctrines, of which, in the present state of our information, it is impossible to give a correct classification. According to Colebrooke, the adherents of this school may

<sup>97</sup> Windischm. *ib.* p. 1913, note.

be divided into the earlier and the later, but as to the difference between their respective opinions, he refers us to a yet unpublished treatise for a correct and satisfactory statement.<sup>98</sup> Even if we are to suppose that the relation which subsisted between the two resembles that between the earlier and the later Stoics, or that between Plato and the New Platonists, it would be extremely difficult to draw from notices so inaccurate and promiscuous as those which we possess, any conclusion as to the true import and original design of their doctrines. Of one branch of the Vedanta, we are told indeed that it insists on every occasion upon the extreme efficacy of faith, which however, is never mentioned by a second, and occasionally only by a third. Again, it is a question, whether the view that the phenomenal and changeable world is merely an illusion—the creature of the imagination, and that the phenomenal objects have no reality, belongs or not to the older and genuine Vedanta, notwithstanding that in some of the works which are otherwise ascribed to this school, it forms a leading and pervading doctrine.<sup>99</sup> Such differences of opinion sufficiently prove, how decidedly important it must be to the right understanding of this philosophy, that we should be able to trace the distinctive doctrines of its several branches.

<sup>98</sup> Colebr. l. i. ii. 2, 8.

<sup>99</sup> Ib. ii. 38, 39. The last point Kennedy has, it would seem, correctly disputed, *ib.* iii. 416, sqq. The question mooted by Kennedy, which trenches also upon others, has not been carried out in the English journals. The later doctrine of the Vedanta was embraced by Sadananda, whose *Vedanta-Sara* has been published, translated, and commented by Frank (München, 1835); by Sadanada, faith in the teacher is recommended as a means of emancipation, p. 4, &c.

The Vedanta claims the distinction of being the orthodox doctrine of the Brahmanic religion, and in support of this claim, it may justly appeal to the fact, that it generally adduces the authority of the Vedas in support of its dogmas, and directly acknowledges a number of the Upanishads as its principal source.<sup>100</sup> Nevertheless, as we formerly remarked when we were speaking of the first Mīmāṃsā, the exposition of the sacred writings by this philosophy is extremely free, and we have no reason to suppose, that a different method was adopted with its exposition of the second Mīmāṃsā.<sup>101</sup>

Now to the influence which the use of this authority exercised on the Vedanta, we are disposed to ascribe the many sensuous representations in which the idea of the divine nature is conveyed. Thus the divinity is at one time called the ether, or air, out of which all things issue, and into which they all return; and at another, the light which shines everywhere, in heaven and the universe, and even in the human individual.<sup>102</sup> These are expressions which do not belong so much to a philosophical doctrine as to an exposition of religious sentiments, which is intended to be level to the general capacity, and appeals to the senses and imagination.

Nevertheless, however great may be the respect which the followers of the Vedanta may have felt for the Vedas, still they did not, at least some of them,

<sup>100</sup> Colebr. l. i. ii. 2. The whole spirit of the four parts of the Veda were reduced by the followers of the Vedanta into four sentences, and they are given by Kennedy, *ib.* p. 418. Cf. Fr. Windischmann: *Sancara sive de theologumenis Vedanticorum* (Bonnæ, 1833), p. 90.

<sup>101</sup> Cf. Colebr. l. i. 17, 18, etc.

<sup>102</sup> *Ib.* p. 11.

make the knowledge of them and their interpretation to be equivalent to the supreme science. For, dividing science into two kinds, a higher and a lower, they understood by the latter the knowledge of the Vedas, and of such other sciences as grammar, &c., which are regarded as an appendix to the Vedas; while the higher science, on the contrary, is declared to be the science of God, and this it is the design of the Vedanta to furnish.<sup>103</sup> Even religious practices and pious meditation are of secondary importance in the estimate of the Vedanta, and they are merely of value so far as they prepare the soul for the reception of the divine science.<sup>104</sup> Acts of piety are merely temporal, and therefore produce only temporary fruits; they may raise a man to the heaven of Indra, but cannot exalt him to eternal felicity.<sup>105</sup> For the Vedanta agrees in this respect with all the other systems of Hindoo philosophy, that it places the highest good in the science which it professes. Yet it candidly allows that this science can only be attained by the gods and the highest caste of men;<sup>106</sup> in this respect it forms an exact counterpart to the vanity of the Greeks, in arrogating to themselves exclusively a liberal and scientific turn of mind, and condemning all foreigners or barbarians to slavery and ignorance.

To judge from the accounts of this philosophy,

<sup>103</sup> *Ib.* p. 13; Windischm. *Sanc.* p. 97.

<sup>104</sup> *Colebr.* l. l. 27, 28, 29, 33, 38.

<sup>105</sup> Windischm. *Sanc.* p. 98, sq.

<sup>106</sup> *Colebr.* l. l. 18. It is only natural, that on this point a great diversity of doctrine should prevail. According to Wilson (*Asiat. Res.* xvii. 185), the old doctrine was, that the Yoga is unattainable in the present age of the world; but that the doctrine was disregarded.



which have hitherto reached Europe, it is far inferior in scientific value, to the Sankhya, and also probably to all the other sects. Most of the scientific grounds which it brings forward, have a polemical bearing against the other schools, from whom however, on the other hand, it does not scruple to adopt whatever doctrines were suitable to the Eclectic purposes which it pursued. We are disposed, therefore, to agree with Colebrooke in the opinion, that the Vedanta philosophy owed its origin and present character to an attempt to defend the theological system of the Vedas<sup>107</sup> against all attacks and objections.

Adopting then this view, we shall now proceed to develop its leading principles, first of all pointing out some of the principal points of its controversy with conflicting systems. The doctrines to which the Vedanta is most decidedly opposed, are those which deny all existence but what is sensible and corporeal. It combats the assumption of the Tscharvaka, that there is only one source of knowledge—perception, which is effected by the impression on the senses of some object present to them. The followers of the Vedanta allow, it is true, that reasoning must in all cases, be referred to a sensuous perception, but in common with other sects of Indian philosophy, they admit in addition to perception and reasoning, of a third source of knowledge; viz. revelation or tradition, which they derive from the remembrance of an earlier existence. This reminiscence may be attained by the saint,

<sup>107</sup> Cf. Sankara's Commentary on the Brahma-Sutra's in Windischmann: die Philos. im Fortgang der Weltgeschichte, p. 1847.

who then communicates his wisdom in words, which have a sacred authority with other men. Revelations of this kind are contained in the Vedas which are eternal, even as language itself is immortal and not of human invention, but of an immortal nature.<sup>108</sup> It is at once conceivable, that it would be to such a reminiscence—to such an original connection of the holy sage with the supernatural principle of all things—that the Vedanta would refer its knowledge of the supra-sensible; and in this respect we may compare it with the *anamnesis* of Plato. In this doctrine, however, it is assumed, that the principle of all things is not corporally or sensuously perceptible. The opposite assumption the Vedanta attempts to refute, on the ground that matter is by its nature inert, that it possesses not the power either of originating motion, or spontaneously effecting any change in itself.<sup>109</sup> If therefore it is argued, the reality of a change in the system of things be assumed, then it must be granted that an incorporeal power exists which may produce a change in brute matter, and become thereby the ground of generation and corruption. Now against the Atomical theory, which, as it was expounded by the D'Schinists and Buddhists, attempted to escape from this conclusion, it is objected that the atoms must by their nature be either active or inactive; but if the former, then would the activity which constitutes the essence of the changeable world be

<sup>108</sup> Colebr. l. l. 29, 445; ii. 18; Windischm. Sanc. p. 105, sqq. Frank l. l. 65.

<sup>109</sup> Ib. i. 572. Brute matter stirs not without impulse. . . . Conversions are not spontaneous.

eternal; while, on the latter supposition, the atoms could never enter into combination, and the non-existence of the world would never cease. Consequently atoms could not be the causes of the combinations and dissolutions of the world. A mere aggregation of atoms does not constitute a world; if, therefore, a world is to be formed out of them, there must be a cause existing to effect an internal relation and union between them.<sup>110</sup> Consequently, the existence of a spirit, different in its nature from body, necessarily follows. Now in this system of philosophy, body is simply something which does not exist for itself, but for something else; whereas the soul has its own existence in itself, or in other words, enjoys an absolute entity. As to the properties of body, they are perceived by some other independent entity, for the sake of which they exist; they cannot be percipient of themselves—the elements cannot feel or be sentient of themselves; the organical body is merely the organ of perception—it has no capacity to perceive itself. But on the other hand, whatever belongs to the soul, e. g. thought or memory, has a perception of itself. Thus the perceived object must be distinguished from perception. On this account the soul is not to be understood as simply the form or shape of the body; for after death the form of the body still continues for a while, notwithstanding that it has

<sup>110</sup> *Ib.* i. 556, 557. I have naturally brought forward only the most essential and true bearings of the controversy. This controversy is directed against the *Vaiseschika* likewise, without, however, entering into its peculiar view, and I therefore have neglected this part of it in the text.

lost all feeling and consciousness.<sup>111</sup> All these arguments apparently remount to the opinion which was widely diffused among the Hindoos, that besides the object enjoyed, there must also be a subject that enjoys. In the next place, we have to notice the arguments by which the Vedanta sought to contravene another view of the Buddhists, which was a close consequence of the Atomical theory which they advocated. For it was, at least, the tendency of these doctrines to throw doubt on the unity of personal consciousness, since by the same principle, that all body is resolved into spacially extended indivisibles, time itself also may be reduced into temporal atoms. In opposition therefore to these sectaries, the Vedanta maintained, that the soul has something more than a merely momentary existence, on the ground that it is endowed with memory and recollection, by means of which it knows of itself that it is the same soul which to-day remembers having seen a particular object, and yesterday saw it.<sup>112</sup>

<sup>111</sup> Ib. i. 569. This too is implied in the division with which the Sankhara sets out according to the version of Windischmann, Sloka 1. *Forma visibilis est, oculus videns et visibilis ; mens vero videns, visibiles ejus affectiones, testis (d. h. Gott) videns est, et non conspicitur.* Form, that is, is corporeal, and therefore on the other hand, form is denied to belong to God. Ib. Sl. 20 ; cf. Sl. 14, where Brahma's existence is distinguished from Brahma himself. And yet an intelligible form of deity seems to be recognized. Windischm. Sane. p. 124, sq. ; Frank Sadananda p. 5 ; Colebr. l. l. ii. 26. In the division it is omitted to be stated, that the visible form is not at the same time seeing also, which forms the difference of the first and the second members. This division into members has reference to the division of the Sankhya, which we previously adduced, but it is much less precise in form, since the third member is not essentially distinct from the fourth, and there is wanting another member, that viz. which neither sees nor is seen.

<sup>112</sup> Colebr. l. l. i. 563.

But the Vedanta is opposed not to materialism only, but also to that species of idealism which denies the reality and truth of the external objects of sensation. For, it argues, the real existence of these objects is proved by perception, since of an object that has been actually perceived, it is impossible to suppose that it does not really exist. These external objects are not a dream and a cheat, for we can draw a strong distinction between a dream and a reality; and when we awake we are conscious of the illusory nature of the dreams which we remember.<sup>113</sup>

In this way does the Vedanta incline to the view which maintains the contrariety of body and soul.<sup>114</sup> But on the other hand, it was equally adverse to the explanation which was given by the Sankhya, of the opposition between soul and nature. As we have already seen, this sect found it impossible to admit, that nature possesses a formative energy; and even granting this, it still held, that by reason of its blindness it is incapable of accomplishing anything like a plan or design. Nevertheless, the system of the world, whose origin is to be accounted for, displays evident and irresistible proofs of its having been formed by a wise and designing Providence. But, according to the Sankhya there is no power which can direct the active formation of matter; for with them, soul or spirit is as it were a stranger in the world. Yet, wherever any effect is accomplished, there must be either design or else connection between the efficient objects. But

<sup>113</sup> *Ib.* i. 564.

<sup>114</sup> See the above division.

the Sankhya does not recognize either of these ;<sup>115</sup> for the contrariety between the subject which enjoys, and the object which is enjoyed, which is the foundation of this whole theory, does not imply any difference of substance between the two.<sup>116</sup>

Now the Pasupata, which is the doctrine of certain Sivaites, assumes that the supreme God—the first cause of the world—rules both matter and the embodied soul. But against such a view, the Vedanta objects that thereby God is made liable to a charge both of passion and of injustice, on account of the unequal distribution of good and evil in the world. And this objection cannot be adequately met by simply saying, that it is the actions of the soul which produce good and evil. For ultimately God must be the prime mover of these actions also. Neither will the difficulty be got rid of by the supposition of an infinite series of acts. Moreover, matter cannot be ruled or worked without organs. But if the supreme God possesses organs, he must have a human form also, and, losing his divine character, be liable both to pleasure and to pain like any other finite being. Further, they insisted on the omniscience and omnipotence of God, with the supposition of the infinity of matter, and of an embodied soul.<sup>117</sup>

It is obvious, that this opposition of the Vedanta to all the other systems of India, would naturally furnish it with the ground of a peculiar view; nevertheless we should ascribe far too high an im-

<sup>115</sup> Colebr, l. i. p. 572, 573 ; Sankhara by Windischm. ib. p. 1847, &c.

<sup>116</sup> Ib. ii. 20.

<sup>117</sup> Ib. i. 573.

portance to its controversial relations, if we were to ascribe to them the origin of the Vedanta. Indeed the Vedanta scarcely appears to have avoided a single one of the very difficulties which it reproaches the other systems with lying under. Moreover, in the notices which have been given us of this philosophy, numerous inconsistencies are discoverable, which, however, may perhaps have originated in a confusion of different doctrines. But even out of these apparent inconsistencies, it is easy to evolve the general view which in all probability served as the basis of the Vedanta.

If the Vedanta denied a difference between the material principle and the soul, it was under a conviction of the necessity of assuming a single principle for all things in the universe which should combine together, both the material and efficient cause.<sup>118</sup> By contending against the Pasupata, that God does not rule over the world, the body, and the soul, it intended to establish the position that he is in all, rather than over all things. This indeed is the leading idea of the Sankhya, that God, the supreme soul, pure sense, pure reason, and pure thought, omniscient and omnipotent, is, notwithstanding his unchangeable nature, the sole source of, and per-

<sup>118</sup> The chief object of Kennedy in the treatise already quoted, *Transact. of the R. Asiatic Soc.* iii. 412, sqq. is to controvert the assertion of Colebrooke, that according to the Vedanta, God is not only the efficient, but also the material cause of the world. Indeed Kennedy goes so far, as to insist that the Indian philosophy does not recognize the idea of matter, and absolutely denies its existence, p. 420. But it is clear, the controversy is but a dispute about words. For the assertion, God is the material cause also, is not to be interpreted to mean that he is a body. He is conceived solely as an intellectual being, which, by his own energy and proper nature or substance, suffers the world to come into existence.

vades all things. God is all ; and herein alone different from the individual, in that he is the whole. Consequently he is both that which is changed, and that which changes. For their supposition, however, of such a God, no further arguments are adduced by the followers of the Vedanta. That God exists, cannot, they argue, be proved ; as indeed it stands not in need of proof, for whoever hears his name knows that he exists.<sup>119</sup> He is manifest to every one, for every individual bears with him his self—his spirit ; from this he knows that he himself exists, and consequently also that God exists ; for this soul or spirit is God.<sup>120</sup> But, in truth, there are but few who recognize this identity of mind with God, and the knowledge of his existence is not a knowledge of his nature ; and accordingly the Vedanta teaches that God is thus known only to a chosen few, to whom he reveals himself :—a doctrine which need not surprise us if we consider that they alone are capable of recognizing mind to whom it reveals itself both in them and in itself. If the opponents of this theory objected that cause and effect must of necessity be different things, the Vedanta adduced a number of instances to the contrary, drawn for the most part from the developments of life. Hair and the nails, they urged, grow out of the same living frame, and inanimate matter is transformed into living worms.<sup>121</sup> As milk is changed into curd, and water into ice, so Brahma transmutes himself manifoldly without any external means or instruments. In the same

<sup>119</sup> Windischm. *Sanc.* p. 127.

<sup>120</sup> *Ib.* p. 94.

<sup>121</sup> *Ib.* p. 114, sq.



way that the spider spins its web from out of its body, and draws it in again, so Brahma creates the world and again absorbs it into himself.<sup>122</sup> These assertions are obviously all founded on the view that one and the same living and self-conscious essence produces all the changes of the world, and yet remains the same during all the mutations of its properties. On this ground the Vedanta refuses to acknowledge a difference between the enjoyed and the enjoying substance ; and, further, attempts to elude the objection of its adversaries, that an opposite cannot be produced from its opposite, by demonstrating that they themselves contradicted their own hypothesis, by making the sensible to proceed out of the insensible, and the little from the great.<sup>123</sup>

It will at once occur to the reader, that the strongest argument on which the Vedanta could have rested, must have been the view which pervades the whole philosophy of India, that the multiplicity of phenomena does not destroy the unity of the essence. Thus it was held, that as the essence of the soul may remain intact, notwithstanding that the most diversified phenomena are mirrored upon it, so the supreme mind or spirit is not altered in its essence by the change of the mundane objects which arise out of itself. In this view the identity of the essence is so firmly maintained as to exclude every possible change that can happen to or in it. Accordingly it is said of God, that although he can transmute himself into all,

<sup>122</sup> Colebr. I. I. 13, 20, 21, 26.

<sup>123</sup> Ib. 20. Sankhara by Windischmann, ib. 1921, &c.

and create all things out of himself, he is nevertheless without shape or form, not affected by the states of the universe, without passion or change, and similar to the clear crystal, which apparently receives into itself different colours, but in reality is equally transparent at all times ; or to the light of the sun or the moon, which, although it is invariable in itself, nevertheless appears different according as it shines upon different objects. The mind or spirit may be compared to pure space, wherein all exists and goes through change after change, but which is not itself changed thereby. In these there is no difference between the percipient, the perceived, and the perception ; it is without multiplicity, and he who believes it to be multiple, dies death upon death.<sup>124</sup>

With this view it is very easy to reconcile what Colebrooke considers a disagreement of doctrine between the earlier and the later followers of the Vedanta, in that the latter taught that whatever happens in the world is merely an appearance, being the illusion of Maja. They may have regarded all this as phenomenal, and even as the act and deed of God, and yet by such expressions have merely meant to signify that the multiplicity and changes of all phenomena, or deeds of God, neither contribute aught to God himself, nor express to others the truth of his entity. For this world is merely God's play.<sup>125</sup> All the knowledge that each single phenomenon conveys is, that God exists,

<sup>124</sup> Colebr. L. I. p. 20, 23, 26 ; Shankara Acharya : *The Knowledge of Spirit*, (translated by Taylor, London 1812. 8) 8, 39, 41.

<sup>125</sup> Windischm. Sanc. p. 142.

without revealing the nature of what he is.<sup>126</sup> In this respect all things are alike; all exist so far as they bear in them the truth of Brahm, and have a part in him; but yet it may be said of each that it really does not exist, since it is neither his essence nor even an expression of it. Hence the famous apophthegms: Thou art he; This my mind is Brahm; I am he. Hence, too, the ether, the sight, and the eye, are occasionally called Brahm. He is both great and little; and yet, on the other hand, all the contrarieties which the world presents are denied of Brahm; he is neither long nor short, neither coarse nor fine, neither so nor so. He enters into all forms, he pervades all without having either a form, or being anywhere.<sup>127</sup> And it is also on this ground, probably, that they taught that it is not the entire Brahm that is transmuted into mundane phenomena.<sup>128</sup>

Now it must be obvious at once that such a doctrine possessed great facility, for representing, on the one hand, the divine essence under the most sensuous conceptions, and yet teaching, on the other, that he is conceivable without any sensuous representations. Now among the sensuous conceptions under which the Vedanta apprehended the creative activity of God, was the hypothesis which,

<sup>126</sup> On this point the Vedanta expresses itself still more abstractly, when it refuses to concede to deity an existence before the creation. Windischm. Sanc. p. 130. Quare quia vox *esse* plerumque res nomine et forma mutatas significat, respectu absentis ejus mutationis ante originem mundi ens Brahma quasi non ens fuit. Ib. p. 137. Ens quidem, O bone, hoc in initio fuit, unum sine secundo, nonnulli vero ajunt: non ens quidem hoc initio fuit, unum sine secundo; ex eo non ente ens nascitur.

<sup>127</sup> Colebr. ii. p. 11, sqq.; p. 15, 26, 27. Shank. Achar. Knowl. of the Spir. 29, not.

<sup>128</sup> Colebr. ii. p. 20.

so far as we know, was most arbitrarily assumed, that the fourth part only of God had entered into the world, while the other three remain unchangeably in heaven.<sup>129</sup> The creation, or in other words, the emanation of the world out of God, was explained by those who embraced this hypothesis, as an act of his almighty will, by which, however, no particular end was designed.<sup>130</sup> It had been thus from eternity, and these emanations proceed for ever through an infinite series of worlds.<sup>131</sup> The one which was without a second, desired to become multiple and to produce; then it brought forth light, which again desired to multiply and produce; and so water was produced, out of which, by a similar desire, the five elements and the whole world arose.<sup>132</sup> From these higher grades of existence, lower again proceed. Thus from ether, which is an immediate emanation from God, air proceeded; and out of air, again, fire; and water out of fire; and out of water, earth. In the same order the five elements return again into each other, and are ultimately absorbed in Brahm. Whatever besides these elements belongs to the world, as emanated from God, is simply a combination of them. Such are the several envelopments of the soul, which possess various degrees of fineness, each finer one being inclosed within a coarser. Of these, the finest is the understanding, which is surrounded, in the next place, by the inner sense,

<sup>129</sup> Ib. 23; Windischm. Sanc. p. 145, sq.

<sup>130</sup> Colebr. l. 1, p. 20, 21.

<sup>131</sup> Ib. p. 21, 22.

<sup>132</sup> Windischm. Sanc. p. 138. The series of emanations does not appear to be given correctly in this passage.

which again is inclosed by the organs of the body.<sup>133</sup>

The soul itself is not, however, an emanation or transformation of Brahm, but a portion of him. Its relation to the supreme Governor of all things is not that of a servant to his master, nor of the subject to the sovereign, but that of a part to the whole. It is a spark of flaming fire, uncreated and infinite, like Brahm himself. Birth and death concern it not; for these belong only to the union of the soul with the corporeal investitures which encompass it, and in which it dwells for a while. In this habitation, this union with the body, the soul suffers pain, falls into darkness, and is in the power of circumstances either for good or for evil. It is passive, yet not, as the Sankhya teaches, absolutely so, for it is a part of the creative energy which fashions all things. But being thus united with body, it dies death after death, and migrates from body to body. This migration constitutes the unrest, the disease of the soul. When one body dies, the soul, invested with a subtle shape, wanders invisible, and ascends to the moon, in order to receive there the reward or punishment it deserves. Thereupon it returns, by means of the elements, into a plant, and from thence into an animal; and in this way passes through a series of transformations, never attaining unto rest until, by employing the means prescribed by the Vedanta, it is emancipated from the laws of the metempsychosis.<sup>134</sup>

Before we proceed to declare what these means

<sup>133</sup> Colebr. l. 1, p. 21, 22, 35; Windischm. Sanc. p. 138.

<sup>134</sup> Colebr. l. 1. p. 22, 23, 25, cf. Windischm. Sanc. p. 174, sq.

are, it will be necessary to examine a few intermediate questions. For if the migration to which the soul is subject, in consequence of its union with the body, be a state of torment and pain; if, too, the different lots, to which destiny exposes the soul, vary in their respective degrees of pleasure and pain, and nevertheless depend upon the supreme Being, the question naturally occurs, why then has God exposed the soul to such a difference of destiny, and in general to the metempsychosis? On the former question the Vedanta observes, that God's mercy must not be doubted, because happiness is not universal in this world, since, in truth, the lot which every soul receives in the renewed world is dependent on its vice or virtue in a previous existence. This answer, however, is insufficient to meet the question generally, and accordingly in the disputes with the Pasupata it is rejected as inadequate, since the earlier existence of the soul must have also ended in suffering and unrest. Consequently the first question resolves itself into the second. And even this the Vedanta appears to evade rather than to meet satisfactorily, by carrying us up to infinity. The series of worlds, it says, is even infinite as the emanating energy of God is infinite; consequently, the deserts and punishments of the souls are also infinite.<sup>135</sup> But the true meaning of this answer is doubtless something beyond what it literally expresses; and accordingly, if we only interpret it by the general tendency of the Vedanta, it will appear well fitted to satisfy all doubts of God's justice and mercy. The migration

<sup>135</sup> Colebr. l. 1, p. 21, 22, 35, 39; Windischm. Sanc. p. 158.

of the soul, as understood by the Vedanta, is nothing else than the migrations of God himself, to which he subjects himself as well as the soul, these wanderings being something wholly unessential, or mere illusions which affect the essence of the soul no more than that of God. For the Vedanta expressly teaches that the action and passion of the soul do not concern its essence, that they come and go without the soul's being in truth modified or changed by them. When the soul invests itself with organs it becomes active, and when it puts them off it enters upon repose; passion may appear to be real, but it is not so in the least. In proof of this view the Vedanta adduces the fact, that the soul in deep sleep, and without dreams, is neither active nor passive, then it enjoys perfect repose, then it returns to its true and undisturbed nature, then it is a perfect Brahm.<sup>136</sup> Moreover it must be remembered, that the actions which are ascribed to the soul, and which constitute its merit or demerit, are not really its own works, but simply those of God within it, or rather within its envelopment. When man ascribes intelligence to the soul, then, in ignorance that these are really distinct in their natures, he commences to say, I am, I know, I do; whereas, in truth, a man ought to say, it is Brahma that does everything in me; I am without will or action; I experience neither birth and growth, nor decline and death; for I am not the internal sense; I feel neither pleasure nor pain; and I am instructed by the holy Vedas that I am a clear transparent essence. The freedom of the will, as Colebrooke remarks, is

<sup>136</sup> Colebr. l. 1, p. 21, 22, 25, 37; Shukl. Ach. 7, 22.

in fact overthrown by this philosophy, which subjects every individual soul to the universal; it is God that effects everything in individual substances without, however, effecting in them anything essential.<sup>137</sup>

But this doctrine, notwithstanding that it thus rejects the activity and every occupation of the soul, nevertheless strongly insists upon their necessity. It even regards them as the means of attaining to repose. This view is perfectly consistent with the way in which the Vedanta, on the one hand, regards the things of this world as altogether evanescent, and yet, on the other, maintains their reality and truth, on the ground, viz. that the entity of the supreme essence must be conceived to be in them. On this point, indeed, the Vedanta approximates very closely to the first Mimansa. For the occupations which it recommends to its followers are such religious practices as the Vedas prescribe, the religious duties which are enjoined on the different castes.<sup>138</sup> But these means, however, are regarded as nothing more than preparatory, as a means to a means, or as a means which possesses only a limited effect. The same is the case with the other means which the Yoga recommends.<sup>139</sup> For instance, certain grades of emancipation are assumed, which this school of philosophical theology appear to have made the subjects of very fanciful representations. Of these grades one is described as the possession of superhuman energies, a magic

<sup>137</sup> Colebr. ii. p. 35, 39; Shank. Ach. 24, 31, 32, 34.

<sup>138</sup> Colebr. ii. p. 27.

<sup>139</sup> Frank Sadananda, p. 39, sq.



power.<sup>140</sup> We also meet with the idea, that he who worships Brahm under a particular form, but not as the supreme God, receives his special reward from that which he worships. The soul is represented under a very sensuous form, as gradually raising itself from the region of earth to the higher spheres, under the guidance of the divine powers who rule over those spheres.<sup>141</sup> In these an imperfect union of a Yogi with the Deity is supposed to take place, consisting in an emancipation from the metempsychosis in the present Calpa—or present existence of the world, although it still continues doomed to fresh migrations in other Calpas.<sup>142</sup> In this imperfect union, accordingly, the soul continues to be invested with a fine form of body.<sup>143</sup> In short, as is readily conceivable in matters of this nature, where the fancy is free to indulge itself in a variety of images, the greatest diversity of ideas will be found to prevail on this subject.<sup>144</sup>

However, the means which are furnished by occupations agreeable to duty, and among these is to be reckoned the duty of reflecting long and deeply in a sitting posture, is merely a means to a means; and is designed to lead the soul to science, to prepare it for the reception of godlike knowledge.<sup>145</sup> This is the only means by which perfect emancipation, perfect bliss, can be obtained. Besides it no other exists; it is the only instrument by which the

<sup>140</sup> Colebr. l. 1, p. 33, 38.

<sup>141</sup> Ib. p. 25, 31, 32, 38.

<sup>142</sup> Ib. p. 34.

<sup>143</sup> Ib. p. 30, 33.

<sup>144</sup> The extracts which Colebrooke gives contain many discrepant doctrines on these points; moreover, they do not sufficiently indicate the distinction of the several systems from which they are taken.

<sup>145</sup> Ib. p. 27, 28.

bonds of passion can be loosed, and without it happiness is unattainable.<sup>146</sup> The migrations of the soul or mind are represented (at least by the later Vedanta) as the consequences of error. Now the power of error is twofold—it deceives and conceals. It is an error of deception when a man regards as truth the multiplicity of phenomena; of concealment, when he is led away from God, and hindered from seeing in him the sole verity.<sup>147</sup> Now the way to overcome both kinds of error is to distinguish between God and the created world—between abiding and unabiding substance. By this distinction we learn, that change and fluctuation are in the world alone, but not in God.<sup>148</sup> Of the latter our soul is a part, and by it we are made superior to change. And hereby we are, in the next place, exalted above the low desire of obtaining the fruits of our activity in this world and the next, which are at best but transitory, and so are enabled to acquire self-control and peace of mind; whereupon a longing for freedom arises, by means of which the soul ultimately raises itself to union with God—to the conviction that it is one with Brahm.<sup>149</sup> This is the true science which is described as immediate cognition, the seeing of Brahm, which involves a discernment that he is identical with his emanations, and with whatever has a part in his essence.<sup>150</sup> Brahm cannot be known by per-

<sup>146</sup> *Ib.* p. 33, 38; Shank. Achar. 2.

<sup>147</sup> Windischm. Sanc. Sl. 13; Frank Sadan. p. 10.

<sup>148</sup> Windischm. Sanc. Sl. 19; Frank Sadan. p. 3. *sq.* Besides this, the Vedanta admits another distinction of mundane things, which, however, is only regarded as a subordinate means, and which vanishes upon the acquisition of true knowledge.

<sup>149</sup> Frank l. 1, p. 4, *sq.*

<sup>150</sup> Colebr. ii. p. 38.

ception ; he can only be contemplated in mind. The soul must turn into itself, and get rid of its ignorance of its own nature, in order that the mind may shine forth in all its splendour in undivided essence. Then it recognizes itself as the spotless Brahm, for it is now united with God. And there-upon even science itself shall vanish, since it is one with the soul ; in the same way that a river empties itself into and unites with the sea, so the soul commingles with God.<sup>161</sup> But as soon as science is thus acquired all past sins are effaced, and evil deeds are for the future excluded. As the water does not wet the leaf of the lotos, so, too, sin touches not him who has arrived at the knowledge of God ; the chains of the heart are broken, all doubt dissipated, and past labours are as though they had never been. Virtue and vice no longer remain, both alike are fetters, and it matters not whether the fetter be of gold or iron ; eternal liberty admits of neither.<sup>162</sup>

It is evident that while this doctrine of the intuition of God is closely connected with those ecstatic states which the religious Hindoos delight to indulge in, it has also a reference to that state of deep sleep, in which the soul is undisturbed by and insensible to the transiency of mundane events.<sup>163</sup> And in this way a most fanciful conception is brought in connection with occasional, if not daily, experience, which however has given rise to many limitations of the absolute intuition—this absolute union of the soul with God. If the soul of the

<sup>161</sup> Ib. 26, 27, 30; Shank. Achar. 4, 5, 16, 30, 36, 37.

<sup>162</sup> Colebr. ii. p. 28.

<sup>163</sup> Ib. p. 11, 25.

individual during deep, undreaming sleep is with Brahm, it must, it is true, be without any act, but still it must retain the faculty of perception, and it is only without perception so long as objects are withdrawn from it.<sup>154</sup> Hence also, it is said that the soul is not so thoroughly and indistinguishably united with God, as a drop of water is with the sea, but it remains distinct, and on this account returns back again to its body.<sup>155</sup> In all this, probably the prevailing idea is, that the soul indeed is at the time united with God, but that it is nevertheless still invested with a very fine corporeal form. A perfect emancipation from the personal difference of the soul from God is regarded as unattainable in this world. Even the sage who has arrived at the science of the Vedanta, does not fully return into God until after his death.<sup>156</sup> Then he reaches to the highest capacity of enjoyment, then he is pure thought, and reason that enjoys, and differs from God in nothing else but the absence of creative power.<sup>157</sup> We at once see that in these attempts to confirm its doctrine of the intuition of God by comparisons with the present state of the soul, the Vedanta had nothing further in view than to indicate certain approximations to the highest degree of the soul's existence. The complete intuition of the perfect is not indeed for this life, but reserved for another state of existence. However on this point it would appear, as we already remarked, that the

<sup>154</sup> Ib. p. 22.<sup>155</sup> Ib. p. 33, 37.<sup>156</sup> Ib. p. 33.<sup>157</sup> Ib. p. 33, 34. The last point does not stand out very clearly, and it is possible that it may have been the subject of a variety of opinions.

school of the Vedanta was not quite unanimous. A part of it, at least, has admitted the hypothesis that there is a state of the soul in waking wherein it is free from error, and merely seeing the delusion of phenomena as though it saw them not, contemplates God in his imperishable unity.<sup>158</sup> For a time, indeed, even after the entrance of the soul into Brahm, delusion still continues, but at last it ultimately vanishes.<sup>159</sup>

With respect to action, we meet with similar results. Thus by the assertion, that for him who has the intuition of God every past act, whether good or bad, are as though they had never been, nothing more is meant than that he will know that whatever he appears to do is nevertheless not his own deed, but the effect of principles within him, which form his body and his consciousness, and are ultimately to be resolved into the operation of Brahm. But even supposing that the sage has arrived at this conviction, how are the migrations of the soul to be terminated thereby? For the soul must ever be dependent on the transformations which the principles of the body, when once they have been set in motion, produce in it and its several envelopes; it can never be thought of as wholly separate from the world. It appears therefore that the Vedanta, like the Sankhya and Yoga, taught that by the knowledge of God which is attainable in this world, such vices and virtues alone are annihilated as have either not yet begun or wholly ceased to produce their consequences, but that this

<sup>158</sup> Frank Sadan. p. 42, 43.; Windischm. Sanc. p. 125, sq.; 173, sq.

<sup>159</sup> Ib. p. 158.

is not the case with those which are actually in work. Of these the operation still continues, like an arrow in its flight, until they have exhausted their imparted activity.<sup>160</sup> Ultimately, however, he who, absorbed in Brahm, is dead to the world, returns to it neither by virtue nor by vice, and becomes neither better by the former, nor worse by the latter, for in the knowledge of God all activity is annihilated.<sup>161</sup>

A different opinion apparently must have been entertained by those who regarded this knowledge not as a consummation, but merely a progress. Perfection, according to them, is absolutely unattainable in that chain of causes, of which the present existence of man is a link. This sect of the Vedanta, while it admitted that cognition is better than action, nevertheless asserted that action is better than inaction, provided that a man can emancipate himself from hope and fear which are the fetters of action. Men ought to allow actions to pass by without producing any emotion in their souls, simply because they themselves are not really the actors and originators of them. They ought in all things to let God be acknowledged, who employs men merely as instruments, until he judges them worthy to be fully identified with himself.<sup>162</sup>

Such, according to the statements which have hitherto reached us concerning it, is the philosophy of the Hindoos. Nothing resembling it is to be found among any Oriental people before the eighth century of the Christian era, when the Arabs began to borrow learning and science from the Greeks.

<sup>160</sup> *Ib.* p. 29.

<sup>161</sup> *Ib.* p. 116, sqq.

<sup>162</sup> *Taylor* l. 1. p. 116.

The few traces which are discoverable among the Persians of philosophical reflection, are too rude to be compared with it for a moment. As to the Cabala of the Jews, recent investigations fully justify us in asserting that it belongs to a much later date,<sup>163</sup> not to mention that in scientific value it is greatly inferior to the Hindoo philosophy.

When now we proceed to take a review of this philosophy in its whole extent, with a view to determine the part which it played in the general history of science, this, in the first place, is manifest, that the learned Greeks at no period possessed more than a very vague and imperfect acquaintance with it. It is only some of its systems that have exercised any influence on Grecian philosophy. How could the very imperfect logic of the Nyaya have made any impression on the Greeks with whom this science had previously attained a far higher development? Neither are we disposed to ascribe greater importance in this respect to the Sankhya or the Vaisheschika directly. It is only to the Yoga and the Vedanta that such an influence can be ascribed with any degree of probability, for we do indeed find many important points of these doctrines, and presented too in a similar way, among the later Greeks, without, however, any scientific

<sup>163</sup> See in particular Hartmann, in the *Leipz. Litt. Zeit.* 1834. Nos. 63, 64. Tost, *Gesch. v. Israeliten.* 3. bd. p. 195, sqq.; Zunz, *die gottesdienstlichen Bortrage der Juden.* p. 162, sq ; 402, sqq. Tholuck (*commentatio de vi, quam Græca philosophia in theologiam tum Muhammedanorum tum Judæorum exercuerit.* Part ii. *De ortu Cabbalæ*, 1837), agrees also in thinking that the Cabalistical works now in existence are, comparatively speaking, of recent date: in Europe the earliest vestiges of the Cabala date in the twelfth century, but in Asia they go back to the eighth century.

grounds being advanced for them, or any national traditions being discoverable to which they might be traced as to their source. Such, particularly, is the doctrine of emanations according to certain fixed, descending degrees of existence, without their being ascribed to any activity, or rational design, or any other motive in the divine intelligence. For it is a characteristic feature of this novel point of view, that it should teach that the developments or emanations do not affect the absolutely simple essence of the self-developing being. Such, again, is the doctrine of opposition between soul and corporeal nature, two things which are it is true supposed to emanate from God, but to differ in their manner of emanation; the latter being considered to be without participation in the divine essence, as a phenomenon wholly devoid of essence, whereas the soul is regarded as a part, or at least an essential emanation of God, which is in a certain manner connected with the unessential and transitory developments of the corporeal, but nevertheless is not thereby effected in its reality and truth. Lastly, a further trace of this influence is furnished by the doctrine of the later Greek philosophy, that the mystical intuition of God is the source of all knowledge, and the means by which man may become wholly absorbed in the essence of God, and attain to the eternal rest of felicity. And besides this mystical doctrine, many other traits of a like character may be discovered in the later philosophy of Greece.

But while we are tracing such points of resemblance, we are strikingly reminded of a principle, which, in such a history as the present, ought never



to be lost sight of, that, viz. similar doctrines among different people may often as justly be ascribed to the similar nature of human mind as to a communication from either one to the other. A striking instance of this principle to which we are alluding, is presented by the philosophy of the Sankhya and that of the later Stoics; both of whom, although proceeding from very opposite principles, endeavour to lead the soul to an absolute indifference for all external objects, and all the merely natural emotions of the soul, whether of pleasure or of pain, and making this to be the end of philosophy, which they regard as nothing more than the means to this end, and accordingly confine its utility to pointing out to man what is or not his proper business. When now we see that the later Stoics arrived at this result by a gradual development of a principle which can in all its steps be historically traced; and when, on the other hand, there is not the slightest ground for conjecturing that the Sankhya received it from the Greeks, we cannot be too cautious how we admit the supposition of any historical tradition between other doctrines of the Greeks and Hindoos, however great may be their correspondence. A further ground for such caution is afforded by the remoteness and little intercourse of the two nations. If then we, nevertheless, do not absolutely withhold the conjecture that some such communication may have actually taken place between them, we are led to do so, not so much by the similarity of the doctrines alone, as by other considerations. Those writers of a purely Grecian character, who first exhibit what we have termed an

Oriental tendency, were possessed of little originality. They were far from claiming the invention of their doctrine, although it was wholly unknown to their predecessors among the Greeks. On the contrary, they regarded it as an ancient tradition; the more especially as it presented the appearance of an opinion, which, although it was originally formed on philosophical speculations, had nevertheless, in its transmission through the mouth of the people, assumed a rude shape. And though they did not absolutely neglect the philosophy of Greece, they evinced a strong admiration for Oriental doctrines, however obscurely transmitted. If, then, they pretended on the weakest and slightest grounds to trace their views to ancient Greek and Jewish traditions, we think they would have done much better by ascribing their origin to the remote wisdom of the East. But, on the other hand, the mode in which these doctrines could have passed from India to Egypt, Syria, Asia Minor, and Greece, is a question open to a variety of conjectures, of which each individual is at liberty to adopt the one which in his judgment is the most probable. For ourselves, we shall be content with remarking, generally, that at periods of the preparation and diffusion of Christianity, an intellectual movement was taking place among all the nations with whose history we are acquainted, which, proceeding from the most extreme point, tended to the concentration of the scattered elements of the enlightenment of the whole world. Thus, of the nations which partook of the advantages of Grecian civilization, we expressly know that among them Oriental and Indian wisdom particu-

larly, enjoyed a high repute, and that travels to the East were undertaken solely with a view of acquiring a better acquaintance with its treasures and records. The history of the Oriental nations, on the other hand, is too obscure to allow us to indulge the hope of tracing a corresponding phenomenon among them, but on general grounds we consider it more than probable that it actually prevailed.



## CHAPTER VI.

### PHILO THE JEW.

WE have already observed that the disposition of the Orientals to enrich themselves with the treasures of Grecian philosophy, although, indeed, it was in its origin much earlier than Philo the Jew, nevertheless is first presented in his writings in such a shape as to enable us to trace distinctly the cast of thought which it brought about.<sup>1</sup> Philo lived at Alexandria, and belonged to a distinguished, probably a priestly, family of the Jewish race.<sup>2</sup> In the political fortunes of his people he appears to have played an important part, and at an advanced age was deputed by his nation to plead their cause with Caligula.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The phenomenon of Philo and similar characters among the Jews has been recently treated of at large by Glover in his work, 'Philo and the Alexandrian Theosophy,' &c. Stuttgart, 1831, 2 vols. I have consulted this work, but with the caution which it is allowed to be necessary. See Dahne's remarks on the writings of Philo the Jew, in the 'Theol. Studien u. Kritiken,' Jahrg. 1833, p. 984, &c. Dahne treats chiefly of Philo in his 'Geschichtliche Darstellung d. Jüdisch-Alexandrinischen Religions Philosophie.' Erste Abth. Halle, 1834.

<sup>2</sup> Philo de Legat. ad Caj. xxii. 567, Mang.; Joseph. Ant. xviii. 8; Euseb. Hist. Eccl. ii. 4; Phot. Cod. 105.

<sup>3</sup> Employments of this nature seem to be hinted at in de Somn. ii. 18, 675. For his embassy to Rome, cf. de Leg. ad Caj. xxviii. 572; xliv. 597, sqq.; Joseph. Ant. xviii. 8, in. The date of this embassy is A. D. 40.

In the writings of Philo, we meet almost at every page with a combination of Grecian philosophy with the religious notions of the Jews, and with oriental views of science and life. He was intimately acquainted with the Platonic philosophy in all its phases; and in his writings we everywhere recognize it as forming a fundamental feature of his own doctrine. He is almost equally fond of employing the numerical symbols of the Pythagoreans; from which circumstance we may fairly infer, that at the time and place at which his own mental character was formed, the Pythagorean philosophy had again revived, and was held in high estimation. But he is equally free in availing himself of ideas and views belonging to the Peripatetic and Stoical schools, notwithstanding that in some points he expresses a decided opposition to the former.<sup>4</sup> To the Stoical school, indeed, he might perhaps be proved to be more highly indebted for the circle of his scientific ideas, than even to the Platonic.<sup>5</sup> These philosophical doctrines he has mixed promiscuously together, not so much from any Eclectical method that he followed, as from a persuasion that he was at perfect liberty to substitute one

<sup>4</sup> Thus he controverts in particular the doctrine of the eternity of the world.

<sup>5</sup> From the numerous proofs which present themselves on all sides to those acquainted with his works, I adduce a few only. *Quod Omnis Prob. lib. xxii. fin.*: The precept of Zeno to live agreeably to nature is called a Pythian oracle; *ib. viii. 454*, another ethic precept of Zeno is regarded as having been derived from the Mosaic code. Matter is usually denominated *οὐσία*, and it is in its nature unmoved, *de Vit. Contempl. i. 472*, the notion of *λόγος σπερματικός*, the distinction between *τίλειος* and *προκόπτων*, and between *ψυχή* and *φύσις*, the relation of the *ἡγεμονικόν* to the other parts of the soul, &c. *De Mundi Creat. xiii. 9*; *xl. 28*; *lxi. 41*; *Quod Deus Immut. ix. 278*; *Alleg. Leg. iii. 47* 114.

for the other, as it suited his purpose; he being, by the character of his mind, totally incapacitated to discern the difference in the points of view from which they had severally proceeded. But Philo was not content with jumbling together the discordant doctrines of the Greeks alone; for in his judgment the truth was to be found among other nations, and especially those of the East. The land of barbarians must share with Greece the possession of the sovereign good;<sup>6</sup> Magi and Gymnosophists belong to the number of the wise;<sup>7</sup> and of all sages none are placed higher than the priests of Jerusalem, who preside over that religious worship which is alone worthy of the Deity.<sup>8</sup> In short, he regards the philosophy of the Greeks, or rather their whole enlightenment as having had its origin in the legislation and writings of Moses;<sup>9</sup> a view which even long before his time had widely spread among his countrymen. Such is the preference which he gave to his own religion, and such the attachment he evinced towards his own people! These national predilections it was the more easy for him to reconcile with his fondness for the philosophy of Greece, the more the symbolical, or rather allegorical mode of interpreting the Scriptures which he had adopted, facilitated his desire of finding under the literal sense which he did not

<sup>6</sup> Quod Omnis Prob. lib. xi. 456; de Vita Cont. iii. 474.

<sup>7</sup> Quod Omnis Prob. lib. xi. 456; xiv. 459, sq.

<sup>8</sup> De Vita Cont. x. 484.

<sup>9</sup> Quod Omnis Prob. lib. viii. 454; de Judice, ii. 345; Quis. Rer. Div. Her. xliii. 503. Moses is, in short, regarded as a guide to philosophy. De Conf. Ling. xx. 419; The Mosaic law is made binding on all nations. De Vita Mos. ii. 4. p. 137, sq.

wholly reject, the profoundest ideas of philosophy.<sup>10</sup> This fact clearly proves, that the preference which he felt for his own nation, was but the faint vestige of an hereditary prejudice, since the conviction of his judgment evidently led him to ascribe to all nations alike an equal share of wisdom: for Philo unconditionally adopts those cosmopolitic sentiments which invariably spring up among a people dispersed and oppressed, and consequently deprived of everything like a national polity.<sup>11</sup>

But notwithstanding that the most opposite opinions are combined together by Philo, he was far from adopting indiscriminately every doctrine that laid claim to the name of civilization and philosophy. On the contrary, he expresses a decided aversion for every one which assumed the form either of a sensuous Pantheism, or of a worship of the sensible world or mundane soul as God. Astrology, as closely connected with the foregoing, he also condemns, under the comprehensive term of the Chaldee philosophy.<sup>12</sup>

In the analysis of his doctrines, which it is now our duty to pursue, the principal task is to separate whatever he derived from Grecian philosophy from what had its origin in his own Oriental ideas and

<sup>10</sup> De Conf. Ling. xxxvii. 433, &c.

<sup>11</sup> De Mundi Creat. l. 1. Τοῦ νομίμου ἀνδρὸς εὐθὺς ὄντος κοσμοπολίτου. Ib. xlix. 34. Similar expressions occur in his other works. To this cosmopolite tendency of his mind, I ascribe his preference for democratical forms of government, which removes all distinctions of rank, and his rejection of the ancient prejudice, that slavery is an institution of nature. Quod Deus Immut. xxxvi. fin. p. 298; Quod Omnis Prob. lib. xii. 457.

<sup>12</sup> De Migr. Abr. xxxii. sqq. p. 464. At times, however, he is himself not sufficiently on his guard against confounding God with the soul of the world. Leg. Alleg. i. 29, 62.

education. The mutual relation of these two elements of his system is in general of this nature, that while the great majority of his conceptions and ideas are borrowed from the Grecian philosophers, yet the spirit of his theory, by which we must be guided in ascertaining its more special determinations, is essentially founded on Oriental views. We have already called attention to Philo's prejudice in favour of his national religion, and, in perfect consistency with this prejudice, we find him entertaining the opinion, which, as we formerly observed, was widely diffused at this period, that the present state of knowledge was narrow and mean as compared with that of olden times. The wisdom of his own age Philo regarded as corrupted with many sophistical arts.<sup>13</sup> He purposed, therefore, to expound the ancient lessons of holy wisdom, confessing, however, that the accounts of an eye-witness ought to be held in higher esteem than he who has only heard and received the testimony of others.<sup>14</sup> Thus was he led mainly to the Oriental view of things, to which, however, he thought it possible to give the form of Greek science, not merely as an ornament, but as a means calculated indeed to lead to a higher or profounder view, without however pretending to determine how far it was absolutely necessary. With such a view there was naturally connected a depreciation in some degree of Grecian philosophy, although this aversion is not universal. It is most strikingly apparent in the encomiums which he lavishes upon the Essenes as the true examples of

<sup>13</sup> De Poster. Caini, xxx. 244; Quod Omnis Prob. lib. xi. 456.

<sup>14</sup> De Conf. Ling. xxviii. 427; de Migr. Abr. ix. 443.



ancient moral purity among the Jews. For, according to Philo, the Essenes were above those idle disputes about terms, into which the Greek allowed himself to be seduced.<sup>15</sup> All verbal disputes the former left to logic, as unnecessary for the possession of virtue. In the same manner they did not trouble themselves with physical questions, except such as concern the knowledge of God and the creation of the world, but held that all others far surpass the powers of human intelligence. They cultivated the study of morals alone, guiding themselves therein by their national laws and customs, and employing symbols for the conveyance of their lessons.<sup>16</sup> It is to such a view that we must ascribe the unfavourable opinions he occasionally advances of the Encyclic sciences, and some parts of philosophy, and even of philosophy or human science itself. He considers the aim of human wisdom to be the knowledge of the whole world. But this knowledge, he says, both transcends man's capacity,<sup>17</sup> and in itself cannot reveal to him more than a reflection, a shadow as it were of God.<sup>18</sup> The whole world, if it could be intelligibly explained in a single term, would not express the truth of God, but merely the majesty of his ministering forces.<sup>19</sup> Philo then

<sup>15</sup> Quod Omnis Prob. lib. xiii. 459. Δίχα περιεργείας ἑλληνικῶν ὀνομάτων.

<sup>16</sup> Ib. xii. 458. Cf. de Carit. 2 fin. p. 386.

<sup>17</sup> Quod Omnis Prob. lib. xii. 458.

<sup>18</sup> Alleg. Leg. iii. 32, p. 107. Εἴθ' οἱ δοκοῦντες ἄριστα φιλοσοφεῖν ἔφασαν, ὅτι ἀπὸ τοῦ κόσμου καὶ τῶν μερῶν αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν ἐνυπαρχουσῶν τούτοις δυνάμεων ἀντίληψιν ἐποιησάμεθα τοῦ αἰτίου . . . οἱ δὲ οὕτως ἐπιλογιζόμενοι διὰ σκιᾶς τὸν θεὸν καταλαμβάνουσι διὰ τῶν ἔργων τὸν τεχνίτην κατανοοῦντες.

<sup>19</sup> De Legat. ad Cnj. i. 546.

proceeds to show at length, after the manner of the Academical or Sceptical schools, how little confidence man can place in his sensuous representations of things, and even in his intellectual thoughts; how great is the deception of the senses; how little agreement as to principles was to be found among the different sects; that there is no certain criterion of truth, and that consequently the wisest course is to withhold assent, without rashly adopting any particular opinion.<sup>20</sup> Philo adopts it as a general principle that the knowledge of the outward world is either beyond the powers of man or else of little value, and on this ground he estimates very lowly the value of physical inquiry, except so far as it is in connection with the knowledge of God. The great end to which he would lead man is to know himself, to return into himself, and there to occupy himself with the worthiest object in the whole world,—his own soul.<sup>21</sup> Yet how unfit is man for this task! for human reason, however well adapted it may be to learn the nature of all besides, is like the eye, which sees other objects but not itself. No one can say what the soul is, whether blood, or air, or fire, or even whether it is corporeal or incorporeal. How then can any one say what the soul of all is? <sup>22</sup> Accordingly he adopts the Socratic idea

<sup>21</sup> De Ebriet. xl.—xlix. 382, sqq.; de Conf. Ling. xxv. 423, sq.

<sup>22</sup> De Migr. Abr. xxxiii. 465; xxv. 466.

<sup>23</sup> Leg. All. i. 29, 62. 'Ο νοῦς ὁ ἐν ἐκάστῳ ἡμῶν τὰ μὲν ἄλλα δύναται καταλαβεῖν, ἑαυτὸν δὲ γνωρίσαι ἀδυνάτως ἔχει. ὥσπερ γὰρ ὁ ὀφθαλμὸς τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ὁρᾷ, ἑαυτὸν δὲ οὐχ ὁρᾷ, οὕτω καὶ ὁ νοῦς τὰ μὲν ἄλλα νοεῖ, ἑαυτὸν δὲ οἱ καταλαμβάνει· εἰπάτω γάρ, τίς τί ἐστι καὶ ποταπός, πνεῦμα ἢ αἷμα ἢ πῦρ ἢ ἀήρ ἢ τί ἕτερον σῶμα· ἢ τοσοῦτόν γε, ἢ ὅτι σῶμά ἐστιν ἢ πάλιν ἀσώματον. εἴτα οὐκ εὐήθεις οἱ περὶ θεοῦ σκεπτό-

that the end of all science is the conviction that man knows nothing, for one only is wise, and that is God.<sup>23</sup> At other times he joins himself to the New Academy and thinks that God alone knows the true ground of things, although the probable ground, which is discoverable by apparent conjecture, may be easily found even by man.<sup>24</sup>

Now the more Philo limited the extent or credibility of human science without any design of resting in the Scepticism of doubt, he naturally sought the more zealously for a higher source of knowledge. God alone, he taught, can furnish a knowledge of truth; it is his gift.<sup>25</sup> Now the mode in which man is to arrive at this higher source of truth, is described in general, as a religious inspiration of the soul, and the lessons which are thus furnished, as for instance, his own expositions of the holy scriptures, when they take a higher flight than usual, he considers as mysteries fit to be trusted to the initiated alone.<sup>26</sup> As to

μενοι ούσιαις; οἱ γὰρ τῆς ἰδίας ψυχῆς τὴν οὐσίαν οὐκ ἴσασι, πῶς δὲν περὶ τῆς τῶν ὅλων ψυχῆς ἀκριβώσαιεν; De Creat. Mund. xxiii. 16.

<sup>23</sup> De Migr. Abr. xxiv. 457. Τὸ γὰρ μηδὲν οἶσθαι εἶδέναι πέρας ἐπιστήμης ἐνὸς ὄντος μόνου σοφοῦ τοῦ καὶ μόνου θεοῦ.

<sup>24</sup> De Creat. Mund. xxiv. 16, fin.

<sup>25</sup> De Conf. Ling. xxv. 424. Καὶ μὴν σφαλλομένων γε τῶν καθ' ἡμᾶς αὐτοῦς περὶ τε νοῦν καὶ αἰσθησιν κριτηρίων ἀνάγκη τὸ ἀκόλουθον ὁμολογεῖν, ὅτι ὁ θεὸς τῷ μὲν τὰς ἐννοίας, τῷ δὲ τὰς ἀντιλήψεις ἐπομβρεῖ, καὶ ἔστιν οὐ τῶν καθ' ἡμᾶς μέρων χάρις τὰ γινόμενα, ἀλλὰ τοῦ δι' ἑν καὶ ἡμεῖς γεγόναμεν, δωρεαὶ παῖσαι.

<sup>26</sup> De Cherub. 14 in. p. 147; Leg. Alleg. iii. 38, 107; de Decal. 10. p. 187. On the other hand, Philo disapproves of the heathen mysteries, as alien to the Mosaic law, and is of opinion that whatever is good may be openly communicated to all. De Vict. Offer. 12. p. 260. It is plain that he admits of no mysteries, but such as of themselves must ever remain concealed from those who have not been duly prepared for them. Quod omnis prob. lib. ii. p. 447. Why then does he (de Cherub. l. l.) recommend his *Mystæ* to divulge

these religious inspirations, his own statements are so far inconsistent, that at times he makes merely a general state of sentiments and mental direction to be indispensable for the right reception of the divine gift, but at others requires a very special and extraordinary state of mind.<sup>27</sup> The former is the case when he makes innocence and faith to be the means by which man may arrive at a knowledge of the divine; the latter when, in the manner of the Greeks, he describes a certain Corybantic enthusiasm as opening to man a view of the world of ideas, which are the divine prototypes.<sup>28</sup> We must not, however, suppose that Philo's meaning is actually the same as that of the ancient Greek philosophers, who regarded such a state of phrensy as being a divine inspiration indeed, but yet did not on that account seek to exalt it above a calm and sober science; and the knowledge acquired by scientific reflection. Moreover, by this enthusiasm Philo himself does not intend any violent emotion of the soul, but merely a state of repose and peace, while the soul enjoys the highest excellence, the gifts sent from God. For he depicts this state as an exemption from care and toil, and even from the practice of virtue. All things come in abundance without art, and by the bountiful provision of nature itself; the good comes spontaneously. In

nothing? Perhaps we may regard this advice as nothing more than one of those rhetorical formulæ, which are far from unfrequent in Philo.

<sup>27</sup> De Migr. Abr. 24 p. 456. Τίς οὖν ἡ κόλλα (sc. πρὸς τὸν Θεόν); τίς; ἐκτίβεια δῆπον καὶ πίστις· ἀρμύζουσι γὰρ καὶ ἐνοῦσιν αἱ ἀρεταὶ ἀφθάρτῳ φύσει διάνοιαν. In other passages, piety is recommended merely as a means to enthusiasm. De Monarch. i. 9, 221, sq.

<sup>28</sup> De Creat. Mund. xxiii. 16; de vita Cont. ii. 473.

this divine rapture the soul is first of all freed from external perception and absorbed within itself. Similarly, the inspiration of dreams is described as a return of the soul into itself; which is also made to be its state when awake, and, forcibly possessed with the lessons of philosophy, it forgets all things that belong to its habitation in the body. The soul in these states is deprived of its free volition, and the activity of its own judgment. Whatever the soul produces out of itself, is for the most part faulty; on the other hand, that which it brings forth after having been fructified by God, is perfect and complete.<sup>29</sup> Philo is not deterred by a false shame from adducing his own repeated experience as an example of these states, and confesses that often when he has set down to his work full of philosophical ideas, and with a matured conception of the matter in hand, his intellect has been void, and he has been forced to give up the task without advancing it in the least. At other times, when he has disposed himself to work without a clear perception of his task, he has, he says, suddenly found himself full of ideas and thoughts which came from above, and he has been so carried away by the inspiration as to forget all external matters, the place where he was, and whatever was present before him, even himself, and what he had said and written.<sup>30</sup> We must here call particular attention

<sup>29</sup> De Migrat. Abr. xxxiv. 466.

<sup>30</sup> De Cherub. 9 in. p. 143; de Migr. Abr. vii. 441. Τότε μέλειται μὲν καὶ πόννοι καὶ ἀσκήσεις ἡσυχάζουσιν, ἀναδίδονται δὲ ἀνευ τέχνης, φύσεως προμηθεΐα πάντα ἀθρόα, πᾶσιν ὠφέλιμα. καλεῖται δὲ ἡ φορὰ τῶν αὐτοματιζομένων ἀγαθῶν ἀφesis, ἡπειδὴ περὶ ὁ νοῦς ἀφίεται τῶν κατὰ τὰς ἰδίας ἐπιβολὰς ἐνεργειῶν καὶ ὥσπερ τῶν ἐκουσίων ἡλευθίρωται διὰ τὴν

to the fact, that he expressly describes this state of the soul as passive, as distinctive of free volition, and that he considers himself therein to be merely an instrument of God, and makes its special merit to be the emancipation of the reason, not only from a consciousness of all external relations, but also of its own emotions.<sup>31</sup> Such a state, it is easily conceivable, cannot fall to the lot of all men. For although God's mercy is universal, it is only natural that a certain order should prevail in the divine economy to regulate the attainment of the supreme gifts of mercy.<sup>32</sup> It is therefore that Philo speaks of the profoundest wisdom which the God-inspired have received, as of a mystery which is not to be revealed indiscriminately to all.

This mystical element in the opinions of Philo, is decisive as to the predominantly Oriental character of his doctrine. Even though in the theory of a divine inspiration, whereby God permits man to contemplate his own essence, some of the expressions and mystical conceptions of Plato are intro-

πληθὺν τῶν ὑομένων καὶ ἀδιαστάτως ἐπομβρούντων. . . . τὸ ἱμαντοῦ πάθος, δ' μυριάκις παθὼν οἶδα, διηγούμενος οὐκ αἰσχύνομαι. βουλευθεὶς ἔστιν ὅτι παρὰ τὴν συνήθη τῶν κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν δογμάτων γραφὴν ἰλθῆναι καὶ ἄχρη συνθεῖναι ἀκριβῶς ἰδῶν ἄγονον καὶ στείραν εὐρὼν τὴν διάνοιαν ἀπρακτος ἀπηλλάγην. . . . ἔστι δὲ ὅτι κενὸς ἰλθὼν πλήρης ἐξαίφνης ἰγενόμην, ἐκινιφομένων καὶ σπειρομένων ἀνωθεν ἀφανῶς τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων, ὥς ὑπὸ κατοχῆς ἐνθίου κορυβαντιᾶν καὶ πάντως ἀγνοεῖν τὸν τόπον, τοὺς παρόντας ἱμαντόν, τὰ λεγόμενα, τὰ γραφόμενα.

<sup>31</sup> Quis Rer. Div. Her. liii. 511. "Ἐως μὲν οὖν ἔτι περιλάμπει καὶ περιπολεῖ ἡμῶν ὁ νοῦς, μεσημβρινὸν ὅλα φέγγος εἰς πᾶσαν τὴν ψυχὴν ἀναχίων, ἐν ἑαυτοῖς ὄντες οὐ κατεχόμεθα· ἐπειδὴν δὲ πρὸς δυσμὰς γίνηται κατὰ τὸ εἶκος ἑκστασις ἢ ἐνθεος ἐκίπτεται κατοχωτικὴ καὶ μανία.

<sup>32</sup> Ib. liii. 510. Φαύλῳ δὲ οὐ θέμις ἱρμηνεῖ γενέσθαι θεοῦ, ὥστε κυρίως μοχλῆρὸς οὐδεὶς ἐνθουσιᾶ, μόνῃ ταῦτ' ἰφαρμόττει, κ.τ.λ. De Monarch. i. 9, 221.

duced, still the whole cast of Philo's ideas on this point is very different from the Platonic, even if we make but little allowance for what is merely figurative in the latter. With Plato the intuition of ideas is throughout inseparable from scientific development; whereas Philo either wholly neglects the latter, or else regards it as nothing higher than an uninfluential means of purifying the soul, and decidedly rejects the opinion, that the scientific development of human thought can enable man to apprehend the divine.<sup>33</sup> But this is not the only point in which Philo leans to the Oriental view of things, although it is precisely the one on which all the others of a like nature depend, since it lays a foundation for the contempt of scientific culture and profane pursuits, and thereby opens a wide field for the idle play of fancy. Correctly viewed, Grecian philosophy is nothing more than the abundant source from which Philo liberally drew the materials with which he fed his fancy, and the means of indulging it; and we must therefore, strongly condemn the weak prejudice, which would make the Platonic theory to be the main constituent of his doctrine. The Platonic philosophy, in short, does not even furnish exclusively the elements with which his fancy sports. The Aristotelian and Stoical systems may well contest this title with it.<sup>34</sup> It is at once conceivable, that such a mixture of heterogeneous elements, held together

<sup>33</sup> De Post. Caini, xlviii. 258. Τοῦ ὄντως ὄντος ἐναργεία μᾶλλον ἀντικαταλαμβάνομένου ἢ λόγων ἀποδείξει συνισταμένου.

<sup>34</sup> I must in this respect, oppose the opinion which my respected teacher Neander advances in his *Genetischen Entwicklung der Vornehmsten Gnostischen Systeme*, p. 2. Crenzer judges more correctly of his relation to Plato, although apparently proceeding from another view of the Platonic philosophy, than I

by no other bond than that of fancy, should have proved an almost invincible impediment to stability of doctrine, even though it must be admitted, that all his statements, however vague and inconsistent they often are, were invariably based upon a certain general view, which was derived from Oriental ideas, and is of a religious rather than a philosophical character. As philosophers, we find it impossible to estimate his merit very highly, although as historians, he particularly demands our notice, for having brought into course a certain chain of ideas, which both in themselves were not without a philosophical import, and which also exercised considerable influence on the subsequent development of philosophy. Probably, he was not even the first to give currency to them, but only adopted them, while perhaps, the merely partial diffusion of his works deprives him of all claim to the merit of having put these ideas in extensive circulation; and his writings possess the merely relative merit of being the only source from which we are able to prove the oldest existence of these ideas, among those who enjoyed the benefits of a Grecian education. That he was not the first to originate, but adopted them from others, is to our minds, convincingly proved from the mode in which he advances them, and supposes their truth to be already demonstrably established; as also from the little inventive powers which his works exhibit throughout.

But whatever may have been the predominant  
can think right to adopt. S. Kritik der Schriften des Juden Philon in d.  
Theol. Studien u. Kritiken. Jahrg. 1832. i. Hft.



element of Philo's system, its heterogeneous nature necessarily involved his positions in great inconsistency. The necessity which he felt of availing himself of the treasures of Grecian civilization and philosophy, prevented him from carrying out his mystical theosophy in perfect purity. For there was something inconsistent with this higher wisdom when he ascribed to the mental training, furnished by the Encyclic and philosophical sciences, a merely negative value, and making their virtue to consist in purifying the soul from error, and rendering it capable of receiving and maintaining the higher wisdom for which they also awaken the desire. In this spirit Philo sought to show that the Encyclic sciences, grammar, rhetoric, geometry, and so forth, are necessary, not only for the purposes of life, but also for protection against the arts of sophists, and the delusions of the senses. Without these man cannot enjoy with confidence even the higher wisdom.<sup>35</sup> It is clear, that in these preparatives for philosophy, Philo included the investigations of logic, since it was only by the aid of these that the Encyclic teaching could be considered duly fitted to contend against the frauds of sophistry. Thus Philo makes the ignorance of these arts to be the reason why Abel fell by the hand of Cain; and asserts that Aaron was associated with Moses in order to show that the richness of intellectual ideas requires to be combined with the cultivation of the powers of outward expression.<sup>36</sup> If therefore Philo advised

<sup>35</sup> De Ebriet. xii. 364.

<sup>36</sup> Quod Deter. Pot. Insid. 10, sqq. p. 197, sqq.; de Migr. Abr. 13, 14, 447, sq.

a neglect of the body, the sensuous perception, and the powers of speech, he must not be understood thereby, as recommending the complete abstraction from them, for this would be to recommend death itself; but what he meant is, that man should repress all fondness for the sensible world and the language of flattery, in order to raise himself above them, and to see in himself their master, instead of their slave.<sup>37</sup> But Philo does not stop here. For if the senses and language are of use to man, the next step is naturally to ascribe to them a positive value; and if worldly knowledge is not absolutely to be rejected, it is impossible to mistake the importance of the senses for acquiring a knowledge of mundane things. Accordingly Philo does not hesitate to avow a belief that they furnish food to human reason; and he shows at great length, that without them man could not judge of black and white, hard and soft, and the like.<sup>38</sup> Indeed he goes so far in this direction of thought as to concede to the passive emotions of the soul (*πάθη*) a share in the cognition of objects; for, he argues, pleasure is subservient to the preservation of the the species; pain and fear move the soul and teach it to despise nothing.<sup>39</sup> Even if he is unwilling to grant, that man may discover the truth of what really is, and its operations by means of corporeal things, still he is far from controverting the hypothesis, that the senses and the body are perhaps the

<sup>37</sup> De Migr. 1, 2, 35.

<sup>38</sup> Alleg. Leg. iii. 18, 98; de Plant. Noe, xxxii. 349. Τὸ τρέφον τὸν νοῦν ἡμῶν ἰστέον αἰσθησικῶς.

<sup>39</sup> Alleg. Leg. ii. 3, 68.

instruments by which God leads man to a knowledge of the invisible, incorporeal essence, i. e. of himself.<sup>40</sup> In short, he represents sensuous perception as being the mean between reason and sensible things; for the latter being fecundated by God, give rise to a desire in the soul, and perception is thereby rendered possible; which, however, could not take place, so long as the reason, on the other hand, did not yearn towards the external world and set the senses in motion.<sup>41</sup> This view of sensation evidently reverts to the Stoical hypothesis of a ruling portion of the soul, which expands itself from the centre to the periphery of the living being. Now as this hypothesis was, in its essential features at least, designed to explain the formation of thought by sensuous perception, or to allow it to arise out of the reciprocal action of the internal and external, it is obviously in direct opposition to Philo's prevailing purpose, which was to allow to the sensual no share in true knowledge, and indeed to censure it as seducing the soul from the true path of wisdom. Perception, he is of opinion, is not, undoubtedly, in itself evil; indeed it may be regarded as a species of good, in so far as it permits us to become cognizant of outward objects in their

<sup>40</sup> De Somn. i. 32, 649. Οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄλλο τῶν ὄντων οὐδὲν ἀσώματον ἐννοῆσαι δυνατόν, ὅτι μὴ τὴν ἀρχὴν λαβόντας ἀπὸ σωμάτων. De Ebriet. xxviii. 374, though he speaks of creatures, it is plain from what follows, that he thereby means corporeal things: παρ' ὑμῶν μὲν οὐδὲν, παρὰ δὲ Θεοῦ λήψομαι, οὐπάντα κτήματα, δι' ὑμῶν δὲ ἴσως. ὄργανα γὰρ ὑπηρετήσοντα ταῖς ἀνάγκαις αὐτοῦ χάρισιν γηγίνησθε.

<sup>41</sup> Leg. Alleg. i. 11, 49. In these matters we must not look for consistency in Philo especially, as this part of his system is very negligently worked out. Thus it ill accords with the doctrine quoted above, that he maintains that reason must perceive even when it does not will do so.

truth ; but still it is so mixed up with the seductive lusts and other passions of the soul, as to be inconceivable in any other light than as a mixed good and ill. Pleasure seduces and deceives man by leading him to regard as profitable and good much that is wholly worthless ; pleasure is absolutely evil, and the good have no part in it.<sup>42</sup> When according to its nature it strives to arrive at perception, it thereby imparts to the soul the evil also which belongs to itself, and thus perception deceives the reason by imparting to it, together with the conception, a love also of the external object.<sup>43</sup> This delusion of sensation Philo regards as inevitable so long as man abandons himself to perception, on the ground that the connection between pleasure and perception is so close that the latter cannot come into contact with reason except by means of the former. For, according to Philo, pleasure forms the link by which the two heterogeneous parts of the soul, reason, and sense, are held together.<sup>44</sup> He might, therefore, well say, that in the human race nothing is done without pleasure ; and if he added the qualification that the good and the bad take the idea of pleasure very differently, the latter regarding it as some-

<sup>42</sup> Leg. Alleg. iii. 20. 100. Ἡ δὲ αἰσθησις ἀκραίφυνός δίδωσι τὰ σώματα οὕτως, ὥς ἔχει φύσει ἐκείνα, πλάσματος καὶ τέχνης ἐκτός. Ib. 21. λεπτίον οὖν, ὅτε ἡ αἰσθησις οὔτε τῶν φαύλων, οὔτε τῶν σπουδαίων ἰστίν, ἀλλὰ μίσον τι αὐτῇ καὶ κοινὸν σοφοῦ τε καὶ ἀφρονος. . . . ὁ δὲ ὄφει, ἡ ἡδονή, ἐξ αὐτῆς ἰστί μοχθηρά. διὰ τοῦτο ἐν μὲν σπουδαίῳ οὐχ εὐρίσχεται τὸ παράπαν, μόνος δὲ αὐτῆς ὁ φαῦλος ἀπολαύει.

<sup>43</sup> De Creat. Mund. 59, p. 39, sq.

<sup>44</sup> Leg. Alleg. ii. 18, 79. Δυσὶν προγεγονότων, νοῦ καὶ αἰσθήσεως, καὶ τούτων γυνυῶν κατὰ τὸν διδλωμένον τρόπον ὑπαρχόντων ἀνάγκη τρίτην ἡδονὴν συναγωγὸν ἀμφοῖν ὑπάρχει πρὸς τὴν τῶν νοητῶν καὶ αἰσθητῶν ἀντίληψιν, κ.τ.λ.

thing good, but the former as only necessary,<sup>46</sup> this implies that every one is necessarily subject to the delusion of pleasure, unless perhaps, what is not improbable, Philo here forgot his own general view of pleasure.

If then, in fact, we find the views of Philo concerning the primary principles of human conception but little consistent, not to say intrinsically opposed to each other, we can hardly expect that he could have formed a consistent doctrine of the scientific development of ideas. We have already remarked, that he held demonstration in little esteem. Equally slight was the value which he put upon correct distinction.<sup>46</sup> All these points strikingly indicate his contempt for every indirect acquisition of knowledge, and his great reliance on the immediate intuition of truth. Connected herewith, in Philo's mind, was probably, the view that all knowledge gained by means of perception is limited to the corporeal:<sup>47</sup> while true knowledge, on the other hand, is based on the cognitions of the soul, which it contemplates immediately in itself by its own proper nature, and apart from its combination with the body. Nevertheless, we find traces of a disposition to admit a species of mediation of knowledge by perception, which rises gradually from the lower to the higher. Perception, viz. refers to the

<sup>46</sup> Leg. Alleg. ii. 6, 70. 'Ἄλλ' ὁ μὲν φαῦλος ὡς ἀγαθῶ τελείῳ χρήσεται, ὁ δὲ σπουδαῖος ὡς μόνον ἀναγκαίῳ· χωρὶς γὰρ ἡδονῆς οὐδὲν γίνεται τῶν ἐν τῶ θνητῶ γίνεσι.

<sup>46</sup> De Agric. 32, p. 321, sq.

<sup>47</sup> This is supported by all the passages already quoted touching the grounds of knowledge. Leg. Alleg. ii. 18. Οὐτε γὰρ ὁ νοῦς διχα αἰσθήσεως ἠδύνατο καταλαβεῖν ζῶον ἢ φυτὸν ἢ λίθον ἢ ξύλον ἢ συνόλως σῶμα.

individual, by which term Philo understood the individual object.<sup>48</sup> Now in opposition to this sensuous cognition of the individual substance, he conceived of the higher knowledge as of a knowledge of species, which are not like individual objects—perishable, but imperishable and eternal,<sup>49</sup> the copies of the prototypes in the divine intellect.<sup>50</sup> However, Philo does not firmly adhere to this view, he is not content with advancing from individuals to species, and stopping there; but when he is considering the subordination of the species to the genera, he views the latter as the higher, and consequently teaches that the former, as comprising less under them, are transitory.<sup>51</sup> By this mode of conception Philo proceeded constantly from the special to the general; and regarding the former as compared with the latter, if not as transitory, yet at least as valueless, he finally referred the truth of all things to the highest generality. This method, as far as we are able to see, Philo steadily followed, and by a natural consequence arrived at the view that the most general is the supreme, and the pure truth. The original archetype of all things—the supra-sensible world—is, to his mind, the idea of ideas—the highest genus; but still this is only to be understood in a subordinate sense; for the

<sup>48</sup> De Creat. Mund. 46, p. 82. Τοῦ δὲ αἰσθητοῦ καὶ ἐπὶ μέρους ἀνθρώπων.

<sup>49</sup> Ib. 13, p. 9. Here we have, it is true, the expression τὰ γένη, but it is clear from the context that εἶδη is meant.

<sup>50</sup> De Conf. Ling. 14, p. 414.

<sup>51</sup> De Mutat. Nom. 11, p. 590. Τὸ μὲν γὰρ εἶδος καὶ βραχὺ καὶ φθαρτόν. τὸ δὲ γένος πολὺ τε αὐ καὶ ἀφθαρτόν. De Cherub. 2, p. 139. In both passages he is speaking of virtues, but the proposition is general. In the second γένος is opposed to ἐν μέρεσιν and to εἶδος, and it is said in general γένος δὲ πᾶν ἀφθαρτόν.

highest genus, in the first and truest sense, is God.<sup>52</sup>

Philo, therefore, believed that the scientific development, rightly understood, is an advance from the lower notions, through higher and higher, to the highest. However, that he should not have followed this gradation methodically, is easily explicable from the general cast of his ideas, which led him to confine his efforts to the single object of obtaining the knowledge of God, at all events, and even at the expense of contempt for all lower branches of knowledge, which, although he could not look upon them as good, he was nevertheless constrained to cultivate as indispensable. With such a view the special was necessarily merged in the general, as is clear from what he advances on the idea of God. He generally designates God as that which is, which, according to Philo, is the supreme genus. It was therefore quite consistent in him to maintain, that in the idea of God the multiplicity of all true entity is united; and Philo frequently expresses himself in such a manner as apparently to favour the conclusion that he had adopted such an opinion. Thus he calls God sometimes the One and the All, which embraces and fills all;<sup>53</sup> at others he talks of the reason as seeing, when it has arrived at God, the corporeal ideas.<sup>54</sup> Nevertheless the fact, that it is not God but the

<sup>52</sup> De Creat. Mund. 6 fin. p. 5. Τὸ ἀρχίτυπον παράδειγμα, ἰδίᾳ τῶν ἰδεῶν, ὁ Θεοῦ λόγος. Leg. Alleg. ii. 21 fin. p. 82. Τὸ δὲ γενικώτατόν ἐστιν ὁ Θεός καὶ δεύτερος ὁ Θεοῦ λόγος.

<sup>53</sup> Leg. Alleg. i. 14, p. 52.

<sup>54</sup> De Ebriet. 25, p. 372. Ὁ νοῦς, ὅταν θεωρηθῇ πρὸς αὐτῷ τῷ ὄντι γίνηται, καταδύμενος τὰς ἀσωμάτους ἰδέας.

Word which proceeds from him, that Philo calls the idea of ideas, affords undoubted proof that he was indisposed to acknowledge any multiplicity soever in God. And consequently he proceeds to demonstrate that God alone exists for himself, without aught beside himself, without multiplicity, and without mixture.<sup>55</sup> He calls him, therefore, at times, the one, the simple, or the good, or some other indication of his essence, but in general in the strict sense of the term, maintains that God is without properties.<sup>56</sup> Now although, in its immediate application, this assertion may refer only to sensible properties, according to the phraseology of the Stoics, it must, nevertheless, be taken also in a more general signification; for Philo expressly declares that no name can properly be ascribed to God. The existent cannot be expressed; he simply is.<sup>57</sup> Consequently, the properties which are usually attributed to God must be regarded as inadequate designations of his essence; he is better than goodness itself, purer than the one, and more prime than the unit.<sup>58</sup> Even when Philo is regarding God as the creative reason, he declares him to be higher than virtue and science; higher indeed than even the good and beautiful.<sup>59</sup> This doctrine of the namelessness of God, which, taken in the

<sup>55</sup> Leg. Alleg. ii. 1, p. 66; de Mut. Nom. 34, p. 606.

<sup>56</sup> Leg. Alleg. i. 15, p. 53.

<sup>57</sup> De Somn. i. 39, fin. p. 655. Σκεψάμενος, εἰ ἔστι τι τοῦ ὄντος ὄνομα, σαφῶς ἔγνω, ὅτι κύριον μὲν οὐδέν, ὃ δ' ἂν εἶπῃ τις, καταχρώμενος ἱερί. λίγισθαι γὰρ οὐ πύφκειν, ἀλλὰ μόνον εἶναι τὸ ὄν.

<sup>58</sup> De Vita Cont. 1, p. 472.

<sup>59</sup> De Creat. Mund. 2, p. 2. Καὶ ὅτι τὸ μὲν δραστήριον ὃ τῶν ὄλων νοῦς ἰστὶν εὐλικρινέστατος καὶ ἀκραιφνέστατος, κρείττων τε ἡ ἀρετὴ, καὶ κρείττων ἡ ἐπιστήμη, καὶ κρείττων ἡ αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν.



full sense of the word, must apply also to the names of God and being, appears to be connected with the national feeling of the Jews, which forbade the true and holy name of God to be uttered except by the holy and the wise.<sup>60</sup> With this doctrine of the unmentionableness of God, the belief that in his nature he is unknowable, is naturally connected. It is even requisite for his felicity that he should have no peculiar character; it is only the existence simply, and not the essence of God, that can ever be known.<sup>61</sup>

It is very natural that a doctrine like Philo's, which essentially directed its efforts to the problem of exhibiting the Deity to man, and ascertaining by some means or other the relation between them, but which, nevertheless, was driven to the conclusion that man can neither conceive of nor give a name to God, should fall into contradiction with itself, and consequently in the course of its expositions be continually driven to abandon its previous positions. Of this there are numerous instances in the writings of Philo.<sup>62</sup> In the present place we shall call attention to a few only, although in the further progress of our disquisitions many others will occur. We might perhaps be disposed to consider

<sup>60</sup> That the name *Θεός* is inappropriate is expressly said, *De Conf. Ling.* 27, p. 425.

<sup>61</sup> *De Leg. ad Caj.* 44, p. 597, fin.; *de Vita Mos.* iii. 11, p. 152.

<sup>62</sup> *Quod Deus Immut.* 11, p. 281. *Οἱ μὲν οὖν ψυχῆς ἰσχυροὶ νοηταῖς καὶ ἀσωμάτοις φύσεσιν ἐνομιλεῖν δυνάμενοι, οὐδεμιᾷ τῶν γεγονότων ἰδίᾳ παραβάλλουσι τὸ ὄν· ἀλλ' ἐκβιάσαντες αὐτὸ πάσης ποιότητος . . . ἔν γάρ τῶν εἰς τὴν μακαριότητα αὐτοῦ καὶ τὴν ἀκραν ἐδδαιμονίαν ἦν τὸ ψιλήν ἀνευ χαρακτήρος τὴν ὑπαρξιν καταλαμβάνεσθαι . . . τὴν κατὰ τὸ εἶναι μόνον φαντασίαν ἐνιδίξαντο, μὴ μορφώσαντες αὐτό. Ib. 13, 282. 'Ο δ' ἄρα οὐδὲ τῷ νῦν καταληπτός, ὅτι μὴ κατὰ τὸ εἶναι μόνον.*

it in some degree allowable, if Philo represented the idea of God exclusively in negative formulæ, as when, for instance, he called him that which has no properties, and that which is bounded by nothing besides itself; or when he argued against the view of those who conceive of God under some form more or less anthropomorphic.<sup>63</sup> Moreover, we might let it pass without objection, if in the idea of God he united opposite determinations; as, for instance, in his assertion, that God is everywhere and nowhere.<sup>64</sup> But Philo did not stop here; but, on the one hand, ascribed to the divine idea the very determinations which, on the other, he had sought to remove from it. Thus, too, we might perhaps suppose it to be a merely negative position, when he called God pre-eminently an unchangeable being.<sup>65</sup> But the way in which he used this designation of God decidedly proves that he saw in it something more than a merely negative determination. For in the mind of Philo this immutability of God was connected with that peace and repose which he elsewhere described as the true good—the supreme felicity.<sup>66</sup> To which are associated also joy and cheerfulness, which are described to be the consequences of the divine perfection—felicity and supreme good.<sup>67</sup> This is still more evident from the fact that Philo, notwithstanding he rejected the Platonic doctrine that God is good, nevertheless, after the manner of Plato, made the

<sup>63</sup> *Quod Deus Immut.* 11, sq. p. 280, sqq.; *de Sacr. Abel.* 29, sq. p. 181, sq.

<sup>64</sup> *De Conf. Ling.* 27, p. 425.

<sup>65</sup> *Quod Deus Immut.* 5, sq.

<sup>66</sup> *De Somn.* ii. 34, p. 388, sq.

<sup>67</sup> *De Cherub.* 25, p. 154; *de Abrah.* 36, p. 29; *de Sacrif. Abel.* 30, fin. p. 183.

immutability of God to follow from his being the good or the best, and that therefore it is impossible for him to become either better or worse.<sup>68</sup> Thus, without any fear of contradicting himself, he several times calls God good, and even grounds thereon the doctrine of the creation of the world; which is that God allowed the non-existent to come into being, after contemplating his own goodness, and finding joy in giving.<sup>69</sup> In the same way God is called light; by which term, however, we must not understand a sensible, but a supra-sensible light; God sees the world even before it comes into being, since he illuminates himself.<sup>70</sup> It is clear that this view would represent God as reason, and not the sole but the universal reason of all;<sup>71</sup> and against this positive determination of the idea of God, Philo has nothing to object.

Perhaps, indeed, it may be conjectured, that in such positive determinations Philo did not intend to be understood as speaking of the supreme God, but of his ministering forces, which he deems worthy of divine worship. For Philo distinguishes between God, as properly so called, and the god so styled in an improper sense, who is, however, only the olden Word of God; the former alone is the God,

<sup>68</sup> De Incorr. Mund. 13, p. 500. ἴσος γὰρ αὐτὸς ἑαυτῷ καὶ ὁμοῖος ὁ Θεός, μᾶλλον ἀνίσταται πρὸς τὸ χεῖρον, μᾶλλον ἐπίσταται πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον δεχόμενος, κ.τ.λ.

<sup>69</sup> De Nom. Mut. 5 fin. p. 585. Διὰ τί γοῦν ἐποίησε τὰ μὴ ὄντα; ὅτι ἀγαθὸς καὶ φιλόδοτος ἦν. Quod Deus Immut. 23, fin. p. 288, 289; Leg. Alleg. i. 14, fin. p. 52. He also makes this distinction: God himself is the giver of good, but the angels the averters of evil; and thus keeps the Deity pure from all contact with evil. Leg. Alleg. iii. 62, p. 122.

<sup>70</sup> Quod Deus Immut. 12, p. 281. Ἐώρα διὸ ὁ Θεός καὶ πρὸ γενέσεως φωτὶ χρώμενος ἑαυτῷ. De Cher. 28, p. 156.

<sup>71</sup> Leg. Alleg. iii. 9, p. 93.

the latter god.<sup>72</sup> But this distinction is not steadily maintained by Philo, either in word or in reality; and, as was to be expected from its very nature, it only serves to involve him in fresh difficulties. The world is the revelation of God in great and in the whole; and it is represented as being formed by the Word of God;<sup>73</sup> and therefore in the very spirit of Philo, the Word of God may be called the creative God. The conjecture, therefore, naturally arises, that in the passages which speak of God the Creator, of his goodness, his benevolence, and other properties, the Word of God is to be understood. This, however, is not the view which Philo follows; but God himself is declared to be the orderer of the world and the first cause; while the Word of God, on the other hand, is regarded as simply the instrument by which all is fashioned.<sup>74</sup> Consequently, the positions of Philo concerning the immutability of God, and his inexpressible nature, which is without qualities or properties, must be viewed simply as an endeavour to think of God absolutely, without reference to the world, which, however seriously he might entertain it, he found it impossible to maintain throughout. If also he says, God belongs not to the relative, and if

<sup>72</sup> De Somn. i. 39, p. 655.

<sup>73</sup> De Monarch. ii. 5, p. 225. Λόγος δὲ ἐστὶν εἰκὼν Θεοῦ, δι' οὗ σύμπας ὁ κόσμος ἰδημιουργεῖτο.

<sup>74</sup> De Cherub. 35, p. 161, sq. 'Ο Θεὸς αἰτίον, οὐκ ὄργανον, τὸ δὲ γινόμενον δι' ὄργανον μὲν, ὑπὸ δὲ αἰτίου πάντως γίνεται. . . . τί οὖν ἐστὶ δημιουργὸς πλὴν τὸ αἰτίον ὑφ' οὗ; . . . εὐρήσεις γὰρ αἰτίον μὲν αὐτοῦ (sc. τοῦ κόσμου) τὸν Θεόν, ὑφ' οὗ γίγνεται ὅλη δὲ τὰ τίςατα στοιχεῖα, ἐξ ὧν συνεκράθη, ὄργανον δὲ λόγον Θεοῦ, δι' οὗ κατασκευάσθη. This is Philo's usual phraseology: but it is not, however, quite fixed; for occasionally it is said that something, e. g. good, is fashioned not only by, but also through, God. Leg. Alleg. i. 18, p. 51.

on this account he would distinguish the working energy of God, by which the world was made, from God himself, in order that God might remain unchanged, after the working of this energy in the creation,<sup>75</sup> this is merely an abstract conception, which could not take firm root in his system, and which he is himself incessantly forced to contradict. Thus he declares it to have been revealed to him by that higher inspiration which he boasts of enjoying, that about God there are two supreme energies, goodness and power; and that by the former he created the world, and by the latter rules it; and that these two are united together by the Word of God, which holds the mean between them, so that by this Word God becomes ruler and good.<sup>76</sup> Such a mode of thinking implies that God must be thought of either as originally good and a sovereign, or else as only having become so by his union with the Word. But, in short, the union of God with his energies cannot be understood in any other sense than as a relative idea, which must necessarily be unchangeably joined with the essence of God. This necessity was, in fact, acknowledged by Philo, since he taught by a symbol, which became very famous in succeeding ages, that God cannot cease

<sup>75</sup> De Mut. Nom. 4, in. p. 582. Τὸ γὰρ ὄν, ὃ ὄν ἐστιν, οὐχὶ τῶν πρὸς τι· αὐτὸ γὰρ ἑαυτοῦ πλήρης καὶ αὐτὸ ἑαυτῷ ἰκανὸν καὶ πρὸ τῆς τοῦ κόσμου γενέσεως καὶ μετὰ τὴν γένεσιν τοῦ παντὸς ἐν ὁμοίῳ. ἀτρεπτον γὰρ καὶ ἀμετάβλητον. . . . τῶν δὲ δυνάμεων, ὧς ἔτεινεν εἰς γένεσιν ἐπ' εὐεργεσίᾳ τοῦ συσταθέντος, ἐνίας συμβίβηκε λίγισθαι ὥσαντι πρὸς τι, τὴν βασιλικήν, τὴν εὐεργετικήν. . . . ταύτων συγγενὴς ἐστὶ καὶ ἡ ποιητικὴ δύναμις, ἡ καλουμένη Θεός· διὰ γὰρ ταύτης τῆς δυνάμεως ἔθηκε τὰ πάντα ὁ γεννήσας καὶ τεχνιτεύσας πατήρ, κ.τ.λ.

<sup>76</sup> De Cherub. 9, p. 143, sq. Λόγῳ γὰρ καὶ ἄρχοντα καὶ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι τὸν Θεόν.

to be active, since it is his peculiar property, in the same way as to burn is the property of fire, and to freeze of snow.<sup>77</sup>

This direction of thought is in fact remarkable. Philo labours to keep the idea of God free from all admixture with ideas of mundane things. On this account he is decidedly hostile to Pantheism, and places the contrariety between God and the world in so strong a light as almost to preclude all intercourse between God and his creatures even by the interposition of the energy or Word of God, whom he seems to make an independent being. By his very nature God is separate from all becoming; the degree of imperfection which distinguishes every other nature from the divine is no small one; everything is different from him in its entire constitution.<sup>78</sup> Out of matter he has, it is true, made all things, but he did so without touching it, for it could not be that the omniscient and the happy should come into contact with shapeless and confused matter.<sup>79</sup> God embraces the whole universe, and yet at the same time he is out of it.<sup>80</sup> But in this direction of thought Philo was unable to maintain himself consistently. All that he could accomplish was to introduce certain intermediate members between the world and God which he designates as the energies or Word of God; nevertheless, as he is

<sup>77</sup> Leg. Alleg. i. 3, p. 44. Παύεται γὰρ οὐδέποτε ποιῶν ὁ Θεός, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἴδιον τὸ καίειν πυρὸς καὶ χιόνος τὸ ψύχειν, οὕτω καὶ Θεοῦ τὸ ποιεῖν.

<sup>78</sup> De Sacrif. Abel. xxviii. 181. "Λμεινον δὲ οὐδὲν ἐπινοῆσαι θίμης τοῦ αἰτίου, ὅποτε οὐδὲ ἴσον, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ὀλίγῃ καταδείσκειν. ἀλλ' ὅλῃ γίνεαι καταβεβηκὸς ἅπαν τὸ μετὰ θεὸν εὐρίσκεται.

<sup>79</sup> De Vict. Offer. xiii. 261, fin.

<sup>80</sup> De Posterit. Caini, v. 228, sq.

driven to make these the means by which God originally made all things, and which he keeps in dependence on himself, the determinations, which he would restrict to the energies alone, ultimately apply to God himself. Thus God is designated as the creator and governor of the world—the first cause; he is depicted as good and beneficent, and (notwithstanding that in other passages his essence is declared to be unknowable) the object of the most beautiful sciences.<sup>81</sup> The attempt in short is futile, and only serves to evince the tendency of Philo's ideas, which however found their limitation in another direction of his philosophy.

Between these two directions Philo's whole system fluctuates, which is also disturbed by a further source of vacillation. The wider the chasm between God and the world appeared to him, the less disposed was he to concede to man a knowledge of God. When, therefore, he looks to the limited nature of mundane things, he considers a full and perfect intuition of God to be impossible. But, on the other hand, he feels conscious of a desire in human reason for the highest and true perfection, and therefore is indisposed to deny to man all hope of a thorough insight into the divine nature. To this point of view we must refer the fact that he ascribes to man no other perception of God than what is as it were a reflection from a mirror.<sup>82</sup> This idea he indeed carries out so far as not to con-

<sup>81</sup> De Vict. Off. xiii. fin. 262. *Τί γὰρ μάθημα κάλλιον ἐπιστήμης τοῦ ὄντως ὄντος θεοῦ;*

<sup>82</sup> De Decal. xxi. fin. 198, *Ὡς γὰρ διὰ κατόπτρου φαντασιούται ὁ νοῦς θεὸν ὁρῶντα καὶ κοσμοποιούντα καὶ τῶν ὅλων ἐπιτροπεύοντα.* De Vita Cont. x. 483, fin.

cede even to Moses a perfect contemplation of divinity. Human discernment goes no further than a cognizance of God's existence. By the powers subordinate to him, and by his operations, man learns to know God; these, however, reveal to man his existence and not his essence. If man say that God can be seen, this can only be true in an improper sense. Philo treats this desire, to know more of God than simply that he exists, as the extreme of folly.<sup>83</sup> Consistently enough with his own views, he maintains in support of this opinion that in his essence God is nothing else than the existent, of which in short nothing beyond existence can be known. But even in this distinction between the essence and the existence of God we clearly discern a strong sense of the necessity of understanding by God something more than simple existence. The process by which, through the desire of perfection which is inherent in the reason, Philo was led to the opposite view, may be traced clearly enough in the way in which he represents the effort to contemplate God as the way to perfect felicity.<sup>84</sup> But, alas! human powers are inadequate to attain to this supreme end. In himself no one has power to see God; but God must show himself to him. Even when Philo is speaking of an imperfect knowledge of God, he expressly makes an objection to the presumptuous idea that man by

<sup>83</sup> De Poster. Caini, xlviii. 258. Τὸ δὲ ὁρατὸν εἶναι τὸ ὄν οὐ κυριολογεῖται, κατάχρησις δι' ἔστιν, ἐφ' ἑκάστην αὐτοῦ τῶν δυνάμεων ἀναφερομένου. . . . . ἀνθρώπου γὰρ ἱκανεῖ λογισμῷ μέχρι τοῦ καταμαθεῖν, ὅτι ἔστι τι καὶ ὑπάρχει τὸ τῶν ὄλων αἰτιον, προελθεῖν. περαιτέρω δὲ καὶ σπουδάζειν τρίπρασθαι, ὥς περὶ οὐσίας ἡ ποιότητος ζητεῖν, ὡγύγιός τις ἡλιθιότης. . . . . αὐται (sc. αἱ δυνάμεις) γὰρ οὐ τὴν οὐσίαν, τὴν δὲ ὑπαρξιν ἐκ τῶν ἀποτελουμένων αὐτοῖς παριστᾶσι.

<sup>84</sup> De Vita Cont. ii. 473.



his own powers can ever see God, it is not man that sees God, but God that manifests himself to him.<sup>85</sup> This view evidently hints at some mystical process in the contemplation of God, and such a conception clearly affords ample scope for the hypothesis of an inconceivable enlargement of human faculties beyond the limits affixed to them by man's circumscribed position in the world. By such enlargement man is to acquire a true contemplation of God, not through a mirror, not through this world, through his shadow or his Word, but in himself. Now to that very Moses, to whom, as we recently saw, nothing was conceded beyond the knowledge of God, we now find Philo ascribing a contemplation of God in himself. We must not here omit to observe that this supreme knowledge of God necessarily comprises also a knowledge of the lowest,—the powers of God and of the world.<sup>86</sup> In this supreme science man is no more led by the powers or angels of God, but by God himself, and as he advances he keeps pace with these forces of God, so as ultimately to deserve to be placed on an equality with them.<sup>87</sup>

<sup>85</sup> De Poster. Caini, v. fin. 229; de Abrah. xvii. fin. p. 13. "Ὅς ἐνεκεν φιλανθρωπίας ἀφικνουμένην τὴν ψυχὴν ὡς αὐτὸν οὐκ ἀπιστρέφῃ, προὔπαντήσας δὲ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ φύσιν ἰδείξει, καθ' ὅσον οἷόν τ' ἦν ἰδεῖν τὸν βλέποντα, διδὲ λίγεται, οὐχ ὅτι ὁ σοφὸς εἶδε θεόν, ἀλλ' ὅτι ὁ θεὸς ὥφθη τῷ σοφῷ. καὶ γὰρ ἦν ἀδύνατον καταλαβεῖν τινὰ δι' αὐτοῦ τὸ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν ὃν μὴ παραφύνατος ἐκείνου ἑαυτὸ καὶ παραδείξαντος.

<sup>86</sup> Leg. Alleg. iii. 33, 107. "Ἔστι δὲ τις τελειώτερος καὶ μᾶλλον κεκαθαρμένος νοῦς, τὰ μεγάλα μυστήρια μνηθεῖς, ὅστις οὐκ ἀπὸ τῶν γεγονότων τὸ αἴτιον γνωρίζει, ὡς ἂν ἀπὸ σκιᾶς τὸ μῖνον, ἀλλ' ὑπερέψας τὸ γιννῆτόν ἐμφασιν ἑναργῇ τοῦ ἀγεννήτου λαμβάνει, ὡς ἀπ' αὐτοῦ αὐτὸν καταλαμβάνειν καὶ τὴν σκιὰν αὐτοῦ, ὅπερ ἦν τὸν τε λόγον καὶ τόνδε τὸν κόσμον. . . . . μὴ δὲ κατοπτρισαίμην ἐν ἄλλῃ τινὶ τὴν σὴν ἰδέαν, ἢ ἐν σοὶ τῷ θεῷ.

<sup>87</sup> De Migr. Abrah. xxxi. 463.

On such a vacillating basis it was impossible to found a stable theory of the world and its relations. In order to investigate Philo's views on these subjects, we must in the first place attend to his doctrine of the energies of God. These he expressly distinguishes from God himself, considering them as his instruments, as his ministers in the formation of the world.<sup>88</sup> They are partly beneficent, partly vindictive, although even the latter have alone good in view, since punishment is intended only for the suppression of evil.<sup>89</sup> That in his representations of these ministering powers, Philo ascribed to them a proper existence and personality, is obvious from many of his statements on this head. He considers, it is true, these ministering powers collectively as the supra-sensible world, as the world of ideas, in which view he appears willing to adopt the Platonic doctrine without modification.<sup>90</sup> He also says, that to speak plainly and without figure, the supra-sensible world is nothing else than the Word of God, which thus indeed forms the world.<sup>91</sup> But the world is also of itself regarded by Philo as a personal being, since he calls it the firstborn Son of God, or the firstborn angel—the many-named archangel, and even lauds it as the God of imperfect things—the second God.<sup>92</sup> If further proof be

<sup>88</sup> De Poster. Caini, vi. 229; de Vict. Offer. xiii. 261, fin.

<sup>89</sup> De Conf. Ling. xxxiv. 431.

<sup>90</sup> De Vict. Offer. xiii. 261, fin. Ταῖς δυνάμεσιν, ὡν ἔννομον ὄνομα αἱ ἰδίαι.

<sup>91</sup> De Creat. Mundi, vi. 5. Εἰ δέ τις ἐθειλήσειε γυμνοτέρως χρῆσθαι τοῖς ὀνόμασιν, οὐδὲν ἂν ἕτερον εἰποι τὸν νοητὸν εἶναι κόσμον ἢ τοῦ λόγου ἤδη κοσμοποιούντος.

<sup>92</sup> De Agricult. xii. 308; de Conf. Ling. xxviii. 427; Leg. Alleg. iii. 73, 128; Fragm. ap. Euseb. Præp. Ev. vii. 13, 625, ed. Mang.

required, we need only appeal to his doctrine of angelic natures, which he compares with the heroes of the Greeks and their demons, with which, agreeably to a view borrowed from the Pythagoreans, the air is full, and which Philo makes to enter as souls into the bodies of mortal men, and in fixed periods again to raise themselves out of them.<sup>93</sup> Now these angels are also called Words of God,<sup>94</sup> and it is said that with them, as with incorporeal essences and immortal souls, the divine locality and holy space, i. e. the supra-sensible world, is filled.<sup>95</sup> Philo, therefore, it is plain regards the Words of God partly as persons, and partly tends to connect the doctrine of angels with that of the ideas, and thereby to constitute the single ideas as much as the world of ideas itself into separate essences.

Philo's theory of the communication of the world with God by means of the ideas, is in details extremely complicated. It would seem that the necessity of deferring in his allegorical exposition to certain passages of Scripture had not been without its influence. On the whole he asserts that the powers of God are indeterminable as God himself,<sup>96</sup> and also that the angels are, like the stars, innumerable. But at the same time he felt it advisable to

<sup>93</sup> De Somn. i. 22, 641, sq.

<sup>94</sup> Leg. Alleg. iii. 62, 122; de Conf. Ling. viii. fin. 409, &c.

<sup>95</sup> De Somn. i. 21, 640. *Εἰδέναι δὲ νῦν προσήκει, ὅτι ὁ θεὸς τόπος καὶ ἡ ἐν αὐτῇ χώρᾳ πλήρης ἀσωμάτων ἐστὶ λόγων· ψυχὰς δὲ εἰσὶν ἀθάνατοι οἱ λόγοι οὗτοι.* In some other passages, ib. xix. 638; xxiii. 643, this doctrine is applied in a different manner from that which we have lately been speaking of.

<sup>96</sup> De Sacrif. Abel. xv. 173. *Ἀπερίγραφος γὰρ ὁ θεός, ἀπερίγραφοι καὶ αἱ δυνάμεις αὐτοῦ.* De Creat. Mundi, vi. 5, *Ἀπερίγραφοι γὰρ αὗται καὶ ἀτελεύητοι.*

bring this innumerable number under certain general divisions, in order to render them in some degree conceivable, or at least explicable.<sup>97</sup> At times he makes six to be the number of the highest energies which go forth from the supreme God; at other times he rejects this number as too large for a notional classification, but again wavers between two or three, or rather doubts if it be not better to reduce all of them under one collective force—the Word of God. The two highest forces he designates sometimes as creative goodness and governing mercy, at others as beneficence and retribution.<sup>98</sup> But the union of these two he again places either in God himself or in his Word.<sup>99</sup> This uncertainty is obviously connected with his general vagueness of view, which goes so far as to lead him at one time to venerate God himself as the creator, and at others to regard the creative energy as distinct from him. Now if the Word of God is to be considered the connecting link between the two supreme energies, this supposition is nearly equivalent to the view which comprehends all the divine forces in the Word; which therefore indicates the supreme idea, and comprises all others in itself. Perhaps indeed we ought to regard this as the favourite opinion of Philo, for

<sup>97</sup> De Profug. xviii. 560.

<sup>98</sup> De Sacrif. Abel. xv. 173; de Abrah. xxiv. 19; de Vita Mos. iii. 8, p. 150; de Conf. Ling. xxxiv. 431; Quis Rer. Div. Her. xxxiv. fin. 504.

<sup>99</sup> De Sacr. Abel. xv. 173. Ὁ θεὸς δορυφορούμενος ὑπὸ δυνεὶ τῶν ἀνωτάτω δυνάμεων, ἀρχῆς τε αὐτῆς καὶ ἀγαθότητος, εἰς ὧν ὁ μῖσος. De Abrah. xxiv. 18, sq.; de Profug. xix. 561; de Cherub. ix. 143, sq. Κατὰ τὸν ἵνα ὄντως ὄντα θεὸν δύο τὰς ἀνωτάτω εἶναι καὶ πρῶτας δυνάμεις, ἀγαθότητα καὶ ἰξουσίαν. καὶ ἀγαθότητι μὲν τὸ πᾶν γεγεννηκῆναι, ἰξουσίᾳ δὲ τοῦ γεννηθέντος ἀρχεῖν. τρίτον δὲ συναγωγὴν ἀμφοῖν μίσσιν εἶναι λόγον· λόγῳ γὰρ καὶ ἀρχοντα καὶ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι τὸν θεόν.

besides the fact that the divine Word plays a prominent part in his theory, pervading it throughout, and indicating the relation which subsists between the unknown God and his revelations of himself,<sup>100</sup> it moreover harmonizes perfectly with his predilection for the ideal theory of Plato, which has led him to make the divine Word represent the universal place of ideas—the supra-sensible world—the idea of ideas.<sup>101</sup>

As, then, according to this view, the Word of God is the being who serves as the organ of the creation, Philo assigns to him a twofold relation—connecting him on the one hand with God, and on the other with the world. This relation is illustrated by that which subsists between an inward and an expressed thought (*λόγος ἐνδιάθετος, προφορικός*). The world of ideas which is within God, finds, he says, a manifestation in the sensible world, and the latter bears the same relation to the former, as the emanated does to its eternal source.<sup>102</sup> After this explanation, we are able to understand why, according to a view already noticed, Philo held it to be impossible for mundane beings to be cognizant of God, or of the ideas in their absolute purity. So far, indeed, as the ideas have entered into the world, are they accessible to it; the pure reason may indeed comprehend them, but that reason, which in the sensible world is mixed up with sensation, is incapable of

<sup>100</sup> Hereon is founded the opposition between *λόγος* and the *λίγων αὐτός*. De Sacrif. Abel. xviii. 175. 'Ο γὰρ θεὸς λίγων ἅμα ἰποίει. Hereto also we must refer the passage, de Ebriet, viii. 361, sq. where God is described as the father, but his science or wisdom, which is not different from the *λόγος*, as the mother of the world.

<sup>101</sup> De Creat. Mundi, v. 4; vi. 5.

<sup>102</sup> De Vita Mos. iii. 13, p. 154.

more than glancing at copies of the ideas.<sup>103</sup> On the same ground Philo further asserts, that the energies of God are ineffable by man.<sup>104</sup> Yet, for all this, it is pretty clear that man is not precluded from a hope that, at some time or other, if not perhaps in the present life, he may emancipate himself from the fetters of sensation, and by some mysterious road or other, rise to a perception of the pure idea: for Philo frequently speaks of the Word of God and the ideas as objects of human cognition, by means of which man may acquire a knowledge of the divine, even though this knowledge be limited to the discovery that the divine essence is in its nature very different from all human conceptions of it.<sup>105</sup> It is in this sense that he gives to the Word of God the title of the Interpreter.<sup>106</sup>

This doctrine of the powers of God, which, though they are to be strictly distinguished from God, and do not in any way affect his essence, are nevertheless essentially united to him, possesses a striking affinity to the view which explains the existence of the world as an emanation from God. Philo openly adopted this view, although, as will subsequently appear, he was unable to carry it out with due rigour of consequence. However, all the essential features of the theory of emanation may be

<sup>103</sup> De Monarch. i. 6, p. 218, sq. God says, Μήτ' οὖν ἐμὲ, μήτε τινὰ τῶν ἐμῶν δυνάμεων κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν ἐλπίσῃς ποτὶ δυνήσεσθαι καταλαβεῖν. τῶν δὲ ἰφικτῶν, ὡς εἶπον, ἑτοιμῶς καὶ προθύμως μεταδίδωμι.

<sup>104</sup> De Migr. Abrah. viii. 442. Νικῶνται γὰρ ὑπὸ τῶν τοῦ ὄντος δυνάμεων οἱ περὶ αὐτὸν (αὐτῶν?) ἅπαντες ἅπαξ λόγοι.

<sup>105</sup> De Somn. i. 11, 630; Leg. Alleg. iii. 73, 128; Quod Deus Immut. i. 273; de Conf. Ling. xx. 419.

<sup>106</sup> Leg. Alleg. i. 1.

distinctly recognized in the description which he gives of the Deity as a light which not only illuminates himself, but also emits a thousand rays, which collectively go to form the supra-sensible world of his energies.<sup>107</sup> And the same theory is again distinctly traceable, where Philo compares, under an image which has previously been noticed, the operation by which God becomes the cause of the world with that of fire, by which it emits heat, and snow gives forth cold. For the images by which this procedure is illustrated, lead us to consider it as a process of nature, in which God emits the mundane forces out of himself, or rather allows their emanation to go on, without experiencing any change in himself; while, at the same time, it is clearly implied that these powers, inasmuch as they are emitted from God, are on that account inferior to him, and that with them a descending series of being commences. The same view is also strongly implied in the names which Philo employs to designate his idea of the divine Word, which he believes to be most aptly described as the image, or still more adequately, as the shadow, of God.<sup>108</sup> But at this beginning of a descending series, Philo is not content to stop, but proceeds to teach us that in the same way that God is the prototype of the Word, so again the Word is the archetype of other things, and of man among the rest.<sup>109</sup> Again, as God

<sup>107</sup> De Cherub. xxviii. 156. *Αὐτὸς δὲ ὡν ἀρχέτυπος ἀγγὴ μυρίας ἀκτῖνας ἐκβάλλει, ὧν οὐδεμία ἐστὶν αἰσθητή, νοηταὶ δὲ αἱ ἅπασαι.* This image is applied somewhat differently, de Somn. i. 19, p. 638.

<sup>108</sup> De Monarch. ii. 5, p. 225; Leg. Alleg. ii. 31, 106. *Σκιά θεοῦ δι' ὃ λόγος αὐτοῦ ἐστίν.*

<sup>109</sup> Leg. Alleg. i. 1. *"Ὡσπερ γάρ ὁ θεὸς παράδειγμα τῆς εἰκόνος, ἣν σκιάν νυνὶ κέκληκεν, οὕτως ἡ εἰκὼν ἄλλων γίνεται παράδειγμα.*

condescends to be a radiating light, so by a further application of the same figure, the forces, which are around God continually, are said to emit a like resplendent light.<sup>110</sup> Now not to lose ourselves amid these various symbols, we shall dismiss them with the remark, that it was quite consistent in Philo, who held the Word of God to be the supreme idea and energy of God, to assume the existence of lower and inferior forces which bear the same relation to the Word as it does to God himself, or as the lower ideas to the higher. And it is a further result of the same direction of thought, to represent the angels as an intermediate order of being, between the rays of divine light and the human soul. And thus, though it is only in its highest and most exalted state that the human soul is illuminated directly by the divine rays, still even in its state of degradation it is able to contemplate the light of angels.<sup>111</sup>

This theory of a descending scale of emanation apparently implies the necessity of finding some mode of transition to the sphere of imperfection which exists in the world, from the sphere of perfection, (to which belongs God, and to which also in a certain degree the supreme forces which are the

<sup>110</sup> Quod Deus Immut. xvii. 284. Δυνάμεις —, αἱ περὶ αὐτὸν οὐσαι λαμπρότατον φῶς ἀναστράπτουσιν.

<sup>111</sup> De Somn. i. 19, p. 638. Ἡ ἀσκητικὴ διάνοια . . . ὅταν μὲν εὐφορῇ καὶ πρὸς τὸ ὕψος αἵρηται, ταῖς ἀρχετύποις καὶ ἀσωμάτοις ἀκτίσι τῆς λογικῆς πηγῆς τοῦ τελειοφόρου θεοῦ περιλάμπεται, ὅταν δὲ καταβαίνει καὶ ἀφορῇ, ταῖς ἱκείνων εἰκόσιν, ἀθανάτοις λόγοις, οὓς καλεῖν ἔθος ἀγγέλους. In what follows it is worthy of remark, that the divine rays are called *πράγματα*, or real things, in opposition to their images, *λόγοι*, in direct contradiction to the Platonic phraseology, which, however, was not steadily adhered to by others of the later Platonists, Ib. xxiii. 643.



immediate effluxes of the divine essence must, as its true types be ascribed.) That strong sense of the imperfection and evil of this world, which we have more than once noticed as characteristic of Oriental ideas, is strikingly manifested in Philo, who in connection with it evinces also a strong disposition to exalt to the utmost the idea of God, and to remove it entirely from all contact and intercourse with evil. Philo, it is true, enumerates the power of vengeance among the immediate emanations from God, but at the same time he carefully subjoins the remark, that no evil is introduced into the world by this punitive energy, but that it is exclusively subservient to good. This tendency has led him further to attribute to subordinate ministers all those operations which appeared to him unbefitting the divine excellence.<sup>112</sup> In short, the doctrine of Philo is throughout pervaded with the idea that good alone can spring from God, and that, consequently, whatever evil is found in the world owes its origin to a different source.<sup>113</sup> Now to discover this source, we need not look beyond his theory of a descending series of emanations. For according to this theory, which Philo had adopted in its general spirit, whatever proceeds from another cannot be perfect, by its very nature it is passive—action is the property of God alone.<sup>114</sup> Philo therefore

<sup>112</sup> De Conf. Ling. xxxiv. 431.

<sup>113</sup> De Creat. Mundi, xxiv. 17. "Ἔδει γὰρ ἀναίτιον εἶναι κακοῦ τὸν πατέρα τοῖς ἐγγύνοις. It is remarkable that in this passage where Philo follows the traditional history of the creation, he admits that God can form also the ἀδιάφορα. De Conf. Ling. xxxv. 432.

<sup>114</sup> De Cherub. xxiv. 153. "Ἴδιον μὲν δὴ θεοῦ τὸ ποιεῖν, ὃ οὐ θίμις ἐκπράσασθαι γεννητῶ, ἴδιον δὲ γεννητοῦ τὸ πάσχειν. The forces of God are,

was perfectly consistent in regarding the Word as merely the work or organ of God. Now as he proceeded with his series of dependent orders of existence, he naturally arrived at grades of being more and more imperfect, and as he regarded this gradation as a scale of subordinate and contrary ideas, he was necessarily led to adopt the view that the world is composed of opposite qualities which reciprocally limit each other.<sup>116</sup> In this mutual limitation then, he thought he saw a sufficient explanation of the imperfection discoverable in the system of the world. Indeed, Philo followed out this view so far as to hold that even the perfect power of the Deity himself is limited by the physical incapacity of all mundane things to receive the gifts of the divine mercy.<sup>116</sup> It was on this ground that he ventured to assert that God employs the pure forces against himself, but mixed ones against all that comes into being, because the latter is incapable of enduring the purity of the former.<sup>117</sup>

For all the purposes of the philosophical problem which Philo had proposed to himself, he might have been content to stop here. But he was carried further by an interest of a practical nature to which, however, a theoretical question in all probability attached itself. For although Philo was led by his theory of emanations to admit a descending series of

it is true, termed ἀγίννητοι; but the Word of God is also called the first-born of God.

<sup>116</sup> De Incorrupt. Mundi, xx. 507.

<sup>116</sup> Quod Deus Immut. xvii. 284, sq. Εἰδὼς τοίνυν ὁ δημιουργὸς τὰς περὶ αὐτὸν ἐν ἅπασιν τοῖς ἀρίστοις ὑπερβολὰς καὶ τὴν τῶν γεγονότων, εἰ καὶ σφόδρα μεγαλαυχοῖεν, φυσικὴν ἀσθένειαν, οὐτε εὐεργετοῖν, οὐτε κολάζειν, ὡς δύναται, βούλεται, ἀλλ' ὡς ἔχοντας ὁρᾷ δυνάμειος τοὺς ἐκατέρου μετέξοντας.

<sup>117</sup> L. 1.

being continually less perfect, still these several gradations of existence were supposed to lie within the sphere of the supra-sensible and therefore eternal world, and consequently to be exempt from change and becoming. In this manner nothing but ideas, which moreover are conceived of as spirits, are as yet produced. But now if there be a sensible and changeable world and corporeal things within it, the existence of these still requires explanation. For this purpose then, Philo found ready to his hand the idea of matter as it was exhibited by Grecian philosophy.<sup>118</sup> This notion he adopted pretty nearly in the Stoical sense of it, although at times he evinces a disposition to employ it after the manner of Plato or Aristotle. For while he would describe matter to be a blind, inanimate force, the difficulty seems to have occurred to him, that the operation of such a force in the sensible world is calculated to limit the power of God; and he consequently felt disposed to represent it as a non-being<sup>119</sup> or mere potentiality, and with this view to combine, as not inconsistent with it, the Stoical dogma, that matter is a mere passivity. At the same time, he unhesitatingly advanced the opinion that it is a corporeal mass, devoid alike of form and properties, which in itself is inert and quiescent, resisting motion in space, but yet capable, when set in motion, of entering into every possible form and mode.<sup>120</sup> Thus, then, we have the imperfection of

<sup>118</sup> De Cherub. xxxv. 162.

<sup>119</sup> Quod Deus Immut. xxv. 290. Γένεσις δὲ ἡ μὲν ἀγωγή καὶ ὁδὸς τίς ἐστιν ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος εἰς τὸ εἶναι. De Nom. Mut. v. fin. p. 585; De Creat. Mundi, xxvi. fin. p. 19; de Somn. i. 13, fin. p. 632.

<sup>120</sup> De Creat. Mundi, ii. 2. Τὸ δὲ παθητικὸν ἄψυχον καὶ ἀκίνητον ἐξ αὐτοῦ.

mundane things presented in another and different form of view from what it would appear in, if it had been accounted for in perfect agreement with the ideas which Philo had previously advanced. The imperfection exhibited in this world is no longer referred for its cause to the gradually increasing defectibility of all emanated objects, but it now appears to have its ground in a positive force or principle, which, being by its nature blind and irrational, is incapable of adopting truth into itself, but which troubles and corrupts the clear essence of reason whenever it comes into contact with it.<sup>121</sup> After such an explanation of matter, we are able to understand why Philo found himself constrained to draw a wide and essential distinction between the pure ideas or angels, and the creatures of this world, who simply by their dependence on matter, are necessarily estranged from them.

But this explanation of matter was not uninfluenced by the practical interests which Philo had in view in his philosophical scheme, i. e. by his doctrine of human liberty, which must be regarded as the basis of all his precepts to, and requirements of, humanity. In order to establish the validity of this doctrine, Philo thought it sufficient to appeal to the simple principle, that in every contrariety, one member necessitates the other. As then, it is undeniable that the necessary exists in the system of the world, it follows that the free also is to be found

Ib. v. 5. *Ὀυσίᾳ . . . δυνάμιν γείνεσθαι πάντα ἣν μὲν γὰρ ἐξ ἑαυτῆς ἄτακτος.*

<sup>121</sup> De Ebriet. ix. 362; Quod Deus Immut. xvii. 284, sq.; de Nom. Mut. vi. 585.

in it.<sup>122</sup> This principle, however, has the appearance of being brought forward simply to hide the difficulty in which Philo found himself involved, by advancing a doctrine, which in so many respects came into collision with his other principles, and which he must have been aware had formed one of the chief grounds of dispute between the Stoics and the Academicians. He himself trenched in some measure on this debated ground, by advancing the position that man is of a mixed nature, capable alike of good and evil.<sup>123</sup> The grave difficulties which such a position immediately suggests, must have appeared peculiarly weighty to Philo as having to admit in mundane things a twofold dependence, by which they are connected on the one hand with the divine nature, and with matter on the other. After ascribing as he does activity to God alone, and mere passivity to created things, and after teaching that God influences the soul at pleasure, and that human works are as nought,<sup>124</sup> what degree of freedom did he in fact leave to the human will? But if human liberty be irreconcilable with the divine operations as explained by Philo, still more so is it with the resistance or influence of matter; for while the divine is alone free, the material, he says, is necessary.<sup>125</sup> Thus, then, does the human soul

<sup>122</sup> De Confus. Ling. xxxv. 432. "Εδει γὰρ καὶ τὸ ἀντίπαλον τῷ ἀκουσίῳ, τὸ ἰκούσιον, εἰς τὴν τοῦ παντός συμπλήρωσιν κατασκευασθὲν ἀναδειχθῆναι.

<sup>123</sup> De Creat. Mundi, xxiv. 17. Τὰ δὲ τῆς μικτῆς ἐστὶ φύσεως, ὥσπερ ἄνθρωπος, ὃς ἐκιδίχεται τὰ ἑναντία, φρόνησιν καὶ ἀφροσύνην, κ.τ.λ. According to de Conf. Ling. xxxv. 432, man alone is in this case, but it applies also to the less perfect angels.

<sup>124</sup> Leg. Alleg. ii. 21, p. 82.

<sup>125</sup> De Somn. ii. 38, p. 692. Καὶ γὰρ ὁ μὲν θεὸς ἰκούσιον, ἀνάγκη δὲ ἡ οὐσία. Quis Rer. Div. Her. lv. 512. Ταῖς σώματος ἀνάγκαις.

appear to vacillate between two opposite constraining forces, alike beyond its control. And it is even in this light that it is in fact regarded by Philo, who, indeed, particularly insists upon the necessity which it lies under by reason of its dependence on the divine First Cause. Thus he says: in the soul that has been fructified by God, good springs up by the simple provision of nature, and without the aid of art. As the divine grace produces whatever takes place in the human reason, it rather allows its own conclusions and activities to proceed than actually originates them, and it is, as it were, emancipated from free volition.<sup>126</sup> Every good disposition of the soul is brought about by the guidance of God, and, on the other hand, every evil one also is no less the result of the divine will, since it is the effect of those sensual desires which matter gives rise to in man. With some men, indeed, it is impossible for them to profit even by the good which God has placed within them. Moreover, Philo does not hesitate to affirm that the bad become so by the wrath of God, as much as the good are made such by his mercy, although he is constrained to qualify this assertion by teaching that it is only in an improper sense that wrath can be ascribed to the Deity.<sup>127</sup> It is rather to be referred to the constraint of nature than to God, if men are irrationally carried away

<sup>126</sup> De Migr. Abrah. vii. 441. Τότε μελίται μὲν καὶ πόνοι καὶ ἀσκήσεις ἡσυχάζουσιν, ἀναδίδονται δὲ ἀνευ τέχνης φύσειως προμηθεῖα πάντα ἄθροα, πᾶσιν ὠφέλιμα. καλεῖται δὲ ἡ φορὰ τῶν αὐτοματιζομένων ἀγαθῶν ἀφίσις, ἐπειδὴ περ ὁ νοῦς ἀφίσταται τῶν κατὰ τὰς ἰδίας ἐπιβολὰς ἐνεργειῶν καὶ ὥσπερ τῶν ἐκουσίων ἡλευθέρηται διὰ τὴν πληθὺν τῶν ὑομένων καὶ ἀδιαστάτως ἐπομβρούντων.

<sup>127</sup> Ib. xxvi. 462, sq. Leg. Alleg. i. 13, p. 50; Quod Deus Immut. xx. 283, Οἱ μὲν φαῦλοι θυμῷ γεγονῶσι θεοῦ, οἱ δ' ἀγαθοὶ χάριτι.

by the current of external perceptions.<sup>128</sup> Philo, moreover, asserts that the course of natural things continually carries man further away from the original purity and perfection in which he was created by God. Accordingly he explains the fall of our first parent as simply a natural event, and is of opinion that all subsequently born are gradually less capable of resisting sin, as being more and more affected by the principle of becoming in matter which is its natural cause.<sup>129</sup> Thus then nothing is peculiar to man, neither good nor evil; God works on his reason, and matter on the irrational motions of sensibility.<sup>130</sup> Thus, it must be confessed, Philo's theoretical views must have suggested to him many grounds for doubting the possibility of human liberty. If, therefore, he nevertheless adhered to a belief in it, and to a firm conviction of its truth, we must unquestionably ascribe this persuasion to the practical tendency of his mind. The warm interest which he felt in exhorting men to the practice of virtue, led him to insist that if they are miserable they are so by their own guilt alone, and that therefore they deserve to be punished or rewarded according as they follow vice or virtue. But, he argues, if man be not free it would be unjust to punish him for his evil deeds, and in fact he cannot truly be said to be guilty of sin.<sup>131</sup> Now such an

<sup>128</sup> De Sacrif. Abel. xxxii. fin. Ἀλόγως ὑπὸ τῆς τῶν ἐκτὸς αἰσθήσεων φορᾶς ἀγόμενος.

<sup>129</sup> De Creat. Mundi, xlvii. sqq., p. 32, sqq.; Quis Rex. Div. Her. lix. 515; de Nom. Mut. vi. 585; de Vita Mos. iii. 17, p. 157.

<sup>130</sup> De Cherub. xxii. 152; xxxii. 159. Ἐγὼ γ' οὖν ἐκ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος συνεστώς, νοῦν, λόγον, αἰσθησὶν ἔχειν δοκῶν οὐδὲν αὐτῶν ἴδιον εὐρίσκω. Ib. xxxiii. in. p. 160.

<sup>131</sup> Leg. Alleg. i. 13, p. 50. Βούλεται τὰ θεῖα δίκαια εἰσαγαγεῖν· ὁ μὲν

opinion probably appeared to Philo to be justified in some measure by his general view of human nature as holding an intermediate position between God and matter, and that consequently it is in man's power to apply either to the one or the other, and to choose between the two; either yielding to the constraining force of matter, or devoting himself to the service of God, which will furnish the true freedom of will and the pure light of reason.<sup>132</sup>

The reader who has attentively followed thus far the exposition of Philo's doctrine, cannot fail to have observed that it is in all its parts devoid of consistency, and of coherence in the development of its fundamental positions. It contains propositions borrowed from widely conflicting views and opinions, which are either imperfectly apprehended or slightly alluded to, without any attempt to refer them to any adequate and extensive principle. In our judgment, indeed, Philo seems to hesitate half way between the Grecian and the Oriental cast of thought; he appears to have a suspicion of the peculiar truths which are contained in each, but to be unable either to give expression to this conjecture, or to form a due estimate of their comparative merits, to point out their essential difference, and to determine from a higher point of view the amount of their respective claims to his assent. Such is the doubtful and unstable position which Philo everywhere maintains. Nevertheless, there

οὐν μὴ ἱμπνευσθεῖς τὴν ἀληθινὴν ζωὴν, ἀλλ' ἀπειρος ὢν ἀρετῆς, κολαζόμενος, ἐφ' οἷς ἡμαρτεν, εἶπεν ἐν, ὡς ἀδίκως κολάζεται, κ.τ.λ. Quod Deus Immut. x. 279.

<sup>132</sup> Leg. Alleg. iii. 69, p. 125; de Creat. Mund. xxiv. 17; Quod Deus Immut. x. 279.



is, we must admit, one point to which, in the midst of his general vacillation, Philo steadily adheres ; and this is the aspiration after a higher degree of excellence than the present sphere of man's existence apparently admits of. His soul seems to have been possessed with a lively sense of the evil and misery which encompass mankind. His writings contain many expressions of this feeling, in the earnestness of which he frequently exhorts men to strive with the utmost diligence to attain to a higher and better position than they actually hold ; it is, indeed, the moving principle of his entire doctrine, which is thoroughly devoted to the practical improvement of mankind, chiding, exhorting, and encouraging them. His scientific speculations have for their exclusive object, the endeavour to furnish mankind with a right basis and principle of practice. And having given them this direction, he probably thought that for such a purpose it did not require to be elaborately worked out, and that he was at liberty to use every available argument, whence-soever derived, as a stimulus to the moral exertions of mankind. Those, however, who are duly impressed with the closeness of the connection which subsists between theory and practice, are naturally apprehensive lest this indecision of theory should have exercised an unfavourable influence on his practical precepts. Unfortunately, we shall find that this apprehension is more than justified in the case of Philo, as soon as we proceed to investigate his views of human life and pursuits.

Our previous exposition has shown us, that the point to which Philo mainly sought to direct the

efforts of mankind, was the elevation of themselves to that supreme excellence in which the better element of the human constitution had its origin. As he explained the system of the world, with its inherent evil, to be a descending gradation of the divine energy, he naturally recommended, as the means of its correction, a return and ascent from the mundane to the divine. On this point, however, his instructions are vague and uncertain, in consequence of his inability to determine the precise point to which human exertion can attain in this direction. For although his practical view was in general founded on the conviction that the divine essence is inaccessible to mortal and changeable natures, and that man cannot know and worship it, except indirectly in its energies, still he frequently deviates from this opinion. For, in fact, Philo could not make up his mind to shut out the human mind altogether from that highest aspiration which has for its object the contemplation of God himself, and accordingly he conceded that, although this lofty height can never be actually reached, it is still good and right for man to strive to come as near to it as possible.<sup>133</sup> To this admission we must further ascribe the distinction which Philo drew between the sons of God and the sons of his Word; the former being capable of contemplating God himself, but the latter only his image; which distinction he advances, notwithstanding the

<sup>133</sup> De Conf. Ling. 20, fin. p. 419. 'Εμπρεπὲς γὰρ τοῖς ἱταίριαν πρὸς ἐπιστήμην θεμίνοις ἰφίσταται μὲν τοῦτον ἰδεῖν· εἰ δὲ μὴ δύναιντο, τὴν γοῶν εἰκόνα αὐτοῦ, τὸν ἱερώτατον λόγον, μεθ' ὃν καὶ τὸ ἐν αἰσθητοῖς τελειότατον ἔργον, τόνδε τὸν κόσμον. τὸ γὰρ φιλοσοφεῖν οὐδὲν ἢν ἄλλο ἢ ταῦτα σπουδάζειν ἀκριβῶς ἰδεῖν.

doubt which he avows of the existence among mortal men of any such sons of God.<sup>134</sup> This view of the inaccessible nature of the supreme good is again clearly implied when Philo, after speaking of wisdom as actually existing, and of the sage and the votary of wisdom, still declares this wisdom to be destined to remain for ever concealed from mortal creatures.<sup>135</sup> Even the perfect man appears to him as one who is still fluctuating between God and his perishable nature.<sup>136</sup> Again, when Philo is speaking of the soul loosed from the bonds of the body, he ascribes to it, it is true, a certain approximation to good, as it continually ascends to the higher regions of heaven, but still he is very far from promising to it the power of reaching to the Most High; on the contrary, he does not concede to them the rank even which the angels hold, who, being actuated by no human desires, remain perpetually with God as mediators between him and the lower spheres of the world.<sup>137</sup>

The method in which Philo usually exhorts mankind to virtue, and to the attainment of the highest degree of excellence which it is in their power to reach, exhibits the same singular medley of ideas as we have already met with in his general theory. Moreover, it evinces a like predominant bias for

<sup>134</sup> Ib. 28, p. 426, sq. Οἱ δὲ ἐπιστήμῃ κεχηρμένοι τοῦ ἰνὸς υἱοὶ θεοῦ προσαγορεύονται δέοντως. . . . . καὶ γὰρ εἰ μήπω ἱκανοὶ θεοῦ παῖδες νομίζεσθαι γεγόναμεν, ἀλλὰ τοι τῆς αἰδίου εἰκόνης αὐτοῦ, λόγου τοῦ ἱερωτάτου.

<sup>135</sup> De Nom. Mut. 4, p. 584.

<sup>136</sup> De Somn. ii. 35, in. p. 689. Τὸν μὲν οὖν τέλειον οὔτε θεὸν οὔτε ἀνθρώπον ἀναγράφει Μωϋσῆς, ἀλλ', ὡς ἔφην, μεθόριον τῆς ἀγεννήτου καὶ φθαρτῆς φύσεως.

<sup>137</sup> De Somn. i. 22, p. 641, sq.

Oriental views, notwithstanding the Grecian form and style which it assumes throughout. The strongest symptoms of this tendency are, his description of mental peace, and repose, and of joy in God, as the supreme good of man, and his preference of contemplative to political life.<sup>138</sup> Thus the Therapeutæ, who adopted a life of contemplation, and taking no part in political pursuits withdrew entirely from the world, are the subjects of a eulogium quite alien to the spirit of the olden philosophy of Greece.<sup>139</sup> For even Plato, who went further in this direction than any other of the Greek philosophers, was far from approving of a total abandonment of political duties. This disagreement of the ideas of Philo and those of the earlier philosophers of Greece, is presented almost in every topic which he advances in commendation of the Therapeutæ, and particularly in the passage where he declares the merit of their contemplation to consist in its being, not a merely intellectual study of the world and its affairs, but in religious meditations and ceremonies connected, more or less closely, with the irallegorical interpretation of the holy Scriptures.<sup>140</sup> A virtuous political career is only praiseworthy so far as it is a means towards the higher wisdom of religious meditation; it constitutes, as it were, an inferior grade in the development of the soul, a preparatory step towards the intuition of the divine, so far as this is permitted to man. The study of the Encyclic sciences affords a similar means, but is far inferior to the profession of priests and prophets, who deem

<sup>138</sup> De Migr. Abrah. 9, p. 443.

<sup>139</sup> De Vita Contemplativa.

<sup>140</sup> Ib. 2, 3, 8, 10, 11.

it derogatory to their high calling to take any part in the civil administration of the state. This view is moreover the basis of his classification of mankind, whom he divides into, 1. the earthly, who are devoted to pleasure; 2. the heavenly, who are occupied with human sciences; and, 3. the divine, priests and prophets, who are the true citizens of the world of ideas.<sup>141</sup> In short, the praises of retirement, and of lonely meditation on the divine nature constitute a leading feature in the character of his mind. Man, he asserted, ought to withdraw from outward things into himself, in order to be absorbed in the universal reason, which is God.<sup>142</sup>

Philo's exhortations to virtue, in general, too closely resemble edifying harangues to admit of much precision of ideas. Nevertheless, we must admit, that they are throughout based on a certain order of ideas, through which it is necessary to follow him; and that, further, a few opinions present themselves which, as clearly springing from an Oriental source, demand our attention. For the most part Philo proceeds on the Stoical view, that virtue is the only good. The doctrine of an external and corporeal good he expressly ascribes to an effeminate cast of mind.<sup>143</sup> We have quoted Philo's view, that without God virtue is unfruitful, and that it must be looked upon as the exclusive gift

<sup>141</sup> De Gigant. 13, p. 271. Θεοῦ δὲ ἄνθρωποι ἱερεῖς καὶ προφῆται, οἵ τινες οὐκ ἤξισαν πολιτείας τῆς παρὰ τῷ κόσμῳ τυχεῖν καὶ κοσμοπολίται γενέσθαι, τὸ δὲ αἰσθητὸν πᾶν ὑπερκύψαντες εἰς τὸν νοητὸν κόσμον μετανίστησαν καὶ ἐκείθι ᾤκησαν, ἐγγραφόντες ἀφάρτων ἀσωμάτων ἰδιῶν πολιτείας.

<sup>142</sup> Leg. Alleg. iii. 9, p. 93; 13, 14, p. 95, sq.

<sup>143</sup> De Post. Caini, 34, sq. p. 247, sq.; De Somn. ii. 2, p. 660.

of God.<sup>144</sup> Nevertheless, the definitions which he occasionally gives of virtue insensibly adopt a Platonic character. Man, he says, ought to labour to resemble the model of his proper nature, and this is, God's idea of humanity—the true man.<sup>145</sup> Now as he considered this perfection to be unattainable, otherwise than by the subjection of the sensible to the rational, he was led to adopt the Platonic division of virtue, which derives four kinds of it from a division of the soul into the concupiscible, the irascible, and the rational,<sup>146</sup> although he did not observe the pure Platonic notion of these four parts of virtue, but approximated them to the Stoical views.<sup>147</sup> These four parts of virtue, however, indicated to Philo's mind nothing more than a lower species of it, which is human and perishable; while, on the other hand, he taught that there is a higher kind, which is imperishable and universal, and comprises the former within itself as a genus does its species. This he designates as the good which is formed after the wisdom of God, i. e. after his Word, and which is full of joy in God, in whom it finds its delight and glory.<sup>148</sup> The good which is formed after the divine wisdom is in its

<sup>144</sup> Quod Deter. Pot. Insid. 17, p. 203.

<sup>145</sup> Leg. Alleg. i. 12, p. 49; ii. 2, p. 67; de Creat. Mundi, 46, p. 32.

<sup>146</sup> Leg. Alleg. i. 22, sq. p. 57, sq.

<sup>147</sup> Ib. 19, p. 56.

<sup>148</sup> Ib. i. 19, 56. He is speaking of the streams in Eden: 'Ο μὲν δὴ μέγιστος ποταμός, οὗ αἱ τέσσαρες ἀπόρροαι γεγόνασιν, ἡ γενικὴ ἰσὺν ἀρετῇ, ἣν ὠνομάσαμεν ἀγαθότητα, αἱ δὲ τέσσαρες ἀπόρροαι ἰσάριθμοι ἀρεταί· λαμβάνει μὲν οὖν τὰς ἀρχὰς ἡ γενικὴ ἀρετὴ ἀπὸ τῆς 'Εδέμ, τῆς τοῦ Θεοῦ σοφίας, ἣ χαίρει καὶ γάννυται καὶ τρυφᾷ ἐπὶ μόνῳ τῷ πατρὶ αὐτῆς ἀγαλλομένη καὶ σεμνυνομένη Θεῷ. . . . ἡ (sc. τοῦ Θεοῦ σοφία) δὲ ἰσὺν ὁ Θεοῦ λόγος· κατὰ γὰρ τοῦτον πεποιήται ἡ γενικὴ ἀρετὴ. De Cherub. 2, p. 139.

nature different from human wisdom, which, on the other hand, is distinct from prudence (*φρόνησις*), one of the four Platonic virtues. The former is the virtue which leads man to worship God, while the latter is occupied exclusively with the conduct of life. But the opposition between perishable and imperishable is exhibited in a still stronger light, the two being elsewhere represented as an incorporeal and a corporeal virtue.<sup>149</sup> But that Philo was here proceeding without anything like a precise distinction of ideas is soon apparent, for we find him, in another place, admitting of an incorporeal virtue, whose office is the expiation and atonement of the faults and errors which the pursuit of sensual pleasure gives rise to.<sup>150</sup>

If, however, in his terminology, Philo appears to have adopted Grecian ideas, we shall nevertheless, find from another division which he gives of virtue, that in his view of it he essentially followed the Oriental character of thought. Thus, in his allegorical interpretation of the Jewish Scriptures, he considered the three patriarchs to be representatives of certain states of the soul (*τρόποι ψυχῆς*), symbols of three virtues; the first being the image of that virtue which is formed in man by instruction and science; the second, that which is a gift of nature; and the third, that which is acquired by ascetical practice (*ἀσκησις*).<sup>151</sup> Now the order in

<sup>149</sup> De Præm. et Poen. 14, p. 421. Σοφία μὲν γὰρ πρὸς Θεραπεῖαν Θεοῦ, φρόνησις δὲ πρὸς ἀνθρώπινου βίου διοίκησιν.

<sup>150</sup> Leg. Alleg. ii. 20, p. 80, sq.

<sup>151</sup> De Abrah. 11, p. 9. Τρόπους γὰρ ψυχῆς ἔοικεν ὁ ἱερός διερευνᾶσθαι λόγος, ἀστέιους ἅπαντας, τὸν μὲν ἐκ διδασκάλιας, τὸν δ' ἐκ φύσεως, τὸν δ' ἐξ ἀσκήσεως ἐφίμενον τοῦ καλοῦ. De Somn. i. 27, p. 646. Τὴν ἀρετὴν ἡ φύσει ἢ ἀσκήσει ἢ μαθήσει περιγίνεσθαι φασί.

which Philo has arranged these three virtues, placing the natural first, and then the ascetical, and lastly the scientific, is evidently borrowed from Aristotle; but the terms by which he has designated the three immediately suggests a difference of view. For Aristotle's virtue of habit is manifestly different from Philo's ascetical practice. For the design of the latter is not simply to temper and moderate human passions, but to eradicate them entirely, and to effect a perfect apathy.<sup>152</sup> How, indeed, was it possible for Philo and Aristotle to agree on such a point? For while the latter taught that corporeal nature in itself had a certain tendency towards good, the latter saw in it irreconcilable hostility to whatever is good and divine. This hostility, according to Philo, had its principle in matter which stands in aboriginal opposition to God, seeking to change and to destroy whatever God has made and fashioned. He insists, therefore, in the strongest possible terms, on the mortification of the flesh and body, and consequently of the senses, and even of articulate language; notwithstanding that the latter appeared to him to be near akin to reason or the Word of God.<sup>153</sup> We must therefore regard it as simply a concession to human weakness, if Philo at times limits this mortification to the highest degree of possible attainment, and allows the sensual desires to survive, on condition, however, that they be brought into perfect subjection to

<sup>152</sup> Leg. Alleg. ii. 25, fin. p. 85. 'Εάν γὰρ ἀπάθεια κατὰσχῃ τὴν ψυχὴν, τελείως εὐδαιμονήσει. Ib. iii. 45, p. 113. Μωϋσῆς δὲ ὅλον τὸν θυμὸν ἐκτέμνει καὶ ἀποκόπτειν οἶεται δεῖν τῆς ψυχῆς, οὐ μετριοπάθειαν, ἀλλὰ συνόλως ἀπάθειαν ἀγαπῶν. Ib. 47, 48, p. 414, sq.

<sup>153</sup> De Prof. 17, p. 559.



reason. Or, as Philo elsewhere expresses himself, the Holy Spirit enjoins man to transform within him the irrational part of his soul, and to take care that it becomes to a *certain degree* rational.<sup>154</sup>

From these statements it must be clear that the term nature, as a ground of virtue, was taken very differently by Aristotle and by Philo. For the former understood by it the rational disposition of those human motives which relate to the passions ; but in the view of the latter, nothing good can spring from this nature, and virtue cannot be acquired except by the total eradication of all such motives. This difference of view under a similarity of expression, is again strikingly exhibited in the following point. With Aristotle, natural virtue is but a slight rudiment of good, scarcely meriting the name of one, but with Philo it is exhibited as the supreme virtue ;<sup>155</sup> and, on the other hand, he greatly depreciates the ascetical, holding it to be little better than a pursuit of the true.<sup>156</sup> He consequently dwells much upon the uncertainty of its success, arising from its attempt to rise by its own strength, and to acquire excellence by its own act and exertion ; whereas the true stability of goodness is exclusively a divine gift. Accordingly, he describes the ascetic as a man who puts forth all his powers in any contest, and who must simply, on that account alone, occasionally remit his exertions in order to renew his exhausted strength. The ascetic

<sup>154</sup> Quis. Rer. Div. Her. 38, p. 499. Τὸ ἀλογον ἡμῶν μέρος ψυχαῖσιν καὶ τρόπον τινὰ λογικὸν γενέσθαι.

<sup>155</sup> De Somn. i. 27, p. 646.

<sup>156</sup> De Sacrif. Abel. 36, p. 186, fin. Πόνου μὲν γὰρ καὶ προκοπῆς ὡν Ἰακώβ σύμβολον.

may be well able to endure both toil and suffering, yet he who receives his virtue from heaven is far happier. The former must occasionally relapse into the weakness of his human nature, while the latter possesses, by the gift of God, mental repose and peace, which can never be broken nor disturbed.<sup>157</sup> Now what that nature is which Philo regarded as the principle of this much boasted virtue, it is impossible to mistake. It is not the nature which a man receives at his birth, but that which God breathes into him, by making the inspiration of his Word and his power to descend upon him after he has long exercised himself in conflict with his natural desires, and informed himself by the study of the Encyclic sciences.<sup>158</sup> It seems, then, that in Philo's view the natural stood in a certain opposition to the two other kinds of virtue, since, that even which is acquired by science, is also regarded as a human work. It is not that sure and certain science which both Plato and Aristotle depicted as the true essence of virtue, but a mere result of reflection on the phenomena of the world, as exhibited and explained by the Encyclic sciences. It therefore admits of improvement, while natural virtue is presented at once perfect and complete by reason of the infinite quickness of the divine ope-

<sup>157</sup> De Nom. Mut. 13, p. 591. Εἰς' ὃ μὲν διδασθεὶς ἀθανάτῃ χρώμενος ὑποβολεῖ τὴν ὀφίλειαν ἱναυλον καὶ φθάναντον ἰσχυρὴν μὴ τρεπόμενος· ὃ δὲ ἀσκητῆς καὶ τὸ ἐκούσιον ἔχων αὐτὸ μόνον καὶ τοῦτο γυμνάζων καὶ συγκερωτῶν, ἵνα τὸ οἰκτεῖον πάθος τῷ γεννητῷ μεταβάλῃ, καὶ ἂν τελειώθῃ, καμῶν πρὸς τὸ ἀρχαῖον ἐπ' ἀνίσει γίνος· τλητικώτερος μὲν γὰρ οὗτος, εὐτυχίστερος δὲ ἐκείνος. De Somn. i. 23, p. 643.

<sup>158</sup> De Somn. l. 1 ; de Præm. et Pæn. 4, p. 412 ; de Ebriet. 12, p. 364.

ration.<sup>159</sup> And again, this scientific virtue must be distinguished from another and superior one, which, according to Philo, may be acquired from philosophy or wisdom, for this again is to be looked upon as a divine gift. The virtue of science so understood, Philo is not indisposed to place on an equality with that of nature.<sup>160</sup> This latter he also describes as the root of the other kinds of virtue; not, however, as if the latter grew out of the former, but the supreme virtue is regarded as the source of the four inferior grades, on the ground that the general is higher than all particular species.<sup>161</sup>

But there is yet another point of view from which this mode of expression strongly recommended itself to Philo. It is readily conceivable, that the strange combination which Philo here exhibited of Oriental and Aristotelian ideas, must have infallibly given rise to great vacillation between the two. Moreover, a mode of interpretation which treated persons as ideas, had for its natural consequence a disposition to regard ideas under a personal light. Both these tendencies of his system are observable in Philo, when he remarks that each of the three patriarchs participated indeed in all the three virtues, but that he derived his name from

<sup>159</sup> De Ebriet. 31, in. p. 375, sq.

<sup>160</sup> De Mut. Nom. 14, p. 591. "Οτι ἡ μὲν διδασκὴ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἀσκητικὴ δέχονται τὰ πρὸς βελτίωσιν ἐφίεται γὰρ δὴ ὁ μὲν διδασκόμενος ἐπιστήμης, ὡν ἀγνοεῖ, ὁ δὲ ἀσκήσει χρώμενος στεφάνων καὶ τῶν προκειμένων ἄλλων φιλοπόνῃ καὶ φιλοδιάμονι ψυχῇ. τὸ δὲ αὐτοδίδακτον καὶ αὐτομαθὲς γένος, αἵτε φύσει μᾶλλον ἢ ἐπιτηδεύσει συνιστάμενον, ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἴσον καὶ τίμιον καὶ ἄρτιον ἡνέχθη, μηδεὶς ἐνδύοντος τῶν εἰς πλήρωσιν ἀριθμοῦ. In this sense, science also is identical with the contemplation of God. De Migr. Abrah. 8, p. 442.

<sup>161</sup> De Somn. i. 27, p. 646; Leg. Alleg. i. 19, p. 56.

that particular one, which was the predominant feature of his character. For, he adds, neither instruction without nature and practice can attain to perfection, nor yet nature reach its proper end without learning and exercise, as neither can practice, when it is not raised on the foundation of good natural gifts and education.<sup>162</sup> The view that is here advanced, that nature combined with science is the basis of right practice, and that this again is the completion of the former two, must clearly be understood in the spirit of the Aristotelian philosophy, with which, however, there is little agreement in Philo's other opinion, that when science and practice have done their utmost in the development of human powers, God furnishes what is still wanting to perfection, by a renovation of man's nature. One point more: Philo may, perhaps, have discovered, by which to approximate his own theory to this doctrine of Aristotle, even if the above attempt should appear inadequate. For he could not fail to perceive that nature, conceived of as a divine grace, must be sensibly felt in all the lower developments of virtue, and that therefore it might, in a certain sense, be considered as their ground. Besides, he must have acknowledged, that the divine influences of nature cannot be altogether independent of the previous state of their object; for to this conclusion he would be naturally led by the principle of his moral theory, that the supreme gifts of peace and contentment of soul come indeed from God, but that still they presuppose as their indispensable antecedents the highest exertions of

<sup>162</sup> De Abrah. xi. 9.

the individual, both in scientific pursuits and in ascetical practice.<sup>163</sup> It was exactly in this light that Philo understood the relation of instruction in the Encyclic sciences to practice and nature. He declares that practice is the result of instruction and learning; that men must be fed at first with the milk of science, in order afterwards to be able to 'digest the strong meat of Athletæ, and be obedient to the precepts of scientific culture, which withdraws them from sensual pleasure, and introduces them to spiritual things.<sup>164</sup> And then he considers the virtue which is acquired from nature, and receives, as we have seen, its completion in the stable science of God, or the good as a consequence of exercise in the Encyclic sciences; for, he says, it is only by means of the latter that the former can be securely possessed, and many who had devoted their youth to philosophy without previous exercise of the Encyclic sciences, were unable to rise to the height they desired.<sup>165</sup> We see then that Philo makes that to repose on well-grounded science, which, according to his view, must also be regarded as the gift of God. It is in this light that he distinguished the virtue of instruction from science or wisdom, which he looked upon as the most stable virtue, and the root of all other excellence.<sup>166</sup> This then is nothing else than the virtue of nature. But when now he allows wisdom to spring from logical, physical, and ethical doctrines, we see him returning again to Grecian ideas, and perceive how diffi-

<sup>163</sup> De Somn. i. 27, p. 646. Τὸ γὰρ ἀσκήσαι ἔργον τοῦ μαθήσαι.

<sup>164</sup> Congr. Erud. Grat. 13, sqq. p. 528, sqq.

<sup>165</sup> De Ebriet. xii. xiii. 464.

<sup>166</sup> De Nobil. v. 442; de Fort. iii. 377.

cult it must have been for him to distinguish the virtue which springs from education, from the wisdom which is the gift of God. Indeed we cannot wholly acquit him of the charge of occasionally confounding the two. The most decided instance of this confusion of ideas is, the proposition in which he declares that when the virtue which is acquired by instruction has once become by nature the object of unfailing memory, it is even superior to the virtue of practice, even though the latter may by the gift of God have reached to intuition.<sup>167</sup> For he who practises it (*ἀσκητῆς*) will ever and anon be reduced to an inferior state by the exhaustion which his conflict entails, whereas he who is elevated by wisdom, enjoys a permanent abiding in the higher regions of knowledge.<sup>168</sup> This view is evidently in accordance with the pre-eminence which Philo assigned to scientific over political life, but it is still more particularly connected with his description of man's life as a continual struggle with his sensuous nature, which, however, can never be brought into perfect subjection. On this account, man can never attain to a perfectly calm and undisturbed intuition of God. The Spirit of God, may indeed, occasionally enter into man, but cannot abide and stay with him.<sup>169</sup>

<sup>167</sup> De Fort. l. l.

<sup>168</sup> De Mut. Nom. xiii. 591. *Λεκτέον οὖν, ὅτι καὶ ταῦτα χαρακτηρῆς εἰσιν, οἷς ἡ διδακτὴ τῆς ἀσκητικῆς ἀρετῆς διαφέρει. ὁ μὲν γὰρ διδασκαλίᾳ βελτιωθείς, εὐμοίρου λαχὼν φύσει, ἢ περιποιεῖ τὸ ἀληστον αὐτῷ διὰ συνεργοῦ μνήμης, μόνῃ χρηταί, ὡν ἔμαθεν ἀκριξ ἐπιληημνός καὶ βεβαίως περιεχόμενος. ὁ δὲ ἀσκητῆς, ἐπειδὴν γυμνάσθεται συντόνως, διαπνέει πάλιν, κ.τ.λ. Ib. xiv. 591.*

<sup>169</sup> Quod Deus Immut. i. 272, fin.; de Gigant. v. 265. *Μένει μὲν γὰρ ἔστιν ὅτε, καταμίνει δὲ οὐδ' εἰσάπαν παρὰ τοῖς πολλοῖς ἡμῖν. It is te-*

The impediment is man's sensuous nature, for even when he is carried out of himself by enthusiasm, his human nature still hovers closely around him, watching an opportunity to seize him as soon as his desire for the divine remits its intensity.<sup>170</sup> It is difficult, however, to reconcile the preceding statement with the stability that is, nevertheless, promised to scientific virtue. Most undoubtedly it is inconsistent with the description of it, previously given, according to which the cultivation of the Encyclic sciences is but the milky food of the young, while *ascesis* or practice is represented as the further progress from knowledge to action.

However, through all these inequalities of exposition we discover a gleam of something like a steady and invariable principle. And this was the conviction of man's weakness, and God's power over man, connected on the one hand with the view that all mundane things, and especially the earlier existence of mankind, are necessarily objects of the imperfection, which clings to all that is created and material, which, even on that account, is subject to decay, and on the other hand, influenced by the doctrine (which had its ground in Philo's earnest longing to effect a moral improvement of his fellow men) that man must do his part, and as it were meet the operation of the divine grace.

markable, that here the presence of the divine Spirit within man is represented as a something quite usual, and taking place both with and in spite of man's will.

<sup>170</sup> De Som. ii. 34, fn. p. 689. 'Ἐπειδὴν δὲ σὺ ἐνθουσιῶδες καὶ ὁ πολὺς ἡμερὸς χαλᾶσθαι, παλινδρομήσας ἀπὸ τῶν θείων ἄνθρωπος γίνεται, τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐντυχὼν, ἅπαν ἐν τοῖς προφυλαίοις ἐφήδρευεν, ἵν' αὐτὸ μόνον ἐκέρψαντα ἐνδοθεὶν ἱεραπόσθαι.

This conviction of a divine influence on man is implied in the notion of natural virtue, which leads to the recommendation of a life agreeable to nature. Philo was strongly possessed with the idea, that whatever is good comes from the hand of God. But he felt that the inclination of the flesh—of matter, which is powerful in the world, although it is properly passive, nevertheless sets itself in opposition to good, while he was deeply conscious of the weakness of human nature which is an obstacle to God's abiding in man. Therefore he taught, that it is man's office to struggle with matter, and that for this purpose a life of ascetical practice is necessary. This is the reason why ascetical virtue is associated with the natural, and we might indeed regard it, according to Philo's view, as the proper virtue of man, were it not for the strong disposition he evinced to ascribe a high value to the scientific culture of the Greeks, in consequence of his inability to deny its importance for the development of that higher science—philosophy, which strives after an intuition of God.

From this it is clear, that Philo, even though it was his chief desire to exhort men to follow virtue and to forsake vice, could not make any high requisition upon them. How, in short, was it possible in this mortal life—that combination of rational and necessary—to look for the perfection of the sage? It is enough, he said, if we meet with a man exempt from vice, the possession of perfect virtue is denied to men of our generation.<sup>171</sup> For

<sup>171</sup> De Mut. Nom. vi. 585, fin. 'Ἀγαπήντων γὰρ αἱ τῶν κακιῶν ἀπογορεπαί, τῶν δὲ ἀρετῶν ἡ παντὶλὴς ἐκῆσις ἀδύνατος ἀνθρώπῳ τῷ καθ' ἡμᾶς.



the same reason, he joins to those higher virtues which represent the perfection of man's nature, or at least the pursuit of it, others of an inferior degree, to the practice of which he invites mankind ; and in the same way that he attaches in general the four perishable Platonic virtues to that which is imperishable, so, inversely, the three higher Aristotelian virtues are associated with three inferior ones, which in all essential respects appear to have had their origin in a purely Oriental view. These he called, hope, repentance or change of mind (*μετάνοια*), and justice. Hope is the basis of human life, but men ought to cherish a just hope—hope in God as the source of their existence and preservation.<sup>172</sup> Hope is the principle of all that is good in mankind ; it is by it that we become properly men. It is as it were the porter which opens the door to the royal virtues which reside within us. Without cultivating the former, it is impossible to attain to the latter.<sup>173</sup> Hope, moreover, is represented as the virtue which is in an especial manner implanted in man by means of laws and institutions, but, nevertheless, capable of arising in him as an effect of the unwritten law of nature.<sup>174</sup> Hope is followed by repentance as the second virtue, which is necessary to man as born and brought up in the midst of so much that is evil. From this evil, repentance turns him away, by awakening an earnest desire to elevate himself to true good by means of virtue,

<sup>172</sup> De Præm. et Pœn. ii. 410. Μόνος δ' ἀποδοχῆς δίκιος ὁ ἀναθίς τῇν ἑλπίδα θεῶ καὶ ὡς αἰτίῳ τῆς γενίσεως αὐτῆς καὶ ὡς αἰσινῇ καὶ ἀδιάφθορον ἱκανῶ μόνῳ διαφυλάξαι.

<sup>173</sup> De Abrah. ii. sq. p. 2. sq.

<sup>174</sup> Ib. iii. 3.

and by teaching him to avoid the evil and choose the good. It invites him to solitude, on the ground that evil generally exists among man, and that the love of kindred, friends, and country, entails the risk of contracting the evil which belongs to them respectively. In solitude we live with the dead, whose writings have preserved the memory of their good deeds and virtues. Repentance, indeed, cannot extract from solitude its highest good, for as compared with perfection, it is but as a convalescent body to one which has never been diseased.<sup>175</sup> Never to err is the prerogative of God; it may perhaps, be the privilege also of the godlike man; but the highest felicity of the enlightened individual is after error to return to good.<sup>176</sup> Of him who is not utterly enslaved to vice, but gives promise of amendment, Philo thinks it reasonable to hope a perfect moral re-establishment, grounding this expectation on a confidence in the inexhaustible grace of God, who never punishes the guilty at the moment of the commission of their crimes, but mercifully allows them a season for repentance. Those on the other hand, who labour under an incurable malady of heart, are threatened with everlasting corruption and punishment.<sup>177</sup> As to the third virtue, justice, we are naturally surprised to meet it here, after previously finding it placed in a different combination, among the four Platonic virtues. What is still more singular, justice, like

<sup>175</sup> De Abrah. iii. sq. p. 3, sq.; de Præm. et Pœn. iii. 410, sq.; de Pœnit. i. 405.

<sup>176</sup> De Pœnit. l. l.

<sup>177</sup> Leg. Alleg. iii. 34, fin. p. 108; de Cherub. i. 139.

goodness, is depicted as the virtue which rules over all the others ;<sup>178</sup> and the just man is consequently described as protecting and supporting the wicked among whom he lives, and indeed the whole human race, by means of his instruction and example ;<sup>179</sup> a merit which Philo has elsewhere made to be the privilege of the sage.<sup>180</sup> He declares the reward of justice to be the salvation, not only of the just, but also of the whole human race, and of all the living inhabitants of the earth.<sup>181</sup> Philo indeed carries his eulogium of justice so far, as, forgetting that in his system it constituted nothing more than a subordinate virtue, to give it a determinate character, and, indeed, in this manner to raise its importance so high, as to confound all distinction between it and the supreme or natural virtue. For the just man is represented as thoroughly perfect from the first.<sup>182</sup>

When Philo proceeds to determine, in the next place, the relation of the three inferior to the four superior virtues, he merely states generally that the former are to the latter as the training exercise of the young to the deeds of the experienced veteran.<sup>183</sup> Nevertheless, the description which he gives of them one by one, suggests the suspicion that he considered each of the inferior virtues as a lower degree of some superior one corresponding to it. Thus

<sup>178</sup> De Abrah. v. 5. Ἀμεινον γὰρ οὐδὲν δικαιοσύνης, τῆς ἐν ἀρεταῖς ἡγεμονίδος, ἢ καθάπερ ἐν χώρῳ καλλιστευούσα πρὸς βίην. Ib. vi. 6.

<sup>179</sup> De Migr. Abrah. xxi. 454, sq.

<sup>180</sup> De Sacrif. Abel. xxxvii. in. p. 187 ; de Pœnit. 2, fin. p. 407.

<sup>181</sup> De Abrah. 8, fin. p. 8 ; de Præm. et Pœn. 4, in. p. 414. This alludes to Noah as the symbol of justice.

<sup>182</sup> De Abrah. ix. 8. Ὁ μὲν γὰρ τέλειος ὁλόκληρος ἐξ ἀρχῆς.

<sup>183</sup> Ib. 10, p. 8.

hope seems to be regarded as an inferior grade of scientific virtue; repentance, which has its place in the conflict with evil, is a lower degree of the ascetical; and justice, which from the first attaches itself to good, is the beginning of natural virtue. This relationship between hope and scientific virtue is thrown out very strongly by Philo, when he makes faith to be the bond of their union; for, he says, as true hope is a hope in God, so true faith is one which trusts in God, who alone possesses certainty of knowledge. That these notions are in themselves connected together is obvious. Hope cannot be rightly explained otherwise than as a lower degree of confident belief, and on this ground Philo has called faith the fulfilment of good hopes.<sup>184</sup> According to him, faith consists in an assured confidence that the perfect good which is not present, which is however promised, does truly exist.<sup>185</sup> Now this virtue he acknowledges existed in Abraham, the symbol of virtue by instruction, who viewed faith in God as the reward of his hope, with which he maintained his pursuit of perfection.<sup>186</sup> It is obvious that this notion of faith was well adapted for the objects of Philo's religious exhortations; but at the same time it was intimately connected with the hopes which, in common with his nation, he enter-

<sup>184</sup> De Abrah. 46 in. p. 39 in.; de Migr. Abrah. 9, p. 442; Quis Rex. Div. Her. 18, p. 485, sq.

<sup>185</sup> De Migr. Abr. 1. 1. Εἰς μαρτυρίαν πίστεως, ἣν ἐπίστανται ἡ ψυχὴ θεῷ, οὐκ ἐκ τῶν ἀποτελεσμάτων ἐπιδικουμένη τὸ εὐχάριστον ἀλλ' ἐκ προσδοκίας τῶν μελλόντων. ἀρτηθεῖσα γὰρ καὶ ἐκκριμασθεῖσα ἰλπίδος χρηστῆς καὶ ἀνενδοίαστα νομίσασα ἤδη παρῆναι τὰ μὴ παρόντα διὰ τὴν τοῦ ὑποσχομένου βεβαιωτάτην πίστιν, ἀγαθὸν τι κίων, ἀθλον εἴρηται.

<sup>186</sup> De Prom. et Pœn. 4, p. 412.

tained of a further fulfilment of the divine promises and a better future, when the good and pious among the dispersed should again be gathered together under a divine and superhuman manifestation, visible to the saints, but invisible to all others, under which they were to enjoy a state of the most perfect bliss on earth.<sup>187</sup> Therefore it is, that faith is called the queens of virtues, or the most perfect virtue.<sup>188</sup> We have here again another proof how difficult it was for Philo to form and adhere to a fixed idea of what he wished to be duly appreciated as the highest term of excellence in the development of humanity.

The allusion we have just made to the national expectations of Philo, calls for the remark that, great as was his attachment to his people, he was nevertheless in some degree estranged from them by the Grecian education which he had received. To this he was indebted for those cosmopolite sentiments which we have already noticed, and the not unfrequent exhortations that he makes to universal philanthropy. Moreover, the spirit of allegorical interpretation tended greatly to weaken his attachment to the literal sense of the sacred traditions, which formed, however, the historical basis on which the national hopes and character of the Jewish people rested. Again, the views of the divine nature which Philo laboured to establish, were so opposed to the anthropomorphic representations of God which so frequently occur in the Mosaic records, that he did not scruple to explain

<sup>187</sup> De Execrat. ix. 435, sq.

<sup>188</sup> De Abrah. xlvi. 39; Quis Rer. Div. Her. xviii. 485.

all such expressions as so many pious frauds.<sup>189</sup> This allegorical mode of interpretation is not confined to historical matters, but it applied to the whole body of divine legislation, the Jewish theocracy, and all the religious ceremonies connected therewith. These he did not hesitate to call symbolical rites, designated for the weak-minded, and applying only to the carnal life, whereas the truly spiritual requires only a purely spiritual worship, without the aid of outward ceremonies and forms. It is true, he blames those who find fault with such ceremonies, but his reason for this is simply because such persons only do so, in order to acquire a character for superior virtue, and a plea for withdrawing themselves from communion with the rest of mankind.<sup>190</sup> This, however, must have been but a slight fault in the eyes of one like Philo, who was more disposed to praise than to blame a life of solitude.

The intermediate position which we have assigned to Philo between the Oriental and the Græco-Oriental philosophy is, as we believe, perfectly justified by our exposition of his doctrines. In his mental character we have both a Grecian education based on philosophy, and the Oriental habit of thought which, moreover, is its predominant feature. The former trait is exhibited in his regard for the Encyclic sciences, and in his manner of connecting them with, and making them subordinate to philosophy. Almost the whole of his view of the classification of the sciences, of the system of the world, and of the relative value of its several parts, is drawn by an Ec-

<sup>189</sup> Quod Deus Immut. xiv. 282, sq.

<sup>190</sup> De Migr. Abr. xvi. 450.

cretical process from Grecian investigations, if indeed, the mixture which he made of Platonic, Aristotelian, Stoical, and other Greek doctrines, as they severally fell in with the immediate purpose of inquiry, deserves the name of Eclecticism. However, the use that he has made of the Grecian philosophy would scarcely have entitled him to a place in our history. It is his Oriental doctrines alone that recommend him to our notice. The influence of these is evident in the view he gives of the relation of God to mundane things. He appears no doubt to attach himself to Stoical views when he represents God as the sole efficient cause in the world, and places all else in a merely passive relation to him. But how widely does this doctrine recede from the true sense of the Stoical, when Philo proceeds to limit the intellectual liberty of the human soul, which the Stoics regarded as an emanated portion of the divine activity, to preparing a place within itself for the divine operation! With him the opposition is not so much between God and matter, as between God and the creature. This is the passive material for the divine operation, and whatever good arises herein, is but an effect of divine grace. Of this extensive operation of grace, neither the Porch nor Grecian philosophy generally had the slightest conception. By this transformation of ideas, it is manifest, the opposition between God and world was rendered wider and more irreconcilable. Even the doctrine, that the things of this world cannot be utterly subject, as rather they must yield to the power of God, and transmute themselves into the nature of the passive, tends to deprive them of all title

to union with the divine. For this reason, too, the divine retires the further from the human, the greater is God's constraining force upon man. Even the good which is now in the world, appears insufficient to express what God is. The idea of God is removed so far above human apprehension as wholly to vanish out of sight. God might perhaps be aptly designated as the existent, but for the inability of men either to understand or to express simple existence. Therefore God withdraws from the world his power, before which nothing can consist; to be a creative cause is unworthy of him; therefore he is withdrawn wholly within himself, and leaves to his ministers the disposition and fashioning of matter, which places itself over against this retiring God as another illusion, since the further the world is removed from the existent the more of necessity does it participate in the unreal. Now to bind together these two contrary extremes, naturally appears impossible. All the aid that the doctrine of emanations could supply for this purpose, only served to veil its impossibility, by introducing the ministering spirits between God and matter; and being adapted on the one hand to remove God himself from all direct contact with the world in order that his pure idea might be unpolluted thereby, and on the other to furnish, by a descending gradation in the divine effluxions, a transition from the perfect to the imperfect. To satisfy the first object, the emanation of the powers from God is regarded as a matter of perfect indifference to God himself, his divine essence being altogether unaffected thereby. This emanation, moreover, is represented as proceeding



from eternity, and the emanations themselves consequently appear to be eternal beings who, however, are not illimitable in their essence, inasmuch as they are the mere organs of the divine will. How unjustly this system has been connected with the ideal theory of Plato, must be obvious to every one.

On the other hand, it exhibits a more intense consciousness of the impassable gulf which the ancient world discovered between itself and true perfection. Hence, the many complaints which it contains of the transitoriness, vanity, and delusion of all earthly and mundane things. It is therefore but a prejudice of his nation, when he assigns a better state of existence to the angels, while he owes it to his Grecian education, if he concedes the same to the stars. In accordance with the predominant tendency of his philosophy, he, of necessity, regarded whatever is material, and even all spiritual emanations from the godhead, as eternally removed from perfection. But the greater and the more insuperable this gulf of separation appeared, the more intense would be the desire to overcome it. Yet his efforts in this direction were necessarily irregular, since the rule of the system forbade the emanated beings to quit the fixed and definite path of the creature. On this ground, there was much to recommend to Philo's mind the doctrine of the contemplation of the existent, not, as it were, in a mirror, but in the truth of a mystical and unnatural mode of cognition, in order to give expression to its own longing, notwithstanding that this expression was at best but irregular, as evinced by the many various forms in which this doctrine is partly ex-

hibited and partly hidden. In short, what clear conception could be formed of such a perfect contemplation, which forthwith reveals its own imperfection by the fatigue with which it affects the soul, which thereupon is again overpowered by the influences of the flesh? But its irregularity is particularly shown by the mysterious form under which it exhibits itself, and which is declared to be an indescribable ravishment of the reason, which, however, as such, in this reverie ceases at once to be active. This doctrine has been confounded more or less with Grecian views, as Plato also spoke of an intuition of ideas, but in a widely different light, and under mythical symbols, and without any attempt to ascribe to it anything different from scientific activity, nor in any way implying that God was there to be perceived, except in the ideas themselves. This contemplation has also been connected with the Grecian view of the inspiration of a divinely-possessed individual; but, in truth, the divine insanity of the Greeks is far from being the object of Philo's praises, who, on the contrary, promises as the fruit of such contemplation a perfect and imperturbable serenity of soul. This promise clearly testifies to the Oriental origin of Philo's doctrine. He, however, came far short of the Indian philosophers, in the intensity with which they gave themselves up to the contemplation of deity—to absorption in self or in God, simply because he was not bold enough to maintain with like positiveness the absolute separation of soul and matter, and the utter worthlessness of all that is opposite to God in the world. However much he depreciated this

changeable, nevertheless he could not altogether deny its truth, and he also acknowledged a connection and dependence of all the several parts of the mundane system ; in a word, he evinced a strong leaning towards the interests of human life, and to Grecian enlightenment. Nevertheless his view of the supreme end of human endeavours led him, of necessity, to limit man's success in every kind of virtue to a mere preparation for the reception of the divine grace—to an approximate, not an absolute purification of the soul, in order to prepare a worthy receptacle for the grace of God.

## CHAPTER VII.

### RISE AND DIFFUSION OF ORIENTAL IDEAS AMONG THE GREEKS.

THE peculiar line of philosophical thought, occupied for the most part with Oriental ideas, which we met with in Philo, is rarely, and at most occasionally, to be found in the properly Greek writers of the period which we are now considering. So foreign, indeed, was it to the mental character of the Greeks and Romans, that two centuries were required to familiarize it to them. But in order to understand this tardy result, it will be necessary to point out the occasional but scattered traces of Orientalism which the history of these two centuries exhibits.

The writings of Philo contain frequent application of the arithmetical symbols of Pythagoras, and imply that an acquaintance with them was very general at this epoch. It is therefore impossible to doubt that the Pythagorean doctrine was again in favour and extensively prevalent, although we are wholly unable to ascertain the date and occasion of its revival.<sup>1</sup> It is not improbable that this event

<sup>1</sup> A slight trace is furnished by the statement of David the Armenian in the Berlin. Scholia to Arist. p. 28 a, that Jobates, king of Libya, eagerly sought for the writings of Pythagoras, and thereby gave occasion for many works being palmed off under this name. Now, as no such a king as the Jobates here alluded to is historically known, it is not improbable that Juba II. king of

was a result of the erudite labours of the Alexandrian schools, of whose operations our accounts are very deficient and unsatisfactory. Nearly contemporary with Philo, is the first re-appearance of Pythagorean philosophers. Now these exhibit in general that particular character of philosophy which it is the business of our present chapter to portray, the main feature of which is an adherence to the civilization of Greece, combined with a leaning to the mystical view of the East, which appeared most akin to the secret symbols of the Pythagorean theory of numbers, as well as with other superstitious doctrines. This new form of Pythagorism appears to have nourished a strong predilection for the Platonic theory of ideas, and to have attached itself no less zealously to the ascetical doctrine of morals. Justin Martyr informs us, that in his youth he had fallen in with one of these Pythagoreans, who promised to raise him by his philosophy to happiness and a knowledge of the good and beautiful, on condition of his forming a previous acquaintance with music, geometry, and astronomy; which sciences, he insisted, were necessary to withdraw the soul from the sensible, and to prepare it for the reception of the supra-sensible ideas.<sup>2</sup>

The scientific value of the ideas prevalent in this school appears to have been very low: we shall therefore content ourselves with a brief notice of

Mauritania, is intended, who was also styled king of Lybia, and is well known for his learned pursuits. Thus, then, the doctrine of Pythagoras would appear to have gained a new diffusion about a generation before Philo. The allusions which seem to point to an earlier date are doubtful. Cf. my *History of the Pythagorean Philosophy*, p. 75.

<sup>2</sup> Dialog. c. Tryph. p. 219, ed. Francof. 1686.

some of the more eminent individuals that belonged to it. The first of these that presents himself is that marvellous personage Apollonius of Tyana, who, notwithstanding the fabulous legends of which he is the subject, arrests our attention as one of the few whose agency in introducing the Oriental wisdom among the Greeks has been historically recorded. Apollonius was born in the reign of Augustus, and lived to a great age. Of his life, we have a very detailed account in the laudatory biography which, at the instance of the empress Julia Domna, the elder Philostratus compiled from questionable sources.<sup>3</sup> His biographer is not exempt from suspicion of having distorted the truth by rhetorical exaggeration and embellishments, without, however, being open to the charge of having intentionally foisted upon us a different character from the true one of his authorities.<sup>4</sup> In general, therefore, we believe it possible to extract from Philostratus some genuine historical traits.

<sup>3</sup> The chief source, the work of Damis on the Travels of Apollonius, in which Damis accompanied his instructor, cannot be used without extreme suspicion, although probably free from all intentional dishonesty. The many strange marvels which Damis recounts, could not have found faith anywhere except in so weak a head as, according to Philostratus, Damis possessed. The letters of Apollonius are unquestionably spurious.

<sup>4</sup> It is well known that, in later times, Apollonius was compared with our Saviour, and Philostratus has been suspected of having had such a comparison in view. Nevertheless, not a single trace of a controversial tendency is to be discovered in the work. We cannot concur with the opinion of Baur (*Apollonius of Tyana and Christ, or the relation of Pythagorism to Christianity*, Tübingen. 1832), who, although he denies the polemical bearing of the work against the Christians, yet maintains that Philostratus throughout his work had in view the parallel with Christ. At all events it is only in comparatively few passages of the work that this parallel is discoverable. Moreover, those who have pursued this subject of inquiry appear to have looked but little to the general character of Philostratus as an author.

Apollonius is depicted as a wonder-worker, who, however, according to the opinion of Philostratus at least, did not perform his miraculous works by the aid of magic, but by a divine energy and intelligence which resided in him.<sup>5</sup> The chief part of the marvels which tradition has accumulated on him, consist of soothsayings, and announcements of future or distant events, with which he could not be acquainted by any natural means. For these purposes he paid great attention to dreams and omens, although on many occasions it was deep meditation within himself that revealed to him the hidden events. The latter source of prediction reminds us of the contemplation of the Hindoos and of that retirement within a man's self, which Philo recommended as leading to the intuition of God. Indeed Indian Jarchas had taught Apollonius, that no one can come near to the wisdom which embraces all things, until he has first arrived at a knowledge of himself.<sup>6</sup> It was moreover equally accordant with the new Pythagorism, to whose school Apollonius had attached himself. He was a pupil of Euxenus a Pythagorean, whom, however, he blames as too sensual, his own rule of life being one of the strictest austerity.<sup>7</sup> This rule he steadily adhered to, and strove in every way to imitate, if not to go beyond, the example of Pythagoras. For not only did he refuse all animal food, clothed himself in linen, went barefoot, and allowed his hair to grow, but even abstained from wine, and followed a life of celibacy.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>5</sup> See especially, *Vita Apoll.* i. 2 ; iv. 45 ; v. 12.

<sup>6</sup> *Ib.* ii. 18.

<sup>7</sup> *Ib.* i. 7, 8.

<sup>8</sup> *Ib.* i. 8, 13.

A Life of Pythagoras is also ascribed to him.<sup>9</sup> But his Pythagorism did not evince itself in any respect for and diffusion of that theory of symbolical numbers, which was the favourite pursuit of the rest of the neo-Pythagoreans; on the contrary, we find occasional hints which seem to intimate that it held in his eyes but a subordinate value;<sup>10</sup> and in the same manner, whatever importance he ascribed to mathematical sciences, music and astronomy, as introductions to philosophy, was of a very secondary kind. His chief effort, on the other hand, was directed to a reformation of religious rites and the restoration of the service of the temples, in the spirit of the strictly moral practice which he had imposed upon himself. This is the object of the treatises which are ascribed to him on soothsaying, on storms and sacrifice.<sup>11</sup> If the latter work be genuine, of which indeed there is no ground for doubting, he would appear not only to have forbidden animal sacrifice, but also to have taught, that sacrifice ought not to be offered to the supreme God, on the ground, that whatever belongs to the earth is an impurity before God. In a fragment still extant from this work, he recommends a pure worship of the supreme God who is separate and alone; a pure prayer which requires not even

<sup>9</sup> Suid. s. v. Ἀπολλώνιος Τυαν. ; Porph. v. Pyth. 2. This work has been held to be the same with the one on the opinions of the Pythagoreans, which, according to Philostratus, viii. 19, he brought from the cave of Trophonius. Iamblichus also, de Vita Pyth. 254. mentions the work of Apollonius on Pythagoras, and there is much that is probable in the opinion which Jonsius first promulged and Meiners carried out, that the Biographies of Pythagoras by Porphyry and Iamblichus drew largely from this work.

<sup>10</sup> Philostr. v. Apoll. iii. 30.

<sup>11</sup> Ib. iii. 41 ; iv. 19.



words for its expression.<sup>12</sup> Now this is in perfect agreement with what we have found Philo teaching ; with whom Apollonius further concurs in highly esteeming olden national rites, and in attempting to re-establish ancient forms of worship,<sup>13</sup> to the exclusion however of all that was opposed to his own view of the divine nature, and especially of the cruel sacrifice of animals, which he condemned on Pythagorean principles, which led him to oppose all excess and also to maintain the affinity of brutes and men and the metempsychosis. The greater part of the impure rites which, according to his view, the national religion had fallen into, he ascribed to the fault of the poets who had sedulously and wilfully propagated immoral fables of the gods.<sup>14</sup> But there is yet another point of resemblance between Philo and Apollonius, and this is, that with all his national predilections he was unable to resist a tendency to a foreign element—the mysterious and profound wisdom of the Orientals. This bias led him to undertake long and distant travels (which, on the faith of existing traditions, must unhesitatingly be assigned to him), in order to visit the

<sup>12</sup> Euseb. pr. Ev. iv. 13, Οὕτως τοίνυν μάλιστα ἂν τις οἴμαι τὴν προσήκουσαν ἐπιμίλειαν ποιοῖτο τοῦ Θείου τυγχάνοι τε αὐτόθεν ἱλαῶ τε καὶ εὐμένους αὐτοῦ παρ' ὀντιναοῦν μόνος ἀνθρώπων, εἰ θεῶ μὲν, ὃν δὴ πρῶτον ἴσαμεν, ἐνὶ δὲ ὄντι κεχωρισμένῃ πάντων, μεθ' ὃν γνωρίζεσθαι τοὺς λοιποὺς ἀναγκαῖον, μὴ θύοι τι τὴν ἀρχήν, μήτε ἀνάπτοι πῦρ, μήτε καθόλου τι τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἐκονομάζοι (δεῖται γὰρ οὐδενός, οὐδὲ παρὰ τῶν κρειττόνων ἤπερ ἡμεῖς, οὐδ' ἔστιν ὃ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀνίησι γῆ φυτὸν, ἢ τρέφει ζῶον, ἢ ἀήρ, ὃ οὐ πρόσσεστί γε μίασμα); μόνῃ δὲ χρῶτο πρὸς αὐτὸν αἰετῶ κρείττονι λόγῳ. λίγω δὲ τῶ μὴ διὰ στόματος ἰόντι, κ.τ.λ. This passage is also found in Euseb. Dem. Ev. iii. 3, 150, ed. Colon. with a few deviations of which I have here adopted one. Cf. Philostr. Vit. Apoll. iii. 35 ; iv. 30.

<sup>13</sup> Philostr. Vit. Apoll. i. 16.

<sup>14</sup> Ib. v. 14.

Magi, the wise men of India and Upper Egypt.<sup>15</sup> According to him the doctrine of Pythagoras, which he professed to adopt, was derived from India, from whence it was brought into Egypt, from which country again it passed in the person of Pythagoras into Greece.<sup>16</sup> These few points are all that we can adduce with certainty of the history of this individual.

While the predominant tendency of Apollonius's mind was of an ethical character, other Pythagoreans of the same or perhaps a somewhat later date, were more exclusively devoted to the ideal theory and scientific ideas of their school. Such were Moderatus of Gadeira who lived in the times of Nero,<sup>17</sup> Nicomachus of Gerasa, whose date is a little earlier than the Antonines,<sup>18</sup> and some others. But the labours of these men seem to have been rather of an erudite character than important for the development and diffusion of a new habit of thought, so that they only deserve a mention in this place as members of the neo-Pythagoreans, who for the most part adopted more or less of Oriental ideas.

A more important personage in this respect is a Platonic philosopher of these times—the historian Plutarch. The popular works of this writer evince a stronger desire than is to be found in any of his Greek or Roman contemporaries, to reconcile and combine philosophical enlightenment with the public national religion; although many traces of a

<sup>15</sup> Ib. i. 18.

<sup>16</sup> Ib. iii. 19.

<sup>17</sup> This is inferred from Plut. Symp. viii. 7, in. See. Jonsius de Script. Hist. Phil. iii. 5, 2.

<sup>18</sup> Brucker, Hist. Phil. ii. 161.

like endeavour have already been noticed by us in the learned philosophy of this age.<sup>19</sup>

Plutarch was born at Cheronea about the middle of the first century, A.D. and lived to the times of Hadrian. By his teaching and writings he acquired considerable renown among his contemporaries, and was loaded with honours and official appointments, many of which were conferred on him by the Roman emperors. In his old age he was appointed a priest of the Pythian Apollo.<sup>20</sup> He was one of the most prolific and most eloquent writers of his day, and in all times he has found admirers who have placed him on an equality with the greatest ornaments of the best ages. This admiration he owes in a great measure to the gentleness which breathes in all his moral doctrines, and the warmth with which he seeks to enforce them by good examples and religious remarks, and the pleasure wherewith he labours to place in a conspicuous light all that is great and exalted. But still it would be difficult to defend Plutarch against the charge of having often carried the forbearance of his judgment to the point of weakness, and having occasionally thrown a seductive charm over brilliant vices, by associating them with real virtues. Whatever was dazzling and presented the appearance of superior force and vigour, was sure to excite his admiration, and he requires, in short, our indulgence for having in his own works preferred the brilliant to the true. His display of learning, his unexpected turns of

<sup>19</sup> Cf. Schreier de Doctrina Plutarchi et Theologica et Morali, in Igen's *Journal for Historical Theology*. Vol. 6.

<sup>20</sup> An Seni sit Ger. Resp. 17.

thought, his witty and pointed language, his rhetorical skill and ornamental style, are but so many proofs of the decay of correct writing. In short, none of his works convey that impression of earnestness which belongs to a well digested whole; they seem designed for no other purpose than to string together, however loosely, the more striking and brilliant passages which they contain.

These observations on Plutarch's character as a writer are equally applicable to him as a philosopher. There is something peculiarly attractive in the way that he recommends to the reader his moral theory, whose end is elevation of mind, excellence in every human art, and the imitation of ancient virtue. He expresses a heartfelt aversion to the grovelling views of human life which the Epicurean professed; but yet the moderation of his own sentiments equally indisposed him to the Stoical view, which he attacked under its original form, and not unfrequently without due allowance. He was not only opposed to their contempt for the customs of life, and for all virtue which rests on habit rather than knowledge, but he also considered many of the most essential opinions of God and the world to be irreconcilable with his own convictions. Nevertheless, Plutarch, like the rest of his contemporaries, did not scruple to borrow largely from the ideas of the Stoical school. On the other hand, Plato and Aristotle were especial favourites, and particularly the former, as he found in their writings much to support his own moral and religious views; and he has adopted literally the mythical portion of the Platonic exposition, and made it the centre to which

to attach his own personal convictions. This heterogeneous medley of ideas, which in common with his contemporaries Plutarch adopted, has introduced into his whole system a vagueness and indecision which occasionally led him to speak in the tone of the New Academy, and to doubt whether a probable doctrine, at least, in the highest questions of philosophy, be within human attainment.<sup>21</sup> Nevertheless, whenever the subject under consideration requires or admits of it, Plutarch expresses himself positively enough.

His doctrine naturally appeared to him to want authority, inasmuch as it was in no single part based on any fixed foundation. In his philosophy this was undoubtedly the case; for although he did occasionally touch upon the first principles of knowledge, as well as upon the forms of scientific exposition, yet this is done so rarely, and with such slight traces of original inquiry, that it is at once apparent that he held logic in little regard, and that he had no inclination for any other than ethical questions, and investigations into the last grounds of things, to which his religious bias predisposed him.<sup>22</sup> In the same manner he does not absolutely neglect physical researches, but still he abstains from entering profoundly and at length into their fundamental and general principles, and consequently his treatises on special topics can only be regarded as compositions undertaken rather for the display of his learning and acuteness than for the love of investigating truth. But the less anxious Plutarch was to give a solid foundation to his philosophy, the

<sup>21</sup> De Sera Num. Vind. 4, 14.

<sup>22</sup> De Prof. in Virt. 7.

more open would his exposition be to doubt and inconsistency, as being little more than a compilation from different and even conflicting systems.

There is something exceedingly surprising in the pains which at times Plutarch takes to reconcile statements which proceed from the most opposite points of view ; as when, for instance, he makes the distinction of five parts in the *Sophist* to be coincident with that of four in the *Philebus*, by supposing that the latter further admitted a separating cause in opposition to that which combines.<sup>23</sup>

To quote another instance : he adopts the Platonic division of the soul concurrently with that of Aristotle, and acknowledges five members of the soul—the nutritive, the sensitive, the sensual desire, the irascible, and the rational.<sup>24</sup> This confusion of view runs through the whole of his moral doctrines ; in general he adopts the ethical theory of Plato, to which, however, without consideration, he appends the Aristotelian doctrine of the relation which subsists between habit and the mental disposition, and the cultivation of moral virtue, as the discovery of the mean between two opposite extremes.<sup>25</sup>

But even in the religious tendency of his mental disposition he was equally incapable of discovering a sure foundation for his convictions since these comprised many inconsistencies. He applied himself as decidedly to the overthrow of superstition<sup>26</sup> as to the establishment of faith. He gave a

<sup>23</sup> De E. I. ap. Delph. 15.

<sup>24</sup> Ib. c. 13 ; cf. de Virt. Mor. 3.

<sup>25</sup> De Virt. Mor. 4 ; cf. de Prof. in Virt. 3, 13 ; de Fort. 2.

<sup>26</sup> Especially in his work, *Περὶ Δεισιδαιμονίας*.

most revolting picture of the fears to which superstition is incessantly a prey, from his apprehension of suffering ill of the gods. The superstitious is practically an Atheist, since to hold the gods to be malignant is to disbelieve in them.<sup>27</sup> In this position we discern at once the moral tendency of his religious sentiments. But, above all else, did he firmly maintain the doctrine of a divine providence, which for the good disposes all things to good. But it was assuredly difficult for Plutarch to draw the line between superstition and true faith; and the more so as he felt himself constrained to admit the existence of a superior evil power, and of evil demons in the world.<sup>28</sup> His confidence, therefore, must have rested on an opinion that the power of good is greater than that of evil, although the latter can never be wholly mastered by the former. Now in this opposition to a superstitious fear of the gods, Plutarch, like Apollonius, had in view the purification of the popular religion, for which purpose he naturally sought to establish a standard of the right and the wrong. With this view he set himself in direct opposition to the mixture which had already commenced of all religious rites, and insisted on whatever was ancient and national.<sup>29</sup> He declared it to be contrary to the laws to introduce barbarous forms of worship into Greece, and frequently avows his disappro-

<sup>27</sup> De Superst. 11, fin.

<sup>28</sup> De Is. et Os. 25, 26, 59; de Def. Or. 14.

<sup>29</sup> Amator. 12. Ἀρκεί γὰρ ἡ πάτριος καὶ παλαιὰ πίστις, ἥς οὐκ ἔστιν εἰπεῖν, οὐδ' ἀνενρεῖν τεκμήμιον ἰναργέστερον. . . . ἰὰν ἰφ' ἑνὸς ταράττηται καὶ σαλεύηται τὸ βέβαιον αὐτῆς καὶ νομομισμένον, ἐπισηφάλης γίνεται πᾶσι καὶ ὑποπτος. De Sera Num. Vind. 22, The Greeks here are called τὸ βέλτιστον καὶ θεοφιλέστατον γένος.

bation of them, and in particular declares himself an enemy of Jewish and Syrian rites.<sup>30</sup> Nevertheless, he could not entirely escape the universal tendency of his age to recognize a value in foreign cults, and he recommended the worship of Osiris and Isis, as under foreign names representing the true gods. For, he says, as the sun and moon and heaven and earth and sea are common to all men, but differently named by different nations, so by the same law the one Reason which orders all things, and the one Providence which rules over them, receive different titles and honours from different nations and races. There are barbarian gods and Grecian gods, but all men worship alike the heavenly dispensers of all good gifts—the benefactors of the whole human race.<sup>31</sup> It is clear, therefore, that Plutarch could not have had a very strong conviction of the sure foundation, even of the legal portion of the Grecian worship. It was the more difficult for him to feel this, as he could not fail to discover much of a superstitious character in the ideas and usages of that people, and as he could not be blind to the difference of opinion which prevailed among them as to the divine nature and worship. The opinions of men on this subject are, he said, influenced by three guides or teachers, the poet namely, the legislator, and the philosopher; all of whom equally admit the existence of gods, but widely differ as to

<sup>30</sup> De Superst. 3, 8; de Stoic. Rep. 38. Thus he places Syrian and Judean in juxtaposition. How far he was from a correct acquaintance with the Jewish religion may be seen especially from Sympos. iv. qu. 5, p. 6.

<sup>31</sup> De Is. et Os. 67.



their number, nature, and power. The guide least to be depended upon is the poet, for who can take for truth the poetical images which ascribe divine honours to dissension and flight, to fear and pain?<sup>32</sup> Legislators are, indeed, more highly esteemed by Plutarch; compared with the poets they appear to be regarded as those ancient theologers<sup>33</sup> whom, on one occasion, he designates as the ancient philosophers.<sup>34</sup> Nevertheless, he cannot consent to look upon them as trustworthy guides, on the ground that philosophy is frequently constrained to dissent from them.<sup>35</sup> Philosophy, therefore, alone remains to furnish a decision as to the right worship of the gods, and to it accordingly he ascribes the true interpretation of religious ceremonies and festivals which the law has appointed, and to it as the teacher of truth they ought all to be referred.<sup>36</sup> But here Plutarch draws a distinction between a philosophy solely occupied with secondary physical causes, by which, confining its attention to the corporeal alone to the neglect of the divine first cause, it would account for all things, and the Platonic wisdom, which re-establishes the latter in all its rights. Thus does Plutarch oppose the ancient theologians and physicians to each other; the latter were exclusively occupied with mediate, corporeal, or second causes, the former with the supreme first cause, on which all depends. True philosophy ought not

<sup>32</sup> Amat. 18; de Stoic. Rep. 38.<sup>33</sup> De Def. Or. 48, in.<sup>34</sup> De Anim. Procr. 33.<sup>35</sup> Amat. l. 1.<sup>36</sup> De Is. et Os. 68, in. Διὶ δὲ μάλιστα πρὸς ταῦτα λόγον ἐκ φιλοσοφίας μυσταγωγὸν ἀναλαμβάνοντας ὁσῶς διανοῖσθαι τῶν λεγομένων καὶ δρωμένων ἕκαστον· ἵνα μὴ . . . ἡμεῖς, ἃ καλῶς οἱ νόμοι περὶ τὰς θυσίας καὶ τὰς ἱερῶν ἔταξαν, ἐτέρως ὑπολαμβάνοντες ἐξαμάρτωμεν.

to devote a less degree of attention to the divine origin of all things, than to the natural causes by which he operates in this world.<sup>37</sup> These two kinds of causes are so intimately connected together that they must be conceived to exist concurrently in one and the same operation; for while the natural truly produce their particular effect, yet this effect is at the same time designed to accomplish or indicate some divine purpose. And such a view serves further to reconcile the science of nature with the pretensions of divination, and with whatever is regarded by popular superstition as a prodigy.<sup>38</sup> Thus, then, we find the part which Plutarch undertook resulting in a compromise between philosophy and the national faith. Standing half way between both he felt unable to give his full confidence to either; for reasons which we have already alleged he could not throw himself in the arms of philosophy; while the superstitions which were mixed up with the popular belief were an obstacle to its unqualified adoption. His object was to find some new route by which to escape from the embarrassing position in which he was placed between two conflicting extremes; and hence the indecision which marks his course.

<sup>37</sup> De Def. Orac. 48. Καθόλου γάρ, ὡς φημί, δύο πάσης γενέσεως αἰτίας ἔχουσας, οἱ μὲν σφόδρα παλαιοὶ θεολόγοι καὶ ποιηταὶ τῇ κρείττονι μόνῃ τὸν νοῦν προσέχουσιν εἴλοντο . . . οἱ δὲ νεώτεροι τούτων καὶ φυσικοὶ προσαγορευόμενοι τοῦναντίον ἑκείνους τῆς καλῆς καὶ θείας ἀποπλανηθύνειν ἀρχῆς, ἐν σώμασι καὶ πάθεσι σωμάτων πληγαῖς τε καὶ μεταβολαῖς καὶ ἐκράσεσι τίθενται τὸ σύμπαν ὅθεν ἀμφοτέροις ὁ λόγος ἰνδιεῖς τοῦ προσήκοντός ἐστι, τοῖς μὲν τὸ δι' οὐ καὶ ὑφ' οὐ, τοῖς δὲ τὸ ἐξ ὧν καὶ δι' ὧν ἀγνοοῦσιν ἢ παραλείπουσιν.

<sup>38</sup> Vita Pericl. 6.

This want of decision becomes still more apparent the more we enter into the examination of his religious opinions. It is far from being the case, as perhaps after the passages already quoted one might be disposed to expect, that he of necessity adopted the Platonic and Aristotelian doctrine of first and second causes as the principle by which to determine between true and false religion. This doctrine would scarcely have justified the distinction of good and evil demons, and that conception of demons generally which would represent them as souls invested with air, and as having for their office to announce future events to mankind.<sup>39</sup> But what was a still stronger objection, this doctrine was little calculated to confirm the popular mind in its belief in the marvellous, for which, however, Plutarch had a strong disposition. He was anxious, not only to respect the divine origin of all things, but to acknowledge it concurrently with their natural origin, as if the two had a different import and a different essence. Moreover, together with the mediate influence of God, which these olden philosophers acknowledged, he wished to ascribe to him an immediate and supernatural operation also. If he describes the mental joy which seizes the truly pious and unsuperstitious worshipper at the religious festivals in the temples, he accounts for it by the opinion and well-grounded hope, that in these places and on these occasions God is especially present to men, and kindly deigns to accept the honours offered to him, and will send, to the good and virtuous, intimations and oracles,

<sup>39</sup> De Def. Or. xxxviii; cf. de Geni. Socr. xx, 23.

visions and auguries.<sup>40</sup> And if again he is far from favouring these popular opinions in their spirit and literal sense, and was disposed to foist upon them a philosophical interpretation, he nevertheless showed a disposition to encourage them, even in their common acceptation, and indeed in certain respects attached himself in the most decided manner possible. The causes to which Plutarch, in common with Plato and Aristotle referred all mundane developments, are not merely natural ones, and having their principle in the free activity of reason, but to these Plutarch added a third kind, which he called the divine operation in the human mind. These he exemplified by the demon of Socrates. The higher reason, he taught, influences the well-disciplined mind inaudibly by the thoughts, and the soul is enchanted and suffers itself to be led on. The voice of the demons speaks throughout the universe; but it is perceptible to those alone whose minds are undisturbed, and whose souls are at peace.<sup>41</sup> Whatever is good man ought to ask of the gods, but especially that by their help he may, so far at least as it is permitted to mankind, participate in a knowledge of the divine nature.<sup>42</sup> Plutarch describes by a very beautiful image, the soul of man as an instrument of God, whose only office is to give

<sup>40</sup> Non Posse Suav. Vivi Sec. Epic. xxi. 'Ἄλλ' ὅπου μάλιστα δοξάζει καὶ διανοεῖται παρῆναι τὸν θεόν, ἐκεῖ μάλιστα λύπας καὶ φόβους καὶ τὸ φροντίζειν ἀπωσαμένη τῷ ἡδομένῳ μέχρι μίθης καὶ παιδιᾶς καὶ γέλωτος ἀφήσιν αὐτήν. . . . . οὐ γὰρ οἶνου πληθος, οὐδ' ὀπτησις κρεῶν τὸ εὐφραϊνόν ἐστιν ἐν ταῖς ἰορταῖς, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἱλπίς ἀγαθῇ καὶ δόξα τοῦ παρῆναι τὸν θεὸν εὐμενῇ καὶ δέχεσθαι τὰ γινόμενα κεχαρισμένως. Ib. xxii. fin. Πέμποντες ἀγγέλους, φήμας καὶ ἐνύπνια καὶ οἰωνοὺς.

<sup>41</sup> De Genio Socr. xx.

<sup>42</sup> De Is. et Os. i, in.

back in the greatest possible purity, the ideas which God has implanted in it. To do this, in perfect purity is impossible, since every organ, every being which owes its manifestation to another, adds something of its own to all that it receives, and consequently can never give pure expression to the whole nature of that other. Thus no celestial body is more fitting than the moon to be the organ of the sun, but yet the moon reflects to earth the solar light alone, it is unable to transmit its warmth also. Therefore all that the soul is capable of, is to strive to the utmost to imitate the divine, or to receive it within itself in the highest possible degree of perfection. But in this attempt it is beset by a struggle between its imparted divinity and unborn humanity, and hence arise the violent emotions of the soul in enthusiasm.<sup>43</sup> We here discover the influence of the opinion, which we formerly met with in Philo, that the utmost that human efforts can effect is, by the purification of the soul from all impassioned emotions, to give free scope to the divine operation which thereupon will produce a higher sphere of existence. Accordingly the divine enthusiasm, which Plutarch estimated far more highly than Plato did, is represented by him as an affection of the soul; and further, a life of solitude

<sup>43</sup> De Pyth. Orac. xxi. Ψυχὴ δὲ ὄργανον θεοῦ γέγονεν· ὄργάνου δ' ἀρετὴ μάλιστα μιμεῖσθαι τὸ χρώμενον ᾧ πέφυκε δυνάμει καὶ παρέχειν τὸ ἔργον αὐτοῦ τοῦ νοήματος ἐν αὐτῷ, δεικνύσαι δ' οὐχ ὅσον ἦν ἐν τῷ δημιουργῷ καθαρὸν καὶ ἀπαθὲς καὶ ἀναμάρτητον, ἀλλὰ μεμιγμένον πολλῶ τῷ ἄλλοτριῳ· καθ' ἑαυτὸ γὰρ ἄδηλον ἡμῖν. . . . ὁ καλούμενος ἐνθουσιασμός ἐοικε μίξις εἶναι κινήσεων δυοῖν, τὴν μὲν ὡς πίπτοντα τῆς ψυχῆς ἅμα τὴν δὲ ὡς πέφυκε κινουμένης. Ib. xxii. ; de Anim. Procr. xxvii. Bergl. de Def. Orac. xlviij.

regarded as the best preparation for a knowledge of the Deity.<sup>44</sup>

If the preceding statements distinctly reveal an Oriental character of thought, yet in other respects Plutarch faithfully adhered to Grecian views. Although, after Plato, he defined God to be unchangeable and to preserve eternal repose, still his doctrine is not uninfluenced by the view, that good, and the knowledge of reason consists in motion.<sup>45</sup> God, he says, who is hidden within himself, and who exists only for himself, who is reason and idea, has by motion proceeded into generation.<sup>46</sup>

But here we meet with a view which, notwithstanding that it may be referred to Plato and to Aristotle, reminds us more strongly of Oriental opinions. Plutarch brings prominently forward the idea that God envelops himself in a mysterious obscurity, and he distinguishes the absolute God from the God the creator of the world,—a distinction which in such a definite form at least is no where to be met with in the earlier philosophy of Greece. God, he says, in himself is unknown to us;<sup>47</sup> the first God sees, but is not seen;<sup>48</sup> he is far removed

<sup>44</sup> De Is. et Os. ii. Plutarch evinces a fondness for Pythagorean doctrines, and particularly favours that of the Metempsychosis. If the work De Esu Carnium belongs to him, it also testifies to this predilection in so far, as although not approving of total abstinence from animal food, he yet wishes to limit the use of it.

<sup>45</sup> De Is. et Os. lx. Οὕτω καὶ τὴν νόησιν καὶ τὴν φρόνησιν ὡς νοῦ φορὰν καὶ κίνησιν οὖσαν ἱμίνου καὶ φερομένου καὶ τὸ συνιέναι καὶ τάγαθὸν ἔλως καὶ ἀρετὴν ἐπὶ τοῖς ρίουσι καὶ θίουσι θέσθαι, κ.τ.λ. Ib. lxii. sq.; lxxvii; Quæst. Plat. ii. 1.

<sup>46</sup> De Is. et Os. lxii. fin. Αἰνίττεται δὲ καὶ διὰ τούτων ὁ μῦθος, ὅτι καθ' αὐτὸν ὁ τοῦ θεοῦ νοῦς καὶ λόγος, ἐν τῷ ἀοράτῳ καὶ ἀφανεί βιβηκώς, εἰς γίνεσιν ὑπὸ κινήσεως προῆλθε.

<sup>47</sup> De Pyth. Orac. 21. Καθ' αὐτὸ γὰρ ἀδηλον ἡμῖν.

<sup>48</sup> De Is. et Os. 75.

from the earth; it would be a tainting his pure essence if he were to come into contact with things that are subject to decay and death. The souls of men which are invested with bodies and liable to suffering, have no community with him, except the power of gaining revelation from him during dreams by means of philosophy. It is only when, being separated from body, they have reached to the invisible and the holy, where they joy to behold the beauty which is invisible to men that this God is their guide and their king.<sup>49</sup> The difference however which we here believe to exist between Plutarch and the earlier philosophers of Greece, is simply one of degree, for the doctrines of the latter contain passages which place whatever is mundane, and especially the terrestrial life, in a certain alienation from God. Plutarch seems only to have dwelt upon it with greater complacency. And thus, in his system, Isis plays nearly the same part that the Word of God does in that of Philo; she is supposed to form the intermediate link which connects earthly and perishable things with Osiris, the supreme God. Similarly to Philo, he advances the idea that God is simple and a pure light; he calls him the existent, his essence is unity; all distinction, all difference arises only in order to produce the non-existent.<sup>50</sup> Therefore the idea of the intel-

<sup>49</sup> Ib. lxxix. 'Ο δ' ἐστὶ μὲν αὐτὸς ἀπωτάτω τῆς γῆς ἄχραντος καὶ ἀμίαντος καὶ καθαρὸς οὐσίας ἀπάσης φθορὰν δεχομένης καὶ θάνατον. ἀνθρώπων δὲ ψυχαῖς ἰνταυθοῖ μὲν ὑπὸ σωμάτων καὶ παθῶν περιεχομέναις οὐκ ἔστι μετουσία τοῦ θεοῦ, πλὴν ὅσον ὀνείρατος ἀμαυροῦ θιγεῖν νοήσει διὰ φιλοσοφίας, κ.τ.λ. De E. I. ap. Delph. xx.

<sup>50</sup> De E. I. ap. Delph. xx. 'Αλλ' εἶναι δεῖ τὸ ὄν, ὥσπερ ὃν τὸ εἶναι, ἢ δ' ἐτερότης, διαφορὰ τοῦ ὄντος, εἰς γίνεσιν ἐξίσταται τοῦ μὴ ὄντος. De Is. et Os. 78.

lectually cognisable, the pure and the holy is, as it were, a lightning flash which permits man to touch and perceive the same.<sup>51</sup> The thoughts, ideas, and emanations of God remain within the heavens and the stars; they come to man dispersedly only, and at intervals, and do not abide with him long, and it is the office of Isis to sustain and cherish them in this form.<sup>52</sup> This goddess, ruling over the sensible things of this world, gathers together the scattered members of God and preserves them, and permits man to see the supra-sensible in the sensible.<sup>53</sup> But on this head Plutarch is not always perfectly consistent. We meet in his writings with representations which apparently take a different direction of thought. God, he teaches us, is the beginning or principle, and every principle multiplies by its creative energy, that which proceeds out of itself.<sup>54</sup> This creative energy of God, as manifest in the world, is in the next place described not only as giving form and fashion to matter, but as multiplying itself therein, for the rational soul is explained to be not only a work but also a portion of God.<sup>55</sup>

It would be extremely difficult, from such occasional remarks and such vacillating and conflicting views, to extract the core and spirit of Plutarch's real opinions, did not his view of the relation of God to the world furnish a central point, to which he frequently recurs, and with which his assertions, for the most part, coincide. This point in which all

<sup>51</sup> De Is. et Os. l. 1.

<sup>52</sup> Ib. lix. Οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐν οὐρανῷ καὶ ἀστροῖς λόγοι καὶ εἶδη καὶ ἀπορροαὶ τοῦ θεοῦ μίνουσι, τὰ δὲ τοῖς παθητικοῖς διεσπαρμένα, κ.τ.λ.

<sup>53</sup> L. 1.; ib. 78.

<sup>54</sup> Ib. 36.

<sup>55</sup> Plat. Quæst. ii. 2.



else centres, is the relation of matter to God. He expressly declares it to be his conviction, that it is necessary to recur frequently to the truth, that the irrational soul and formless body were from all time together, and they had neither beginning nor production.<sup>56</sup> But now as he set out with this position, his own habit of thought necessarily led him, on the other hand, to posit also a rational principle, which might implant reason into the irrational soul and give a form to rude matter, so that he would seem to recognise three principles, which originally, independent of each other, co-operated in the formation of the world.<sup>57</sup> But as we have already seen, he considered two of these principles to have been together originally, and he may consequently have regarded his own view as coinciding with the doctrines of Plato and Aristotle, according to what he felt to be their true interpretation, and as agreeing also with that of Zoroaster, who referred the origin of the world to two principles—good and evil.<sup>58</sup> And this opinion Plutarch manages to connect even with the proposition which we have already reported, that it is necessary in the explanation of phenomena to apprehend physical and natural causes as well as the divine first cause, who is the beginning and end of all things.<sup>59</sup> And thus does he satisfy his inclination, to attach his own novelties to some more ancient doctrine.

<sup>56</sup> Ib. iv. Ἡ τὸ πολλάκις ὑφ' ἡμῶν λεγόμενον ἀληθὲς ἐστίν; ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀνους ψυχὴ καὶ τὸ ἀμορφὸν σῶμα συννηπύρχον ἀλλήλοις αἰεὶ καὶ οὐδέποτε αὐτῶν γίνεσιν ἔσχεν οὐδ' ἀρχήν.

<sup>57</sup> L. l.

<sup>58</sup> De Def. Orac. 47; de Anim. Procr. 6, 27.; de Is. et Os. 46. sqq.

<sup>59</sup> De Def. Or. 47, 48.

His view becomes still more distinct, when we examine the arguments by which he supports it. He declares matter to be indispensable for the creation of the world, not only on the ground that it was necessary to maintain the old maxim, that nothing can come of nothing;<sup>60</sup> but he seems to have been deeply impressed with the consideration that the evil to be found in the world required to be accounted for. On this ground, he decidedly condemns the hypothesis of a matter without properties, for such, he argues, must lend itself, without power of resistance, to the formation of all possible good. He indulges his aversion to the Stoics by attributing this supposition exclusively to them, and censures them for deriving evil from the non-existent without cause or reason.<sup>61</sup> God therefore, he infers, cannot be made the sole cause of the world, for as without God there could not be anything good in it, so, on the other hand, if all things proceeded from God, no evil would be found among them.<sup>62</sup> On these grounds he considers himself compelled to give a positive value to matter as the cause of evil, although, on the other hand, he was constrained to find in it a certain indefinite potentiality by virtue of which it presented to God a fitting material for the production of good. Thus, then, with Plutarch did the notion of matter fall into two parts—the principle of evil, and the

<sup>60</sup> De Anim. Procr. 5.

<sup>61</sup> De Anim. Procr. 6. Αἱ γὰρ Στωικαὶ καταλαμβάνουσιν ἡμᾶς ἀπορίας τὸ κακὸν ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος ἀναίτιως καὶ ἀγεννήτως ἐκτεσάγοντες· ἐπεὶ τῶν γ' ὄντων οὔτε τὸ ἀγαθὸν οὔτε τὸ ἀποιον εἰκὸς ἔστιν οὐσίαν κακοῦ καὶ γίνεσθαι παρασχέειν. De Is. et Os. xlv. lviii.; Adv. Stoic. xxxiv.

<sup>62</sup> De Is. et Os. xlv. Ἀδύνατον γὰρ ἢ φλαῦρον ὄντιον, ὅπου πάντων, ἢ χρηστὸν, ὅπου μηδενὸς ὁ θεὸς αἰτίας, ἐγγενίσθαι.

indifferent which may receive a determination either for good or for evil; and on this account, by means of his notion of matter, connects together the two terms of the Platonic contrariety of the like and the different, i. e. of the good and the evil.<sup>63</sup> Before the creation of the world, there was a privation of form, but not of body or of soul, for God could neither form body of the incorporeal nor a soul of the soulless; but having these two without order and measure, he reduced them into a whole of the most perfect beauty, united them together, and formed of their union the most perfect of living creatures.<sup>64</sup> The irrational soul moreover is called indefinite motion, which we may regard as the formless and unfashioned matter of time, as contrariwise the formless incorporeal appears as the matter of the orderly system of the world in space.<sup>65</sup>

Now it may, at first view, appear singular that Plutarch should have referred original evil to the unordered motion of the soul, and not to the corporeal; which, on the other hand, he regarded as the indifferent, which unresistingly permits itself to be transformed into good. Indeed, it is especially singular, when we bear in mind the strong inclination of all the previous philosophers, whose opinions Plutarch in other respects adopted, to view the corporeal as an incumbrance and evil to the soul, and when we elsewhere find him describing

<sup>63</sup> De An. Procr. 26.

<sup>64</sup> Ib. v. 'Ακοσμία γὰρ ἦν τὰ πρὸ τῆς τοῦ κόσμου γενίσεως, ἀκοσμία δὲ οὐκ ἀσώματος, οὐδ' ἀκίνητος, οὐδ' ἀψυχος. . . . ὁ γὰρ θεὸς οὕτως σῶμα τὸ ἀσώματον, οὕτως ψυχὴν τὸ ἀψυχὸν ἐποίησεν, κ.τ.λ.

<sup>65</sup> Plat. Quest. viii. 4.

the body as the tomb of the soul, and death as its emancipation from evil. But on this point his statements are most precise and decided. Thus he demands of such as ascribe the Platonic necessity to corporeal matter, how was it possible for Plato, who understood by matter an entity without properties or forces of its own, to look upon such an inert mass, devoid of any particular determination one way or other as the principle of evil, as a power disobedient to the divine will?<sup>66</sup> Plato, he says, called matter the mother and nurse of all things, while the cause of evil was in his view unensouled motion;<sup>67</sup> thus he also speaks of a twofold soul—a good and an evil one, of which the former was first formed by the creation of the world, while the latter is eternal and imperishable, prior to the creation, and the first cause of all evil.<sup>68</sup> In this way did Plutarch connect his own opinion with certain passages of Plato's writings; nevertheless, his convictions could not have been formed in the first instance from passages like these, which easily admitted of a very different interpretation, and it was probably founded in the main on the moral view which he entertained of evil. This led him to look upon evil as a disorder of the soul, not arising from external circumstances, but having its ground in itself. He therefore zealously combated the Stoical view, that in the soul all is dependent on reason, and that in mankind the only point to be considered

<sup>66</sup> De Anim. Procr. 6. Οὐ γὰρ οἶόν τε τὸ ἀποιον καὶ ἀργόν ἐξ αὐτοῦ καὶ ἀρρεπὲς αἰτίαν κακοῦ καὶ ἀρχὴν ὑποτίθεσθαι τὸν Πλάτωνα καὶ καλεῖν ἀπειρίαν, αἰσχροὺς καὶ κακοποιούς, αὐτοὺς δ' ἀνάγκην, πολλὰ τῷ θεῷ δυσμαχοῦσαν καὶ ἀφηνιάζουσαν.

<sup>67</sup> Ib. 7.

<sup>68</sup> Ib. 6, 8, 9; de Is. et Os. 48.

is the distinction between soul and matter. In his view, on the contrary, the soul appeared to consist of two parts—the rational and the irrational, the good and the evil, the former being derived from God the creator of the world, the latter from itself; and this irrational and evil part of the soul possesses a power to resist the good, and must ultimately be referred to the principle of evil in the world.<sup>69</sup> In this way did Plutarch contrive to connect his ethical doctrine with his general theory of the world. And we may also recognise its influence in his hypothesis of evil demons, which he has carried out with greater strictness than even Plato was able to do, even though he went so far as to ascribe to the heavenly bodies a participation in that mixture of good and evil which reigns throughout the world.<sup>70</sup>

In this view, however, there was a point of some difficulty. Plutarch had been led, by a consideration of the evil to be found in man, and which appeared to him truly fearful, to regard the primary soul as evil, by reason of its unrestrained course. But in the same way the soul of man must have also appeared to him the seat of true good, and he

<sup>69</sup> De Virt. Mor. 3. "Εοικε δὲ λαθεῖν τοῦτο τοὺς ἅπαντας, ὃ διττὸς ἡμῶν ὡς ἀληθῶς ἕκαστός ἐστι καὶ σύνθετος· τὴν γὰρ ἑτέραν διπλόην οὐ κατεῖδον, ἀλλὰ τὴν ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος μίξιν ἐφανιστίραν οὖσαν. . . . Ἐφανῶς μὲντοι καὶ βεβαίως καὶ ἀναμφιδόξως Πλάτων συνείδεν, ὅτι τούτου γε τοῦ κόσμου τὸ ἐμψυχον οὐχ ἀπλοῦν οὐδὲ ἀσύνθετον οὐδὲ μονοειδὲς ἐστίν, ἀλλ' ἐκ τῆς ταυτοῦ καὶ τῆς τοῦ ἑτέρου μεμιγμένον δυνάμει, κ.τ.λ. . . . ἢ τε ἀνθρώπου ψυχῇ, μέρος ἢ τμήμα τῆς τοῦ παντός οὖσα καὶ συνηρμοσμένη κατὰ λόγους καὶ ἀριθμοὺς τοιοῦτας ἐκείνους, οὐχ ἀπλῇ τίς ἐστιν, οὐδὲ ὁμοιοπαθής, ἀλλ' ἕτερον μὲν ἔχει τὸ νοερόν καὶ λογιστικόν, ᾧ κρατεῖν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου κατὰ φύσιν καὶ ἄρχειν προσήκόν ἐστιν, ἕτερον δὲ τὸ παθητικόν καὶ ἄλογον καὶ πολυπλανὲς καὶ ἀτακτον ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ, ἐπιστασίας διέμενον."

<sup>70</sup> De An. Procr. 28, in.

would therefore be induced to assign to the primitive soul a capacity likewise for good.<sup>71</sup> Viewed under this aspect, then, the primary soul would appear to him indifferent as to good or evil—an intermediate principle. But, on the other hand, although in the view of Plutarch the corporeal is not properly evil, yet is it incapable of that good which he invariably ascribed to the spiritual, but rather presents to the irrational or sensuous part of the soul many evil seductions,<sup>72</sup> whereby its intellectual faculties are impeded. Consequently, from this point of view, the corporeal principle must appear to be originally evil. Now, by these considerations, the contrariety which Plutarch assumed to exist between the evil soul and the corporeal matter, which is susceptible of all qualities and states, assumes an entirely new phase. A disposition arises to ascribe to the soul a longing and desire for good, and to regard it as the intermediate principle between good and evil;<sup>73</sup> while to the body are apparently imputed the diversified ills which man has to endure in this life, and it is thereby made to be the ground of evil. On the whole, Plutarch felt himself unable to separate the constituents of the two principles, which were formed of God, in such a manner as to arrange on one side the corporeal and whatever is obedient to reason, and on the other that which is of the nature of the soul and repugnant to reason. On the con-

<sup>71</sup> Ib. 9.<sup>72</sup> Ib. 27, 28.<sup>73</sup> De Is. et Os. 48, fin. 'Ἀπολείπει δὲ καὶ τρίτην τινὰ μεταξύ φύσιν, οὐκ ἄψυχον, οὐδ' ἄλογον, αὐδ' ἀκίνητον ἐξ αὐτῆς, ὥσπερ ἔνιοι νομίζουσιν, ἀλλ' ἀνακειμένην ἀμφοῖν ἰκίνας, ἱφαιμένην δὲ τῆς ἀμείνονος αἰεὶ καὶ ποθοῦσαν καὶ διώκουσαν. Ib. 53.

trary, he found himself constrained to ascribe an indifference doubtless for good or evil, but yet a power of seducing to the latter; and to the soul in the same manner a tendency on the whole to evil, but at the same time a capacity of being disposed to good.<sup>74</sup> But notwithstanding, he perseveres in keeping these constituents apart from each other, and essentially he posits three distinct principles. And here it is necessary, once for all, to remark, that in this theory the corporeal plays a very subordinate part. It is true, that frequent mention is made of the beauty of its forms and harmonious movements; but it is evident, on the whole, that, to the mind of Plutarch, good has its seat mainly in the soul. This is the case with evil also; for in reference to that, the body scarcely appears in any other light than as the occasion of the evil inclinations of the soul. But now, the more that the corporeal is withdrawn from consideration, the greater desire do we find to exalt the moving and animating force of the soul which universally pervades matter. With this desire was connected his theory of demoniacal existence, the

<sup>74</sup> De Is. et Os. 49. 'Απολίσθαι δὲ τὴν φαύλην (sc. δύναμιν) παντάπασιν ἀδύνατον, πολλὴν μὲν ἐμπεφυκυῖαν τῷ σώματι, πολλὴν δὲ τῇ ψυχῇ τοῦ παντός. . . . ἐν μὲν οὖν τῇ ψυχῇ νοῦς καὶ λόγος, ὁ τῶν ἀρίστων πάντων ἡγεμὼν καὶ κύριος, Ὅσιρίς ἐστιν ἐν δὲ γῇ καὶ πνεύματι καὶ ὕδατι καὶ οὐρανῷ καὶ ἀστροῖς τὸ τεταγμένον καὶ καθεστηκός καὶ ὑγιαῖνον Ὅσιριδος ἀπορροή καὶ εἰκὼν ἐμφαινομένη. Τυφὼν δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ παθητικὸν καὶ τιτανικὸν καὶ ἄλογον καὶ ἐμπληκτον· νοῦ δὲ σωματικοῦ τὸ ἐπικληκτον καὶ νοσῶδες καὶ παρακτικὸν ἀωρίαις καὶ δυσκрасίαις, κ.τ.λ. One of the principal points of difference in the expositions of this doctrine, which Plutarch has given in considerable details in the works de Is. et Os. is, that in the latter he labours to refer the contrariety between the evil and middle principle to that between the evil soul and corporeal matter, while in the former he is rather disposed to see evil in both.

notion of which comes prominently forward wherever the idea of a spiritual existence, raised far above terrestrial life, occurs in a more general and important signification, and especially where it is applied to the principles of mundane existence, which are not of a divine nature.

In this doctrine of Plutarch, it is impossible to overlook its approximation to Oriental ideas, notwithstanding that the Grecian element still preponderates in its composition. This Oriental tendency does not venture to show itself openly, but by lurking under the cover of ancient Greek doctrines, seeks to give to itself the air of a national sentiment. This fact is most apparent on a comparison of Plutarch's writings with those of Philo. The same principles nearly are maintained in both, but in Philo in a much stronger and more decided form. Both present the same thoughts: that God in himself is hidden from man; that contact with matter would sully his eternal essence—the simplicity of his essence; but Plutarch was, nevertheless, not restrained by them from considering God as the good absolutely, and also from recognising the operation of God in the development of the good that is in the world. Both alike were disposed to assume a sort of mystical union of man with the divine; but while Philo regarded this union as superior to science, and as furnishing an actual intuition of God, Plutarch apparently wavered between the respective importance of the two, and in enthusiasm saw nothing more than a merely demoniacal influence. Further, Philo's theory of the intermediate essences which are



to form the links of the natural communion between God and man is much more complete; his belief in a descending series of emanations from God, by which the divine ultimately comes down to man, is much firmer; in all other correspondent opinions, too, he is much more decided than Plutarch, who touches on them incidentally only, and without connection. Moreover, we may notice how cautiously the latter recommends a life of abstinence as a means for arriving at a knowledge of God, while his moral precepts urgently invite men to political life; and how utterly averse he is to that contemplative repose which Philo so highly extolled; and how little his view of religious worship betrays the silent and almost melancholy earnestness of Philo, but rather exhibits the lighter and more cheerful colours of the Grecian worship. We might, perhaps, be justified in asserting, that all these differences had their centre in their respective views of the highest grounds of all entity. Plutarch, it is true, brings more prominently forward than Philo does the principle of evil in the world, but it is only with a view to be able to refer the disposition which is in it for good to its original nature; when in the view of Philo the repugnant nature of matter, which absolutely refuses to be brought into subjection to a spiritual life, necessarily strengthened the aversion with which he regarded the union of man's soul with the corporeal. Plutarch evinces a decided wish to free man, amid the evils of the sensible world, from all fear of the evil principle; the powers which he assigns to these opposing principles are far from equal, and the mas-

tery is ascribed to good.<sup>76</sup> It was but natural that Oriental conceptions should only have gained a gradual admission into the Grecian mind.

We must not overlook the fact, that these conceptions began to find their way among the Latin writers also of this period. We have a proof of this in the works of L. Apuleius, who in the time of the Antonines was a teacher of the Platonic and Aristotelian philosophies at Medaura of Numidia. He stands in nearly the same relation to Plutarch as Roman does to Grecian philosophy. His sketch of the Platonic and Aristotelian doctrines is a meagre compilation, deficient in right apprehension of principles and systematic connection. All that we are called upon to notice, is simply his view of God and of the demons in their relation to the world. He declares the superintendence of all things to be derogatory to God, and therefore ascribes to him a host of ministers by whose agency he disposes all mundane events.<sup>76</sup> These ministers are the demons which, according to his, in the main, very sensuous conceptions of them, have their abode in the air, and being encompassed with aeriform bodies, are the true inhabitants and living creatures of the intermediate region between heaven and earth.<sup>77</sup> All the religious ceremonies

<sup>76</sup> De Ia. et Oa. 49, in. *Μεμυγμένη γὰρ ἡ τοῦδε τοῦ κόσμου γένεσις καὶ σύστασις ἐξ ἑναντίων, οὐ μὴν ἰσοςθενῶν δυνάμεων, ἀλλὰ τῆς βελτιονος τὸ κρᾶτος ἴσιν.*

<sup>76</sup> De Mundo, p. 70. ed. Elmenhorst. Quod si cui viro vel cuilibet regi in decorum est per semet ipsum procurare omnia, quæ proficiunt, multo magis deo inconueniens erit. (Compare herewith the pseudo-Aristotelian work on the World, c. 6.) De Deo Socr. p. 45, 46.

<sup>77</sup> De Doctr. Plat. i. p. 7 ; de Deo Socr. II. II. ; p. 49. Thus the neo-Platonists corrected Plato.

of the Greeks and barbarians, and even the practice of magic, have these beings for their objects.<sup>78</sup> Nothing that passes within the human heart is, he thinks, hidden from them, and he makes them to act the part of conscience in the human mind.<sup>79</sup> Anything like scientific connection between these several propositions, it would be vain to look for in such a writer as Apuleius. We shall therefore merely observe further, that he speaks of a trinity of divine faculties, which are immutable and eternal : God himself ; the divine Reason which comprises the ideas ; and the soul of the world. And to this trinity he opposes the mutable things of this world, which do not truly exist, but must be looked upon as copies of the truly existent.<sup>80</sup>

The philosophy of this period having once taken this direction, it gradually advanced in it, not wholly uninfluenced by the stimulus which the writings of Plutarch afforded.<sup>81</sup> Our information on this point consists of little more than desultory notices both of the authors and doctrines, which contributed to diffuse these ideas. Among those of whose writings the neo-Platonists profitably availed themselves, Cronius and Numenius are especially mentioned, being described as men of a congenial spirit.<sup>82</sup> Of them we shall not venture to speak more precisely than to say, that with regard to

<sup>78</sup> De Deo Socr. ll. ll.

<sup>79</sup> Ib. p. 51.

<sup>80</sup> De Doctr. Plat. i. 4. Et sicut superior (sc. essentia) vere esse memoratur, hanc non esse vere possumus dicere. Et primæ quidem substantiæ vel essentiæ primum deum esse et mentem formasque rerum et animam ; secundæ substantiæ omnia, quæ inde formantur, etc.

<sup>81</sup> Cf. Eunap. De Vit. Phil. Proœm. p. 5, seqq. Commel.

<sup>82</sup> Porphy. de Antro Nymph. 21. In this work Cronius is mentioned more than once as the author of a mystical interpretation of Homer.

chronology they properly take their position in the present place;<sup>83</sup> of Cronius nothing has been preserved beyond a few propositions relating to the doctrine of metempsychosis, and destitute of originality;<sup>84</sup> of the doctrines of Numenius we possess fuller information, and they furnish us with a point of comparison, which it will be imperative on us to make known.

The high estimation in which neo-Platonists held the numerous writings of Numenius, may be inferred from the great labour bestowed upon them by Amelius, one of the most distinguished disciples of Plotinus,<sup>85</sup> and from the prevalent suspicion against which he found it necessary to defend his master of having adopted without acknowledgment the doctrine of Numenius, as the foundation of his own.<sup>86</sup> As Numenius was born at Apamea in Syria, we may perhaps ascribe to the influence of country, his adoption of Oriental ideas, and the cause of his paying to those religious views, with which the former are usually associated, a higher and more extensive regard than was paid to them by later members of the neo-Platonical school.<sup>87</sup> The character of Moses he held in the highest veneration, as proved by the title of the Athenian Moses which he gave to Plato;<sup>88</sup> and, in general, attributed great importance

<sup>83</sup> Clemens Alexandrinus is the earliest writer that mentions Numenius. According to Procl. in Tim. ii. p. 93, he cannot well have been earlier than Herodes Atticus.

<sup>84</sup> Nemes. de Nat. Hom. ii. 50, Antv.

<sup>85</sup> Porphy. v. Plot. c. 2. I reckon the paragraphs of the Basle Edition as chapters.

<sup>86</sup> Ib. c. 11.

<sup>87</sup> Suid. s. v. *Νουμήνιος*.

<sup>88</sup> Porphy. de Antro Nymph. 10 ; Clem. Alex. Strom. i. p. 342.

to the Jewish and other Oriental traditions,—those of the Egyptian, the Magi, and the Brahmins, for instance ;<sup>89</sup> while he has made free use of the history of our Saviour, without however naming him, for the purpose of his allegorical interpretations.<sup>90</sup> He appears to have been of opinion, that the wisdom of Greece originally flowed from an Eastern source ; at least his statements would lead to the conclusion, that he was disposed to refer Plato to Pythagoras, and Pythagoras to the sages of the East.<sup>91</sup> Socrates and Plato appear to him, it is true, to have possessed correct ideas and a true religious feeling, but yet not to have given a sufficiently clear expression to it.<sup>92</sup> The latter circumstance was the source of all the mistakes of subsequent philosophers, Aristotle, the Stoics, and the members of the New Academy, in whom he placed the decline of the older philosophy of Greece. To judge from the extant fragments, the loss of his entire works is not greatly to be regretted, since they exhibit their author as one who, without affording the slightest trace of profound inquiry, displays with no little vanity, the patchwork of his erudition, and at the same time gives himself the lofty air of a philosopher, who condescended to such things merely for the sake of amusement.<sup>93</sup> Nevertheless, he is justly entitled to the praise of having

<sup>89</sup> Euseb. Pr. Ev. ix. 7, 8.

<sup>90</sup> Grig. c. Cels. iv. 51, 543, ed. Delarue.

<sup>91</sup> Euseb. Pr. Ev. ix. 7 ; xi. 10 ; xiv. 5.

<sup>92</sup> Ib. xiv. 5.

<sup>93</sup> This opinion is principally grounded on the fragments of his work *περί τῆς τῶν Ἀκαδημαϊκῶν πρὸς Πλάτωνα διαστάσεως*, which Eusebius Pr. Ev. xiv. 5, sqq. gives. See particularly c. 6. p. 732 fin. Ed. Colon. 1688.

explained the main features of his doctrine with tolerable precision and clearness.

With the philosophers who followed this direction of thought, we have already seen the idea of being assuming a conspicuous and important position. This was also the case with Numenius. His treatise concerning good, which may be regarded as the most valuable of his works, probably began with an examination of this notion. Men habitually oppose it to the notion of the changeable and perishable. Therefore being cannot be a body because whatever is corporeal is perishable,—nor matter, because that is not permanent but transitory; and it is infinite, therefore indefinite, and consequently irrational and unknowable. Proceeding now from this notion of the corporeal, Numenius endeavours to demonstrate the necessity of an incorporeal first cause. The corporeal, he argues, requires something besides itself to hold it in combination, for it is infinitely divisible and consequently may be easily dissipated. For the same reason, one corporeal nature cannot hold another in an unchangeable unity; but it is requisite to suppose a something incorporeal—an immaterial soul to preserve the body from dissipation and corruption. As a contingent question, Numenius here endeavours to prove, that the incorporeal can exist in space; and that such is the case with the force which keeps body in combination, and for this purpose enters into a controversy with the Stoics, who had declared quality and magnitude, and whatever else is an accident of body, to be in itself corporeal

also.<sup>94</sup> The incorporeal as the contrary of divisible and changeable body, he regards as a simple and unchangeable substance; in short, as that which is.<sup>95</sup> Whoever would wish to rise to the right apprehension of being, him Numenius recommends, in Plato's manner, to abstain from all sensual pleasures, and after applying diligently to mathematical sciences, to investigate the nature of the One. This he calls Reason or the Good.<sup>96</sup> Now to good nothing can be likened; nothing that is sensuous can bear to behold it near at hand, and must view it as it were at a glance and from a distance. The supreme and prime Reason is beyond the ken of man. On this account Numenius rejoices in his office, which is to make known to man whatever is most marvellous in this first and supreme God; and man ought not to wonder if he is told that the quietude of the first cause of all is innate motion.<sup>97</sup>

Apparently, we have here a doctrine whose object was, to explain and account for the link which connects the supreme immutable God and the mutable world. But in truth, Numenius found it a difficult undertaking to connect God, the self-perfect essence, with matter. Indeed he believed,

<sup>94</sup> Euseb. Pr. Ev. xv. 17; Nemes. de Nat. Hom. ii. 29, Ed. Antv. That this passage develops the doctrine of Numenius was seen by Tennemann. The doctrine of the incorporeity of qualities was not unfrequently discussed in this age without our being able to trace its rise. It was evidently formed in opposition to the exaggerations of the Stoical doctrine. We meet with it in Alcinous among others, and especially in the work, Quod Qualitates Incorporee, which is to be found among the works of Galen.

<sup>95</sup> Eus. Pr. Ev. xi. 10.

<sup>96</sup> Ib. xi. 18, 22.

<sup>97</sup> Ib. 18. Μη θαυμάσης δ', εἰ τοῦτ' ἔφη, πολὺ γὰρ ἔτι θαυμαστότερον ἀκούσθ. ἀντὶ γὰρ τῆς προσούσης τῷ δευτέρῳ κινήσεως τὴν προσεῦσαν τῷ πρώτῳ στάσει φησὶ εἶναι κίνησιν σύμφυτον. Ib. 22.

that every change is a further estrangement from the pure essence of God. Indeed he was chiefly led to the notion of an incorporeal essence, by the necessity he felt of acknowledging an unchangeable substance. If he ascribes life to the first God, it is nevertheless, a stationary life; God is inactive, far estranged from all operation—he is not the Creator of the world.<sup>98</sup> He is but the Father of the Creator deity; a proposition, which in all probability, implied the principle of the theory of emanation, which made the second cause to proceed from the first without change of any kind. He seems to have placed this view in a very strong and suitable light, by denying that the divine giving was in any respect to be compared with the same act of man. In the latter, the gift in passing to the recipient, passes wholly away from the donor; but with the gifts of God it is not so. In the same way that science, when communicated to others, is not lost by him who imparts it, but on the contrary, he is rather benefited by its communication; so God imparts his gifts to the second cause—Reason, viz. which diffuses itself over the world. For science remains with God who gave it, in the same degree that it does with me or thee who receive it.<sup>99</sup>

<sup>98</sup> Ib. 18. Καὶ γὰρ οὕτε δημιουργεῖν ἐστὶ χρεῖων τὸν πρῶτον. . . . . τὸν μὲν πρῶτον θεὸν ἄργον εἶναι ἔργων ἐνυμπάντων.

<sup>99</sup> L. 1. Καὶ ἐξῆς δὲ ἄλλιν περὶ τοῦ πῶς ἀπὸ τοῦ πρώτου αἰτίου τὸ δεύτερον ὑπίστη τοιάδε φησίν· ὅποσα δὲ δοθίντα μέτεισι πρὸς τὸν λαμβάνοντα, ἀπελθόντα ἐκ τοῦ δεδοκότος, ἐστὶ θεράπεια (ἐστὶν ἀνθρώπεια), χρήματα, νόμισμα κοῖλον, ἐπίσημον. ταυτὶ μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ θνητὰ καὶ ἀνθρώπινα· τὰ δὲ θεῖα ἐστὶν, ὅλα μεταδοθίντα ἐνθὺνδ' ἐκείθι γεγεννημένα ἐνθὺνδε τε οὐκ ἀπελήλυθε, ἐκείθι γινόμενα τὸν μὲν ὤνησε, τὸν δ' οὐκ ἐβλαψε καὶ προσώνησε τῇ περὶ ὧν ἡπίστατο ἀναμνήσει. ἐστὶ δὲ τοῦτο τὸ καλὸν χρῆμα, ἐπιστήμη ἢ καλή, ἥς ὤνατο μὲν ὁ λαβὼν, οὐκ ἀπολείπεται δ' αὐτῆς ὁ δεδοκώς, κ.τ.λ.



This is the distinction which Numenius draws between his First and Second God. The first God is the absolute Good, Reason, the primary principle of the substance which is intellectually cognisable—the idea; but the Second is the copy—the imitation of the First, and since the copies of the essence must be in a state of becoming, he is the principle of all becoming. The position of the latter has a double aspect; on the one side turning to his own principle, he forms the idea of himself and receives the same, i. e. knowledge from the First God, and on the other, turning towards the becoming, he forms the world.<sup>100</sup> Now in this representation the creation does not appear independent of the First God, since the Second proceeds from the First God, is conceived of as his Son, and in the formation of the world has simply the ideas for his model. The First God is therefore not inconsistently named the lawgiver, who distributes among things the seeds of soul, which had been dispersed by the Second God throughout the world. Now God the Creator, while he combines and harmoniously arranges the multiplicity of matter, looks unto God, and from this contemplation derives judgment, but deduces the tendency to change the resistance of matter.<sup>101</sup> This twofold tendency of the Second God Numenius carries out further, and

<sup>100</sup> Ib. 22. Εἰ δ' ἔστι μὲν νοητὸν ἡ οὐσία καὶ ἡ ἰδέα, ταύτης δ' ὁμολογήθη πρεσβύτερον καὶ αἰτίον εἶναι τὸ νοῦς, αὐτὸς οὗτος μόνος εὑρηται ὡς τὸ ἀγαθόν. καὶ γὰρ εἰ ὁ μὲν δημιουργὸς θεὸς ἔστι γενέσεως ἀρχή, τὸ ἀγαθὸν οὐσίας ἔστιν ἀρχή. ἀνάλογον δὲ τούτῳ μὲν ὁ δημιουργὸς θεός, ὡς αὐτοῦ μιμητής, τῇ δὲ οὐσίᾳ ἡ γένεσις, εἰκὼν αὐτῆς οὐσα καὶ μίμημα. . . ὁ γὰρ δεύτερος, διττὸς ὡς αὐτὸς ποιεῖ τὴν τι ἰδίαν ἑαυτοῦ καὶ τὸν κόσμον, δημιουργὸς ὢν, ἔπειτα θεωρητικὸς ὄλως. Cf. Procl. in Tim. iv. 249.

<sup>101</sup> Ib. 18. Λαμβάνει δὲ τὸ μὲν κριτικὸν ἀπὸ τῆς θεωρίας, τὸ δὲ ὀρμητικὸν ἀπὸ τῆς ἰφίσεως.

he thus divides his Second God into a Second and a Third. The two are in reality one, but yet by the union with matter, which is dual, they also receive from it duality, while they impart unity to it. On the one hand the Second God exists absolutely, united with the ideas, contemplating the supra-sensible, being itself also supra-sensible; but on the other, it adopts into itself the nature of matter, in that looking thereat, it seeks to form and fashion it, and therein forgets itself; this sensible God is in short the world.<sup>102</sup>

We meet with a similar cast of thought in Numenius' doctrine of the soul. Agreeably to the nature of the world, into which the creative energy of God has entered, but in which its due office is to be allowed to matter also, every thing, but especially the soul, divides itself into two opposite natures. According to this view, the soul is said not merely to possess two opposite aspects, but rather to consist of two distinct souls, of which one is rational, the other irrational.<sup>103</sup> These opposite natures

<sup>102</sup> L. l. 'Ο Θεός ὁ μὲν πρῶτος, ἐν ἑαυτῷ ὡς ἔστιν ἀπλοῦς διὰ τὸ ἑαυτῷ συγγινόμενος διόλου μήποτε εἶναι διαιρετός· ὁ Θεός μέντοι ὁ δευτέρος καὶ τρίτος ἔστιν εἷς, συμφερόμενος δὲ τῇ ἕλῃ δυάδι οὕση ἰνοὶ μὲν αὐτήν, σχίζεται δὲ ὑπ' αὐτῆς, ἐπιδυμητικὸν εἶδος ἐχούσης καὶ ρεούσης. τῷ οὖν μὴ εἶναι πρὸς τῷ νοητῷ, ἣν γὰρ ἂν πρὸς ἑαυτῷ, διὰ τὸ τὴν ἕλῃν βλέπειν, ταύτης ἐπιμελούμενος, ἀπερίοπτος ἑαυτοῦ γίνεται καὶ ἄπτεται τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ καὶ περιέπει, ἀνάγει τε ἔτι εἰς τὸ ἴδιον ἡθος ἱσχυράμενος τῆς ἕλης. . . . ὁ μὲν οὖν πρῶτος περὶ τὰ νοητά, ὁ δὲ δεύτερος περὶ τὰ νοητά καὶ αἰσθητά. Procl. in Tim. ii. 93. ὁ γὰρ κόσμος κατ' αὐτὸν (sc. Νομήνιον) ὁ τρίτος ἔστι Θεός. This appears to be alluded to also, ib. v. 299. According to the afore-quoted passage of Proclus, Numenius would seem besides to have expressed himself as if he made the First and the Second God to be the δημιουργός, but the third the work, δημιουργούμενον. Yet, as he also made all three to be identical, we cannot expect to find him invariably and precisely maintaining their respective differences.

<sup>103</sup> Porphy. ap. Stob. Eccl. i. 836. "Ἄλλοι δὲ, ὡς καὶ Νομήνιος . . . . δύο ψυχάς—ἔχειν ἡμᾶς οἰοῦνται, τὴν μὲν λογικὴν, τὴν δὲ αἰσθητικήν.

within the soul are in constant collision, just as good and evil are for ever opposed to each other.<sup>104</sup> For from matter evil arises within the soul, and for this reason the embodying of the soul is regarded as an evil;<sup>105</sup> on the other hand, the soul has its portion of good which accrues to it from its participation in the divine Reason. This portion of good Numenius seems to have made to consist chiefly in the intellectual activity of the soul, although he does not appear to have absolutely neglected all considerations of a moral direction of it.<sup>106</sup> Nevertheless, in the portions of his doctrine which have reached us, these considerations only occasionally occur, whereas they speak, in the most decided tone possible, of science as the gift of God, and as that which by its reception most identifies man with God.<sup>107</sup> To the human soul Numenius ascribed a faculty of cognition, wholly independent of sensation, which accompanies indeed the sensuous presentation, but nevertheless is still not to be regarded as the cause of the latter.<sup>108</sup> The former is the effect of the rational, the latter of the irrational soul. In the former he may perhaps have placed that rational cogitation, by means of which all appropriate objects participate in good and are destined to be united with it.<sup>109</sup> This union he represented to be of

<sup>104</sup> Jambl. *ib.* p. 894.

<sup>105</sup> *Ib.* p. 896, 910.

<sup>106</sup> Euseb. *Pr. Ev.* xiii. 5.

<sup>107</sup> Euseb. *Pr. Ev.* xi. 22. *Μερίχει δὲ αὐτοῦ τὰ μετέχοντα καὶ ἐν ἄλλῳ μὲν οὐδενί, ἐν δὲ μόνῳ τῷ φρονεῖν.*

<sup>108</sup> Porphy. *Ap. Stob. Ecl.* p. 832. *Νουμήνιος δὲ τὴν συγκαταθετικὴν δύναμιν παραδεικτικὴν ἐνεργειῶν φήσας εἶναι, σύμπτωμα αὐτῆς φησὶν εἶναι τὸ φανταστικόν, οὐ μὴν ἔργον τι καὶ ἀποτέλεσμα, ἀλλὰ παρακρούθημα.*

<sup>109</sup> Euseb. *Pr. Ev.* xi. 22.

so intimate a nature, that all distinction becomes merged in it. This view seems to have had some reference to that other opinion of his, according to which he derived human life solely from the Second God, who by looking at us communicated life to the body; by reason of which, Numenius was also led to assume a return of God into himself, in which he will contemplate himself alone, while, on the other hand, all things will be dissolved, and Reason alone live a life of felicity.<sup>110</sup>

It must be manifest to all, that the doctrine of Numenius sought to give a determinate shape to the Oriental view of the relation which subsists between the sensible and the supra-sensible world, and has rounded itself off into a system, which is mainly occupied with the highest of all human notions, and has scarcely any other object than to discover some means of passing from the supra-sensible to the sensible, and of allowing the return of the latter into the former, without greatly troubling itself about the scientific foundation and validity of man's idea of the supra-sensible.<sup>111</sup> And

<sup>110</sup> Jambl. Ap. Stob. Ecl. i. p. 1066. "Ἐνωσιν μὲν οὖν καὶ ταυτότητα ἀδιάκριτον τῆς ψυχῆς πρὸς τὰς ἑαυτῆς ἀρχὰς πρεσβεύειν φαίνεται Νουμήνιος.

<sup>111</sup> Euseb. Pr. Ev. xi. 18. Βλέποντος μὲν οὖν καὶ ἐπεστραμμένου πρὸς ἡμῶν ἕκαστον τοῦ Θεοῦ συμβαίνει ζῆν τε καὶ βιώσκεισθαι τότε τὰ σώματα, κηδεύοντα τοῦ Θεοῦ τοῖς ἀκροβολισμοῖς, μεταστρέφοντος δὲ εἰς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ περιωπὴν τοῦ Θεοῦ ταῦτα μὲν ἀποσβέννυσθαι, τὸν δὲ νοῦν ζῆν βίον ἐπανρόμιον εὐδαίμονος. We must confess that we do not know how we are to reconcile herewith another account which Cousin has published in the *Journal des Savants*, 1835, p. 148, from an unpublished commentary on the *Phædo* of Plato, ὅτι οἱ μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς λογικῆς ψυχῆς ἀχρι τῆς ἰμψύχου ἕξως ἀπαθανατίζουσιν, ὡς Νουμήνιος.

the consequence of all this is, that such doctrines exhibit a religious tendency, rather than a valid development of the understanding, and that free recourse is had to the imagination in order to supply the deficiencies of research.

# HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY.

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## BOOK XIII.

### ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY : THIRD PERIOD. HISTORY OF ITS DECLINE.

#### PART II.

#### NEO-PLATONIC PHILOSOPHY.

#### CHAPTER I.

##### RISE OF THE NEO-PLATONIC PHILOSOPHY. PLOTINUS.

Nothing can be more easy than the passage from the preceding book to the present. The opening of this period of our history, presents us with nothing else than the firmer establishment, and the more extensive, and also more regular development of the line of thought which we depicted at the close of the last portion of our labours. When we look to the essential subject-matter of the two doctrines, without either neglecting or exaggerating some peculiar differences, both of exposition and of idea, we are struck with the strong resemblance between the system of Numenius and that of the neo-Platonists. This indeed was, to a certain degree, admitted by the latter.<sup>1</sup> If, then, we have nevertheless separated our consideration of the two, we have

<sup>1</sup> Longin. *Ap. Porphy. de Vita Plot.* 15. The same result follows from the statements of Porphyry and Iamblichus.

done so, because the historical course of the present period is very different from that of its predecessor. In the latter, this particular line of thought was associated with many ill-assorted ideas of a Greek or Roman character; it had yet to make its way, and to gain a gradual diffusion, and stood isolated amid many other attempts directly repugnant to its nature. But in the present period, we find it the presiding object of philosophical investigation, which still faithfully adhered to the Grecian enlightenment. In this field, it had no opponent of any weight to resist; conscious of supremacy, it gained rapid authority over both Grecian and Barbarian minds, as far as Grecian civilization had spread; and, like it, adopting into itself doctrines and customs otherwise reputed barbarous. But while it thus gained so wide an expansion, it also contracted such a latitudinarian spirit, that its own loose and indeterminate formularies could scarcely stretch wide enough to comprehend its many contradictory opinions. One enemy alone was excepted from this large tolerance: after having mastered or made a compromise with so much, one enemy alone remained with whom it would not hear of peace—and this was Christianity. This neo-Platonism combats, not as being of a barbarous origin, for such an objection, even though it was still urged against Christianity, had long lost all meaning and all force. But the great offence of Christianity was that it was not equally tractable with other religious schemes; that it asserted its claims as the only true religion, and condemned all other forms, as adoring false gods, or not possessing the true worship of the true God. With such an

intolerant antagonist no peace was to be made ; and still less as Christianity, though devoid of the intellectual culture of the Greeks, and even lightly esteeming if not actually despising it, was continually gaining ground on the neo-Platonic philosophy. For the latter, driven to and fro amid the cloudy vagueness of its many and diversified doctrines, had in the former an opponent which stood firm and strong in oneness of idea, and in simplicity and purity of sentiment. Before such an adversary the fall of this school was ultimately certain. At the first collision, indeed, it held itself high, both in hope and courage, apparently little aware of the might of its adversary, and confident in the resources of ancient civilization, and trusting to its traditions in a province where tradition was without authority, and by a new interpretation attempting to give freshness to the faded ideas of an obsolete mode of thinking. But its pride and haughtiness soon sunk, as it was more and more despoiled and hemmed in by the new faith which would not allow of the co-existence of any olden belief. And then it began to make actual war upon its powerful adversary, and to have recourse to arms, of which it was itself at first ashamed,—an expedient unworthy of philosophy and of the olden civilization of which it boasted itself the champion. But these weapons were found equally powerless, and neo-Platonism, condescending to murmurings and complaints, despaired of the age and people in whose bosom it had found its own development. It was its fate to seek in vain amid remote times for that which was even close at hand.



At the close of the second or commencement of the third century of our era,<sup>2</sup> Ammonius Saccas founded that school of philosophy at Alexandria which is usually designated by the name of neo-Platonic. He is represented to have been the son of Christian parents, and to have received from them a Christian education, but when he was of an age to think for himself, and had studied philosophy, to have gone over to the pagan worship.<sup>3</sup> In his doctrine he is said to have sought to establish the agreement of Plato and Aristotle on all leading points of speculation ;<sup>4</sup> an attempt which, though it did not secure the unqualified approbation of his successors, had nevertheless many admirers. His school was frequented by a numerous body of disciples, among whom we find many distinguished names which we shall presently have to notice, as he did not commit his own opinions to writing.<sup>5</sup> Among these was Longinus, who still

<sup>2</sup> Theodoret. de Gr. Aff. Cur. vi. 869. ed. Hal. places him in the reign of Commodus ; but he must have been alive at least as late as 243 A.D. in which year Plotinus quitted him. Compare the full and particular treatise by Dehaut, *Essai Historique sur la Vie et la Doctrine d'Ammonius Saccas*. Brux. 1836. 4to.

<sup>3</sup> Porphyry. Ap. Euseb. Hist. Eccl. vi. 19. This much agitated passage would have much greater weight if it came from a more trustworthy source. Porphyry is, according to Eusebius, a disciple, not only of Plotinus, a decided contemner of whatever is earthly and historical, but also of Longinus, who did not think quite the same on these matters, consequently the disciple of two scholars of Ammonius ; nay, he has even confounded the two Origenes, his own contemporaries. The contradiction of Eusebius is of less importance since he evidently confounds the two Ammonii.

<sup>4</sup> Hierocles Ap. Phot. Cod. ccxiv. 283, ed. Hoesch. p. 285 ; Cod ccli. 750.

<sup>5</sup> Longin. Ap. Porphyry. v. Plot. 15. In two passages of Numenius, de Nat. Hom. ii. 29 ; iii. 56, seq., we have a tolerably full analysis of the doctrine of Ammonius of the soul, and its union with the body. But besides that so late an authority, who does not give any references to his sources, is not to be implicitly trusted, in both passages Ammonius seems to be named simply as the

holds a conspicuous place among writers on style. His extant treatise on the sublime affords little means by which we can judge of his philosophical opinions; and all that can be discovered from the fragments of his other works is, that on several important points he was at issue with Plotinus, another disciple of Ammonius.<sup>6</sup> The last-named philosopher was unquestionably the most distinguished member of the school of Saccas. The controversy which was carried on between him and Longinus, and the little respect which he evinced for the latter, would seem to lead to the conclusion that Ammonius had not given a fixed and definite form to his philosophical views.<sup>7</sup> Besides Plotinus, two other disciples of Ammonius are mentioned with distinction, Erennius and Origen.<sup>8</sup> These three individuals had entered into a mutual engagement not to publish the doctrines of their master. This compact Erennius first broke by the publication of some work or other, and he was followed by Origen, whose treatises, however, were few and unimportant,<sup>9</sup> but who, if we may infer so much

head of the neo-Platonic school, to whom the doctrines of his followers might conveniently be referred.

<sup>6</sup> L. L.

<sup>7</sup> Porphy. v. Plot. 8. Plotinus appears to have gradually given a precise form to his doctrine. *Ib.* 2, 3. Of Origen also, a fellow disciple of Plotinus, it is doubted whether he ever rose so high as the One which is above Reason. *Procl. Theol. Plat.* ii. 4, 90.

<sup>8</sup> *Ib.* 2; Hierocl. *Ap. Phot. Cod.* ccxiv. 285; *Cod. celi.* 750.

<sup>9</sup> Porphy. v. Plot. 2; Longin. *ib.* 15. And here pre-eminently lies the necessity of distinguishing him from Origen the Christian father. It has been assumed indeed that this person also was a disciple of Ammonius, but the reasons assigned for this opinion are inadequate. If Origen declares that he had heard the philosopher of whom Heraclas was a disciple, this testimony is not decisive in favour of Ammonius, since there was unquestionably more than one teacher of his philosophy at Alexandria. If Porphyry calls him a disciple

from the respect which Plotinus testifies for him, was no mean philosopher. By these publications Plotinus considered himself released from his engagement, and composed the works which we still possess. The writings and the biographical notices which we have of Plotinus are the sources from which all our conjectures as to the doctrine of Ammonius must be drawn, since our information concerning the philosophy of Origen or Erennius is extremely scanty, and inadequate for any such purpose.

Plotinus was born at Lycopolis in Egypt,<sup>10</sup> according to the calculation of one of his scholars, in the year 205 or 206, A.D.<sup>11</sup> He received his scientific education at Alexandria, where in his twenty-eighth year he devoted himself to the pursuit of philosophy. Finding little satisfaction in the several masters whose schools he first frequented, he at last became a hearer of Ammonius, in whom he recognised all that he desired. This philosopher imbued his mind with a reverence and taste for the wisdom of the East. After spending eleven years in the school of Ammonius, he came to a determination to join the expedition which the Emperor Gordian was leading against the Persians, for sake of the opportunity which it furnished him of forming an acquaintance with the philosophy of the Persians and Indians. When on the murder

of Ammonius, this is only another instance of the already noticed confusion of the heathen with the Christian Origen, Euseb. Hist. Eccl. vi. 19. Besides which it is very improbable that Origen would have chosen an apostate like Ammonius for his teacher in philosophy.

<sup>10</sup> Eunap. v. Plotini; Suid. s. v. Πλωτῖνος. In which Lycopolis is uncertain.

<sup>11</sup> Porphy. v. Plot. 1.

of Gordian, the expedition was abandoned, Plotinus proceeded to Antioch, and shortly afterwards to Rome. Here he suddenly assumed the character of a teacher of philosophy, but appears at first to have met with very little success; for Amelius, one of his most zealous disciples, told Porphyry that his school was full of disorder and noisy declamation, every member being permitted to state his difficulties and express his opinions. Plotinus would appear to have taught the doctrines of Ammonius, which only in the tenth year of his residence at Rome, he began to commit to writing for the use of his most approved disciples.<sup>12</sup> It would seem that his disciples, and especially Amelius and Porphyry (of whom the latter did not join him before the twentieth year of his residence in Rome), were very influential in the establishment and success of his system. At all events, Plotinus arrived in the course of time at the highest distinction. This is proved by the names of the long list of scholars and eminent personages, both male and female, who attached themselves to his society, and the favour which Gallienus and his consort evinced for him, and the confidence in his personal integrity which caused

<sup>12</sup> Ib. 2. I must here again recur to the reservation of the doctrines which was agreed upon by the disciples of Ammonius. To judge from the statements of Porphyry, it is doubtful whether their mutual engagement referred to his written or his oral doctrine. It is said that Plotinus continued faithful to his engagement, and although he formed a school, did not teach to his disciples the doctrines of Ammonius *τηρῶν δὲ ἀνέκπυστα τὰ παρὰ τοῦ Ἀμμωνίου δόγματα*; but soon afterwards it is added, that he derived the instruction which he imparted from his intercourse with Ammonius *ἐκ δὲ τῆς Ἀμμωνίου συνουσίας ποιούμενος τὰς διατριβάς*. Porphyry appears to distinguish between a secret and a public doctrine of Ammonius; but let us ask, was it required of his disciples to keep back the former from their own approved scholars? Such a duty would indeed be the extreme of mystery.

him to be chosen a guardian of several minors, and not less so by the many hostile assaults which his doctrine was exposed to.<sup>13</sup> After a residence at Rome of six and twenty years, he was attacked by a severe malady, which put a stop to his usual discourses with his disciples, and he went into retirement in Campania, where he died in the six and sixtieth year of his age.<sup>14</sup>

The accounts which we have received of the character of his school, seem to warrant the conclusion, that the object of Plotinus was a general, but mainly philosophical, culture of the mind. He accustomed his disciples to express themselves both in prose and verse, and composed for their use certain models which, notwithstanding the imperfect mastery which he possessed of the Greek language, have been highly extolled for fertility of thought and invention.<sup>15</sup> He also caused the works of other philosophers to be read, of whom, however, only the more recent writers are named; it mattered not whether they were Platonicians or Aristotelians, or others from whom he greatly differed in opinion. Upon these he afterwards delivered his judgment.<sup>16</sup> Plotinus does not seem to have been altogether free from the mysticism which was peculiar to the age, but still to have kept it under a sober restraint. We do not discover any indication of his practising the magical art, notwithstanding that he has nowhere expressed a direct condemnation of it; he examined the claims of astrology, but declared them to be open to objection.<sup>17</sup> If he avowed a contempt for the pursuits of politics and worldly advan-

<sup>13</sup> Ib. 4, 6, 8.

<sup>14</sup> Ib. 1.

<sup>15</sup> Ib. 5, 8.

<sup>16</sup> Ib. 8.

<sup>17</sup> Ib. 9.

tages, as unworthy of a philosopher, he nevertheless diligently looked after the property of the infants who were placed under his guardianship, on the plea that it was a duty to preserve it for them so long as they were strangers to philosophy.<sup>18</sup> Nevertheless, we find his school so full of mysticism, and his philosophy so closely interwoven with it, that we cannot hesitate to censure Plotinus as having shown too great indulgence to the bias of his times which led men to sacrifice to fanciful speculations, all the important requisitions of actual life. Among his disciples we find one of the name of Rogatian, who, upon being nominated to the Prætorship, refused to accept the office, manumitted all his slaves, and abandoning all care of his property, and refusing to reside in his own house, depended on his friends for food and lodging; in short, evinced the greatest possible contempt for all earthly possessions. This person was pronounced by Plotinus the model of philosophers.<sup>19</sup> Plotinus himself, with the approbation of the Emperor Gallienus, conceived the adventurous idea of founding a city to be called Platonopolis, and to be constituted and governed by the laws of Plato. In all probability he would have carried his design into execution if wiser and more prudent counsellors of the emperor had not successfully opposed themselves to it.<sup>20</sup> He declared himself ashamed of his body, which he declared to be but a phantom, which it is a burthen to carry about, and on this account he refused to have recourse to medical aid, and practised a rigorous abstinence, eating neither flesh nor even bread.<sup>21</sup> Of his country, his kindred, and

<sup>18</sup> Ib. 6.<sup>19</sup> Ib. 4.<sup>20</sup> Ib. 8.<sup>21</sup> Ib. 1, 5.

the date of his birth, as of contemptible matters, he imparted no information to his friends, although he kept a festival on the anniversaries of the birth-days of Plato and Aristotle.<sup>22</sup> His disciples venerated him as one who was raised far above the lot of mortals. The magic arts which an envious scholar of Ammonius practised against him, are said to have redounded upon their author. When an Egyptian priest in his presence and by his consent invoked his demon, a god appeared. When he was invited by Amelius to be present at a sacrifice, he replied, The gods to whom the sacrifice is about to be made must come to him, not he to them; and of this enigmatical speech his disciples ventured not to ask an explanation. He had it in his power to denounce unknown thieves and robbers, and to make known to his disciples their mental dispositions and future fortunes. Lastly, at his death, when he had uttered his last words, "I seek to raise the god within us, to the divine in the universe," a serpent stole from beneath his bed and disappeared in the wall.<sup>23</sup> Must not such a man have attained to the greatest height that humanity can reach? Porphyry assures us that in the six years which he spent in the society of Plotinus, the latter had six times beheld and been united to the supreme God.<sup>24</sup>

The writings of Plotinus have apparently come down to us complete, or nearly so, but still in a state which gives occasion to many doubts. Plotinus was a very careless writer, and what he had once written, even at distant intervals, the weakness of his eye-sight prevented him from submitting

<sup>22</sup> Ib. 1.

<sup>23</sup> Ib. 1, 7.

<sup>24</sup> Ib. 18.

even to a single revision. Besides which, he was so far from being a master of the language in which he wrote, that even orthographical errors are not unfrequently to be found in his works. On this ground he assigned to Porphyry the task of arranging them.<sup>25</sup> The latter has undoubtedly made an attempt to fulfil this duty, but the result is a very singular one. Finding these works to consist of many special treatises, having little, if any, connection with each other, he has arranged them in six *Enneads*, according to the diversity of subject-matter; he moreover corrected the external form of the expression, and made a few additions which it is impossible to particularize.<sup>26</sup> This edition of the works of Plotinus is apparently the same as that which has reached us: however, an old note attached to it speaks of another edition by Eustochius, also a disciple of Plotinus, who remained with him to the time of his death, and which differed from the Porphyrian edition in the disposition of the several books.<sup>27</sup>

<sup>25</sup> Ib. 4, 5.

<sup>26</sup> Ib.: at the end. *Τὰ μὲν οὖν βιβλία εἰς ἕξ ἐννεάδας τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον κατετάξαμεν, τέσσαρα καὶ πεντήκοντα ὄντα. καταβεβλήμεθα δὲ καὶ εἰς τινὰ αὐτῶν ὑπομνήματα ἀτάκτως διὰ τοὺς ἐπιειξαντας ἡμᾶς ἑταίρους γράφειν, εἰς ὑπὲρ αὐτοὶ τὴν σαφήνειαν αὐτοῖς γενέσθαι ἤξιουν. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τὰ κεφάλαια αὐτῶν πάντων, πλὴν τοῦ περὶ τοῦ καλοῦ, διὰ τὸ λείπειν ἡμῖν, πεποιήμεθα κατὰ τὴν χρονικὴν ἐκδοσιν τῶν βιβλίων· ἀλλ' ἐν τούτῳ οὐ τὰ κεφάλαια μόνον καθ' ἕκαστον ἐκκείται τῶν βιβλίων. ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπιχειρήματα, ἃ ὡς κεφάλαια συναριθμεῖται. νυνὶ δὲ πειρασόμεθα ἕκαστον τῶν βιβλίων διερχόμενοι τὰς τε στιχμαῖς αὐτῶν προσθεῖναι καὶ εἰ τι ἡμαρτημίνον εἴη κατὰ λίξιν διορθοῦν καὶ ὅ τι ἀν' ἡμᾶς ἄλλο κινήσῃ, αὐτὸ σημαίνει τὸ ἔργον.* Are the *ὑπομνήματα* incorporated in the work? What are the *κεφάλαια* which are wanting in the book on the Beautiful? what the *ἐπιχειρήματα*? Porphyry speaks as if he were then just entered upon the edition of the works separately. But when he prefixed the life of Plotinus to the edition of his works, he was now more than 68 years old, ib. xviii.; can he have been so long occupied with this edition?

<sup>27</sup> *Ennead*. iv. 4, 29. This is worthy of attention; for according to the state-



Amelius, too, possessed the works of Plotinus and disseminated them.<sup>28</sup>

The style of Plotinus is very unequal. At times the copious fulness of his diction bespeaks his intimate acquaintance with the Platonic writings, but at others we may trace in his language the effects of a long and painful study of the Aristotelian. This is seen not only in particular terms, but also in the frequent harshness and abruptness of the style, in which the writer's meaning is hinted at rather than explained.<sup>29</sup> Porphyry discovered in his master's works many ideas which had been borrowed from the Stoical school; and we shall have occasion to notice many points of resemblance, not only in thought but also in terms of expression, between him and earlier philosophers who evinced a disposition for Oriental ideas. His writings have been justly taxed with obscurity, which arises not only from the general tendency of his ideas, but also from his fondness for nice and subtle distinctions, and from the involved character of his style, which sometimes scarcely allows us to guess his meaning or to trace the grammatical connection of his sentences. Moreover, the heterogeneous medley of scientific elements which we meet with in Plotinus, greatly

ment of Porphyry, it would almost seem that the arrangement of the books had been the work of Plotinus himself. Creuzer is even of opinion that the present edition follows partly the Porphyrian and partly that of Eustochius. Cf. Annot. in Plot. p. 79, sq.; 202. The grounds on which he supports this view, do not however appear to me sufficient to establish it. The new edition, by Creuzer, (Oxon. 1835,) affords great helps for the right interpretation of a number of passages which were lamentably corrupt in the very incorrect Basle edition, but still Creuzer himself owns that there are many incurable faults in our present text.

<sup>28</sup> Longin. ap. Porphyry. v. Plot. xiii. xiv. xv.

<sup>29</sup> V. Plot. viii.

increases the difficulty of tracing the thread of his ideas. But, notwithstanding, it cannot be denied that all his assertions refer more or less to the central point of his system, or rather have scarcely any other object than to exhibit and elucidate this centre. An idle object, alas! for this point itself is incapable of elucidation; and so Plotinus himself admits. In this painful struggle to attain to the unattainable, his writings may well be compared to the fable of the Danaidæ, which well sets forth the nature of a fluid, by representing the water as still eluding all efforts to confine it. However large may be the sphere over which the efforts of Plotinus extend themselves, it ultimately contracts itself within a single point. A complaint has been made of his obscure brevity; but this complaint is only just when applied to single sentences: on the whole he is far too diffusive; from his repeated attempts to express what is inexpressible, his works are full of repetitions. Passages also are occasionally found in which he abandons the immediate subject of his doctrine, and treats of matters which admit of being expressed in intelligible language. These matters are for the most part little, if at all, in unison with the general spirit of his theory, and may be regarded as digressions from his proper subject, and betray a passing remembrance of the old traditional treasures which he had inherited from the better times of Grecian philosophy. In such passages, however, his style is heavy, and approaches to the prolixity of old age, which for the most part we meet with in the neo-Platonic school.

A slight notice of the relation in which Plotinus

stood to the earlier philosophy and to the opinions of his age, will here be necessary. Generally, he might justly call himself a Platonist. Without expressly naming Plato, he speaks of him as the true philosopher, whose doctrine he has undertaken to expound.<sup>30</sup> He does, it is true, occasionally meet in Plato with ideas which he cannot approve of; but of such he cannot admit, that Plato actually entertained them.<sup>31</sup> Thus, by a latitude of interpretation, he easily gets rid of all difficulties. The doctrine which he advanced of the three supra-sensible grounds of all existence, is not brought forward as a novelty, but as contained in the Platonic writings, although, he admits not fully developed there:<sup>32</sup> and we need not wonder that he could find this doctrine in Plato, when we discover that he had no difficulty in imputing it to Parmenides, Anaxagoras, Heraclitus and Empedocles, Pythagoras and Pherecydes. If any surprise be felt, it must be at his admission that Aristotle was not very favourably disposed to it, even though he was constrained to adopt views essentially similar.<sup>33</sup> There is something herein which looks like a disposition to identify in all essential points the Platonic and the Aristotelian systems; but, on the other hand, his disquisitions are frequently directed expressly to controverting the doctrine of Aristotle. This Plo-

<sup>30</sup> Enn. iii. 9, 1 in.

<sup>31</sup> VI. 6. 4, 8.

<sup>32</sup> V. i. 8. Καὶ εἶναι τοὺς λόγους τοῦσδε μὴ καινοὺς, μῆδε νῦν, ἀλλὰ πάλαι μὲν εἰρησθαι μὴ ἀναπειπταμένως, τοὺς δὲ νῦν λόγους ἐξηγητὰς ἐκείνων γεγονέναι, μαρτυρίοις πιστωσαμένοις τὰς δόξας ταύτας παλαιὰς εἶναι τοῖς αὐτοῦ τοῦ Πλάτωνος γράμμασιν. As a specimen of his arbitrary interpretation, see iii. 5, 5.

<sup>33</sup> V. 1, 8, 9. This statement is expressed in very loose language.

tinus attacks in several points, and, with one exception, all those which in his day were regarded as the characteristic doctrines of the Peripatetic school.<sup>34</sup> The excepted doctrine which he approved of and adopted, is that of the eternity of the world. Something of the same kind is the position which he holds relatively to the Stoical school. Many ideas which owed their origin to this sect, but had become part of the common stock of Grecian enlightenment, Plotinus unhesitatingly avails himself of; but yet he ardently enters on the refutation of the leading points of the Stoical philosophy, the spirit of which was even more adverse than the Platonic or Aristotelian system to his own view of things. The Stoical doctrine of the sensuous elements of human knowledge and its materialism, are treated by him as palpable absurdities, which pervert the true nature of things, prefer the non-existent to the existent, and make the last to be first.<sup>35</sup> On the other hand he evinces a favourable disposition to such opinions as looked for true philosophy to Oriental doctrines. In the same way that, as already noticed he hoped to find among the Indians a profounder wisdom than was elsewhere to be found; so he also believed that in the symbols of the Egyptian priests, greater knowledge was hidden than was ever set forth by the investigations of Grecian science.<sup>36</sup> This same direction of ideas also led Plotinus to give an interpretation of the olden mythology, which indeed followed Plato and the earlier

<sup>34</sup> Instances may be found, *Man.* i. 4, 6, 7, 15; iii. 7, 8; iv. 2, 1; vi. 1, 3, 11[1].

<sup>35</sup> *V.* 1, 28.

<sup>36</sup> *V.* 8, 6.

theologers, but still had in it a strong taste of theocracy.<sup>37</sup> In this part of his doctrine he takes up the pretended Platonic doctrines of the supreme ground of all existence, and of the stars as created gods,<sup>38</sup> without, however, showing much disposition to go very deeply into them; for he considers all appeals to mythology as simply auxiliary proofs for such weaker minds as have not yet emancipated themselves from the sensible.<sup>39</sup> He refuses to concur in the opinion, that the gods can be moved by prayer,<sup>40</sup> and differed from those who, from the supposed influence of the stars on the government of the world, have drawn conclusions favourable to the pretensions of astrology,<sup>41</sup> although, by reason of the universal connection of all things, among which, even virtue, which knows no master, must be included, he would not deny that every mundane event may be considered as a sign, and to have been itself pre-signified.<sup>42</sup> But however in these and similar points, Plotinus may have set himself against the wide-spreading superstitions of his day, in others he gave way to them, as appears from several traits of his system.<sup>43</sup> Not content, in the spirit of the olden worship, with assuming the manifestation of gods and demons, he even gives precise determinations of the difference of their respective natures. Not only does he evince a high veneration for the mysterious, but even declares philosophy not to be repugnant to the different arts of

<sup>37</sup> III. 6, 8; v. 1, 4, 7, 8, 12, 13.

<sup>38</sup> V. 1, 2.

<sup>39</sup> IV. 7, 15.

- <sup>40</sup> IV. 4, 42.

<sup>41</sup> III. 1, 5, 6; iv. 4, 30, *sqq.*

<sup>42</sup> IV. 4, 39.

<sup>43</sup> I. 6, 7; iii. 1, 3, 5, 6; vi. 9, 11. The contemplation of the One, for instance, is referred to the mysteries.

magic and other incantations; although he does not approve of them in every respect, and is disposed to assign to them only a limited power. He even believes that he can justify the belief of them by the universal sympathy between all things in the sensible world; for among these, mutual love and hate operate every where, and consequently the whole practical life of man is under the power of incantation.<sup>44</sup>

This conclusion sufficiently evinces how low he was disposed to rate practical life; the theoretical possessed a far higher value in his eyes. Now, if from this fact any one should be disposed to argue, that with certain perversities of opinion which belonged to the age in which he lived, and from which no one can wholly escape, his doctrine was in the main of a truly philosophical import, he will have, in the first place, to get rid of the admissions which Plotinus himself makes. These are to be found in his statements of the nature of science. When we inquire, in the first place, what province in the education of human thought he assigned to sensuous perception and presentation, we do indeed hear something that sounds favourable to them. He regards perception in the light of a messenger who announces a fact which ought to be submitted to the review of the reason.<sup>45</sup> He does not look upon it as a passive affection, but an operation of the

<sup>44</sup> Thus he speaks against the magic of the Gnostics, ii. 9, 14. Magic, in his opinion, has no power over the happiness of the sage or over the theoretical life. It applies only to the *ἄλογον*, not to the *λογικόν* of the soul. i. 4, 9; iv. 4, 43, 44. On the other hand, as to its influence over practical life, cf. iv. 3, 13; 4, 26, 40, 34. Πᾶν γὰρ τὸ πρὸς ἄλλο γοητεύεται ὑπ' ἄλλου. Ib. 44.

<sup>45</sup> V. 3, 3.

soul; and perception no less than memory is not a weakness, but a strength of the soul.<sup>46</sup> That which perceives is to a certain degree a judging faculty, and perceptions are obscure thoughts of the supra-sensible world, as also the thoughts of the supra-sensible world are clear perceptions;<sup>47</sup> a doctrine which, in reality, does not deviate much from the Stoical. But when now we hear him incessantly avowing his aversion for any contact of the soul with the corporeal and with sensuous perception, we are forced in truth to conclude, that without very seriously intending the above propositions, he adopted them with the other parts of the Platonic doctrine, in which, indeed, they do not stand very firmly. According to Plotinus, the soul is in a body for its punishment solely; it is, he says, for this end only that it is percipient of the corporeal.<sup>48</sup> The objects of perception are external simply; for if an internal object should seem to be perceived, this must be internal to the body; but for the soul it is still external.<sup>49</sup> Now, conceived in this sense perception must be valueless, as regards the perception of truth; since, as we shall presently see, knowledge apprehends nothing but what is internal and spiritual; whereas, the external is a mere phantom, and nothing real.<sup>50</sup>

<sup>46</sup> IV. 6, 2, 3.

<sup>47</sup> IV. 3, 23; vi. 7, 7, fin. "Ὡστε εἶναι τὰς αἰσθήσεις ταύτας ἀμυδράς νοήσεις, τὰς δὲ ἐκτὶ νοήσεις ἰναργεῖς αἰσθήσεις.

<sup>48</sup> IV. 3, 24. "Ἐχουσαι δὲ (sc. αἱ ψυχαί) τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὸ ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι τῶν σωματικῶν κολάσεων ἔχουσιν.

<sup>49</sup> V. 3, 2. Τὸ μὲν οὖν αἰσθητικὸν αὐτῆς (sc. τῆς ψυχῆς) αὐτόθεν ἀνφαίμεν τοῦ ἔξω μόνον εἶναι· καὶ γὰρ εἰ τῶν ἐνδον, ἐν τῷ σώματι γιγνομένων συναισθήσεις εἶη, ἀλλὰ τῶν ἔξω αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἡ ἀντίληψις.

<sup>50</sup> V. 5, 1. Τὸ γε γινωσκόμενον δι' αἰσθήσεως τοῦ πράγματος εἰδωλόν

Those who put any trust in perception, are likened to those who take dreams for realities; for sensation is an accident of the sleeping soul; that part of the soul which is in the body is in sleep—its true awakening is a perfect separation from body.<sup>51</sup> Sensation he declares to be simply an affection and stern necessity of the soul, resulting from the universal sympathy which prevails among mundane things;<sup>52</sup> by which explanation he places it under the same idea to which he had elsewhere referred the principle of enchantment.

Now if Plotinus already appears to have outrun Plato in the depreciation of sensuous perception, we shall be still more strongly convinced of this when we proceed to consider those elements of human thought which are connected with perception. Now of this nature are our conceptions or representations. But of these, according to Plotinus, the soul ought to free itself on the ground that they serve only to the apprehension of the external world.<sup>53</sup> The very recollection of what it has previously experienced, even of its good deeds, ought to be further removed from the soul the higher it raises itself.<sup>54</sup> But moreover, according to Plotinus, language and ratiocinative thought (*λογίζεσθαι*, *λογισμός*, *διάνοια*) are, in the closest manner possible, connected

*ἔστι καὶ οὐκ αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα ἡ αἰσθησις λαμβάνει, μένει γὰρ ἐκείνο ἔξω* II, 6, 1. *Εἶδωλα γὰρ καὶ οὐκ ἀληθῆ.*

<sup>51</sup> III, 6, 6. *Καὶ γὰρ τὸ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ψυχῆς ἐστὶν εὐδούσης· ὅσον γὰρ ἐν σώματι ψυχῆς, τοῦτο εὐδει.* IV, 4, 23.

<sup>52</sup> IV, 5, 3. *Τούτῳ γὰρ ἔοικε καὶ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι ὁπωσοῦν εἶναι, ὅτι συμπαθεῖς τὸ ζῶον τότε τὸ πᾶν ἑαυτῷ. . . . τοῦτο δὲ οὐ κατὰ σώματος πάθημα, ἀλλὰ κατὰ μείζους καὶ ψυχικὰς καὶ ζῶον ἐνὸς συμπαθοῦς ἀνάγκας.*

<sup>53</sup> I, 4, 10; v, 3, 2.

<sup>54</sup> IV, 3, 32.



with the sensuous elements of presentation, and therefore the former fall under the same condemnation as the latter. The souls in heaven have no need of words;<sup>55</sup> there there is neither ratiocination, nor even the rational (λογικόν) in its human acceptation;<sup>56</sup> that reason is weak which for its confirmation stands in need of ratiocinative reflection.<sup>57</sup> Occasionally, it is true, certain modifications of this condemnatory opinion do occur, as for instance, when Plotinus adopts the Platonic view of dialectic, that by the investigation and combination of differences it rises to the highest genus—to unity; and admits also that what is called a judgment is its cognisance; and when, again, he refuses to allow to the supreme reason a total rejection of all differences, and also when he even designates ratiocinative thought as the way to true and moral enlightenment, since he makes the ratiocinative thinker to stand in the same relation to the enlightened mind, as he who is but learning does to him who knows.<sup>58</sup> Nevertheless, all these modifications are nullified by positions which do not allow us for a moment to mistake the degree of contempt which Plotinus had for scientific thought; for how can dialectic observe distinctions and combinations, if it is forbidden to make use of propositions or judgments (πρότασις)?<sup>59</sup> Man, he says, cannot arrive

<sup>55</sup> IV. 3, 18.<sup>56</sup> VI. 7, 9.<sup>57</sup> IV. 3, 18.

<sup>58</sup> IV. 4, 12. Τὸ γὰρ λογίζεσθαι τί ἄλλο ἂν εἴη ἢ τὸ ἐφίεσθαι εὐρεῖν φρόνησιν καὶ λόγον ἀληθῆ καὶ τυγχάνοντα νοῦ τοῦ ὄντος; ὅμοιος γὰρ ὁ λογιζόμενος . . . τῷ μανθάνοντι εἰς γνῶσιν. ζητεῖ γὰρ μαθεῖν ὁ λογιζόμενος, ὅπερ ἤδη ἔχων φρόνιμος. Compare herewith, i. 3, 5. Φρόνησιν μὲν περὶ τὸ ὄν, νοῦν δὲ περὶ τὸ ἐπίκεινα τοῦ ὄντος.

<sup>59</sup> I. 3, 4, 5, 8, 2.

at true intelligence so long as he looks upon science as a doctrine or a collection of propositions and judgments, for this is but science here below—the science of this earth or world.<sup>60</sup> But, for the purposes of science, the syllogism is of still less avail than the judgment.<sup>61</sup> For ratiocinative thought cannot get rid of the stain which cleaves to it as confining itself either to the sensible and external, or to that which proceeding from the mind is yet relative to the sensible,<sup>62</sup> and consequently furnishes nothing more than an opinion, a conviction, a science of the sensible, i. e. of types,<sup>63</sup> but not of truth. It exhibits the temporal, but the temporal is incapable of revealing in any degree the external; on the contrary, time, by its dispersion, conceals the abiding essence of eternity.<sup>64</sup>

Nevertheless, as we have already remarked, Plotinus admitted of a science within the reach of man upon earth, which is a knowledge not of types but of reality, and consisting not of terms and propositions but of union with real objects (*πράγματα ὄντα*).<sup>65</sup> This science is the result of a higher faculty than that of ratiocination, which Plotinus designates as the reason or rational re-

<sup>60</sup> V. 8, 4. 'Αλλ' ἡμεῖς εἰς σύνεσιν οὐκ ἤλθομεν, ὅτι καὶ τὰς ἐπιστήμας θεωρήματα καὶ συμφόρησιν νενομίκαμεν προτάσεων εἶναι. τὸ δὲ οὐδ' ἐν ταῖς ἐνταῦθα ἐπιστήμας.

<sup>61</sup> V. 5, 1, and in many other passages besides.

<sup>62</sup> V. 3, 1, 2. Τὸ δ' ἐν αὐτῇ (sc. τῇ ψυχῇ) λογιζόμενον παρὰ τῶν ἐκ τῆς αἰσθήσεως φαντασμάτων παρακειμένων τὴν ἐπικρίσιν ποιούμενον καὶ συνάγον καὶ διαιροῦν ἢ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐκ τοῦ νοῦ λόγων ἐφορᾷ ὅσον τοὺς τύπους.

<sup>63</sup> V. 3, 6. Καὶ γὰρ ἡ μὲν ἀνάγκη ἐν νῷ, ἡ δὲ πειθὼ ἐν ψυχῇ. . . . ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐνταῦθα γεγενήμεθα, πάλιν αὐ καὶ ἐν ψυχῇ πειθῶ τινα γενέσθαι ζητοῦμεν, ὅλον ἐν εἰκόνι τὸ ἀρχέτυπον θεωρεῖν ἰδέλοντες. Ib. 9, 7.

<sup>64</sup> I. 4, 7.

<sup>65</sup> V. 9, 13.

flection (*νόησις*). Under it is comprised that higher self-knowledge which it is necessary to distinguish from the self-knowledge of the understanding, which latter thinks its own thoughts; it is the knowledge which the reason has of its own essence, and in which it is cognisant that itself is the truth and essence of man.<sup>66</sup> This argument is not to be acquired by reasoning, nor by any other intermediate process, which would make its objects appear to be without the cognisant subject, but in such a manner as to eliminate all distinction between the knowing and the known. It is a contemplation of truth within itself; it is not man who contemplates the truth, but the truth contemplating itself. In no other way can this knowledge be attained to. What the supra-sensible truth is, he knows who sees it.<sup>67</sup>

We have already met in Philo with this contemplation of truth in itself, and a similar doctrine was taught by Numenius under the name of the union of the soul with Reason, but Plotinus goes beyond his predecessors. He is not content with this pure rational thought. He talks of something still higher than the Reason, as that from which it issues, which he is wont to designate the One, or the First the Good; a desire of his soul urges him to attain to this contemplation, compared with which reasoning and reason itself lose all value. It appears to him not to be sufficient, that the reason in its con-

<sup>66</sup> V. 3, 4.

<sup>67</sup> V. 3, 3; 8; 5, 1. It is worthy of notice, that in the latter passage we have a *δοξάζειν* attributed to the *νοῦς*, as also the contemplation is here called *αὐτοθάνεισθαι παρόντος*. V. 3, 4. This will serve as an instance of the looseness of the phraseology of Plotinus. On the subject of the contemplation of the good, cf. i. 6, 7.

templation of itself is perfectly identical with its contemplated object, for he still fears lest there should be concealed within it a motion—a distinction of the contemplation and the contemplated, as in the intelligible notions which appear to be essential to the ideal world of Plato. Man's rational thought is based upon terms and definitions; but these Plotinus was indisposed to regard with Plato, as the true foundation of a perfect enlightenment; for such a purpose they have too much in common with ratiocinative thought and the sensible; and therefore he advises man to have recourse rather to the undefined and the undefinable. The soul, he observes, foolishly thinks that it possesses nothing and knows nothing when it arrives at that which is without definition and without form, and such a fear drives it to attach itself solely to the sensible.<sup>68</sup> But it ought to resolve to give up every notion and every knowledge, if it would wish to reach unto the First, for the One is an undefinable energy.<sup>69</sup> Men ought to free themselves from multiplicity of ideas which does but carry them to the sensible, and also from all discourse, for that which is over all, is also over language and even the most worthy Reason. We run into contradictions when we attempt to predicate aught of him; it is only through an immediate intuition and presence that that which is better than

<sup>68</sup> VI. 9, 3. 'Ἄλλ' ἐστὶν ἡμῖν γνῶσις εἰδῶν ἐπεριδομένη, ὅσα δ' ἂν εἰς ἀνείδειον ἢ ψυχὴ ἴη, ἐξ ἀδυνατοῦσα περιλαβεῖν τῷ μὴ ὀρίζεσθαι καὶ οἷον τυποῦσθαι ὑπὸ ποιήλου τοῦ τυποῦντος, ἐξολισθάνει καὶ φοβεῖται, μὴ οὐδὲν ἔχῃ διὰ κάμνει ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις καὶ ἀσμένῃ καταβαίνει πολλάκις ἀποκρίπτουσα ἀπὸ πάντων μέχρις ἂν εἰς αἰσθητὸν ἦκοι ἐν στερεῷ ὥσπερ ἀναπαυομένη. Ib. 7, 32. 'Ἀρχὴ δὲ τὸ ἀνείδειον.

<sup>69</sup> V. 3, 13, 14. Οὐδὲ γνῶσιν, οὐδὲ νόησιν ἔχομεν αὐτοῦ. Ib. 4, 1; vi. 2, 17, sqq.; 8, 8; 9, 5; 6.

science can be gained, for all science is multiplicity and not a true unity, of which alone good is a property.<sup>70</sup> He who has once attained thereto, immediately contemns the pure cogitation which before he loved, because he now sees that this thinking was yet but motion.<sup>71</sup> Thus then are thought and science reduced to a means, although a useful one, for the attainment of the intuition of the One. Plotinus himself advances the question, why in such a case he should condescend to any words or doctrine concerning this contemplation or subject to be contemplated; but, on consideration, he declares it to be as necessary, in order to stimulate men by words to follow after this contemplation, and compares it to pointing out the way to one who knows not his right road. Instruction serves only as the way and the route, but contemplation itself is the work of him who wishes to contemplate. Excited by such words, man may perhaps have an apprehension of it, and then he will see that it is ineffable, and will not even venture to express what then happens to him. Plotinus, however, promises this intuition more speedily than Philo does. All that is requisite is the desire of such intuition; for the First—the primary cause of all things—is near to all and remote from none; but man must put aside whatever holds him back, weighs him down, and suffers him not to ascend to its height. We must lay aside all that is alien to

<sup>70</sup> VI. 9, 4 in. *Γίνεται δὲ ἡ ἀπορία μάλιστα, ὅτι μὴδὲ κατὰ ἐπιστήμην ἢ σύνεσιν ἐκείνου, μὴδὲ κατὰ νόησιν, ὥσπερ τὰ ἄλλα νοητά, ἀλλὰ κατὰ παρουσίαν ἐπιστήμης κρείττονα, κ.τ.λ.*

<sup>71</sup> Ib. 7, 35, in. *Ὡς τὼ δὲ ἐπακίῃται τότε, ὡς καὶ τοῦ νοεῖν καταφρονεῖν, ὃ τὸν ἄλλον χρόνον ἡσπάζετο. ὅτι τὸ νοεῖν κινήσις τις ἦν, αὕτη δὲ οὐ κινεῖσθαι θίλει.*

it, and advance towards it alone and in solitude. As soon as man becomes again exactly what he was before parting from it, he will then be able to contemplate the First and the Good. 'This, however, is not man's work, but in our reason the good contemplates itself; it is a matter which in the contemplation attaches itself to the contemplated object.'<sup>72</sup>

Now we are here arrived at the extreme limit of mysticism,<sup>73</sup> in which we would not enter further than is necessary. However we cannot avoid mentioning a few points connected with the mystical view of Plotinus. Among these we must record the fact that he himself boasts to have often enjoyed this highly lauded contemplation of the divine, and a perfect union with it,<sup>74</sup> and that he describes this event as an enthusiasm, an inspiration of Apollo or the Muses, an intoxication of the soul.<sup>75</sup> In it the soul lives no longer, but is exalted above life; it thinks not, but is above thought; it is no longer soul nor reason, but has become that which it con-

<sup>72</sup> IV. 4, 2; v. 3, 3; vi. 7, 16. Βλέπων δὲ αὐτὰ μετὰ φωτός, παρὰ τοῦ δόντος ἑκείνα καὶ τοῦτο κομιζόμενος, κ.τ.λ. Ib. 8, 19. Λαμβανίτω τις οὖν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ἀνακινήσεις πρὸς ἑκείνο, ἑκείνο αὐτὸ καὶ θειάσεται καὶ αὐτὸς οὐχ ὅσον θίλει εἰπεῖν δυνάμενος. . . . οὐδ' ἂν τολμήσαι τις ἰδῶν ἔτι τὸ ὡς συνάβη λήγειν. Ib. 9, 4. 'Ἀλλὰ λίγομεν καὶ γράφομεν πέμποντες εἰς αὐτὸ καὶ ἀναγείροντες ἐκ τῶν λόγων ἐπὶ τὴν θίαν, ὥσπερ ὁδὸν δεικνύοντες τῷ τι θεάσασθαι βουλομένῳ· μέχρι γὰρ τῆς ὁδοῦ καὶ τῆς πορείας ἡ διδασκίαν οὐδενὸς ἐκείνο, καὶ πάντων δι', ὥστε παρὸν μὴ παρῆναι. . . . ὅταν οὕτως ἔχῃ, ὡς εἶχεν, ὅτε ἤλθεν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, ἡδὴ δύναται ἰδεῖν, ὡς πίπτειν ἐκείνος θεατὸς εἶναι.

<sup>73</sup> I. 6, 8. 'Ἀλλὰ ταῦτα πάντα ἀφείναι δεῖ καὶ μὴ βλεπεῖν, ἀλλ' οἷον μέσσαντα ὅσιν ἄλλην ἀλλάξασθαι καὶ ἀνεγείραι, ἣν ἔχει μὲν πᾶς, χρῶνται δὲ ὀλίγοι.

<sup>74</sup> IV. 8, 1, in.

<sup>75</sup> V. 3, 14; 8, 10; vi. 7, 35; 9, 11.

templates, wherein is neither life nor thought.<sup>76</sup> It is free from every form, not only its own proper one, but also every rational form, and all that is intelligible, and from every other good but the First. As soon as the soul turns from its present circumstances, the First immediately appears to it; nothing is between the soul and it, and they are no longer two but one.<sup>77</sup> This is not properly a contemplation, but in it man has become a different creature.<sup>78</sup> Man sees himself become a god, or, to speak more properly, not become, but actually being so, although only now for the first time becoming manifest to himself as such; for man is never separate from God, not even when the nature of body has drawn us to itself, but we breathe the One, and continue to be what he permits us; he never withdraws altogether from us, but ever continues present.<sup>79</sup> We have the One even when we do not say so.<sup>80</sup>

We are naturally surprised to find Plotinus in these and similar harangues expatiating at large on this contemplation of the One, although he regarded it as a matter on which all talking was in vain,

<sup>76</sup> VI. 7. 35. Διὸ οὐδὲ κινεῖται ἡ ψυχὴ τότε, ὅτι μὴδ' ἐκείνο, οὐδὲ ψυχὴ τοῖνον, ὅτι μὴδὲ ζῷ ἐκείνο, ἀλλὰ ὑπὲρ τὸ ζῆν· οὐδὲ νοῦς, ὅτι μὴδὲ νοεῖ, ὁμοιοῦσθαι γὰρ δεῖ, νοεῖ δὲ οὐδ' ἐκείνο, ὅτι οὐδὲ νοεῖ (νοεῖται?) Naturally enough Plotinus is not invariably faithful to this view. See vi. 9, 19.

<sup>77</sup> Ib. 34. Ἰδοῦσα δὲ ἐν αὐτῇ ἰξαίφνης φανέντα, μεταξὺ γὰρ οὐδὲν, οὐδ' ἐτι δύο, ἀλλ' ἐν ἁμῶν. See vi. 3, 17.

<sup>78</sup> VI. 9, 10. Τάχα δὲ οὐδὲ ὄψεται λεκτίον . . . ἀλλ' οἷον ἄλλος γενόμενος καὶ οὐκ αὐτός. Ib. 11.

<sup>79</sup> VI. 9, 9. Οὐδὲ χωρὶς ἴσμεν, εἰ καὶ παρεμπιπτοῦσα ἡ σώματος φύσις πρὸς αὐτὴν ἡμᾶς εἴλκυσεν, ἀλλ' ἐν πνίομεν καὶ σωζόμεθα, οὐ δόντος, εἴτα ἀποστάντος ἐκείνου, ἀλλ' αἰὶ χορηγοῦντος, ἕως ἂν ᾗ, ὅπερ ἰστί. . . . . θεὸν γενόμενον, μᾶλλον δὲ ὄντα, ἀναφανέντα (ἀναφθίντα is the reading of the codd.) μέν τότε. . .

<sup>80</sup> V. 3, 14.

since it can never be intelligibly spoken of. Consistently with his own views, he ought to have confined himself to exhorting men to bring about this contemplation in themselves, as soon as they have cast aside whatever of an alien and obstructive nature clings to them, and returned to their previous state. This simplification of man's nature, it was within his power to describe, and he has repeatedly done so;<sup>81</sup> but when he went beyond this, and even spoke in positive terms of the act of contemplation and of identification with the One, he inevitably fell into contradictions. Of these the following are some of the most startling contradictions:—He speaks in one place of the mutability of this contemplation, notwithstanding that in another he has promised to the soul a perfect quiescence in its identification with the One. When the soul has attained to a vision of the One, it still thinks that it does not even possess the object it had been seeking, from its incapacity to feel itself to be different from that which it thinks, and consequently it often voluntarily descends again to the sensible.<sup>82</sup> There is then, in fact, a singular folly of the soul in the midst of its most perfect wisdom. Plotinus does not seem always to regard the contemplative soul as so foolish, but he, nevertheless, ascribes to it another kind of imperfection.<sup>83</sup> To the question, why the soul which has

<sup>81</sup> I. 6, 7; v. 3, 17. Πῶς οὖν τοῦτο γίνοιτο; ἀφελε πάντα. v. 8, 11; vi. 9, 11. Φυγὴ μόνου πρὸς μόνον. . . . μονοῦσθαι. . . . τὸ δὲ ἴσως ἦν οὐ θάυμα, ἀλλὰ ἄλλος τρόπος τοῦ ἰδεῖν, ἑκστασις καὶ ἀπλωσις καὶ ἐπίδοσις αὐτοῦ καὶ ἔφεις πρὸς ἀφῆν.

<sup>82</sup> v. 8, 11; vi. 9, 11.

<sup>83</sup> VI. 9, 3. Καὶ ἀσμένῃ καταβαίνει πολλάκις. . . καθ' ἑαυτὴν δὲ ἡ ψυχὴ ὅταν ἰδεῖν ἰθέλῃ μόνην, ὁρῶσα τῷ συντεῖναι καὶ ἐν οὐσα, τῷ ἐν



once elevated itself to contemplation does not continue therein, he can only answer, that it has, perhaps, not fully passed from the lower regions. The corporeal, with which it is as yet still connected, hinders it from enjoying a steady unbroken vision, and allows only of a hope that some time or other it may be otherwise. But still Plotinus will not concede that the soul can be hindered from remaining with the One. To avoid such a concession, he prefers to divide the soul.<sup>84</sup> The inconsistency of these propositions must be obvious to every mind. Undoubtedly this vision or contemplation is imperfect so long as it has not attained to perfect security. In short, however laudable this aspiration of Plotinus for the highest excellence may appear, we must still confess that he has degraded the intuition of God, by the attempt into which he allowed himself to be seduced to appropriate it to man's imperfect nature.

It is necessary to notice a few more of the contradictions into which in this doctrine Plotinus has fallen, since they are of value as betraying, to a certain point, an inclination to return to a scientific course. In the perfect identification of the soul with the one, the former cannot naturally still preserve its self-consciousness, for it is now perfectly one with the One. This he expressly asserts, when he ascribes self-consciousness to Reason, but not to the One, and therefore requires a perfect forgetful-

*εἶναι αὐτῷ οὐκ οἶται πῶς ἔχειν, ὃ ζητεῖ, ὅτι τοῦ νοουμένου μὴ ἑτερόν ἐστιν.*

<sup>84</sup> VI. 9, 10. Πῶς οὖν οὐ μένει ἐκεῖ; ἢ ὅτι μήπω ἐξελήλυθεν ὅλως; ἔσται δὲ ὅτε καὶ τὸ συνεχὲς ἔσται τῆς θείας οὐκίτι ἐνοχλουμένης οὐδεμίαν ἐνόχλησιν τοῦ σώματος. ἔστι δὲ τὸ ἐωρακὸς οὐ τὸ ἐνοχλούμενον, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἄλλο.

ness of self in order to the contemplation of Unity. But notwithstanding this, he advances an opinion, that he who knows himself, will know where he is; and that he who knows God, must also be aware what God lends to things, and therefore must also be cognisant of himself, since he too is one of the things to whom God vouchsafes his gifts.<sup>85</sup> These views evince a tendency to the Platonic doctrine, that the Good may be studied in the multiplicity of ideas and in the Reason, and that the knowledge of it must comprise the knowledge of Reason and of the ideas. But the same tendency is still more strongly revealed in other positions which Plotinus takes up. The vision of soul, he thinks, penetrates through Reason to the Good; for though Reason veils the Good, it is not like a body which no rays can pierce through,<sup>86</sup> and since now the Reason is not such a simple unity as the One is, he was constrained to admit that either in or through the plurality of the rational world it is possible to see God.<sup>87</sup> This admission most assuredly ill accords with the view, that God cannot be rightly apprehended otherwise than by a complete identification with his indistinguishable entity, and it must therefore be regarded solely as a concession to that scientific view of things from

<sup>85</sup> V. 3, 7; 6, 5; vi. 9, 7. 'Αγνοήσαντα δὲ καὶ αὐτὸν ἐν τῇ θείᾳ ἐκείνου γενέσθαι. . . . ὁ δὲ ἐμαθὼν αὐτὸν εἰδήσει καὶ ὁπόθεν. In the union of the soul with the νοῦς, the former retains its self-consciousness. iv. 4, 2. Εἰς τε νοῦν ἔλθοῦσα ἡρμოსται καὶ ἀρμωσθεῖσα ἡνωται, οὐκ ἀπολλυμένη, ἀλλ' ἔν ἑστίν ἀμφω καὶ δύο· οὕτως οὖν ἔχουσα οὐκ ἂν μεταβάλλοι, ἀλλ' ἔχει ἂν ἀτρίπτως πρὸς νόησιν, ὁμοῦ ἔχουσα τὴν συναίσθησιν αὐτῆς.

<sup>86</sup> IV. 4, 4. 'Εκεῖ μὲν οὖν τάγαθὸν διὰ νοῦ ὁρᾷ, οὐ γὰρ στίγεται ἐκεῖνο, ὥστε μὴ διελθεῖν εἰς αὐτὴν, ἵπκει μὴ σῶμα τὸ μεταξὺ ὥστε ἐμποδίζειν.

<sup>87</sup> V. 8, 1. 'Ἐπειδὴ φαμεν τὸν ἐν θείᾳ τοῦ νοητοῦ κόσμου γεγεννημένον καὶ τὸ τοῦ ἀλθινοῦ κατανοήσαντα κάλλος, τοῦτον δυνήσεσθαι καὶ τὸν τούτου πατέρα καὶ τὸν ἐπίκεινα νοῦ εἰς ἐννοίαν βαλίσθαι, κ. τ. λ.

which the doctrine of Plotinus in its direct tendency diverged.

The latter tendency is most decidedly apparent, when we examine the connection which subsisted between his doctrine of the contemplation of the One, and that of the supreme grounds of all things. Plotinus found already in existence a doctrine formed by his forerunners in the same philosophical direction, which established the necessity of distinguishing three grounds of all entity. We find this doctrine suggested by Philo, and in another form embraced by Plutarch, and distinctly advanced by Numenius. Plotinus also adopted this view; but the mode in which he has determined the several notions of these three principles appears to be original.<sup>88</sup> The distinction between the soul and reason as two different essences, and the subordination of the former to the latter, had been long acknowledged. But it could not remain long concealed that the notion of reason, in its ordinary acceptation, possesses too much of a sensible character to serve for the supreme idea of a philosophy which aspired beyond everything like sensuous objectivity of thought to a perfectly mystical intuition. A tendency of this kind may be traced in Philo's description of the existent as that which is absolutely without properties, and of which in a proper sense nothing can be predicated. But still Philo did not expressly oppose himself to giving it the name of Reason, although he would not allow even the notions of Unity, or the One, of even

<sup>88</sup> We do not mean to say that he was the first who advanced this doctrine, for we have already met with it in Appuleius, and it would appear that it belonged to the school of Ammonius, because no opposition was anywhere made to it. Plotinus did but bring it forward in a more definite shape.

of the Good, to be ascribed in a strict sense to the supreme God. And the same tendency is seen in the system of Plotinus, even though here it assumes a wholly different tone. He indeed places the soul among the supreme triad of principles, and subordinates it to Reason; but with him Reason is not the supreme principle of all, but there is one higher than it, which he calls at one time the First or the Prime Essence, at another the One, and at another the Good; he also calls it that which is above the existent, for existence is by Plotinus reduced to an accessory idea of the Reason, and together with the latter, it forms the second degree in the system of three supreme ideas.<sup>89</sup>

There are some striking points to be noticed in this system of principles. If Plotinus assigned the existent to Reason, why, it might be asked, did he not regard them as two principles, and assume consequently four instead of three? The only answer that can be given to this question is, that the two in fact indicated to his mind but one and the same thing—the Reason and the really existent, or that which is cognisable by reason, supra-sensible; that which thinks, the Reason, and that which is thought, the supra-sensible—the really existent, are in pure and perfect thought indistinguishably combined. For the distinction which subsists in the sensible

<sup>89</sup> V. 1, 10, in. Τὸ ἐπίκεινα ὄντος τὸ ἓν. . . . ἔστι δὲ φεξῆς τὸ ὄν καὶ νοῦς. τρίτη δὲ ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς φύσις. I. 7, 1; 8, 2; II. 9, 1. Οὐ τοίνυν δεῖ ἐφ' ἑτέρας ἀρχὰς εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο (sc. τὸ ἀγαθόν) προστησαμένους, εἶτα νοῦν μετ' αὐτὸ καὶ τὸ νοοῦν πρῶτως, εἶτα ψυχὴν μετὰ νοῦν. αὕτη γὰρ τάξις κατὰ φύσιν, μήτε πλείω τούτων τίθεσθαι ἐν τῷ νοητῷ, μήτε ἐλάττω. εἰ τε γὰρ ἐλάττω, ἡ ψυχὴν καὶ νοῦν ταὐτὸ φήσουσιν, ἢ νοῦν καὶ τὸ πρῶτον, ἀλλ' ὅτι ἑτερα ἀλλήλων, ἰδέιχθη πολλαχῇ.

between the representation and the object, there is no corresponding difference in pure thought between the thinking subject and the object thought of, but Reason is an object to itself.<sup>90</sup> We might, perhaps, be disposed to imagine that Plotinus meant to assert that the difference lay only in the way of conceiving it, and that the existent was only called Reason, so far as it thinks, as Reason also is called the existent so far as it is thought of. But in truth he appears to have been prevented from yielding unqualified assent to this view by another consideration, which we shall hereafter have to notice. At present we shall only remark, on the other hand, that the view which would assign the supra-sensible wholly to the second degree, was somewhat unsuited to his purpose, since he elsewhere speaks of all the three supreme principles as supra-sensible, or cognisable by the reason.<sup>91</sup> It is clear that we have not to expect from Plotinus a very rigorous exposition of his doctrine.

But we must now examine into the grounds which induced him to deny the first place to Reason, and the purely supra-sensible in that which he nevertheless designates as the supra-sensible. Here, again, we find his doctrine dependent on the Platonic system, which had exalted the Good above

<sup>90</sup> V. 2, 4. 'Ο μὲν οὖν νοῦς, κατὰ τὸ νοεῖν ὑφιστάς, τὸ δὲ δὴ τῷ νοεῖσθαι τῷ νῷ διδόν τὸ νοεῖν καὶ τὸ εἶναι. . . . ἔμα μὲν γὰρ ἐκεῖνα, καὶ συν-  
πάρχει καὶ οὐκ ἀπολείπει ἀλλήλα, ἀλλὰ δύο ὄντα τοῦτο τὸ ἐν ὁμοῦ νοῦς  
καὶ δὴ καὶ νοοῦν καὶ νοούμενον, ὃ μὲν νοῦς κατὰ τὸ νοεῖν, τὸ δὲ δὴ κατὰ  
τὸ νοούμενον. Ib. iv. 2. Ἔστι μὲν οὖν καὶ αὐτὸς νοητόν, ἀλλὰ καὶ νοῶν.  
. . . . νοῦς δὴ καὶ δὴ ταῦτόν· οὐ γὰρ τῶν πραγμάτων ὁ νοῦς, ὥσπερ  
ἡ αἴσθησις τῶν αἰσθητῶν προόντων, ἀλλ' αὐτὸς νοῦς τὰ πράγματα.

<sup>91</sup> II. 9, 1. Μῆτι πλείω τούτων τίθισθαι ἐν τῷ νοητῷ, μῆτι ἐλάττω.  
See above.

existence, and truth above science and reason. But, in fact, Plotinus has rather made use of, than adhered to, the Platonic doctrine: for Plato's object was merely to establish the union of science and existence in one first-cause, notwithstanding that in the becoming, wherein they are apprehended by man, they exhibit themselves apart from each other.<sup>92</sup> But herein Plato sought for nothing more than the combination of the two into a real and perfect unity, such as Plotinus has in truth posited in the second of his three supra-sensible principles.<sup>93</sup> This apparent agreement of doctrine, though involving an actual difference of views, has only involved Plotinus in greater confusion; which, as previously remarked, has prevented him from adhering steadily to the doctrine already developed of the relation between Reason and real existence. To these perplexities belong the proofs which he seeks to give, that man must not be content with Reason, but must seek something higher than it, on the ground that Reason cannot be looked upon as a pure unity, but that duality, if not plurality, must of necessity be attributed to it; for in these proofs he is constantly confounding the ratiocinative reason with the reason in pure thought, which, as we have already seen, he made to be identical with the really existent, and then supports his view by the well-known Platonic

<sup>92</sup> S. Th. ii. 325, sq.

<sup>93</sup> V. 3, 5. Τὴν ἄρα ἀλήθειαν οὐχ ἐτίρου δεῖ εἶναι, ἀλλ' ὃ λέγει, τοῦτο καὶ εἶναι. Ἐν ἄρα οὕτω νοῦς καὶ τὸ νοητὸν καὶ τὸ δν· καὶ πρῶτον δν τοῦτο καὶ δὴ καὶ πρῶτος νοῦς τὰ ὄντα ἔχων, μᾶλλον δὲ ὁ αὐτὸς τοῖς οὖσιν. . . . . εἰ οὖν ἐνέργεια (sc. ὁ νοῦς) καὶ ἡ οὐσία αὐτοῦ ἐνέργεια, ἔν καὶ ταῦτόν τῃ ἐνεργείᾳ ἂν εἴη, ἔν δὲ τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ, τὸ δν καὶ τὸ νοητόν, ἔν ἅμα πάντα ἔσται, νοῦς, νόησις, τὸ νοητόν. Ib. 6; iii. 2, 1; v. 9, 5.

grounds of a necessity for acknowledging a higher power than that of inquisitive thought.<sup>94</sup> He asserts, if reason thinks of God, it still does not become God, no more than it becomes motion by thinking of it. Nay, more, he even maintains, in direct opposition to his previous doctrine of the unity of the thinking subject and the object thought of, that the object must exist antecedently to the subject;<sup>95</sup> and his ground for this assertion is, that reason in its cogitation is multiple; for if it did not posit its thinking as distinct from its entity, it would not think, but be merely one.<sup>96</sup> After a view so false, and so directly conflicting with his own conclusions, we might have supposed that Plotinus would not have had much difficulty in proving that this reason is not the highest; for it was easy enough for him to subject it to the many imperfections which cleave to the idea of a thought in the process of development: nevertheless his proofs are very unsatisfactory, since he has made but very little use of this surreptitious advantage. In general he merely appeals to the impossibility of man's remaining content with such a composite entity as reason appears to be; for whatever contains in itself multiplicity, is in want of something—in want, in short, of the elements of

<sup>94</sup> V. 3, 10. Ἦ γὰρ ἐνεργεῖ (sc. ὁ νοῦς), ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο. . . . δεῖ τοῖνυν τὸ νοοῦν ἕτερον καὶ ἕτερον λαβεῖν καὶ τὸ νοούμενον, κατανοούμενον (καθὰ νοούμενον;) ὅν, ποικίλον εἶναι, ἢ οὐκ ἔσται νόησις αὐτοῦ, ἀλλὰ θίξις καὶ οἷον ἐπαφή μόνον. . . . καὶ γὰρ αὐτό ποθός τις καὶ ἡ γνώσις ἔστι καὶ οἷον ζητήσαντος εὐρεσις. Ib. 6 1; 2; vi. 7, 37. Καὶ τῷ ἐξ ἄλλου δίδομεν οὐεῖν καὶ οἷον ζητεῖν αὐτοῦ τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ αὐτὸ καὶ τὸ ποιῆσαν αὐτό.

<sup>95</sup> Ib. v. 9, 7.

<sup>96</sup> VI. 2, 6. Ἦ δὲ θεωρία αἰτία τοῦ φανῆναι αὐτὸ πολλά, ἵνα νοήσῃ· ἴαν γὰρ ἐν φανῇ, οὐκ ἐνόησεν, ἀλλ' ἔστιν ἤδη ἐκείνο.

which it is compounded,<sup>97</sup> according to which view the One alone can be regarded as without want, and sufficient for reason. This argument we must look upon as his chief proof; for though he is not sparing of others, they are of less force. Of these, we shall adduce one which preserved a permanent authority in the neo-Platonic school; and this was that we must prefer the One to all other things, since each, individually, only exists by its being one:<sup>98</sup>—a mode of reasoning which evidently admits of being applied in like manner to the existent. And here the general remark is necessary, that as Plotinus sought to place a perfect entity at the head of all things, he could scarcely omit to posit it as a unity, but that still he would not thereby be deterred from assuming also its multiplicity, since he must have seen that in the rational, multiplicity does not, as in the corporeal, exclude perfection.<sup>99</sup>

Now as we find his proofs of the necessity of assuming a something higher than the Reason so very weak, we cannot abstain from the conjecture which we have already advanced, that the notion, which Plotinus entertained of Reason, was still too sensuous, too little mystical to be placed at the head of his system. And in this opinion we are further confirmed by propositions which we meet with in his disquisitions, all of which tend to get rid of whatever might appear to be predicable of the highest and the first. For as we may not conceive of the First as reason, we must naturally

<sup>97</sup> VI. 9, 6. Πᾶν δὲ πολλὸ καὶ μὴ ἐν ἑνδεΐς. V. 4, 1. Τό γε μὴ ἀπλοῦν τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ ἀπλῶν διόμενον, ἢ ἢ ἐξ ἑκείνων.

<sup>98</sup> VI. 9, 1.

<sup>99</sup> VI. 5, 10.



not ascribe to it either rational thought or an intelligence either of itself or other things. Still Plotinus would not allow, that ignorance must be attributed to it, on the ground that ignorance is only possible in the case where one does not know another. But, as the One is always together with itself, it has no need of self-thought, and yet we must not ascribe to it even this co-existence with itself, as this would imply a plurality in it.<sup>100</sup> So anxiously does he labour to establish and maintain the absolute unity of the One. If therefore he nevertheless numbers the One among the objects of pure intellectual cognition, he still does not forget to add the qualifying remark, that this is not to be understood in the proper sense of the word, but merely in a relation to the Reason.<sup>101</sup> And as thought is denied to the One, so also must volition, inasmuch as being in want of nothing, it cannot have a desire.<sup>102</sup> It is not an energy, but more than an energy; life belongs to it. No entity, no quiddity, no essence, and none of the genera or most general categories of entity can be attributed to it.<sup>103</sup> Moreover, Plotinus abounds in formulas, which by advancing opposite determina-

<sup>100</sup> VI. 9, 6. Οὐδὲ νόησις, ἵνα μὴ ἐτερότης. οὐδὲ κίνησις, πρὸ γὰρ κινήσεως καὶ νοήσεως· τί γὰρ νοήσει ἑαυτὸν; . . . οὐ τοίνυν, ὅτι μὴ γινώσκει, οὐδὲ νοεῖ ἑαυτὸν, ἀγνοία περὶ αὐτὸν ἔσται· ἡ γὰρ ἀγνοία ἐτέρου ὄντος γίνεται, ὅταν θάτερον ἀγνοῇ θάτερον. τὸ δὲ μόνον οὔτε τι γινώσκει, οὔτε τι ἔχει, ὁ ἀγνοεῖ. ἔν δὲ ὃν συνδν αὐτῷ οὐ δεῖται νοήσεως ἑαυτοῦ. ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ τὸ συνεῖναι δεῖ προσάπτειν, ἵνα τηρῇς τὸ ἓν. ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ νοεῖν καὶ τὸ συνεῖναι (συνεῖναι;) ἀφαιρεῖν καὶ ἑαυτοῦ νόησιν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων.

<sup>101</sup> V. 6, 2. "Ὁ πρὸς μὲν τὸν νοῦν νοητὸν ἔσται, καθ' ἑαυτὸ δὲ οὔτε νοῦν οὔτε νοητὸν κυρίως ἔσται.

<sup>102</sup> VI. 9, 6.

<sup>103</sup> V. 3, 12; vi. 2, 3; 9, 10; 8, 18; 9, 3.

tions of the One, abolish every affirmative attribute. The One, he says, is not all things, since otherwise it could not be the origin of them; and yet it may be regarded as all, since it is everywhere; and because it is also in no particular spot, it is even on that account, not all.<sup>104</sup> It is, and it is not the existent; neither moving nor yet at rest; neither freedom nor necessity belongs to it.<sup>105</sup> Now if by such statements Plotinus closely approximates to the views of Philo, it must be observed, that in the same manner as the latter he considers it allowable, although the first is ineffable, nevertheless to speak of it in terms which properly are not applicable to it.<sup>106</sup> It is therefore only a few particular attributes which Plotinus carefully avoids attributing to the One, simply because he proposes to ascribe them exclusively to another of his principles; such, for instance, as thought<sup>107</sup> and life; whereas he is not so scrupulous about ascribing others to it. Thus, with a little hesitation, he ascribes to it volition,<sup>108</sup> and has still less difficulty in giving it an energy and calling it the work of its own energy (*ἰνουργῆμα*);<sup>109</sup> and being once in this direction, he finds little obstacle in ascribing love even to the One — love of itself, and finds it beautiful, and and even amiable to say, that it it has been pro-

<sup>104</sup> III. 8, 8; 9, 3.

<sup>105</sup> V. 2, 1; vi. 8, 8; 9; 9, 3.

<sup>106</sup> VI. 8, 8. Ἀδυναμία τοῦ τυχεῖν τῶν δ προσήκει λέγειν περὶ αὐτοῦ, ταῦτα δὲ περὶ αὐτὸν εἰπομεν. καίτοι οὐδὲν δὲ εὗρομεν εἰπεῖν οὐχ ὅτι κατ' αὐτοῦ, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ περὶ αὐτοῦ κυρίως, πάντα γὰρ ἰκτείνου καὶ τὰ καλὰ καὶ τὰ σεμνὰ ὕστερα. Ib. 13.

<sup>107</sup> Therefore he merely says, vi. 8, 18. Τὸν οἶον ἐν ἐνὶ νοῦν οὐ νοῦν ὄντα.

<sup>108</sup> VI. 8, 13; 21.

<sup>109</sup> VI. 8, 16; 18.

duced, not indeed in compliance with another's will, but its own.<sup>110</sup> As, then, Plotinus allows himself to speak in this way figuratively rather than truly of the supreme principle, we find it extremely difficult to determine the limits of his real and his figurative expressions. On the one hand, if he wished to maintain the position that this principle is inexpressible and inconceivable, we ought, therefore, to look upon every thing he advances regarding it as figurative. But, on the other hand, when we observe that he attempts to establish by proofs, and consequently by a scientific method, many of the statements thus advanced, or at least deduces inferences from these positions, we cannot form any other conclusion than that he really held them to be something more than merely figurative. Three determinations of this kind in particular, fall under question, because in his many scientific applications he most frequently recurs to them, that, viz., the supreme God is good, and the first or the principle (*ἀρχή*), and especially the One. Now, in relation to these three notions, we distinctly see that he wavered between the two directions already noticed, and consequently it will not be uninteresting to examine his statements with regard to them.

In the first place, with respect to the notion of good, he is with Plato greatly disposed to posit nothing above it, and to see in it an expression of the highest. But it must cause some surprise to find him unwilling to concede that the first principle is the Good, from fear lest the Good should be predicated of it, and thereby an entity ascribed to it,

<sup>110</sup> VI. 8, 15 in. On the other hand, vi. 7, 42.

and as if it, the *that*, would be spoken of as a something besides it—as the Good. Therefore he forbids it to say or to think, ‘I am good,’ on the plea that saying or thinking is alien to it, and because it does not first become good by thinking. Nevertheless these doubts arise from the imperfection of human language and thought, and he therefore concedes to the supreme principle, in a certain manner however which admits not of being expressed in words, both to possess good and to be called so.<sup>111</sup> Much more startling is it to find that Plotinus will not concede to the supreme God to be beautiful,<sup>112</sup> when we consider the intimate connection, which, in the ancient mind, subsisted between the beautiful and the good, and that he himself in other passages identifies the two.<sup>113</sup> But he still more openly evinces the tendency of his own ideas, when he reminds us that the idea of good cannot well be entertained without a reference to something else, and in his wish to clear the idea of God from all relativity, insists that it is wrong perhaps to ascribe to the One even a good will, and that perhaps it is not good for itself but only for other things. Then he asserts, without further words, that the One is above the Good, and it is a mere euphemism, when he adds the remark, that in a different sense from all else, the first also may be called the Good,<sup>114</sup> for he is naturally unable to say in what sense.

<sup>111</sup> VI. 7, 38.<sup>112</sup> Ib. 42.<sup>113</sup> I. 6, 6.

<sup>114</sup> VI. 9, 6. "Ὡστε τῷ ἐνὶ οὐδὲν ἀγαθὸν ἔστιν, οὐδὲ βούλησις τοίνυν οὐδενός. ἀλλ' ἔστιν ὑπεράγαθον καὶ αὐτὸ οὐχ ἑαυτῷ, τοῖς δὲ ἄλλοις ἀγαθόν, εἴ τι αὐτοῦ δύναται μεταλαμβάνειν. . . . . οὐ τοίνυν οὐδὲ ἀγαθὸν λεκτίον τοῦτο, δὲ παρέχει, ἀλλὰ ἄλλως τὰγαθὸν ὑπὲρ τὰ ἄλλα ἀγαθὰ. We will remark, as affording a characteristic singularity of the empty subtleties from which Plotinus is far from free, that he seeks at great length to

It is impossible to avoid confessing, that hereby we have lost again whatever of the Platonic theory of the supreme ground of things Plotinus seemed to have appropriated; while, on the other side, all the most positive determinations of his own theory vanish at once. His distinction of the One from the multiple, and from all things, rested on the view, that this One must be the prime and original principle. Still he could not fail to perceive that such a determination was liable to many objections. It is true he was able to appeal to the impossibility of precise language in these matters, when he conquered himself so far as to call God, in virtue of this notion of the prime essence, the most powerful and the first power, which, like all other things, could not endure to remain by itself, but created other out of itself;<sup>115</sup> but must it not have occurred to him that such unprecise terms are not allowable in science, especially as on other occasions, he insisted that the energy must exist before the faculty, and that consequently the faculty cannot be regarded as the First? He does indeed bear this in mind in other places, but then he finds the notion of the prime substance to be too intimately connected with that of faculty for the former not to be involved in the loss of the latter. He now says, God is the prime substance or origin of all that is beautiful and praiseworthy, but still in another sense he is

prove that good is not such, *κατὰ τύχην*. VI. 8, 14, seqq. Our readers may well be spared this and other depths of his philosophy, since we have enough of it already in what is involved in the general course of his doctrine.

<sup>115</sup> V. 4, 1. Εἰ τέλειόν ἐστι τὸ πρῶτον καὶ πάντων τελειώτατον καὶ δύναμις ἢ πρώτη, δεῖ πάντων τῶν ὄντων δυνατώτατον εἶναι. . . . πῶς οὖν τὸ τελειώτατον καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἀγαθὸν ἐν αὐτῷ σταίη, ὥσπερ φθονῆσαν ἑαυτοῦ ἢ ἀδυνατῆσαν, ἢ πάντων δύναμις; πῶς δ' ἂν εἴη ἀρχὴ εἰς;

not the origin of it;<sup>116</sup> and how he would have the latter understood, is left for the present unexplained, but accounted for in another place, unless, indeed, we may otherwise explain it by interpreting the origin of all things by the supreme cause. For Plotinus very distinctly remarks, that we predicate nothing of that which happens to God, when we call him the First Cause, but rather something that applies to men because we receive gifts from him, while he remains within himself.<sup>117</sup> In this position, again, we recognise the same constant endeavour to conceive of God, purely and absolutely, without any reference to aught else, as is evidently contained in all such expressions as—the One Cause, the One Prime Essence, and we may add—the One First.

But what shall we ultimately say, when Plotinus even bids us dismiss, as soon as we have attained to it, the very notion by a sense of whose necessity he thought to lead man to the conception of the supreme principles? Similarly to Philo, who found God to be simpler even than unity, Plotinus declares, that to that to which no name is suitable, the name of One is only more appropriate than any other name, if it must be named at all.<sup>118</sup> Such a conclusion was

<sup>116</sup> VI. 8, 8. Πάντα γὰρ ἐκείνου καὶ τὰ καλὰ καὶ τὰ σιμνά ὕστερα· τούτων γὰρ αὐτὸς ἀρχή, καίτοι ἄλλον τρόπον οὐκ ἀρχή.

<sup>117</sup> VI. 9, 8. Ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ αἰτιον λῖγειν οὐ κατηγορεῖν ἰστί συμβεβηκός τε αὐτῷ, ἀλλ' ἡμῖν, ὅτι ἔχομεν τι παρ' αὐτοῦ, ἐκείνου ὄντος ἐν αὐτῷ. In the following quotation the readings of the MSS. are very fluctuating and unintelligible, but yet come very near to what alone I consider the correct one, I propose to read, διὲ δὲ μὴδὲ τὸ ἐκείνου, μὴδὲ τὸ ὄντος λῖγειν ἀκριβῶς λῖγοντα.

<sup>118</sup> V. 4, 1. Ἐν, καθ' οὗ ψευδὸς καὶ τὸ εἶναι, οὐ μὴ λόγος, μὴδὲ ἐπιστήμη. VI. 9, 5. Τὸ εἶν, ὃ μὴ ὄν ἰστί, ἵνα μὴ καὶ ἐνταῦθα κατ' ἄλλου

the natural result of a doctrine, which insisted that there can be neither discourse nor science of the First. Such a doctrine would not heed the little contradiction, that man still is ever talking of it; that it is suggested by ideas such as those of the First and the One, whose necessity alone is a scientific guarantee of their reality. Man, says Plotinus, must content himself with admitting that he does but speak and think of that which is around God, and which is attached to him, without, however, indicating him himself;<sup>119</sup> and this, although it is impossible to know what is round about God, unless we have some knowledge of himself; nay, although Plotinus himself allows it is absolutely impossible to assert what is round about him.<sup>120</sup> In short, it is in the very nature of mysticism to destroy the edifice which it has itself built up, since it holds its secret too dear to reveal it in any degree in words. But we must yet make a further remark in order to exhibit the reverse side also of his negation of oneness to the One; and that is, that Plotinus who, at times, declares in the most express manner possible, that all multiplicity is alien to the One, still does not always forbid us to conceive of God as multiple, but teaches that in the supra-sensible all is multiple, since it possesses an infinite

τὸ ἓν, ᾧ (codd. al. ὧν) ὄνομα μὲν κατ' ἀλήθειαν οὐδὲν προσήκειν. εἴπερ δὲ δεῖ ὀνομάσαι, κοινῶς ἂν λεχθῆναι, προσηκόντως ἓν, οὐχ ὡς ἄλλο, εἴτα ἓν, χαλεπὸν μὲν γνωσθῆναι διὰ τοῦτο, κ. τ. λ.

<sup>119</sup> VI. 7, 42. Ἀποθοῦ ταῦτα, ἃ νομίζεις σεμνὰ εἶναι ἐν τοῖς δευτέροις, καὶ μήτε τὰ δεύτερα προστίθει τῷ πρώτῳ, μήτε τὰ τρίτα τοῖς δευτέροις, ἀλλὰ τὰ δεύτερα περὶ τὸ πρῶτον τίθει καὶ τὰ τρίτα περὶ τὸ δεύτερον. οὕτω γὰρ αὐτὰ ἕκαστα ἰάσεις, ὡς ἔχει, καὶ τὰ ὕστερα ἐξαργήσεις ἐκείνων, ὡς ἐκεῖνα περιθίσοντα, ἐφ' αὐτῶν ὄντα.

<sup>120</sup> VI. 8, 8.

potentiality.<sup>121</sup> This constitutes one of the most important points wherein Plotinus differed not only from Plato, but also from almost the whole of Grecian antiquity as soon as it had attained to a clearer consciousness of its own pursuits; for he has ascribed to the idea of infinity, which even Philo feared to adopt, all that is best, and will not allow that God has in himself his limits, his measure, and his determination, because, he argues, that then he would become liable to duality.<sup>122</sup> This may be regarded as a valuable accession to philosophical thought, although, indeed, it does not present itself in Plotinus in a very precise form, but pretty nearly in the same loose way as he argues, that because God is everywhere therefore everywhere is also God.

We should, perhaps, be justified in asserting, that all these mystical features in the doctrine of Plotinus arose from his not regarding the first principle simply as such, i. e. in relation to that of which it is the ground, but rather absolutely in itself.<sup>123</sup> This was not the case with the ancient philosophers, if we except those who sought to represent the First as also the last and as the only one of its kind, but not as a principle; and, indeed, such an attempt could not have been made before men began to apprehend the notion of the First not as a notion, i. e. as a

<sup>121</sup> III. 7, 4. *Εἰ δ' ἐκ πολλῶν λέγομεν αὐτόν, οὐ δεῖ θαυμάζειν· πολλὰ γὰρ ἕκαστον τῶν ἐκεί διὰ δύναμιν ἀπειρον.*

<sup>122</sup> V. 5, 11. *Καὶ τὸ ἀπειρον τοῦτο μὴ πλείον ἰνός εἶναι, μηδὲ ἔχειν πρὸς ὃ ὁμοῖ τι τῶν ἑαυτοῦ. τῷ γὰρ εἶναι οὐ μιμήρηται, οὐδ' εἰς ἀριθμὸν ἔκει. οὐτ' οὖν πρὸς ἄλλο, οὐτε πρὸς αὐτὸ πεπύραται, ἐπεὶ οὕτως ἂν εἴη καὶ δύο. vi. 5, 11; 6, 18; 9, 6.*

<sup>123</sup> VI. 5, 4.



creation of thought, but derived it from another source, and then sought to combine with it the scientific pursuit of the ultimate grounds of thought and existence. With such a period we have had to do ever since we met with the mixture of religious belief with philosophical science. We must not mistake the true import of such a period. Its object was to effect a peace between religion and philosophy, not indeed by giving, after the manner of the Platonists and Stoics, a philosophical interpretation to the forms of religious worship, but by adopting into itself the impulses of a religious craving after union with God. With this longing Plotinus is fully possessed. That he should have attempted to connect his philosophy with it demands, no doubt, our approbation; still we must confess that he did not take the best way to accomplish this task by describing the object of religious longing as inaccessible to every notion; nay more, by candidly admitting that it must be understood as something wholly irrelative to man and all other things.

His inability, not to say indisposition, to carry out this pure abstraction is most clearly seen, when he applies himself to the task of explaining the derivation of all things from the First. He is here compelled to conceive his First, relatively to the Second, as creative.<sup>124</sup> His description of the process by which the Second arises out of the First, and the Third out of the Second, adopts more or less of those images of the theory of emanation, which we have previously become acquainted with. He is indeed rich in images, wherewith to render

<sup>124</sup> VI. 9, 3.

conceivable this inconceivable problem, how the Second can be produced out of the First without the First being in any way affected by it, or having any influence upon it. Whatever is, produces its inferior; fire, for example, warmth, and snow cold. Must not then the Good do the same, if it be not envious or devoid of equal power with other things? Its superfluity has flowed away and made another, and so it still remains full as it was before.<sup>125</sup> The First projects all substance out of itself.<sup>126</sup> The one is, as it were, a stream, which wells forth streams, without being itself changed or weakened; it is a seed or root, which suffers all to proceed out of itself but still remains what it ever has been; what proceeds from it is, as it were, a radiation of the light.<sup>127</sup> By such comparisons of the First with lower objects, which Plotinus in other passages absolutely rejects, he believed it possible to reconcile the unchangeable rest of the Good with the necessity of its becoming the principle of other. The necessity which man discovers of assuming some such process of the First, Plotinus transfers to the First itself, even though he would still make this necessity to be itself a freedom. The prime energy,

<sup>125</sup> V. 2, 1. *Ὅσον ὑπερεβρύη καὶ τὸ ὑπερπλήρες αὐτοῦ πεποιήκειν ἄλλο.*  
This image is frequently used by later writers.

<sup>126</sup> VI. 8, 19.

<sup>127</sup> A few passages will suffice. I. 1, 8; 6, 7; 8; iii. 3, 7; 8, 9; iv. 8, 3—6; v. 1, 6; 4, 1; 2; vi. 9, 5. The image of light in particular is often employed, as it is generally current in theories of emanation; hence *ἄκλαμψος* and *ἐλλαμψος*. This image is in a certain degree substituted for that of reason, and pretends seriously to the same place with the supra-sensible. Thus of the sun we are told, that it would be imperceptible if it were pure light, and if there were nothing of corporeal solidity in it. In short, the images are confounded with the substance. Cf. iv. 3, 17; v. 5, 7; vi. 7, 41, 8; 18.

he says, exhibits itself as it ought to.<sup>128</sup> Not one alone ought to be, for then would all remain hidden.<sup>129</sup>

When now, in the doctrine of Plotinus, we pass from the mystical heights of the First to the Second—the Reason, we still find sufficient mystery in his description of it. This character of mystery necessarily passed over from the First to the Second, as the latter was dependent on the former. Plotinus attempts to determine the idea of it with respect both to the First and the higher, and also to the lower. We propose to begin with the former relation. As opposed to the First it naturally appears imperfect; thus we discover in Plotinus also the general principle of the theory of emanation, according to which the First must not be sought in the Second;<sup>130</sup> that is to say, every efflux of the higher must be inferior to that from which it emanates. Now if the First is to be sought in simplicity and unity, the created must naturally be held to be less simple than the creative;<sup>131</sup> and Reason, as a creation of the One, cannot be so perfectly one as its original; it must rather partake of duality and multiplicity, notwithstanding that it may be rightly said of it, that it eschews plurality more than the soul does which is under it, and therefore is further removed from unity.<sup>132</sup> This mode of view leads, in the next place, to a distinction of degree between

<sup>128</sup> VI. 8, 18. *Ἐνέργεια πρώτη, τοῦτο ἑαυτὴν ἐκφάνασα, ὅπερ ἴδει.*

<sup>129</sup> IV. 8, 6 in. *Εἴπερ οὖν δεῖ μὴ ἐν μόνον εἶναι, ἐκέρυπτο γὰρ ἂν πάντα, κ.τ.λ.*

<sup>130</sup> III. 2, 7. *Μήδ' ἐν τοῖς δευτέροις ζητεῖν τὰ πρῶτα.*

<sup>131</sup> III. 8, 8. *Τοῦ γὰρ γεννηθέντος πανταχοῦ τὸ γεννῶν ἀπλούστερον.*

<sup>132</sup> V. 6, 1.

the One and Reason, to which several expressions of Plotinus have reference. Reason is a type, a resemblance of the First, exhibiting in itself much of it, but still not perfectly like to it, nor altogether containing the same perfection. As the First is good, so Reason, to use a Platonic term, is of a good kind.<sup>133</sup> But here Plotinus must have found himself in a difficulty. The First is not Reason, how then can the latter possess any resemblance to the former? He does not solve this difficulty, but merely seeks to avoid it by attempting to show, that the Second must necessarily become Reason, although the First is not of such a nature. His explanation is this: the Second, in the return to the First, saw the First, and this seeing is Reason.<sup>134</sup> A singular doctrine, in truth! All that which constitutes the essence of Reason must be alien to the First, and yet a resemblance is supposed to hold between the two; nay more, the Reason, if it do but perfectly maintain its own purity, can perfectly exhibit and wholly contain within itself the First! Here the two leading parts of the mysticism of Plotinus are in collision—the irrationality of the First, and the supra-sensible contemplation of the Reason. And this doctrine becomes yet more obscure as other ideas are introduced into it, intended to exhibit the objects of the Reason, which, without exception, are denied of the One; so that from this point of view also there cannot be any

<sup>133</sup> VI. 7, 20; 21.

<sup>134</sup> V. 1, 7. Εἰκόνα δὲ ἐκείνου λέγομεν εἶναι τὸν νοῦν. διὲ γὰρ σαφέστερον λέγειν. πρῶτον μὲν, ὅτι διὲ πῶς εἶναι ἐκεῖνο τὸ γινώμενον καὶ ἀποσώζειν πολλὰ αὐτοῦ καὶ εἶναι ὁμοιότητα πρὸς αὐτό, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ φῶς τοῦ ἡλίου. ἀλλ' οὐ νοῦς ἐκεῖνο, πῶς οὖν νοῦν γεννᾷ; ἢ ὅτι τῇ ἐπιστροφῇ πρὸς αὐτὸ εἶρα; ἢ δὲ ὁρασις αὐτῇ νοῦς. VI. 9, 2.

resemblance between the One and Reason. Among these ideas there was, as we have already seen, that of the existent, viz. the supra-sensible, which indicates what is most general in the objective. But to this idea that of life attaches itself; since according to Plotinus, it is necessary to ascribe life to the existent, on the ground that otherwise it would be something dead.<sup>136</sup> From this the ideas of energy and substance follow. As to the relation of these several ideas to one another, Plotinus has not expressed himself with any precision. He appears to make the idea of energy equivalent with that of life, and to attribute life to Reason agreeably to the Aristotelian dogma, that the energy must be antecedent to the potentiality.<sup>136</sup> But substance and life are so associated by Plotinus, that we cannot fail to recognise in them the two aspects of existence—permanent entity and becoming. Agreeably herewith he considers motion as necessary to life, deviating therein importantly from the Aristotelian doctrine, and considers substance and motion to be inseparably united in Reason.<sup>137</sup> But here again we meet with the mystical combination of contraries which are found no less in the idea of Reason than in that of the One. Thus in the Reason the energy is identical with the potentiality. The Reason cannot be conceived of as being in inactivity, nor yet in motion, it is in a stable energy; it is stable and yet moves, for it is always about God,

<sup>136</sup> VI. 9, 2. Ἐχει δὲ καὶ ζωὴν καὶ νοῦν τὸ ὄν, οὐ γὰρ δὴ νεκρόν.

<sup>136</sup> V. 9, 4.

<sup>137</sup> VI. 2, 7. This refers to the so-called Platonic categories, which Plotinus in a most singular and inappropriate way applies to the intelligible world.

and has always thought in and by itself—it is ever striving and ever attaining; it has all things in itself, an indistinct and yet distinct multiplicity.<sup>138</sup> Now when we find that Plotinus ascribes a potentiality to Reason, and remember that with Aristotle the potential is matter, we shall not be surprised if Reason be made to contain in itself a something material. Indeed, this is nothing but consistent with Plotinus' view, in so far as the Reason, as being less simple than the One, contains in itself a multiplicity of species or ideas which are regarded somewhat in the light of human notions. By this means his idea of the Reason approaches to the sensible. For in the same way that every notion combines the general with the special, so the idea of Reason, in its distinction from all other things, possesses a form, and in its universality a matter. In all which again Plotinus adopts the Aristotelian doctrine, from which he borrows indeed the expression of a supra-sensible matter, but yet, in truth, employs it in quite a different sense from that in which Aristotle used it. For, in support of his position, he appeals also to the view that the supra-sensible world is a type of the sensible, and that therefore it must also contain matter.<sup>139</sup> Perhaps it is hardly

<sup>138</sup> II. 2, 3, fin. ii. 9, 1; iii. 2, 2; 8, 10. 'Εν μὲν τῷ νῷ ἡ ἐφ' ἑαυτῆς, καὶ ἐφ' ἑαυτὸν δὲ καὶ αἰεὶ τυγχάνων. V. 8, 6; vi. 9, 5. νῦν ἡσυχον καὶ ἀτριμῆ κίνησιν φατίον, πάντα ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ πάντα ὄντα πληθὺς ἀδιάκριτον καὶ αὐτὸ διακριμμένον.

<sup>139</sup> II. 4, 4. Εἰ οὖν πολλὰ τὰ εἶδη, κοινὸν μὲν τι ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀνάγκη εἶναι καὶ δι' καὶ ἴδιον, ὃ διαφέρει ἄλλο ἄλλου. τοῦτο δὲ τὸ ἴδιον καὶ ἡ διαφορὰ ἢ χωρίζουσα ἢ οἰκία ἵστί μορφῇ. εἰ δὲ μορφῇ, ἵστί καὶ τὸ μορφοῦμενον, περὶ δὲ ἡ διαφορὰ, ἵστί ἄρα καὶ ὕλη, ἢ τὴν μορφὴν δεχομένην καὶ αἰεὶ τὸ ὑποκείμενον. ἵτι εἰ κόσμος νοητός ἵστί ἐκεῖ, μίμημα δὲ οὗτος ἰκτείνου, οὗτος δὲ σύνθετος καὶ ἐξ ὕλης, ἐκεῖ δὲ ὕλην εἶναι. Ib. 5, 6; iii. 8, 8; 10.

worth the while to observe upon the little agreement of this borrowed doctrine with the course of thought which Plotinus generally follows. For how could he consistently explain matter to be the general in a doctrine whose main object was the attainment of the most general? How could he regard this generality of Reason as the prototype of sensible matter? The impropriety of this comparison will be more fully seen hereafter, when we shall have become acquainted with his doctrine of matter. But, however this may be, Plotinus derives from the multiplicity of the ideas of the Reason the multiplicity of the Reason itself; and, on the other hand, its unity from its union with the One. The Reason looks upon the Good and the First, and is present to it; but it also looks upon itself, and is manifold and all.<sup>140</sup> According to this description, we must observe, a true and complete union of Reason with the One, such as Plotinus supposed to take place in contemplation, is impossible. For Reason is only such, so far as existing for itself it looks towards the One; it is around the One only, as it were a permanent circle around the Good;<sup>141</sup> it is near, it is true to the One, but still dares to a certain degree to recede from it.<sup>142</sup>

But now Reason as the Second turns itself to the third which is the Soul. It is self-evident that the

<sup>140</sup> VI. 9, 2. Καὶ χρὴ τὸν νοῦν τοιοῦτον τίθεσθαι ὡς παρῆναι μὲν τῷ ἀγαθῷ καὶ τῷ πρώτῳ καὶ βλέπειν εἰς ἐκείνον, συνῆναι καὶ ἑαυτῷ, νοεῖν τε καὶ ἑαυτὸν καὶ νοεῖν ἑαυτὸν ὄντα τὰ πάντα.

<sup>141</sup> II. 2, 3 fin. Ὁ δὲ νοῦς οὕτω κινεῖται, ἵσθηται γὰρ καὶ κινεῖται, περὶ αὐτὸν γάρ. IV. 4, 16.

<sup>142</sup> VI. 9, 5. Ἐν μὲν εἶναι βουλομένων, οὐκ ὄντος δὲ ἔν, ἐνοειδοῦς δὲ, ὅτι αὐτῷ μὴδὲ ἰσκίδασται ὁ νοῦς, ἀλλὰ σύνιστιν ἑαυτῷ ὄντως, οὐ διαρτῆσας ἑαυτὸν τῷ πλησίον μετὰ τὸ ἔν εἶναι, ἀποστῆναι δὲ πῶς τοῦ ἐνὸς τολμήσας.

Soul is to be understood as an emanation from the Reason, which happens through a necessity of the second nature, without the latter being in any way active therein. Out of the Reason proceeds Thought (λόγος), without any change however of the former, since the latter exists in it originally.<sup>143</sup> Such a thought the soul is conceived to be; but it is not precisely determined what particular thought, or whether it is one in any wise different from others, or whether it comprises all within itself. The latter view seems most consistent with the general theory of Plotinus, notwithstanding that his expression scarcely seems to convey such an idea. The emanation of this thought from the Reason is compared with the procession of the Word out of the thoughts of the Soul.<sup>144</sup> Yet this Thought or Notion, which is the Soul, contains in itself all kinds of entity, in order to be able to fashion them into the sensible world.<sup>145</sup> And here we must remark, that to the Soul and Reason are ascribed a definiteness and precise limitation by the form in all the particular ideas which they comprise, for, he says, the form limits the infinite potentiality of the One.<sup>146</sup> The same naturally holds good of the really ex-

<sup>143</sup> III, 2, 2.

<sup>144</sup> V. 1, 3, 6. 'Ἡ ψυχὴ λόγος νοῦ. It must not be overlooked that Plotinus again makes good play with the ambiguity of the term, λόγος. Cf. in particular, iii. 8, 1, λόγος is employed as equivalent with νοῦς, or with a particular idea of the νοῦς, ii. 4, 3; V. 7. u. elsewhere. But then again λόγος is also called an emanation of the νοῦς, and the νοῦς is called ποιητὴς τοῦ πρώτου λόγου and not λόγος. V. 8, 2.

<sup>145</sup> V. 9, 9; VI. 7, 12; III. 6, 18. 'Ἡ μὲν γὰρ ψυχὴ τὰ τῶν ὄντων εἶδη ἔχουσα, εἶδος οὐσα καὶ αὐτὴ, ὁμοῦ πάντα ἔχει. The same of the νοῦς. I. 1, 8.

<sup>146</sup> V. 1, 7. Καὶ ὁρίζει τὸ εἶναι αὐτῇ τῇ παρ' ἑαυτὸν δυνάμει. . . . ὁρίζεται γὰρ ἡδὴ καὶ εἶον μορφήν ἑαυτὸν ἔχει.



istent—which is the object of the Reason. But while this is regarded as the prototype of the sensible world, and as that on which all things depend and from which they proceed, it possesses also an infinite but all-limiting potentiality.<sup>147</sup> And in this respect also, motion or at least quasi-motion is ascribed to Reason and the existent, in order that it may make itself multiple, and attempt, as it were, to see itself as such.<sup>148</sup> It is clear that the design of these ideas is to furnish a transition from Reason to the Soul and the multiplicity of things, and we might easily adduce many others of a like nature, did we not prefer to pass them over in silence, as they do not move out of the range of those images with which, in the exposition of the emanation of the Reason out of the One, we have already become acquainted.

It is more important to discover the motive which led Plotinus to distinguish the Soul from Reason; that is to say, the pure Soul—the mundane Soul which is not united to any body soever. Now apart from all traditionary doctrines, which might have led him to make this distinction, his own endeavour to exhibit in absolute purity, the notion of Reason and the supra-sensible, would naturally lead him to it in the same way that a desire to apprehend the idea of God in its purity had led him to distinguish between God and Reason. For such an attempt did not allow him to make Reason

<sup>147</sup> III. 8, 9. in. *Τί δὴ ὅν; δύναμις τῶν πάντων.* VI. 4, 4.

<sup>148</sup> VI. 2, 6. *Καὶ ἔν μὲν ὅν, ποιοῦν δὲ ἑαυτὸ ἐν τῇ οἰον κινήσει πολλά καὶ ὅλον ἔν, οἷον δὲ θεωρεῖν ἐπιχειροῦν ἑαυτὸ πολλά. ὥσπερ γὰρ οὐκ ἀνέχεται ἑαυτοῦ τὸ ὅν ἐν εἶναι, πάντα δυνάμινον, ὅσα ἔστιν.*

alone to be the prime cause of the sensible world, and necessarily led to the assumption of another principle of it. It is true indeed that his approximation to Plato has caused him in spite of himself, to call Reason the form of the world;<sup>149</sup> still, in adopting it, he has modified the doctrine; for, according to Plotinus, the Soul was filled with Reason, and thereby became the mother of the world which the Soul impregnated by the idea of the supra-sensible, would as it were in parturition produce as a theorem.<sup>150</sup> It is therefore said, that eternity is around Reason, but time around the Soul;<sup>151</sup> that motion, properly speaking, belongs to the Soul only, and that the Soul is the moving, but Reason the stationary, circle around the One;<sup>152</sup> and even virtue which has to do solely with sensible life, is assigned to the Soul as its locality and not to Reason.<sup>153</sup> And it is part of the same circle of ideas, when Plotinus insists on the idea of providence, being so understood as to imply the principle, that all in the world proceeds from Reason.<sup>154</sup> For Reason, he argues, is not outwardly active. It belongs to it to think only itself, i. e. the supra-sensible world, and its contemplation

<sup>149</sup> V. 1, 8.

<sup>150</sup> III. 8, 4. Ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν φύσεως εἰπόντες οὖν τρόπον θεωρία ἡ γένεσις, ἐπὶ τὴν ψυχὴν τὴν πρὸ ταύτης ἰλθόντες λέγομεν, ὡς ἡ ταύτης θεωρία καὶ τὸ φιλομαθὲς καὶ τὸ ζητητικὸν καὶ ἡ ἐξ ὧν ἰγνώκει ὧδὶς καὶ τὸ πλήρες πεποιθεὶν αὐτὴν θεωρημα πᾶν γινομένην ἄλλο θεωρημα ποιῆσαι.

<sup>151</sup> IV. 4, 15.

<sup>152</sup> II. 9, 1. Κίνησις δὲ πρὸς αὐτὸν (sc. τὸν νοῦν) καὶ περὶ αὐτὸν ψυχῆς ἡδὴ ἔργον. IV. 4, 16.

<sup>153</sup> I. 2, 3, 6.

<sup>154</sup> III. 2, 1; VI. 7, 39. Ἡ δὲ πρόνοια ἀρκεῖ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ (sc. τὸν νοῦν) εἶναι, παρ' οὗ τὰ πάντα. VI. 8, 17.

passes not out of itself, it is therefore remote from every thing practical.<sup>165</sup>

Proceeding from this view of the Plotinian theory we must regard it as the peculiar attribute of the Soul, that it forms the world, takes an outward direction, and thereby becomes practical. On this account also the sovereignty of the world is claimed for it, and motion also in a more proper sense than that in which it is assigned to the Reason ; it directs its utmost potentiality to the outward world, which it adorns and disposes with an inactive faculty.<sup>166</sup> On this account it is described as standing on the utmost verge of the supra-sensible world, to which it still belongs as a thought of Reason, but nevertheless as a neighbour of the world and bordering closely upon it. Of necessity it must take part in the sensible, and is not discontented at not belonging completely to the better nature, simple because it has received none other than an intermediate position among things.<sup>167</sup> Nevertheless, this participation in the sensible and corporeal is not to be compared with that of the individual soul in its body ; for inasmuch as it rules over all that is corporeal, it cannot feel any want ; it has therefore no part either in pleasure or in pain ; no sensuous

<sup>165</sup> V. 3, 6. Οὐ γὰρ δὴ πρακτικός τε οὗτος (sc. ὁ νοῦς), ὡς πρὸς τὸ ἔξω βλέποντι τῷ πρακτικῷ καὶ μὴ ἐν αὐτῷ μένοντι εἰη ἀν τῶν μὲν ἔξω τις γνῶσις.

<sup>166</sup> IV. 8, 2. Δύναμιν δὲ τὴν ἐσχάτην εἰς τὸ εἶσω (sc. τοῦ οὐρανοῦ) πεμπούσης. . . . ἀπράγμονι δυνάμει τόδε τὸ πᾶν κοσμοῦσα.

<sup>167</sup> IV. 8, 7. Διττῆς δὲ φύσεως ταύτης οὐσης, τῆς μὲν νοητῆς, τῆς δὲ αἰσθητῆς, ἀμεινον μὲν ψυχῇ ἐν τῷ νοητῷ εἶναι, ἀνάγκη γε μὴν ἔχει καὶ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ μεταλαμβάνειν τοιαύτην φύσιν ἔχουσαν· καὶ οὐκ ἀγανακτητίον αὐτὴν αὐτῇ, εἰ μὴ πάντα ἐστὶ τὸ κρεῖττον μίσην τάξιν ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν ἐπισχοῦσαν, θείας μὲν μοίρας οὖσαν, ἐν ἐσχάτῳ δὲ τοῦ νοητοῦ οὖσαν, ὡς ἄπορον οὖσαν τῇ αἰσθητῇ φύσει.

perception is to be ascribed to it, in the same way that a total freedom from every sensual affection is assigned by Plato to the blessed stars. Therefore it is idle to object to God that he has associated the Soul with evil, for on the contrary, it enjoys a perfectly happy life.<sup>158</sup> We must admit however, that the descriptions which Plotinus gives us of the nature of the Soul are as unsatisfactory as his account of Reason. They indicate two aspects of the soul, which are irreconcilable with each other, since, on the one hand, it is made to belong to the supra-sensible world, and, on the other, to occupy itself with the sensible. This, however, would perhaps be tolerable, but that each of the two sides are alike absolutely ascribed to the Soul. At one time we are told, the Soul is free from all evil, imperturbable in itself, thoroughly impassible.<sup>159</sup> But then at another we are told, that the certainty of Reason cannot with perfect certainty (*πίστις*) be ascribed to the soul which has nothing more than a persuasion.<sup>160</sup> Reason accrues to it extrinsically only.<sup>161</sup> Hereby it appears to be withdrawn altogether from Reason, and on this account it is said of man, when he begins to live in the supra-sensible, that then the soul possesses rest, and allows activity to the Reason alone, but yet is not itself active in cognition.<sup>162</sup> In such descriptions we see nothing

<sup>158</sup> IV. 8, 2.<sup>159</sup> II. 9, 7.<sup>160</sup> V. 3, 6. Καὶ γὰρ ἡ μὲν ἀνάγκη ἐν νοῷ, ἡ δὲ πειθὴ ἐν ψυχῇ.<sup>161</sup> V. 6, 4. Ψυχὴ μὲν γὰρ ἱσχυρὸν νοῦν ἔχει.<sup>162</sup> V. 3, 6. Καὶ γὰρ καὶ ὥς ἡμῖν δοκῶ, ἐν νοῷ φύσει ἡρεούμεθα καὶ ἡνοούμεν καὶ εἰς ἐν πάντα συναγόντες ἡρῶμεν. νοῦς γὰρ ἦν ὁ νοῶν καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ λίγων, ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ ἡσυχίαν ἔχει, συγχωροῦσα τῇ ἐνεργήματι τοῦ νοῦ, κ.τ.λ.

but an attempt of Plotinus to think of the Soul as belonging to the supra-sensible world, absolutely in and by itself ; while on the other hand, he saw the necessity of bringing it in connexion with Reason as its superior, and also with the sensible world as its work and emanation. Still we must regard it as more agreeable with the natural tendency of his system, to consider, as he elsewhere does, the Soul to be an emanation of Reason, which undoubtedly has a share in the pre-eminence of Reason and in thought, but is, nevertheless, less perfect than its principle, and consequently subject to limitations, and to occasional contact with the material. For, as we shall have presently occasion to show, these expressions are equivalent.

Herewith, moreover, may other expressions of Plotinus accord very well. Thus the Soul has for its work cogitation, but not cogitation alone, for it is not distinguished from Reason, but so far as it has further a peculiar operation of its own, by which, like everything else that is supra-sensible, it allows something inferior to emanate from itself.<sup>163</sup> Two things accrue to it from this ; it partly directs itself to praxis and partly to theory ; to the latter, by seeking to arrive at rest and certainty of the soul, wherein, although it is undoubtedly less calm than reason, yet nevertheless participating in its tranquillity. As praxis, on the other hand, it applies itself to the external and thereby forms the world ; but still this activity is subject to theory since good is

<sup>163</sup> IV. 8, 3. Ψυχῆς δὲ ἔργον τῆς λογικωτέρας νοεῖν μὲν, οὐ τὸ νοεῖν δὲ μόνον. τί γὰρ ἂν καὶ νοῦ διαφέρει ; προσλαβοῦσα γὰρ τῷ νοεῖν εἶναι καὶ ἄλλο, καθὼς τὴν οἰκίαν ἔσχειν ὑπόστασιν, νοῦς οὐκ ἔμεινεν, ἔχει δὲ ἔργον καὶ αὐτὴ, εἰπερ πᾶν, ὃ ἴδεν ἢ τῶν νοητῶν.

the only object that it seeks by its operations, and it contemplates its work so soon as it has accomplished it, and thereupon finds good in itself.<sup>114</sup> Thus has the Soul a twofold relation, looking on the one hand to its superior, the Reason, and on the other, to its inferior, the body.<sup>115</sup> The souls and the mundane Soul no less are amphibious, taking themselves at one time to the sensible, and, once involved therewith, participating in all its destinies, but at another seeking to cling to and to be united with their original, which is Reason.<sup>116</sup> Plotinus gives a somewhat grosser description of this double aspect of the Soul, when, after distinguishing its different parts, he says of the better, that it stretches beyond the heaven, but transports into heaven itself its highest powers;<sup>117</sup> or when, under a somewhat different form, on the hypothesis that the soul divides itself into many individual souls, he proceeds to advance the position that some of these, and the worse indeed, enter into the corporeal, while others are designed to remain within the supra-sensible.<sup>118</sup> It is apparently but a slight deviation of view, when Plotinus ascribes to the soul a triple direction also; one towards that which is prior to itself in which it thinks and recognises, a second by which it maintains itself, and a third towards that which is after itself, which is disposed and governed by it.<sup>119</sup> This addition of

<sup>114</sup> III. 8, 5. *"ἵνα ἔχωσι τὸ ἐκ τῆς πράξεως ἀγαθόν. τοῦτο δὲ ποῦ ; ἐν ψυχῇ.*

<sup>115</sup> IV. 8, 8. *Πᾶσα γὰρ ψυψή ἔχει τι καὶ τοῦ κάτω πρὸς σῶμα καὶ τοῦ ἄνω πρὸς νοῦν.*

<sup>116</sup> IV. 9, 4.

<sup>117</sup> IV. 8, 2 ; 8 ; V. 1, 10.

<sup>118</sup> IV. 8, 8.

<sup>119</sup> IV. 8, 3. *Βλέπουσα δὲ πρὸς μὲν τὸ πρὸ ἑαυτῆς νοεῖ, εἰς δὲ ἑαυτήν, σῶζει ἑαυτήν, εἰς δὲ τὸ μετ' αὐτήν, ὃ κοσμεῖ τε καὶ διοικεῖ καὶ ἄρχει αὐτοῦ.*

a third direction merely distinguishes the proper entity of the Soul, from its opposite relations towards the higher and the lower, for Plotinus will not allow that the peculiar characteristic of the Soul consists in its operations on the sensible.<sup>170</sup>

The Soul closes the supra-sensible Triad of the supreme principles. It is the end of the supra-sensible emanations. This agrees with the view of Plotinus so far forth as the Soul creates the sensible world, and has it for a copy of itself; and, while the sensible world emanates from it, the series of emanations is closed.<sup>171</sup> For the object of the theory of emanations was essentially confined to finding a passage from the highest, or God, to the lowest, which is a mere image of real entity, i.e. to the sensible world. By due consequence of this view, we must consider the sensible world, with all that is in it, and therefore sensible matter also, as the image and efflux of the Soul, filled with the idea of the supra-sensible world; and that thereby we are arrived at that which is the last. According to this view, then, the closing of the supra-sensible emanations with the Soul does not appear arbitrary; but, on the contrary, inasmuch as the Soul now passes outwards, it must necessarily posit the last; especially as, according to the doctrine of Plotinus, intrinsic entity alone possesses a reality, while all that is external falls to the sphere of empty delusion.

<sup>170</sup> I. 1, 9. "Ὅσα δὲ οὐ δεῖται σώματος εἰς ἐνέργειαν, ταῦτα ἴδια ψυχῆς εἶναι.

<sup>171</sup> III. 7, 10. Οὕτω δὲ καὶ αὐτὴ κόσμον ποιούσα αἰσθητόν, μιμήσει ἑαυτὴν κινούμενον, κίνησιν οὐ τὴν ἐκεῖ, ὁμοίαν δὲ τῇ ἐκεῖ καὶ ἐξέλυσσάν εἰκόνα ἑαυτῆς εἶναι, πρῶτον μὲν ἑαυτὴν ἐχρόνωσιν, ἀντὶ τοῦ αἰῶνος τοῦτον ποιήσασα.

Therefore, the sensible matter appeared to Plotinus to be the immediate emanation of the soul. For this matter is the Last, which must of necessity exist in the same way as the First, and a something after the First necessarily exists. As there is measure, so must there be unmeasure; as good must be posited, so also must evil, which stands in direct opposition to good.<sup>172</sup> As the limit of existence, this matter cannot be considered as existent, but as the non-existent it is completely opposite to good—it is evil and hatefulness—evil, the principle, or rather the indication of all privation and evil in the sensible world.<sup>173</sup> Thus conceived, the theory of Plotinus is nothing less than a pure expression of idealism, which labours to represent whatever is external, which is not intellectual or rational, as a mere semblance of truth, and considers the material world as nothing but the creation of the illusions to which the soul is subject by reason of its natural limitation.

However, we do not find that Plotinus was able to carry out this view with due rigour of conse-

<sup>172</sup> I. 8, 1; 3; 7. 'Εξ ἀνάγκης δὲ εἶναι τὸ μετὰ τὸ πρῶτον, ὥστε καὶ τὸ ἔσχατον. τοῦτο δὲ ἡ ὕλη, μηδὲν ἔτι ἔχουσα αὐτοῦ· καὶ αὕτη ἡ ἀνάγκη τοῦ κακοῦ.

<sup>173</sup> Cf. in particular, i. 8, 5; iii. 6, 7, where it is deprived even of the *δύναμις*, which, however, is employed by Plotinus in a widely different sense from that in which it is taken by Aristotle. We have, in the following, a reference to the sophist of Plato: Μὴ δὲν δ' ἂν εἰκότως λέγοιτο, καὶ οὐχ ὥσπερ κίνησις μὴ δὲν, ἢ στάσις μὴ δὲν, ἀλλ' ἀληθινῶς μὴ δὲν. Cf. i. 8, 3. It is nothing but a *παίγνιον*, and all that are in it are *παίγνια*. It is perfect inanity; but naturally it was impossible to adhere to this view of it, and therefore it was regarded as also the cause of semblance (ib. 15), or as merely *μὴ δὲν κατὰ συμβεβηκός*, although it is posited as *μόνον ἄλλο* or *μόνον ἄλλα*. II. 4, 13. So too is also called the last *εἶδος* (v. 8, 7), which perhaps is to be elucidated by *οἷον εἶδος τι τοῦ μὴ ὄντος ὄν*. I. 8, 3.



quence. There was an obstacle to this in the very view which, in common with all his contemporaries, he entertained of the emanations from God.

Agreeably to the principle that each emanation must be less perfect than its principle, and therefore that the further the emanation proceeds the greater imperfection does it give rise to,<sup>174</sup> there must properly be a limitation even in the Reason, and still more so in the Soul, and consequently a something material : a consequence, however, which does not consist very well with the doctrine that both these principles belong exclusively to the supra-sensible world. But the distinction of degree between the more and the less perfect, which, according to this theory, is to be assumed between the principle and its emanation, did not admit of any fixed determination of the series of emanations, and least of all of such an abrupt close as is formed by the passage of the Soul into matter, since the distinction of degree goes on decreasing *ad infinitum*. And this consideration serves to explain why Plotinus has nowhere expressed himself in a precise and invariable manner on the subject of the Soul's emanation. We see, however, that he was forced further to admit certain intermediate grades between Soul and matter. At times he seems to consider individual souls to be emanations of the mundane Soul,<sup>175</sup> in the same way that individual thoughts are represented to be processes from the Reason.

<sup>174</sup> IV. 7. 9.

<sup>175</sup> IV. 8. 3. Πολλὰς ἰδεῖ καὶ ψυχὰς καὶ μίαν εἶναι, καὶ ἐκ τῆς μιᾶς τὰς πολλὰς διαφόρους. Cf. vi. 7. 6. Hence the individual soul is regarded as an εἰδωλον of the mundane soul.

At others, he approximates to the Stoical view, and teaches that from the Soul sensation emanates into animals, and nature into plants,<sup>176</sup> and generally views nature as an efflux of the Soul, which itself also is a soul, as a thought (λόγος) which itself creates thought; with this limitation, however, that nature, as the copy of the practical Reason (φρόνησις), does indeed form and fashion matter, but unconsciously, and without a knowledge of what it is doing;<sup>177</sup> a doctrine which resembles, in some degree, the Aristotelian system. But on these points he is neither original nor unwavering in his opinions. Generally, indeed, he adheres to the principle, that the universal Soul must contain in itself the most manifold and special kinds and grades of existence, which subsequently appear isolated in the sensible world, in the same manner as in the supra-sensible, unity and actuality are present in the whole.<sup>178</sup> According to Plotinus, one of the higher grades of life is expressed in the revolution of the heavens, which imitates the movement of the Soul around Reason; but as the souls descend lower and lower from heaven, and become more and more mixed with what is terrestrial, the less power have they to raise themselves again to the higher. And thus arises what is one of the lowest grades of the Soul's activity in the world—the irrational life of the brute.<sup>179</sup>

In a certain sense, indeed, this view of Plotinus, touching a variety of grades in the emanations of the soul, is reconcilable with his idealistic tendency.

<sup>176</sup> V. 2, 1.

<sup>178</sup> IV, 8, 8; v. 9, 13; vi. 7, 9.

<sup>177</sup> III. 8, 4; iv. 4, 13.

<sup>179</sup> II. 2, 1; 2; iv. 3, 13; vi. 9, 8.

According to him, all that is in the world is life and soul, nay even thought and reason, since it is a theorem which the soul, impregnated with the spirit, has in its birth-pangs produced. In support of this he appeals to the beautiful forms and order of all things, which could only be produced by the Soul.<sup>180</sup> The Soul shaped to itself its body, by emitting out of itself as it were much light; whereupon, at the extreme limits of fire, darkness came forth, which the Soul, as soon as it caught a glance of it, immediately reduced into form and shape.<sup>181</sup> According to this view, all matter is fashioned from within by the Soul; all the elements are filled with its vitality. This earth resembles the trunk of a tree which has in itself a vitalizing nature; the stones are like lopped-off branches; although in the elements life is not always apparent, still it is actually present within them.<sup>182</sup> Plotinus adopts the Platonic dogma, which discovered in the stars and the earth a divine life and reason.<sup>183</sup> And accordingly, the sensible world, both in its parts and the whole, appeared to him endued with life and soul; or rather all that is essential in it is simply soul. Plotinus, therefore, exults in the beauty of this image, this formation of the mundane Soul. Is, he asks, any more beautiful fire conceivable than this? any more beautiful earth? or more perfect sphere than that of heaven? It is true, that evil exists in the world, strife and enmity among all things;

<sup>180</sup> IV. 7, 2. *Εἴπερ λόγος προσελθὼν τῇ ὕλῃ σῶμα ποιῇ, οὐδαμοθεν δ' ἂν προσέλθοι λόγος ἢ παρὰ ψυχῆς* VI. 7, 11. For details, v. 7; v. 9, 6; 12; 14.

<sup>181</sup> IV. 3, 9.

<sup>182</sup> VI. 7, 11.

<sup>183</sup> IV. 4, 22; 26.

but this evil is necessary and indispensable, simply because this world is but an image of the supra-sensible, and therefore inferior, and consequently not so complete a unity. For things must come into opposition with each other, in that, as being imperfect, and yet as proceeding from the All-perfect, they must tend again towards the latter, they consequently seek to acquire a higher degree of perfection than they actually possess. Nevertheless, all this discord is reduced into the most beautiful harmony, which combines the necessary and the good; it is only when a part is considered alone in itself that it appears to be defective, but in its co-ordination with the whole everything is good.<sup>184</sup> The very evil that is in the world is subservient to good; it is useful as an example; by the experience of evil it stimulates man to a clearer cognition of good, since human nature is too weak to know evil antecedently to its experience of it. The greatest excellence that human power can attain to is the promotion of the beautiful by a right use of evil, since it is impossible to get rid of it altogether, inasmuch as it consists in nothing else than that defect of good which in the sensible world is inevitable.<sup>185</sup> Such are the general propositions by which Plotinus attempts to prove that the world is good and rational, and a worthy work of, and, therefore, pervaded throughout by, the Soul. Occasionally he

<sup>184</sup> II. 9, 4; iii. 2, 3; 4.

<sup>185</sup> I. 8, 1; iii. 2, 3. Τοῦτο δὲ δυνάμειος μεγίστης καλῶς καὶ τοῖς κακοῖς χρῆσθαι δύνασθαι. . . . ὅλως δὲ τὸ κακὸν ἡλείψιν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ θεῖον. IV. 8, 7. Γνωσὶς γὰρ ἰναργιστέρα τἀγαθοῦ ἢ τοῦ κακοῦ πείρα, οἷς ἡ δύναμις ἀσθενιστέρα, ἢ ὥστε ἐπιστήμη το κακὸν πρὸ πείρας γινῶναι.

also enters into physical investigations of a more special nature; but without arriving at any available or general result, and apparently seduced by the opportunities they afforded for display, rather than duly led to them by the necessary course of his inquiries.<sup>188</sup> We cannot acquit him of that fault which usually attaches to the idealistic philosophy—a contempt of all that is special and individual. The corporeal, the soul that gives form to body, sensation, the desires and aversions, are, he says, but so many worthless trifles.

But in the statements of Plotinus with respect to the sensible world, two opposite directions of thought may be traced. On the one hand, he views it as a creation of the Soul; and as on this account he wished to ascribe to it also a supra-sensible truth, in its operations and activity, he bursts out into the most lofty encomiums of its beauty, and the wisdom manifest in the mutual coherence of its parts. But on the other, while, without reserve, he follows the opinion that truth is to be found nowhere but in the supra-sensible, while the sensible, on the contrary, in so far as it does not participate in the former, is nothing but a delusive image of the truth, a phantom and a vanity; he takes the lowest possible view of the sensible world, both in the whole and separately in its parts. The first direction of his ideas betrays itself in his agreement with Aristotle in conceiving the sensible world to be eternal. All, he says, that was in the supra-sensible world could not continue therein for ever, since every force must of necessity emit from out of itself a

<sup>188</sup> V. 3, 9.

lower force; the will of God, which is eternal, decreed that the world should have a body from and to all eternity.<sup>187</sup> According to this view, then, even the temporal participates in eternity, and has its ground in the everlasting will of God. In the same spirit moreover he refuses to consider the creative activity of the mundane Soul as a passivity or a tendency towards the sensible. But, he says, it creates the world in its recollection of the supra-sensible ideas, and consequently it is, while it dwells upon these and has their beauty before its eyes, that it forms the sensible so beautifully in all respects, that on this account no regret can possibly arise.<sup>188</sup> In the descent of the Soul, which is called its incorporation, all that takes place is, that the Soul gives a something to the body without however on that account becoming a part of it.<sup>189</sup> And we must not be startled, if after all this we meet with the proposition, that the Soul does not wholly but only partially descend, and being partially mixed with body, participates in its passivity;<sup>190</sup> for the true meaning of this proposition simply amounts to this, that the Soul, as active in the body, is in a certain degree divided into parts, notwithstanding that it is still ever a whole, since it is a property of its nature to be perfectly whole and a unity.<sup>191</sup> Occasionally, indeed, when Plotinus re-

<sup>187</sup> II. 1, 1, sqq.; iii. 2, 1; iv. 8, 4, fin.; 6.

<sup>188</sup> II. 9, 4. 'Ἡμεῖς δὲ οὐ νεῦσιν φάμεν τὴν ποιῶσαν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον μὴ νεῦσιν. εἰ δὲ ἐνευσεν, τῷ ἐπιτελεῖσθαι δηλονότι τῶν ἐκεί. εἰ δὲ ἐπιτέλετο, πῶς δημιουργεῖ; πόθεν γὰρ ποιεῖ, ἢ ἐξ ὧν εἶδεν ἐκεῖ; εἰ δὲ ἐκείνων μεμνημένη ποιεῖ, οὐδὲ ὅλως ἐνευσεν.'

<sup>189</sup> VI. 4, 16. 'Ὅστε τὸ μὲν κατελθεῖν, τὸ ἐν σώματι γενέσθαι, ὥς φάμεν ψυχὴν ἐν σώματι γενέσθαι, τὸ τοῦτῃ δοῦναι τι παρ' αὐτῆς, οὐκ ἐκείνου γενέσθαι.'

<sup>190</sup> II. 9, 2.

<sup>191</sup> VI. 4, 16.

fuses to admit that the Soul of the world, when it commingles with body, is passive and sentient, he speaks most unscientifically. Thus he maintains that the mundane Soul, as having so large a body, requires not to be sensible of what is going on in the several parts of the world, in the same way as what is related of the enormous whale, that it takes no notice of the minuter motions of its own body.<sup>192</sup> But in such views, we trace the influence of his other mode of viewing the world, according to which the sensible phenomenon, which expresses a passive affection of the Soul, does not for it exist really. And this is true, not only of the mundane, but also of every individual soul. On this point Plotinus expresses himself in perfect conformity with the philosophers of India. This sensuous life is a mere stage-play; all the misery in it is merely imaginary; all grief a mere cheat of the player; it is a mere game of play; and as such man ought to look upon it: for the Soul is not in the game, but looks on while nothing more than the external phantom of man weeps and laments.<sup>193</sup> And all this has its origin therein, that the things of the sensible world do in fact stand off from the truth of the One, and estrange themselves from it; inasmuch as by their own proper liberty they wish to be something in and by themselves, and thereby fall to the lot of sem-

<sup>192</sup> IV. 9, 2 "Ὡς περ ἐπὶ κητῶν λίγεται μεγάλων, ἐφ' ὧν παθήματος τινος περὶ τὸ μέρος ὕντος τῷ ὅλῳ αἰσθησις διὰ μικρότητα τοῦ κινήματος οὐδεμία προσίρχεται.

<sup>193</sup> III. 2, 15. "Ὡς περ δὲ ἐπὶ τῶν θεάτρων ταῖς σκηναῖς, οὕτω χρὴ καὶ τοὺς φόνους θεᾶσθαι καὶ πάντας θανάτους καὶ πόλιν ἀλώσεις καὶ ἄρπαγας, μεταθίσεις πάντα καὶ μετασχηματίσεις καὶ θρήνων καὶ οἰμωγῶν ὑποκρίσεις. καὶ γὰρ ἐν ταῦθα ἐπὶ τῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ ἐκάστων οὐχ ἡ ἐνδον ψυχῇ, ἀλλ' ἡ ἔξω ἀνθρώπου σκιά καὶ οἰμῶζει καὶ ὑδύρεται, κ.τ.λ.

blance. Thus, as we have already observed, it is imputed to the Reason, that it ventures to stand off from the One, and is on this account condemned; and thus, too, the beginning of evil is laid to the account of the Soul, which, in its free will, wishes to be something independently;<sup>194</sup> and in the same direction of thought the most fool-hardy and irrational part of the Soul is ascribed to plants as forming the lowest grade of existence.<sup>195</sup> According to this view, then, the irrationality of things increases as they descend in the scale, and are more and more lost in the semblance of matter.

And here we are evidently touching upon the view which Plotinus entertained of the liberty of things. But this subject, like all others handled by him, is the occasion of conflicting views which it was beyond his power to reconcile. These opposite views are the same as we have already met with in Philo—one tending to regard the good alone as free, but the other making liberty to consist in the disposition to evil. The latter view of liberty which we have already met with, makes it to consist in the power which all things enjoy of declining from their original. The ascription to them of such a power was but a natural consequence of the theory of emanations; according to which every substance produces another from out of itself, and is abso-

<sup>194</sup> V. 1, 1. *Τί ποτε ἄρα ἐστὶ τὸ πεποιηκὸς τὰς ψυχὰς πατὴρ θεοῦ ἐπιλαθίσθαι καὶ μοίρας ἐκείθεν οὐσας καὶ ὅλως ἐκείνου ἀγνοῆσαι καὶ αὐτὰς καὶ ἐκείνον;* ἀρχὴ μὲν οὖν αὐταῖς τοῦ κακοῦ ἡ τόλμα καὶ ἡ γίνεσις καὶ ἡ πρώτη ἱερότης καὶ τὸ βουλευθῆναι δὲ αὐτῶν εἶναι· τῷ δὲ αὐτεξουσίῳ, κ.τ.λ. The τόλμα is also mentioned, ii. 9, 11. It is even found in Reason; vi. 9, 5. *Νοῦς ἀποστῆναι δὲ πως τοῦ ἐνὸς τολμήσας.*

<sup>195</sup> V. 2, 2.



Intely in and by itself;<sup>196</sup> but such a liberty is in fact nowise different from that universal necessity which all things are subject to, constraining them to allow these emanations to proceed from out of themselves, and to stand in the relation of primaries to them. The force which has the power to be immanent, and also to emanate, cannot be constrained by ought. The supra-sensible alone with naught beside it was impossible; the sensible followed from it of necessity.<sup>197</sup> If, now, Plotinus looked upon this necessity of emanation as a free operation, he must have been driven to this view by a consideration of the inevitable difficulties which pressed him when he made the lower emanations ultimately dependent upon the supreme God, and yet traced the ground of evil and defect to the descent from the Highest. He who would not suffer it to be said, even in an astrological sense, of the subordinate deities, the stars, that the corruptions of morals arise from them,<sup>198</sup> could scarcely admit that the evil in the world is of God. Accordingly, he describes the descent of Reason to the Soul, and of the Soul to the sensible world, in their respective degrees, as acts of free-will or temerity. Man is a free creature, the

<sup>196</sup> III. 1, 4. 'Ἀλλὰ γὰρ δεῖ καὶ ἕκαστον ἕκαστον εἶναι καὶ πράξεις ἡμετέρας καὶ διανοίας ὑπάρχειν καὶ τὰς ἑκάστου καλὰς τε καὶ αἰσχυρὰς πράξεις παρ' ἑαυτοῦ ἑκάστου. Ib. ii. 9. Οὐ γὰρ δὴ οὕτω τὴν πρόνοιαν εἶναι δεῖ, ὥστε μηδὲν ἡμᾶς εἶναι. IV. 3, 13. Οὔτε τὸ ἐκούσιον τοιοῦτον ὡς προελίσθαι, ἀλλ' ὥς τὸ πηδᾶν κατὰ φύσιν, κ.τ.λ.

<sup>197</sup> IV. 8, 5, in. Οὐ τοίνυν διαφωνεῖ ἀλλήλοις . . . ἥ τε ἀνάγκη τό τε ἐκούσιον, ἐπεὶ περ ἔχει τὸ ἐκούσιον ἡ ἀνάγκη. VI. 7, 8. 'Ἀλλὰ ἦν μὲν ἑκεῖνα, ταῦτα δὲ ἱπποκολούθει ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἑκείνοις· οὐ γὰρ ἦν στήναι μέχρι τῶν ἐκεῖ. τίς γὰρ ἂν ἴσθησι δύναμιν μίνειν τε καὶ προΐναι δυναμίνην;

<sup>198</sup> III. 1, 4; 6. Πονηρία δὲ ἦθους παρὰ θεῶν ὄντων πῶς ἂν δυθείη; iv. 4, 39.

source of his own deeds ; sin is his own guilt.<sup>199</sup> But, in truth, he found it impossible to adhere strictly to this view in general ; for, he teaches, every soul has its part assigned it in this world ; it has in the universal harmony of things a particular idea (λόγος) to accomplish, which in the whole ministers to good, and prescribes to individuals their determinate actions.<sup>200</sup> Besides, according to this view, liberty would be but a pernicious gift. Man would be better off if he did not possess this liberty of evil. But even as a choice between good and evil, liberty appears to him but little desirable ; such a liberty is but a deprivation of power.<sup>201</sup> Occasionally, indeed, he would perhaps ascribe such an election to the soul.<sup>202</sup> But then he calls to mind the proposition of Plato, that every creature that chooses evil, does so, involuntarily impelled, probably, by some indwelling impulse.<sup>203</sup> On this account he denies that it is true liberty to follow nature, and to obey the sensuous presentations and desires. That which is done from opinion merely, is not to be accounted a free act, but only that which right reason accomplishes with science. The reason alone is free, simply because it desires good, which is correspondent with its nature ; whatever is without matter is also free, but this is the case only with theoretical reason. Consequently practical reason, which is necessarily occupied with, and oppressed by, the material, has no claim to liberty.<sup>204</sup> Such a liberty

<sup>199</sup> III. 2, 10. sq.

<sup>200</sup> Ib. xi. 17, 18.

<sup>201</sup> VI. 8, 21. Καὶ γὰρ τὸ τὰ ἀντικείμενα δύνασθαι ἀδυναμίας ἔστι, cf. iii. 1, 1.

<sup>202</sup> III. 6, 2.

<sup>203</sup> IV. 8, 5. Πᾶν μὲν γὰρ ἰὸν ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον ἀκούσιον. φορᾷ γε μὴν οἰκτιρῶν, πάσχον τὰ χεῖρω, κ.τ.λ.

<sup>204</sup> III. 1, 7, 9 ; vi. 8, 2—7.

is, then, ascribed also to man; by his own nature he is freely carried to good, for virtue knows no master.<sup>205</sup>

These observations on the conflicting tendencies of the doctrine of Plotinus, irresistibly enforce themselves upon our minds, when we enter upon the domain of sensation, and inquire what are the results touching individual souls in the sensible world to which his general theory leads. And here it is of importance to bear in mind that individual souls are portions of the universal, and that consequently whatever is taught concerning the latter, applies equally to the former. How, he asks; can we any more than it be without inclination to the corporeal or be free from the passive affections which proceed from the corporeal? That such is not the case, is beyond question; great care, however, is necessary against our being deceived as to what we are in truth. The term *we* may be taken in two senses; one includes the animal, the other confines itself to that which is above it. Now, by animal, Plotinus understood the animated body; but, on the other hand, the true man is something very different; it is absolutely pure from all that is corporeal—pure abstract soul.<sup>206</sup> That the man, and especially the good man, consists not of body and soul, was to the mind of Plotinus sufficiently proved by the separation of the soul from the body

<sup>205</sup> III. 2, 10. Ἀρχαὶ δὲ καὶ ἀνθρώποι· κινεῖνται γοῦν πρὸς τὰ καλὰ οἰκεία φύσει καὶ ἀρχὴ αὐτῇ αὐτεξούσιος. iv. 4, 39.

<sup>206</sup> I. 1, 10. Διττὸν οὖν τὸ ἡμεῖς ἢ συναριθμουμένου τοῦ θηρίου ἢ τὸ ὑπὲρ τοῦτο ἥδη. θηρίον δὲ ζῶμα· ὃ ἐστὶ ἀληθὲς ἀνθρώπος ἄλλος, ὁ καθαρὸς τούτων, τὰς ἀρετὰς ἔχων τὰς ἐν νοήσει, αἱ δὲ ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ χω. ἰσομὲν ψυχῇ ἵδρυνται. κ.τ.λ.

in death and its contempt in life of corporeal advantages.<sup>207</sup> The soul, therefore, is the very man; that is to say, the genuine soul, the soul itself: for we may make a distinction between the genuine or true and the apparent soul, inasmuch as many things here appear to belong to the soul which do not in truth pertain to it.<sup>208</sup> Is it not usual to ascribe pleasure to it, although it is not the soul but the animal, i. e. the animated body, that is sentient of pleasure? <sup>209</sup> We must, he says, purify the soul, or in other words emancipate and set it free from all sensual desires and anger, and this precept implies, that the true soul does not consist of desire and aversion, and that such qualities are alien and accrue to it from without.<sup>210</sup> In these requisitions, Plotinus expresses himself in the very tone of a Stoic. Whatever, he says, does not belong to the essence of the soul, must be removed from it; only he does not for one moment agree with this school, in ascribing to it as its peculiar property the use of the sensuous representations. Nevertheless this is a very unimportant deviation, and belongs to a difference of terminology rather than of view. For when we inquire, what then remains after Plotinus

<sup>207</sup> I. 4, 14. Τὸ δὲ μὴ συναμφοτέρων εἶναι τὸν ἀνθρώπον καὶ μάλιστα τὸν σπουδαῖον μαρτυρεῖ καὶ ὁ χωρισμὸς ὁ ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος καὶ ἡ τῶν λεγομένων ἀγαθῶν τοῦ σώματος καταφρόνησις. iv. 7, 1.

<sup>208</sup> V. 9, 13.

<sup>209</sup> I. 1, 4; 4, 4; iv. 4, 18. Καὶ τὸ ἀλγεῖν καὶ τὸ ἡδισθαι εἰ τὰς τοῦ σώματος ἡδονὰς περὶ τὸ τοῦτονδε σῶμά ἐστιν· ἡμῖν δὲ ἡ τοῦτον ἀλγηδὼν καὶ ἡ τοιαύτη ἡδονὴ εἰς γνῶσιν ἀπαθῆς ἔρχεται. For *θηρίον* we have also the reading *ζῷον*. I. 1, 4; 7. By this term we are to understand the sensuous animal. I. 4, 4. In this limitation of the term it is also said, We could not live if we were not percipiently or sensibly moved by the whole; but the soul furnishes to the soul nothing but life, iv. 4, 36.

<sup>210</sup> I. 2, 6; 4, 4; 5; 8.

has stripped the essence of the soul of all its disguises? we shall receive for answer,—the reflective, intellectual, and inquisitive soul; and this is what properly *we* are.<sup>211</sup> But still it was somewhat startling to find the essence of the soul made to consist in investigation and reflection, from which all change in time cannot well be abstracted; and to meet this difficulty, we are now told that the soul is not in time, but that time is round about it, or that some only of its operations and states are in time.<sup>212</sup> Hence, too, arises the conception, that the true man is even something more than soul, viz, reason, or true thought (λόγος), which in the supra-sensible world, is ever the same.<sup>213</sup> The end towards which all these ideas are driving, must be manifest to every one who has reflected upon similar tendencies, and particularly those of the Oriental philosophy: they go absolutely to disconnect the true essence of the soul and man from their outward manifestation. When once the soul is exhibited in such an absolute form, there is nothing startling to find ascribed to it a perfect freedom from all passivity and motion, which it does indeed allow to proceed out of itself, without however concerning itself at all. In all its so-called passive states and motions, the soul as to its ground and essence remains the same.<sup>214</sup> It is free from the evil

<sup>211</sup> I. 1, 7; 8; v. 1, 1.

<sup>212</sup> III. 7, 6; iv. 4, 15. 'Ἐπεὶ οὐδ' αἱ ψυχαὶ ἐν χρόνῳ, ἀλλὰ τὰ πάθη αὐτῶν ἅττα ἴσθι καὶ τὰ ποιήματα.

<sup>213</sup> V. 1, 11; vi. 7, 5. Λόγον τοίνυν δεῖ τὸν ἀνθρώπον ἄλλον παρὰ τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι.

<sup>214</sup> III. 6, 3. Πανταχοῦ ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς λεγομένοις πάθεισι καὶ κινήσεισι τὴν ψυχὴν ὡσαύτως ἔχειν τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ καὶ τῇ οὐσίᾳ. I. 1, 9. Ἀτρεμῆσει οὖν οὐδε ἥττον ἢ ψυχὴ πρὸς ἑαυτὴν καὶ ἐν ἑαυτῇ· αἱ δὲ τροπαὶ καὶ ὁ θόρυβος ἐν ἡμῖν παρὰ τῶν συνηρημένων καὶ τῶν τοῦ κοινοῦ, ὃ τε

which the sensual man commits and suffers, and is in itself imperturbable.<sup>215</sup> As the soul in general does not turn its regards towards the sensible, so neither does the supra-sensible man; and as the universal soul does not enter wholly into the world of sense, so the human soul does not;<sup>216</sup> if the soul gives life to the body, it does not receive aught from it in return.<sup>217</sup> In carrying out these propositions, Plotinus appears in the main possessed with the idea that the corporeal alone is sensual, but that whatever is incorporeal is supra-sensible, and therefore impassible, and from this view he deduces rigorously enough the freedom of the soul from all passivity, in the same way as he has even ascribed total impassibility to matter on the ground of its being incorporeal.<sup>218</sup>

It is impossible to say that Plotinus did not perceive the ultimate consequences of this doctrine; for he admits that the evil propensities of the soul, and consequently their penalties, do not affect its essence, but that they only influence the composite creature, the living animal or the delusive image of the soul.<sup>219</sup> We have already remarked that accord-

*δὴ καὶ ἐστὶ τοῦτο, ὡς εἰρηται, παθημάτων.* By *κοινόν*, the community, as it were, which consists of body and soul, is meant. What is still more singular, even the *ἐπιθυμητικόν* of the soul is conceived of as unchangeable. iv. 4, 21.

<sup>215</sup> I. 1, 9.

<sup>216</sup> IV. 8, 8; vi. 7, 7.

<sup>217</sup> II. 9, 7.

<sup>218</sup> III. 6, 6. *Τὴν μὲν δὲ (δὴ?) οὐσίαν ἴσην νοητὴν . . . ὡς ἀπαθὴ δεῖ εἶναι δοκεῖν, εἰρηται. ἰπεί δὲ καὶ ἡ ἑλὴ ἐν τῇ τῶν σώματων, κ.τ.λ.* Ib. 9, and in many other passages. It is only the body or the opposed qualities than can suffer, iii. 6, 9; 19. This view is supported on Aristotelian principles, but it does not in truth agree with another proposition; that, viz. matter can be moved and fashioned by the soul. iii. 8, 1.

<sup>219</sup> I. 1, 12. *Ἄλλ' εἰ ἀναμάρτητος ἡ ψυχὴ. πῶς, αἱ δίκαι; . . . .*

ing to Plotinus, passive affections and misery light only upon the outward shadow of man. It is impossible for any expressions of contempt for man's life in this world to be stronger than this. Everything which belongs to it must have appeared to Plotinus insignificant and worthless. But his contempt extends itself to virtue, no less than to vice. The four Platonic virtues are not the true and higher virtues of the soul. Its real virtue is simply wisdom, and the contemplation of whatever the Reason comprises.<sup>220</sup> The happiness of the soul consists not in any outward pursuit, but in its own intrinsic energy; man may be happy even in sleep, for the soul sleeps not.<sup>221</sup> How could any active pursuit or political virtue be of value to a man who placed the highest, nay, the sole end of human exertion in the contemplation of unity, and who hoped to attain to this height of excellence only by the total withdrawal of the soul from all external things? When man is on high, in the supra-sensible, he forgets even the good deeds of his earthly existence, and holds them in little esteem. Once united with the One, the interests of politics appear unworthy of him; he leaves behind him the whole band of virtues, in the same way that he who enters

ὁ μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἀναμάρτητον διδοὺς τῇ ψυχῇ λόγος, ἐν ἀπλοῦν πάντα ἰτίθετο, τὸ αὐτὸ ψυχὴν καὶ τὸ ψυχὴν (ψυχῇ?) εἶναι λίγων· ὁ δ' ἀμαρτῆν διδοὺς συμπλῖκει μὲν καὶ προστίθισιν αὐτῇ καὶ ἄλλο ψυχῆς εἶδος, τὸ τὰ δεινὰ ἔχον πάθη, κ.τ.λ. vi. 4, 16.

<sup>220</sup> I. 2, 1; 6. Τίς οὖν ἐκάστη ἀρετὴ τῷ τοιούτῳ; ἡ σοφία μὲν ἐν θεωρίᾳ, ὡν νοῦς ἔχει. Ib. 7. Καὶ ὅλως ζῶν οὐχὶ τὸν ἀνθρώπου βίον τὸν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ὃν ἀξιοῖ ἡ πολιτικὴ ἀρετὴ, ἀλλὰ τοῦτον μὲν καταλιπὼν, ἄλλον δὲ ἐλόμενος, τὸν τῶν θεῶν.

<sup>221</sup> I. 4, 9; 5, 10.

into the sanctuary, leaves the images of the gods in the ante-temple behind him.<sup>222</sup>

How, indeed, could such a doctrine which recommended an absolute abstraction of the soul from all emotions and relation to the external world avoid involving itself in error? And in truth we meet with little else than erroneous views, when Plotinus thinks it necessary, in order to exhort men to virtue and philosophy, to employ all sorts of arguments, and seeks to lead men to the height of the Supreme, by carrying them through all the degrees of love which Plato has established.<sup>223</sup> But what need have we to cultivate love and desire as uniting all to the Supreme,<sup>224</sup> if, according to our essence, we have never been separated from it? He himself seems to have been conscious of these difficulties, since he proposes the questions,—why needs man to labour to render the soul impassible, if originally it be without passions; and why any purification of the soul is requisite, if it has never been polluted?<sup>225</sup> However, the answers which he gives to these questions are far from satisfactory. He merely observes, that the soul must withdraw itself from the fashioning by the inferior images, even though it does not in reality occasion any disturbance of its contemplation; the

<sup>222</sup> IV. 3, 32; vi. 9, 7; 11. Ὑπερβὰς ἤδη καὶ τὸν τῶν ἀρετῶν χορόν, ὡς περ τις εἰς τὸ εἶσω τοῦ ἀδύτου εἰσδύς, εἰς τοῦ πῶς καταλειπὼν τὰ ἐν τῷ νῶ ἁγάλματα.

<sup>223</sup> I. 6, 9, and in many other places. We have here to note three grades of beauty; that of the body, that of the soul, and lastly that of Reason, which is not λόγος but makes it, v. 8, 3.

<sup>224</sup> V. 9, 1; vi. 5, 10.

<sup>225</sup> III. 6, 5. Τί οὖν χρὴ ζητεῖν ἀπαθῆ τὴν ψυχὴν ἐκ φιλοσοφίας ποιεῖν μὴ δὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν πάσχουσιν; . . . . . ἀλλὰ τίς ἡ κάθαρσις ἂν τῆς ψυχῆς εἴη μηδαμῇ μολυσμίνης;



soul must be abstracted from the body, although this cannot be except by the body having no longer any participation in soul;<sup>226</sup> he requires that the soul should collect itself again from out of the dispersion of the fragmentary existence, wherein it at present lives, to a consciousness of the whole, although it has in truth never quitted this totality.<sup>227</sup> It is clear that in these propositions he grants to the soul at one moment what he is forced to deny to it in the next. The human soul cannot be conceived to be so totally impassive as Plotinus was disposed and believed it incumbent on him to consider it. Man is indeed to a certain degree in eternity, and in a certain degree in time also; we have not wholly fallen, although in part we have. However contemptible and worthless Plotinus may in his own mind be disposed to consider this world of phenomena, it is, nevertheless, not so absolutely worthless and naught as not to exercise an influence over mankind, and to affect more or less a disturbance of his happiness. Plotinus admits that a part of the soul, which belongs to man, is held down here below by the body; the individual soul loses something of its proper might as soon as it enters into body; that part of the soul which moves the body suffers by this its proper operation; and although matter, no less than the soul, is represented as impassive, still evil is held to be a passion of matter, and also of the soul, which has become assimilated to matter.<sup>228</sup> Now although this may hold

<sup>226</sup> VI. 4, 16. Τὸ δ' ἀπειθεῖν τὸ μηδαμῇ τὸ σῶμα ἐπικουινῶν αὐτῆς.

<sup>227</sup> L. 1.

<sup>228</sup> II. 9, 7; iii. 1, 8; iii. 7, 6; vi. 9, 8; v. 9, 10. Τὸ γὰρ κακὸν ἐνταῦθα

good of the soul, so far as it has entered into the sensible world, perhaps we shall find that its supra-sensible essence is unaffected by such imperfections. But no, the very nature of the soul involves an estrangement from good; it must, in the first place, apply itself to good, and thereby become determinate; hence it is, that it appears to be mixed and indeterminatè, and a notion.<sup>229</sup> In this condition, having only a presentiment of good in the vague and indefinite image of the sensuous presentation, it gives birth to love as a proper entity, from which view it results that the very idea of the soul forbids us to ascribe to it an essence unchangeable and unaffected by any passive state soever.

This it was the less possible for Plotinus to deny, the more decidedly his expositions assumed the tone of moral exhortations. His object throughout is to direct men's thoughts to the Supreme Excellence, and to emancipate them from all that is low and mean. Accordingly he views it as the fault of the individual, if in any case a man is unable to loose himself from the sensible.<sup>230</sup> The soul is described by him as occupied in an assimilation of itself to Reason both in practice and cogitation.<sup>231</sup> He is almost incessantly demanding that men should seclude themselves

*ἰξ ἰνδείας καὶ στερήσεως καὶ ἁλλείψεως καὶ ἔλης ἀτυχούσης πάθος καὶ τοῦ ἔλη ὁμοιωμένου.*

<sup>229</sup> III. 9, 3; 5, 7. Διὸ καὶ ἐν τῇ γεννήσει τοῦ ἱρωτος ὁ Πλάτων φησὶ τὸν πόρον τὴν μίθην ἔχειν τοῦ νίκταρος, οἶνου οὕτω δυτος, ὡς πρὸ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ τοῦ ἱρωτος γενομένου καὶ τῆς πινίας μετεχούσης φύσεως νοητοῦ, ἀλλ' οὐκ εἰδώλου νοητοῦ, οὐδ' ἐκίθιν ἰμφαντασθίντος, ἀλλ' ἐκεί γενομένης καὶ συμμιχθείσης ὡς ἰξ εἶδος καὶ ἀοριστίας, ἣν ἔχουσα ἡ ψυχὴ πρὶν τυχεῖν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, μανταυομένη δι' ἐκεῖνα κατὰ ἀόριστον καὶ ἀπειρον φάντασμα τὴν ὑπόστασιν τοῦ ἱρωτος τεκούσης.

<sup>230</sup> VI. 9, 4.

<sup>231</sup> V. 3, 7.

from one another. He wishes to cure by his philosophy such souls as are entangled in misery and ignorance, by directing their attention to two considerations—the worthlessness of all sensible good things, and the consciousness of their high origin.<sup>232</sup> He would seek to bring them to God by virtue, which, as it forms itself in the soul, reveals God, for God without true virtue is but an empty name.<sup>233</sup> Now when Plotinus directed such exhortations to mankind, it was impossible that he could have considered as unreal the very states out of which it was his object to withdraw and improve men. He must have estimated the magnitude of the evil which environs mankind exactly by the amount of pains and trouble necessary to free them from it.

These are the general principles on which Plotinus founded his view of the universal system of things, and these too the contradictions in which he involved himself at the very time that he taught that self-contradiction is a proof of error.<sup>234</sup> On the whole, indeed, we discover two tendencies in the general habit of his ideas which are constantly conflicting with each other; the one tending to an absolute contempt for all mundane things which it labours to represent as utterly null and unprofitable, while the other seeks to exhibit them as self-subsistent, by raising them, as he does, for instance, with man and the soul, to the rank of the supra-sensible. These two directions are in direct opposition to

<sup>232</sup> V. 1, 1.

<sup>233</sup> II. 9, 15. 'Αρετή μὲν οὖν εἰς τέλος προϊούσα καὶ ἐν ψυχῇ ἐγγενομένη μετὰ φρονήσεως θεὸν δεικνυσιν. ἀνευ δὲ ἀρετῆς ἀληθινῆς θεὸς λεγόμενος ὄνομά ἐστιν. vi 9, 3.

<sup>234</sup> E. g. iv. 5, 8.

each other, and lead Plotinus at one time to exclaim that all [things here are but illusory images, and that nothing is real;]<sup>235</sup> at another, to declare that all is here that is there.<sup>236</sup> This contradiction extends itself even to his most general ideas, where it expresses itself as the basis of his theory of emanations, whose very object is to claim an independent subsistence for each emanation, and at the same time to look upon it as null when compared with that which is immediately higher than itself, or that from which the particular emanation proceeds. The extreme result of one of these tendencies is the doctrine that matter is a perfect nullity; that it does not exist for the sake of aught lower, because it is itself the lowest and the last; nor for aught higher, since for this its lower is not absolutely; and lastly, not for itself, since it is only the limit. This view of the nullity of matter may be regarded as a considerable progress, which Plotinus effected in following out the tendency of the Græco-Oriental philosophy, of which the ultimate result was necessarily the position that no truth of the sensible world can stand in opposition to the one and sole truth of the supra-sensible. The promulgation of this doctrine removed, undoubtedly, much of the vagueness and inconsistency which had previously agitated this species of philosophy; but at the same time it gave rise to other difficulties, since consistently the ascetical abhorrence of matter could have no foundation in such a view. That Plotinus did not absolutely reject it, only proves that

<sup>235</sup> II. 6, 1. *Εἶδωλα γὰρ καὶ οὐκ ἀληθῆ.*

<sup>236</sup> V. 9, 13.

the other tendency was able to make itself felt even, on the opposite one. Now the extreme result of that other tendency, was the doctrine of the supra-sensuous intuition of the One. According to the view of Plotinus, the supra-sensible idea is everywhere present in the world, which is nothing else than a thought of Reason, in itself expressing the whole, and which, in the same manner as the Reason does, also bears in itself a perfect consciousness of the Supreme Principle. Now if we conceive all that subsists in the world to be unassailed by any limitation of matter, which indeed is merely a nullity, then every mundane subsistence is participant of this perfect consciousness. The Reason knows that a something exists anterior to itself out of which it exists, and that something is posterior to the First, which is itself.<sup>237</sup> But, it must be confessed, this entity of reason and rational substance are directly attacked by the opposite tendency of the Plotinian theory. In the emanation of things, the emanated and lower exist not for the higher, and therefore the Reason is not for the One; but again the lower is not for the Reason, and consequently the only conclusion that remains is, that it is something for itself. But it is impossible to say what it is for itself, since its actuality consists in nothing more than its emanating from, and again emitting out of itself other emanations, viz., its pure thoughts. Hence its desire to exist for itself is described as a foolish effort, by which it passes into the null, and loses its true entity. On the other hand, its true reality is

<sup>237</sup> V. 5, 2. Καὶ εἴ τι πρὸ αὐτοῦ, ὅτι ἐξ αὐτοῦ, καὶ εἴ τι μετ' ἑαυτοῦ, ὅτι αὐτός.

made to consist in this, that it directs itself to the One, and unites itself with it, whereby, however, its own existence seems forthwith to cease.

We do not hesitate to admit that a certain degree of truth is contained in both directions of this doctrine. Accordingly many true ideas are to be found in the writings of Plotinus, which bear witness to his acuteness and profundity of mind, and have won for him the love and admiration of later ages. He was animated with a noble and earnest pursuit of the highest excellence that the reason can desire. He sought to make truth the property of man; it, he taught, is man's essence; he possesses it, and may apprehend and seize it within his own consciousness. In this world there are not mere phantoms only, but also true virtue and true science. These are within the soul, and whatever is purely developed in it, is also *there*; and whatever is there, it is in the power of the soul to appropriate to itself, so that there is nothing in the supra-sensible which is not to be found in this world also, if we consider the soul to be a part of it.<sup>238</sup> Thus does he exhort man to labour, to improve and call forth the faculties of the soul, and to direct them to the higher, and to raise itself above the selfish and the sensual. Reason must be active in man in order to rule the lower desires, as

<sup>238</sup> V. 9, 13. Είναι δὲ ψυχῆς ὅντως οὐσης ἐκάστης καὶ δικαιοσύνην δὴ τινα καὶ σωφροσύνην καὶ ἐν ταῖς παρ' ἡμῖν ψυχαῖς, ἐπιστήμην ἀληθινήν, οὐκ εἰδῶλα, οὐδὲ εἰκόνας ἐκείνων, ὡς ἐν αἰσθητῶ. . . . . ὅσα μὲν οὖν ψυχῇ ἢ τοιαύτῃ ἐνταῦθα, ταῦτα ἐκεῖ. ὥστε εἰ τὰ ἐν τῷ αἰσθητῶ τὰ ἐν τοῖς ὁρωμένοις λαμβάνοιτο, οὐ μόνον ὄντα ἐν τῷ αἰσθητῶ ἐκεῖ, ἀλλὰ καὶ πλείω. εἰ δὲ τὰ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ λίγοιτο, συμπεριλαμβανομένων καὶ ψυχῆς καὶ τῶν ἐν ψυχῇ, πάντα ἐνταῦθα, ὅσα ἐκεῖ.

the wisdom of the old and experienced restrains the unruly multitude ; but when reason remains inactive the worse principle assumes the rule ; and when it is inactive towards ourselves, then it works towards that which is above.<sup>239</sup> But it is to scientific activity before all things, that Plotinus seeks to stimulate the soul. Compared with this pursuit, every other is mean and contemptible. He seeks to reduce all the practice of this world to theory ; for, he says, nothing is accomplished except by the soul's contemplation of the prototype from which itself proceeds. And then he follows out the idea of science in its highest acceptation. Science is not a mere copy of the truth, different from and extrinsic to it ; for otherwise it would not contain the truth, and if it pretended to reach it by any such a copy, then would it be but a double deception. Consequently the true science of reason must contain in itself the supra-sensible and true, and be one with it.<sup>240</sup> Further, this true science requires no verification from without—nor demonstration, which must itself invariably imply, and refers to, for its own confirmation, some immediate conviction ; whereas the reason is ever present to itself and self-evident, and nothing

<sup>239</sup> I. 1, 11. "Όταν δὲ ἀργῇ εἰς ἡμᾶς, ἐνεργεῖ πρὸς τὸ ἄνω. VI. 4, 15.

<sup>240</sup> V. 5. 1. Εἰ γὰρ καὶ ὅτι μάλιστα δοίη τις ταῦτα ἔξω εἶναι καὶ τὸν νοῦν αὐτὰ οὕτως ἔχοντα θεωρεῖν, ἀναγκαῖον αὐτῷ μῆτε τὸ ἀληθὲς αὐτῶν ἔχειν διεψεύσθαι τε ἐν ᾧ πασιν οἷς θεωρεῖ. τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἀληθινὰ ἂν εἴη ἐκείνα, θεωρήσει τοίνυν αὐτά, οὐκ ἔχων αὐτά. εἶδωλα δὲ αὐτῶν ἐν τῇ γνώσει τῇ τοιαύτῃ λαβών. τὸ τοίνυν ἀληθινὸν οὐκ ἔχων, εἶδωλα γὰρ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς παρ' αὐτῷ λαβών τὰ ψευδῆ ἔξει καὶ οὐδὲν ἀληθές. εἰ μὲν οὖν εἰδῇσει, ὅτι τὰ ψευδῆ ἔχει, ὁμολογήσει ἄμοιρος ἀληθείας εἶναι, εἰ δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ἀγνοήσῃ καὶ οὐκ εἴσεται τὸ ἀληθές ἔχειν οὐκ ἔχων, διπλάσιον ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ ψεῦδος γινόμενον πλὴν τῆς ἀληθείας αὐτὸν ἀποστήσει. — 1b. 2 ; 9, 5 ; vi. 6, 6.

can be more certain than it.<sup>241</sup> It is obvious that Plotinus is speaking here of the one science, and the absolute reason which embraces all. And in these propositions we can trace a thought which Plotinus loved to follow; that, viz. in true science the soul is able to embrace the whole; a thought whose truth he has skilfully and luminously exhibited by many illustrations. For this purpose he has, after Numenius, pointed out an important distinction between the corporeal or sensible and the rational. The corporeal, for instance, can never form a true unity; it is separated in space, and its parts fall away from each other, while the space which one part occupies cannot be entered by any other. But it is very different with the thoughts of the soul; they come together into one science, and when we possess one we may also be in possession of another. Now it is such a science that Plotinus was in search of; one that comprises all true thoughts, and reduces them to the unity of a single thought. And moreover, that which is true of particular thoughts in an individual soul, holds equally of the relations of individual souls one to another. They do not each form by itself an independent and perfect whole, but it is in their rational co-existence that they originate, by their intellectual communion, intelligence and science, and if herein they all possess the Good, still no one possesses it to the exclusion of the rest, and no one has a part which does not belong also to the others, but they are all in similar contact with it, so that no hindrance exists why they should not all have the

<sup>241</sup> V. 5, 1; 2.



same and be one in it. Thus the nature of the soul is in fact illimitable, since no one soul can be limited by another in its rational possession.<sup>243</sup>

Even if these ideas be not entirely new, we must nevertheless, ascribe to Plotinus the praise of understanding them more completely, and following them out more rigorously than any of his predecessors; and we should have to estimate his merits very highly indeed, if he had been able to combine these ideas with a rational life and development of the soul. But it was on this problem that his general theory was wrecked. He was prevented from giving a satisfactory solution of it by the indisposition he everywhere evinces, to recognise the reason as a faculty which gradually arises within man and gradually evolves itself in the life of sensation. Reason, he maintained, rightly understood, is not a faculty; for if it be such, then the irrational might pass into the rational, and thought would be something foreign to it and adventitious. Moreover, the real entity, the object of rational cognition, cannot be generate, for then existence would appear

<sup>243</sup> VI. 4, 4. Διόστησαν γὰρ (sc. αἱ ψυχαί) οὐ διεσθῶσαι καὶ πάρεσιν ἀλλήλαις οὐκ ἀλλοτριωθεῖσαι. οὐ γὰρ πάρεσιν εἰσι διωρισμέναι, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ ἐπιστῆμαι αἱ πολλαὶ ἐν ψυχῇ μιᾷ. καὶ ἔστιν ἡ μία τοιαύτη, ὥστε ἔχειν ἐν αὐτῇ πάσας. οὕτως ἐστὶν ἀπειρος ἡ τοιαύτη φύσις. Ib. 5, 10. οὐ δὲ ὅλον ἐγώ, ὅλον δὲ καὶ σύ. ἀσπασσθὲν ἑκατέρω ἑκατέρω. μιμουμένη δὲ καὶ ἐκκλησίαι καὶ πᾶσα σύνοδος, ὥς εἰς ἐν τὸ φρονεῖν λόγων. καὶ χωρὶς ἑκαστος εἰς τὸ φρονεῖν ἀσθενής, συμβάλλων δὲ εἰς ἐν πᾶς ἐν τῇ συνόδῳ καὶ τῇ ὡς ἀληθῶς συνείσει τὸ φρονεῖν ἐγέννησε καὶ εὖρε. . . . καίτοι καὶ ταῖς ψυχαῖς ὡς ἐφαπτόμεθα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ἔχρην ἐνθυμείσθαι. οὐ γὰρ ἄλλου μὲν ἐγώ, ἄλλου δὲ σὺ ἐφάπτη, ἀλλὰ τοῦ αὐτοῦ. . . . τί δὲ καὶ ἐμπόδιον τοῦ εἰς ἐν; οὐ γὰρ δὴ τὸ ἔτερον ἄπω θεί ἑτέρον, τόπον οὐ παρέχον, ὥσπερ οὐχ ὁρῶντες πᾶν μάθημα καὶ ζεώρημα καὶ ὅλως ἐπιστήμας πάσας ἐπὶ ψυχῆς οὐ στενοχωρουμένας. ἀλλ' ἐπὶ οὐσιῶν φήσιν τις, οὐ δυνατόν. ἀλλ' οὐ δυνατόν ἦν ἂν, εἴπερ δεκοὶ ἦσαν αἱ ἀληθιναὶ οὐσίαι.

to accrue to it contingently.<sup>243</sup> Thus do the conflicting tendencies of his doctrine hinder Plotinus from evolving to a correct intelligence and to perfect life the pregnant ideas which he throws out so abundantly. He was unable to reconcile these tendencies, because, on the whole, he did not depart out of the sphere of thought which he found already developed. These ideas, however, had in his days arrived at a closer contact with each other than had ever before been the case; and the contradiction in which they appeared to be involved, excited in him indeed a lively activity, which however proposed to itself no higher object than the disguising and concealment of these contradictions. As to his mental character, he was utterly devoid of invention, and not a single new idea is to be found in his whole works.

It is in its more special disquisitions that the weakness of Plotinus's theory is most apparent. He lives only in the general, in those dialectical disquisitions on the highest principles of which we have given an exposition. These he is incessantly bandying; they are brought forward in endless repetition, and with little if any variation. He does indeed attach to them certain notions of a more special nature; but of these also, we soon perceive that they are derived from anterior disquisitions, and do not throw any light on the character of his philosophy. He does not, it is true, confine philo-

<sup>243</sup> V. 9, 5. Δεῖ δὲ νοῦν λαμβάνειν, εἴπερ ἐπαληθεύσομεν τῷ ὁνόματι, μὴ τὸν δυνάμει, μηδὲ τὸν ἐξ ἀφροσύνης εἰς νοῦν ἰλθόντα. . . εἰ δὲ μή, ἐπακτὸν τὸ φρονεῖν ἔχει. . . . . διὸ καὶ ὅτως ὄντα ἢ γιγνόμενα καὶ ἀπολλόμενα ἐπακτῷ χρήσεται τῷ ὄντι.

sophy to dialectic, but also recognises physics and ethics as two component parts of it, although he does not appear to have had anything like a clear notion of their relation to dialectic. Upon one point alone is his opinion made up, and that is, that both are of inferior value to dialectic, which alone is highly to be praised.<sup>244</sup> On the other hand, the value of such of his disquisitions as may be assigned to these other parts of philosophy is very insignificant. As he regarded the corporeal and natural becoming merely as a shadowy form in the soul, the natural connection of the world and of finite existences in it necessarily appeared to him in no other light than as a sympathy of the souls<sup>245</sup> which are brought to their respective bodies, as it were, by a magical attraction; and, as it were by a magical art, are united with the whole, while the two reciprocally exercise upon each other a kind of magical influence.<sup>246</sup> Thus did Plotinus resolve physiology into certain magical affinities—a sympathy of souls. On the other hand he ascribes no further importance to ethical doctrines than as they qualify mankind for the task of emancipating themselves from the natural bond of necessary and conditional existence,—the magical enchantment of practical life; every virtue is simply a purification from the corporeal or sensible,<sup>247</sup> and hence the whole theory of ethics loses itself in a system of asceticism.

Thus, then, do we see the Socratic philosophy,

<sup>244</sup> I. 3, 6. Μίρος οὖν τὸ τίμιον· ἔχει γὰρ καὶ ἄλλα φιλοσοφία, κ.τ.λ.

<sup>245</sup> IV. 3, 8; 9, 2.

<sup>246</sup> IV. 3, 13; 4, 26; 40.

<sup>247</sup> I. 6, 6. Ἔστι γὰρ δὴ, ὥς ὁ παλαιὸς λόγος, καὶ ἡ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἡ ἀνδρία καὶ πᾶσα ἀρετὴ καθαρισμός· καὶ ἡ φρόνησις αὐτῇ, κ.τ.λ.

whose characteristic distinction was the attempt to elaborate the orderless constituents of philosophy into an organic whole of three co-ordinate parts, again losing itself in a rude and shapeless mass, incapable of exciting a philosophical interest, except by vague disquisitions of a very general nature, into the first grounds of all things. Although it is with such speculations into first and general principles that philosophy must commence, yet it quickly discovers, as its inquiries advance, that in order to elucidate the general, it must investigate the special; but as soon as it begins to decline, it becomes incapable of a right appreciation of the special, and holds the general to be alone worthy of its attention. However much, therefore, we may be delighted with the occasional flashes of true and vigorous thought, which the writings of Plotinus display, still it is only the blind or the blindfold that can overlook the signs of decrepitude, which the philosophy of Greece exhibits in these productions. The total absence of form in these investigations, the little regard which they pay to the special branches of scientific knowledge, the want of originality, the inability which they so clearly evince either to reconcile divergent tendencies, or to control them by powerful and energetic thought, clearly prove that while we must admit Plotinus to have been highly eminent in his age and country, yet that the period itself was one fast verging to decrepitude, and the people to which he belonged were rapidly hastening to its dissolution as a nation.



## CHAPTER II.

### SPREAD OF NEO-PLATONISM.

To judge from the biography of Plotinus as written by Porphyry, none of that philosopher's numerous disciples were more distinguished than Amelius and Porphyry himself. Of the former, our knowledge is too limited to allow of our forming any estimate of his philosophical merits, whereas the latter at once demands our attention, as having contributed more than all others to the diffusion of his master's opinions.

Porphyry was born at Batanea in Syria, A.D. 233. In his national tongue he was called Malchus, for which he himself assumed the name of Porphyry as its equivalent in Greek. In grammar and rhetoric he had for his teacher Longinus, by whom he was also instructed in the doctrines of neo-Platonism.<sup>1</sup> When in his thirtieth year he joined the school of Plotinus at Rome; he entertained certain opinions with respect to Plato's theory of ideas, which it was difficult to reconcile with the Plotinian doctrine; but when his fellow-disciple Amelius, at the request of Plotinus, had convinced him of the futility of these opinions, he became an undoubting and zealous follower of their master's opinions. A

<sup>1</sup> S. Fabric. Bibl. Gr. v. p. 725, not. Harl.

fit of melancholy, so severe as almost to tempt him to commit suicide, was relieved by a visit to Sicily, where he resided up to the time of Plotinus's death. Upon this event Porphyry returned to Rome, where his eloquence was highly esteemed, and he appears to have continued in that city to the day of his death, which took place at a very advanced age.<sup>2</sup>

Porphyry confesses his inferiority to Plotinus, when he tells us that once only in eighty-six years had he been able to attain to union with God; whereas his master, in a shorter existence of sixty, had four times arrived at the same consummation.<sup>3</sup> Great indeed must have been his confidence in the judgment of Plotinus which could so long implicitly adopt the conclusions of that philosopher in the absence of any instruction as to the basis on which his whole theory rested. He appears to have been entirely devoted to it. So long as he lived it found in him its steadiest and most powerful supporter. He worked in its support by publishing a laudatory biography of Plotinus, by arranging the *Enneadæ* of his works, and by an exposition of its difficulties, and also by compiling a compendium of its leading principles, such as must have been greatly needed for the purposes of the school.<sup>4</sup> He moreover composed several separate treatises, either with a view to controversy or with the design of giving a wider circulation to certain principles which had not met with the attention correspondent to their importance. Under the former head we would place his work

<sup>2</sup> Eunap. v. Porph.; Porph. v. Plot. 1; 2; 3; 7; 11; 12.

<sup>3</sup> V. Plot. 18.

<sup>4</sup> Πορφύριον αἱ πρὸς τὰ νοητὰ ἀφορμαί. Our quotations are given from the edition of Holstenius.

against the Christians, whom he charges with falsifying the doctrines of Christ, who himself is depicted as an enlightened sage.<sup>5</sup> To the latter class belong his commentations of the works of Plato and Aristotle, the Treatises on the Agreement of the Platonic and Aristotelian Views, and on the Philosophy deducible from the Oracles and the Homeric Works; a History of Philosophy, intended probably to exhibit all the philosophical labours of earlier times in the light of his own particular view;<sup>6</sup> as well as several other treatises, of which sufficient fragments still subsist to enable us to form a correct estimate of his opinions. The rhetorical talents of Porphyry, who for the age in which he lived is a tolerable simple, and perspicuous writer, without doubt aided, in no small degree, in gaining friends and adherents for his master's system.

But however extensive his labours may have been, and however important for his school, they were not calculated to ensure him a lasting reputation. If the richness and variety of his learning, and the sweetness of his language, are universally admired, this praise is invariably accompanied with the censure that his doctrine is not always consistent with itself.<sup>7</sup> It is impossible to explain away this complaint by supposing it to have arisen merely from certain occasional discrepancies of method,

<sup>5</sup> This we know from his work *Περὶ τῆς ἐκ λογίων φιλοσοφίας*. Euseb. Dem. Ev. iii. 6, 134 ed. Colon. 1688.

<sup>6</sup> The life of Pythagoras is, perhaps without cause, regarded as a portion of this history.

<sup>7</sup> Eunap. v. Porph. towards the end; Πολλὰς γοῦν τοῖς ἤδη προκειπραγματουμένοις βιβλίους θεωρίας ἰναντίας κατέλιπε, περὶ ὧν οὐκ ἔστι ἱερὸν τι δοξάζειν, ἢ ὅτι προῖων ἕτερα ἰδέξασεν. This as to details is also the opinion of Euseb. Pr. Ev. iv. 10; Jambl. ap. Stob. Ecl. i. p. 866.

such as might easily creep into a rhetorical style; for these would have occasioned slight inconvenience to the superficial and inaccurate minds of his followers. The difficulties which called forth this complaint against so esteemed a teacher, must have been of a far graver and more general nature.<sup>8</sup> Something of this kind is intimated by the remark that Porphyry fluctuated between the rival claims of theurgy and philosophy, in so far as he did not indeed reject the former at once, but only scrupled to ascribe to it the very highest importance. Similar ideas were probably entertained by Plotinus; but as the treatises of this philosopher touched rather upon speculations of a general nature than upon the practical opinions of his own age, he probably had no occasion for bringing forward these ideas, or pronouncing a decided opinion with regard to them. In Plotinus, consequently, such inconsistency was allowed to pass without notice;<sup>9</sup> but such could not be the case with Porphyry, who vigorously combated the prevailing notions of his age and school, and scrupled not to place philosophy high above the superstitious opinions of the popular polytheism. And upon this point a few observations are indispensable for a right appreciation of the history of the neo-Platonic philosophy.

Among the principles to which Porphyry compendiously reduces the doctrine of his school, that of the difference of the corporeal and the incorporeal stands out in a very strong light. The

<sup>8</sup> August de Civ. D. x. 9. Ut videas eum inter vitium sacrilegæ curiositatis et philosophiæ professionem sententiis alternantibus fluctuare.

<sup>9</sup> However, with his disciple Amelius, he is blamed by Jamblichus on the same ground as Porphyry in the text.



latter rules over the former, and it is therefore, although not spacially yet virtually, everywhere present; for the corporeal cannot prevent the entrance of the incorporeal into any body whatever.<sup>10</sup> Consequently, the soul also has the faculty of exerting its powers in every direction; it possesses infinite energy, and every part of it, when it is free from matter, is all-powerful and present to all things. These propositions evidently approximate towards that view of Plotinus which would assign a magical influence to the spiritual over the corporeal world. On the other hand, the natural action of corporeal forces is regarded as wholly subordinate.<sup>11</sup> The action of a distant agent is expressly declared to be the only essential one. An agent does not operate upon another body by contact and proximity; and it is only accessarily that a particular body avails itself, in its operations, of proximity and contact.<sup>12</sup> Holding such a view, it was easy for Porphyry to reconcile himself to many superstitious opinions; indeed we might almost suppose that it was adopted expressly with a view to favour them. And indeed we find much to confirm us in this view. Among these his theory of demons is peculiarly remarkable. These are depicted as aerial beings, which, having no definite shape, are consequently invisible. The good demons rule the air, and the

<sup>10</sup> Sent. (Αἱ πρὸς τὰ νοητὰ ἀφορμαί) 2; 3; 28. Οὐδὲν πρὸς τὸ ἀσώματον τὸ καθ' ἑαυτὸ ἢ τοῦ σώματος ἐμποδίζει ὑπόστασις πρὸς τὸ μὴ εἶναι, ὅπου βούλεται καὶ ὡς θέλει. Ib. 29.

<sup>11</sup> Sent. 39. Ἀπειροδύναμος γὰρ ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς φύσις. . . . τοῦ τυχόντος μέρους πάντα νηαμένον, ἔταν σωμάτων καθαρεύγ.

<sup>12</sup> Ib. 6. Οὐ τὸ ποιῶν εἰς ἄλλο πιλάσει καὶ ἀφ᾽ οὗ ποιῶν ποιῶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ πιλάσει καὶ ἀφ᾽ οὗ ποιῶντα κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς τῇ πιλάσει χρῆται.

evil are subject to them ; they require food for their subsistence, and are not immortal. As man can never be wholly free from liability to pain, he must seek to propitiate even the evil demons by sacrifices ; and by the power of magic man can constrain them. Even the souls of the dead, which still wander around the bodies they have just left, are subject to necromantic influence.<sup>13</sup> When, however, we examine these doctrines of Porphyry a little more closely, we do not find a very intimate connection between them and his philosophy. He merely adopts them as popular opinions, in which he does not venture to deny his belief. Indeed his philosophy is not favourably disposed to the worship of even the national gods, and forbids all animal sacrifice. He professes his reverence for a supreme and pure God ; and the religious worship, which alone he would wish to see, consists of pure words and pure thoughts.<sup>14</sup> After he has established it as a moral precept, that the Divinity ought to be worshipped by all men after their national customs, he comes to the doctrine of other gods besides the highest—which are not merely supra-sensible but even visible deities, next to whom follow the demons and other orders of beings superior to man. A reverence for the divine, which pervades the visible world, gives rise to the necessity of a worship which allows of fire being kindled on the altars, but does not permit of any sacrificial slaughter of animals.<sup>15</sup>

<sup>13</sup> De Abst. ii. 38, 39, 41, 43, 47. Porphyry agrees with Plotinus in regarding man's life in the body as an enchantment. Ib. i. 28.

<sup>14</sup> Ad Marcellam, 18. Sent. 30, unbelief is associated with sin.

<sup>15</sup> De Abstin. ii. 34, 36, 38.

The source of Porphyry's indisposition towards the superstitions of his age lay in the moral direction of his philosophy. With him, as with his teacher, this grew out of his regard for the power of reason, which is raised above the force of nature, and the magic influence of the demons. The flesh has undoubtedly power over man, but this is only the case when evil is in him, and therefore we ought not to impute the blame to the flesh, but to the soul.<sup>16</sup> The evil in man is undoubtedly often ascribed to the demons, and the greatest and most special ill that they can do to man is to produce in him erroneous notions of the gods; but the mind of the philosopher is able to rise superior to all such passive affections. He stands not in need of soothsaying, for he is far removed from all those pursuits to which divination can be profitable. Wisdom is not dependent on luck or chance; and the philosophy which cannot emancipate man from all passive impression, is of no more use or value than a profession of medicine, which is unable to cure the diseases of the body.<sup>17</sup> Man, if he would gain for the soul perfect rest and perfect peace,<sup>18</sup> ought to put off, as he would an outer garment, not only all those external pursuits, which have for their object corporeal advantage, but also the inner garment of desire which looks for such things. Accordingly, Porphyry has directed all his efforts to enforce those ethical practices which he judged to be best calculated to free man from the empire of his passions. These he regards as the most

<sup>16</sup> Ib. 40; ad Marc. 12, 21, 24, 29.

<sup>17</sup> Ad Marc. 31; de Abst. ii. 52.

<sup>18</sup> De Abst. i. 31.

fearful and godless tyrants, from which he deemed it man's duty to emancipate himself, even at the sacrifice, if necessary, of his whole body.<sup>19</sup> And although man cannot entirely divest himself of his passions, still he can greatly restrain his sensual desires, and thereby approach closely to similitude with the gods. On this account Porphyry forbade the slaughtering of animals and animal food, partly, indeed, on the ground of justice and compassion,<sup>20</sup> but chiefly with a view to promote abstinence and self-denial. He asserts that we should come even still nearer to the gods, were we able to spare the vegetable world also, and did not require them for sustenance.<sup>21</sup> As an encouragement to his countrymen, he instances in this respect the practice of the Jews, to abstain at least from eating the flesh of sacrificed animals; but, he says, the Egyptians, those wisest of men, are still more to be praised, who, from a conviction of their relationship to the other animals, put none to death for the sake of food, but even set up their images for public worship as representations of the divine. This ascetical tendency evidently brought him into hostile collision with the public practices of the national religion. This objection, however, he sought to elude, simply by describing the actual and prevailing worship as a corruption. He advanced, in the most decided terms, the opinion that man, in his age, was very far removed from that olden purity and innocence of life which prevailed

<sup>19</sup> Ad Marc. 34.

<sup>20</sup> De Abst. iii. 1, 2, 19, 26. The animals are related to man, and feel pain. The erroneous opinion that they are not endowed with reason is ascribed to human self-love.

<sup>21</sup> Ib. 27.

in the golden age. This golden generation did not, he says, eat flesh or put animals to death ; and we ought to imitate them as Pythagoras did.<sup>22</sup>

Now if this moral view indisposed Porphyry to the customs of the national religion, he was rendered equally averse to them by his attempt to acquire communion with the supreme God. The philosophy which is to raise man to the Highest, can secure this end only by proceeding through Reason and beyond Reason. Man, he says, through a holy life, attains only with difficulty to a perception of God.<sup>23</sup> Nothing material must be offered to him ; for whatever is of matter is impure ; no word, no thought which bears in it any trace of passion is agreeable to him. It is, therefore, inexpedient to speak of him before the uninitiated and in public meetings, and we ought rather to honour him by pure silence and pure thoughts, and to contemplate him in the unimpassioned part of the soul. It is only to the supra-sensible God that we ought to direct our prayers and hymns.<sup>24</sup> Now Porphyry distinguished four virtues, or grades of virtue, of which political virtue is the lowest, i. e. the virtue of a good man who moderates his passions (*μετριοπάθεια*) ; superior to this is the purifying virtue, which purifies from passion the soul of the individual, and establishes it in apathy. The object of this virtue is assimilation to God, and by it we may become demoniac men or good demons. But still greater eminence will that man attain who devotes his whole soul to knowledge, and thereby becomes a

<sup>22</sup> Ib. ii. 26, 27 ; iii. 27 ; iv. 2.

<sup>23</sup> Ib. i. 39, 57.

<sup>24</sup> De Abst. ii. 34 ; ad Marc. 15.

god, and ultimately lives only for reason ; and, acquiring the virtue of reason, becomes like the father of the gods, one with the One.<sup>25</sup> Holding such a view of the highest virtue, the public and established worship naturally appeared to him to be in every respect of little and secondary importance.

Moreover, as the prevailing opinions of his school must have referred him to widely discrepant forms of worship, and ascribed to them great importance as connected with divination, with magic, and with the many other arts of deception. Porphyry must have found himself involved in numerous contradictions, partly arising from the superstition itself, and partly attributable to the disagreement between it and the philosophical religion of his school. But the interest which Plotinus had awakened in him for philosophy was as yet too vigorous for him to decide otherwise than against the claims of superstition, and in favour of philosophy. He sought, indeed, to ingratiate himself with that superstition. He did not dare to reject it unconditionally, but he was nevertheless unable to repress a doubt of the validity of the assumptions on which it rested. This fact comes out pretty clearly in his letter to the Egyptian priest Anebos, wherein he proposes to him a series of questions on which he requires to be satisfied and informed. He there confesses the difficulty he has in conceiving the existence of gods, like the stars, for instance, who, although they possess a finite body, are yet indivisible and infinite in power ; and still more in understanding how infinite beings should be subject

<sup>25</sup> Sent. 34.

to passions, as is implied by the injunction to appease their wrath by prayers and sacrifice, and even to constrain their favour by threats, and by invocations to invite their presence. How can man call some deities benignant, and others malevolent? How is the presence of a god, or an angel, or archangel, or demon, or archon, to be distinguished? For the appearance of all these is described as the same. Similar doubts are advanced as suggested by the different modes of soothsaying, since it appears to him incredible that the gods should, by such trifling matters as are employed for divination, be brought to abase themselves to the service of man. It is also, he says, incredible, that the gods, while their priests abstain from animal food, should be enticed by the sacrifice of animals: that by senseless threats of disturbing the heavens, of revealing the secrets of Isis, and so forth, they should be moved to yield to theurgic arts, and to bring even evil to pass at the behest of their invokers. What virtue or power can the unmeaning and barbarous terms possess which are used in the forms of invocation? Why are all these arts employed for such valueless objects as buying and selling, the solemnization of marriage, or the discovery of a run-away slave? These things do not appear to furnish the true road to felicity. At the close of the letter Porphyry does not hesitate to avow a suspicion that the Egyptians were in error as to the nature of the divinity, and as to the true method of arriving at a union with him. He suggests the possibility that men had been misled to adopt these theurgical arts, by the idle imaginations of the human heart, or the contrivances of

fraudulent and interested individuals, or even of evil demons, rather than by any real manifestations of the good demons or of the gods.<sup>26</sup>

In short, these were bold doubts for Porphyry to advance in such an age and such a school. By the expression of them he risked his whole reputation and authority in his school; it was impossible that they should pass unnoticed and unattacked. They seem to be the effusions of his later years, when, perhaps, he had begun to perceive that the superstitions which he had previously adhered to, and even favoured, were on the point of transgressing all the bounds of moderation. If, however, he thought by this publication to repress their extravagance, he must have greatly over-estimated the influence which such doubts usually exercise. Moreover, an answer to them is extant, which was held in high repute by the later neo-Platonists, and is even ascribed to Jamblichus, the most famous of the disciples of Porphyry. It is composed with considerable skill, and calculated not only to refute the objections of Porphyry, but also, by an appearance of scientific method, and especially by its perfect agreement with the principles of neo-Platonism, to furnish a firm support to the superstitions of heathens in their widest extent. It is entitled, *The Answer of Abamnon the Teacher to Porphyry's Letter to Anebos*.<sup>27</sup>

<sup>26</sup> *Epist. ad Aneb.* The arguments which Tiedemann (*Geist der specul. Phil.* iii. p. 454) has brought against its genuineness are extremely trifling.

<sup>27</sup> The hypothesis of Th. Gale, the editor of this work, under the title *De Mysteriis Ægyptiorum*, which has been adopted by many, that Jamblichus was its author, rests on very weak grounds. That Proclus so considered it is of little weight. Meiners, on the other hand (*Comment. Soc. Reg. Gotting.* vol. iv. p. 50, sqq.), has advanced a stronger case. However, we are convinced that



It defends almost every practice of theurgists and magicians, and attempts to reconcile them with the principles which the neo-Platonists held on the worship as well of one supreme God, as of gods pure and removed from all evil. One of the most common fallacies which it employs for this purpose, and which, in fact, is one of the loosest application, is drawn from the argument that all the objections advanced against theurgy, and the ideas of divine things which such practices imply, rest simply on the mere notions and deductions of the human understanding, which, however, are not validly applicable to the perception of the divine.<sup>28</sup> The author of this answer denies that any distinction may be drawn by man with regard to the respective natures of gods, demons, and other superior orders of being, although at the same time he was unable, naturally enough, to abstain from such a course. The objection of Porphyry, that theurgy implies that the gods must be passively affected by obedience to the practices of the theurgists, is met by the counter objection that this objection implies a difference between the passive and the passionless, whereas such a distinction is wholly inapplicable to the higher essence, notwithstanding that this same distinction is elsewhere frequently employed with reference to divine things by Porphyry's antagonist himself. On the other hand, the doctrine of the mystical union of the soul with the Good, is herein

it was composed by a contemporary at least of Jamblichus. This is to our mind clear from the way in which the author defends the doctrine of Plotinus, that the soul is without passion, whereas most of the later neo-Platonists after Jamblichus disputed this point.

<sup>28</sup> De Myst. Æg. i. 3.

extended in such a way that there follows from it man's mystical union with all higher essences for whose existence no further proof is required, simply because we immediately experience it.<sup>29</sup> The gods are not only in heaven but everywhere, and therefore they can easily communicate themselves to the theurgists, and instruct them into their essence and worship. This sublime communication, which passed from Hermes to the Egyptian priests, and from them to Greece, is the foundation of the secrecy of religious worship, and its hidden signification.<sup>30</sup> It also is the ground of that holy enthusiasm in which man no longer lives a mere animal or even human life, as is clearly shown by innumerable instances of men who, in the fit of enthusiasm, are insensible to the burning of fire, or to wounds inflicted by the sword, or the axe, or the lance, and find a way through what is impervious, nay, pass unscathed through fire and water.<sup>31</sup> The union with the divine rests essentially on the fact, that the separate soul is passionless. Thus, even when it descends into the body it suffers not, as neither do its thoughts, which are ideas (λόγοι). In these man is united with the gods. However, there is no human thought capable of expressing this intimate union between God and the soul. He who accomplishes divine works is not different from him to

<sup>29</sup> De Myster. Ægypt. i. 3. Μονοειδῶς δὲ αὐτῶν (sc. τῶν δαιμόνων καὶ ἡρώων καὶ ψυχῶν ἀχράντων) ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι δεῖ. Ib. iv. 21. "Ἦν δὲ συναινεῖς διαιρέσειν τὴν τοῦ ἱμπαδοῦς ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀπαδοῦς, ἵσως μὲν ἂν τις παραιτήσαιο ὡς οὐδετέρῃ τῶν κριττόνων γίνων ἱφαρμόζουσιν, δι' ἧς ἱμπαδοῦς ἐπὶ ἡμῶν αἰτίας. Daily experience proves more adequately than all reasoning the truth of soothsaying. Ib. iii. 3.

<sup>30</sup> Ib. i. 1, 21.

<sup>31</sup> Ib. iii. 3, 4.

whom his works are directed—that is, from God ; no difference exists between the invoker and the invoked, him who commands and him who is commanded, the superior and the inferior.<sup>32</sup> In such wise do the neo-Platonists express themselves in perfect unison with the Indian philosophy, and thus they get rid of all the doubts which Porphyry advanced, and which he drew from the fact that no power can be ascribed to man as the inferior, over God who is his superior. It is not the gods, they argued, that are called down to men, but in the invocation the man ascends to the gods. Love, which holds all things together, binds him to them, there is no passivity either in God or in man. The only power that the holy names of the gods and other sacred symbols possess, is simply that of elevating the mind of man. In these operations there is a divine necessity, which does not differ from the divine love, which effects that good of necessity works good to all. Their operation exactly resembles that of prayer, which raises up man to God. And if, in conjunction with these names and symbols, corporeal things are also employed in such holy ceremonies, this is the case only because in these things there is something besides the merely corporeal, ideas, for instance, and intellectual measure and relationship with the divine. Man ought to remember that the latter is inseparable from the

<sup>32</sup> Ib. i. 10; iii. 3; iv. 3. Πολὺ δὲ οὖν κρεῖττον ἔστι τὸ νυνὶ λεγόμενον, τὸ μὴ δι' ἐναντιώσεως ἢ διαφορότητος ἀποτελεῖσθαι τὰ τῶν θεῶν ἔργα, ὥσπερ δὲ τὰ γιγνόμενα εἰώθεν ἐνεργεῖσθαι, ταυτότητι δὲ καὶ ἐνώσει καὶ ὁμολογίᾳ τὸ πᾶν ἔργον ἐν αὐτοῖς κατορθοῦσθαι. ἴαν μὲν οὖν καλοῦν ἢ καλούμενον ἢ ἐπιτάττον ἢ ἐπιταττόμενον ἢ κρεῖττον ἢ χεῖρον διαφῶμεν, τὴν τῶν γενέσεων ἐπὶ τὰ τῶν θεῶν ἀγίννητα ἀγαθὰ μεταφύρομέν πως ἐναντιώτητα.

former, and that therefore the immaterial is in an immaterial manner present to the material; from whence it follows, that there is a pure and divine matter which the gods have prepared for themselves as their appropriate abode. Man must put faith in the mystical doctrine that the gods have provided man with a particular matter which theurgy selects for the construction of temples, the making of statues, and other holy purposes, in order to force the gods to deign their presence and manifestation to man.<sup>33</sup>

These propositions alone, clearly indicate that the author of this defence of the mysteries was anxious indeed to maintain himself in the pure elevation of a rational worship of the Deity, but that, with a view to maintain in the fullest extent the value of theurgical practices and the popular opinions on religion, he relapsed into somewhat gross, not to say superstitious ideas. It is exactly this mixture of truth with falsehood that constitutes the perplexing speciousness of this work. This will appear plainly from a consideration of its more positive assertions. The object of the work is to elevate every religious rite to a pure worship of the Deity, and at the same time to exclude every unbecoming notion of his nature. And this object is expressed in general by the attempt of the writer to explain the rites of religion as a purely human contrivance, by which man seeks

<sup>33</sup> Ib. i. 12, 14, 15; v. 23. Ἐλλάμπει τοίνυν κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον καὶ τοῖς ἰσχύουσιν τὰ πρῶτιστα καὶ πάριστιν ἀύλως τοῖς ἐνύλοις τὰ αὔλα. μή δὴ τις θαυμάζειτω, ἴαν καὶ ἕλην τινὰ καθαρὰν καὶ θείαν εἶναι λέγωμεν. . . . πείθεσθαι δὲ χρὴ τοῖς ἀποφρήτοις λόγοις, ὥς καὶ διὰ τῶν μακαρίων θεαμάτων ἕλη τις ἐκ θεῶν παραδίδεται. αὕτη δὴπου συμφυῆς ἴστιν αὐτοῖς ἐκείνοις τοῖς διδοῦσιν. οὐκοῦν καὶ ἡ τῆς τοιαύτης ἕλης ἑσθία ἀνεγείρει τοὺς θεοὺς ἐπὶ τὴν ἔμφασιν καὶ προκαλεῖται εὐθὺς πρὸς κατάληψιν, χωρεῖ τε αὐτοὺς παραγινομένους καὶ τελείως ἐπιδείκνυσιν; Ib. 26.

to raise himself up to the godlike, but in which no action or passion of the gods is to be supposed to enter; for they continue for ever, and from eternity, in immutable perfection. This view is so firmly maintained by the author, that it has enabled him to improve the doctrine of Plotinus, by substituting, for his doctrine that the One suffered the world-creating Reason to issue out of itself, that the first god and king had spontaneously beamed forth out of the One.<sup>34</sup> Whenever, therefore, displeasure or propitiation of the gods is spoken of, nothing else is to be understood by these respective terms than, on the one hand, man's blindness, which alienates him from them; and on the other, his ability to return to them, and to receive again the gift of their eternal goodness.<sup>35</sup> In another passage, however, it is admitted, with something like inconsistency, that out of compassion for the trouble of their worshippers, and from love of their creatures, the gods give to the worthy their due.<sup>36</sup> The writer of this treatise refuses to admit that the demons are corporeal, and he employs a very tortuous ingenuity to show that the visible gods, the stars for instance, must not be supposed to be corporeal. They are not, he says, comprised by, but they comprise bodies; the heavenly, ethereal body, is of nearest affinity to the immaterial essence of the gods; the stars are in a certain degree incorporeal, since the divine form is the predominant principle of their nature. He did not dare absolutely to deny the existence of corporeal gods, since

<sup>34</sup> Ib. viii, 2. Ἐκ τοῦ ἐνός τούτου ὁ αὐτάρχης θεὸς ἑαυτὸν ἐξέλαμψεν.

<sup>35</sup> Ib. i. 13.

<sup>36</sup> Ib. iv. 1.

the books of Hermes treated even of ethereal and empyreal gods, and so he did not scruple to admit at last that there are both material and immaterial gods; to the former of whom material sacrifices must be made.<sup>37</sup> Having gone so far, he could no longer resist the pressure of superstition, and he tells many wonderful stories of the awful appearances of the gods, demons, heroes, souls, angels, archangels, and archons, and of the consequences which, according to their respective ranks, these superior intelligences produce; of the corporeal and mental advantages which their manifestation entails upon those who had invoked their presence; and of the evil, punitive demons, whose good-will man must carefully propitiate. All their manifestations are real and reveal a reality; delusive appearances do, however, occur, when faults or mistakes are committed in the theurgical forms.<sup>38</sup> Naturally, theurgy is an art, and therefore it must not omit to put men on their guard against all spurious and unqualified pretenders to the same dignity. Accordingly, we are taught that it is not every so-called art of magic and divination that deserves the name, but that it is expedient to revert to the earliest tradition of the gods, and to follow the most ancient forms, even though they may be unintelligible. Above all, it is necessary to guard against the love of change, which is characteristic of the Grecian mind; the barbarians are less fickle, and on this account beloved by the gods; but even the pious Egyptians have not in all respects main-

<sup>37</sup> Ib. i. 16; 17. Τρόπον τινὰ ἀσώματοι. v. 14; viii. 2.

<sup>38</sup> Of these things the whole of sec. ii. is full. The evil demons are treated of in sect. iii. 31.

tained the olden traditions in their purity, and in some points the practices of the Chaldees are to be preferred.<sup>39</sup>

If any one should object to the author of this treatise that in such works of theurgy as he recommends, he departs from the pure worship of the Deity, such an objection would not silence him; for he would remind the reader of the wants and imperfection of man's nature and his position in the world. The pure worship of the pure gods is in truth appropriate to such as with supra-mundane capabilities has united himself with the gods, who is out of the body and entirely soul; but that, which is suited for such, is by no means fit to be prescribed to all. To attain to such eminence, is the rare lot of one only, or of a few at most, and it is not at all times that even such men can hold converse so high with the immaterial gods. Moreover, it is impossible to arrive at this purity of worship, except through the lower grades of theurgy.<sup>40</sup> According to the ritual of the priests, man must commence with the worship of the material gods; otherwise it is impossible for him to rise to the immaterial. In this impure body, man requires corporeal benefits which the immaterial gods, who are far removed from all corporeity, cannot bestow;

<sup>39</sup> Ib. iii. 13; 26; vi. 4—7; vii. 5. Φύσει γὰρ Ἑλληνίς εἰσι νευτιροποιοί, κ.τ.λ.

<sup>40</sup> Ib. v. 14, sqq. Κατὰ δὲ τὴν τῶν ἱερίων τέχνην ἀρχεσθαι χρὴ τῶν ἱεουργιῶν ἀπὸ τῶν ὑλαίων, οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἄλλως ἐπὶ τοὺς ἀύλους θεοὺς γένοιτο ἢ ἀνάβασις. Ib. 20. Οὐδεῖ δὴ τὸ ἐνιότῃ μολίς·καὶ ὅψι παραγινόμενον ἐπὶ τῷ τέλει τῆς ἱερατικῆς τοῦτο κοινὸν ἀποφαίνειν πρὸς ἄπαντας ἀνθρώπους, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ πρὸς τοὺς ἀρχομένους τῆς θειουργίας ποιῆσθαι αὐτόχρημα κοινόν, οὐδὲ πρὸς μεσοῦντας ἐν αὐτῇ. καὶ γὰρ οὗτοι ἀμωσγίπως σωματοειδῇ ποιοῦνται τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν τῆς ὁσιότητος.

to participate in these benefits, man must apply to the corporeal gods, who require to be worshipped with material sacrifices and customs. Thus, then, has this philosopher invented a very different method from that of Plotinus, for the attainment by man of a union with the supreme God. With him theurgy is the only true road to happiness.<sup>41</sup> Man ought not to leave unworshipped any of the lower gods, nor even any of the powers which go in their train.<sup>42</sup> The demons carefully watch over the mysteries, as originally containing the connecting bond of the whole mundane system. By these, man may arrive at a real union with God. Philosophy, it is expressly said, is unable to furnish this blessing; it is even denied that human thought is necessary for its attainment; for even without it, the holy signs fulfill the work. Man's thoughts cannot move the gods to reveal themselves; for the lower cannot possess power over the superior; the divine symbols alone are able to effect this, and this power they possess, because they are divine.<sup>43</sup>

We have found it expedient to enter at some length, into the ideas which form the groundwork of this treatise, because they are the best indication of the direction taken by the neo-Platonic school from the time of Porphyry. If he was driven into the shade by it, it only threw a stronger light on his disciple Jamblichus. Of this individual a long

<sup>41</sup> Ib. x. 1.

<sup>42</sup> Ib. v. 21; vi. 7.

<sup>43</sup> Ib. ii. 11. Οὐδὲ γὰρ ἡ ἐννοια συνάπτει τοῖς θεοῖς τοὺς θεουργούς. ἰπεί τί ἐκώλυε τοὺς θεωρητικῶς φιλοσοφοῦντας ἔχειν τὴν θεουργικὴν ἔνωσην πρὸς τοὺς θεούς; νῦν δὲ οὐκ ἔχει τό γε ἀληθὲς οὕτως, ἀλλ' ἡ τῶν ἔργων τῶν ἀρρήτων καὶ ὑπὲρ πᾶσαν νόησιν θεοπρεπῶς ἐνεργουμένων τελειουργία ἢ τε τῶν νοουμένων τοῖς θεοῖς μόνοις συμβέλων ἀφθίγκτων δύναμις ἐντίθησι τὴν θεουργικὴν ἔνωσην. . . . . καὶ γὰρ μὴ νοούντων ἡμῶν αὐτὰ τὰ συνθήματα ἀφ' ἑαυτῶν δρᾷ τὸ οἰκτεῖον ἔργον.



and tedious biography has been written by Eunapius, from which, however, little can be learned as to his external circumstances and fortunes. On this head our information is confined to the following unimportant particulars: that he was a native of Chalcis, in Cælo-Syria; that he resided for the greater part of his life in the east, where he had many followers, and that he died in the reign of Constantine the Great.<sup>44</sup> Such works of his as we possess were designed to recommend the Pythagorean philosophy, but are little calculated to maintain his traditionary reputation. The style is extremely prolix, and bespeaks both the decline of the art of composition, and the author's great credulity. In all probability they consisted, for the most part, of compilations from older works. The carelessness of his style was blamed even by his contemporaries, and as to the ideas which he advanced as the fruits of his own reflection, they will not exempt him from our censure: they are utterly void of originality, and little more than simple traditional ideas. And yet Jamblichus was held in the highest veneration by his school; but this honour he, without doubt, owed simply to his sympathy with the superstitious spirit of his age. The greatest marvels are related of him. He is said to have raised himself by prayer nine feet above the earth, a golden effulgence shone around his person, and although he himself declared these tales to be false, still his expression on the subject of them clearly indicates that he felt greatly flattered by their currency.<sup>45</sup> His scholars relate of

<sup>44</sup> Eunap. v. Jambl. : v. *Ædes*. p. 37. ; Suid. s. v. *Ἰάμβλιχος*.

<sup>45</sup> Eunap. v. Jambl. *Ὡς ὁ μὲν ἀπατήσας ὑμᾶς οὐκ ἦν ἀχαρὺς*.

him, how once upon a time, in the bath he evoked the demons of two springs and bade them appear before their eyes.<sup>46</sup>

With these accounts of his life the statements which are advanced of his deviations from the earlier doctrines of neo-Platonism fully agree. In a manner similar to that of the apologist of the Egyptian Mysteries, but with a more decided spirit of controversy, he refused to concede to Plotinus that Reason in the human soul is without passivity; for in that case, he argues, it would be impossible to sin, when with free-will we indulge in sensuous presentations, and so there would be no obstacle to man's enjoying a more perfect happiness.<sup>47</sup> He called attention also to man's weakness in this world of sense, and on this account sought to gain for him the potent aid of some superior power. This assistance he found in certain souls which he supposed to have descended by some unpolluted way into this world, in order to bring to man salvation, purity, and perfection.<sup>48</sup> But he was far from limiting to these the means which man has to look to for help and safety; but, in a work on the statues of the gods, he maintained that each is endowed with a power resulting from the divine presence within it, whether the statue has fallen from heaven, or had been made by the hand of man.<sup>49</sup> In the same spirit he also spoke of certain priestly virtues, which are higher than the so-called essential virtues, which relate to the divine in the soul, and

<sup>46</sup> L. I.

<sup>47</sup> Procl. in Tim. v. p. 341; Stob. Ecl. i. p. 884.

<sup>48</sup> Stob. Ecl. i. p. 906—910. Ἡ μὲν γὰρ (sc. ψυχὴ) ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ καὶ καθάρσει καὶ τελειότητι τῶν τῆδε κατιούσα δὲ χραντον ποιῆται καὶ τὴν ἐκδόδον.

<sup>49</sup> Phot. Bibl. Cod. 215.

unite us with the One.<sup>50</sup> With the best disposition to pass a favourable judgment on Jamblichus, who was prized in his school as highly as Plato,<sup>51</sup> it would be difficult to acquit him of the charge of employing those dishonest arts which partisanship, exaggeration, and the ambition to shine as the head of a new sect, usually lead to. He appears to have defended the arts and practices of theurgy from the same point of view as the author of the treatise on the Egyptian Mysteries, namely, that the divine energy extends everywhere. The gods, he taught, are ever with us, although we are not always with them; and, he says, when their birth, or wandering from one place to another is spoken of, nothing more is to be understood than that they have been born for us, or that we have approached to them.<sup>52</sup> It is deserving of remark, that, notwithstanding he composed many works in elucidation of the dialogues of Plato, he yet held his philosophy in less esteem than that of Pythagoras, which, in all points, was the subject of his constant and unconditional admiration. To this source we may ascribe the attempt which we meet with so

<sup>50</sup> Cousin Journ. des Savants. 1835, p. 149, from an unprinted Commentary on the Phædo. Προσιθῆσιν ὁ Ἰάμβλιχος ἐν τοῖς περὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν, ὅτι εἰσὶ καὶ ἱερατικαὶ ἀρεταὶ κατὰ τὸ θεοειδὲς ὑφιστάμεναι τῆς ψυχῆς, ἀντιπαρελθοῦσαι πάσαις ταῖς εἰρημέναις οὐσωδίαις οὐσαι, ἐνιαῖαι δὲ ὑπάρχουσαι. The word ἀντιπαρελθοῦσαι is ambiguous; as is also οὐσωδίαις. The latter refers probably to the virtue of the νοῦς, with which the οὐσία is usually conjoined. In this classification there may perhaps be contained a covert attack on the above-given view of Porphyry, Sent. 34, since Jamblichus did not admit that man may be united to the One simply by the virtues of the νοῦς, but that he requires, in addition, the aid of theurgy for this object.

<sup>51</sup> Besides Eunapius, the emperor Julian and Proclus laud him with the most lavish praises.

<sup>52</sup> Procl. in Tim. i. p. 44, 45.

often in his writings to arrange the system of things according to certain holy numbers. Jamblichus gives a detailed enumeration of a whole host of gods, which he has divided into different classes; in short, he evinces great anxiety to establish a polytheistic system of theology.<sup>63</sup> Thus did the philosophy of Greece gradually revert to that form of a theogony from which, in all probability, it received its first stimulus.

After the death of Jamblichus, the zeal of the neo-Platonists to establish a system of heathenish theurgy seems to have abated. Perhaps it was believed, that all had been accomplished that was possible in this respect. Moreover, the times had now arrived when the weak arm of the old tottering state was stretched out to welcome the Christian religion. Constantine the Great and his successors favoured Christianity, which they had adopted, and attempted by law to put a stop to, or at least to repress, the pagan ceremonies and magic.<sup>64</sup> For this reason Eunapius, a neo-Platonist, and the biographer of all the most distinguished members of his sect down to the times of the emperor Theodosius, has remarked of Ædesius, who was one of the most eminent of the disciples of Jamblichus and his successor in the school, that he was not in other respects inferior to his master, although no miracles are recorded of him; since, in all probability, he

<sup>63</sup> Among the signs that the age no longer possessed power to master and understand the ancient literature is, the striking fact that Jamblichus should have singled out ten of the dialogues of Plato, as containing the whole of his system; nay more, that he could assert the same simply of the *Parmenides* and *Timæus*, in which assertion Proclus concurred with him. Procl. in *Tim.* i. p. 5; in *Alcib. Pr.* 11, Creuz.

<sup>64</sup> Procl. in *Tim.* ii. 94; v. 299.

kept those which he did perform concealed, as generally it was not found good to communicate the profounder wisdom, except to a few after long probation and preparatory intercourse.<sup>56</sup> Upon the accession of Julian, the friend and patron of neo-Platonism and the old national worship, this restraint was removed; and under his Christian successors, down to Theodosius, toleration allowed to the followers of the olden religion the free expression of their opinions; nevertheless, during a long interval we meet with no philosopher of any distinction who was able to rekindle an enthusiasm for the still dominant system of philosophy. To judge from the long series of biographical sketches which Eunapius has given us, without, indeed anything like insight into the true character of these times, and without capacity to throw off a living portraiture of his contemporaries, it would almost appear that the reviving passion for the rhetorical art, which now put forth a few untimely fruits, had driven philosophical pursuits entirely into the shade. This pursuit, however, had an external and more general object, and that was, the more practical tendency which had gradually established itself in the neo-Platonic school. The disciples of Plotinus and Porphyry had confined themselves too closely to the school, to a life of contemplation and asceticism, to satisfy the demands of an age in which the olden enlightenment and science, and the whole ancient frame of life, had come into deadly conflict with Christianity. Men must have become gradually convinced that this dispute must be carried

<sup>56</sup> V. *Ædes.* p. 37, Comm.

on with other arms than those merely of learning and philosophy. It was only for a while that the theurgic arts, which were now in high vogue, could hope to deceive men; and even to ensure this brief reign they must put forth something more than a mere theory, or the petty tricks of jugglery performed in secret, but must come forth into a wider stage, and to ensure any considerable result, enter upon political life. Remarkable in this respect is the influence which predictions and premonitory dreams appear to have had on the life and conduct of Julian. But in this regard, Chrysanthus, the successor of Ædesius, who, in perfectly good faith, investigated the laws of divination, was of less influence than Maximus, a member of the same school, and of violent character, who, it is said, by reason of the grandeur of his nature, despised all proof in words, but gave his attestations by miracles, and was able to command favourable indications of the future.<sup>56</sup> Hence the emperor Julian found greater delight and satisfaction in Maximus than in his teacher, Chrysanthus. If, however, the doctrine of this school hoped in this wise to maintain an influence in political life, prodigies and divinations were but one of the means by which it could stimulate men to faith and action; more generally available for this purpose was political eloquence. This found its appropriate avocation not only in the defence of paganism,<sup>57</sup> but also in the attack of Christianity.<sup>58</sup> This new

<sup>56</sup> Eunap. v. Maximi, p. 89; v. Chrysanth. p. 190.

<sup>57</sup> Proof of this is furnished by the discourse of Libanus, *ὅτι τῶν ἱερῶν*.

<sup>58</sup> This accounts for the labours of the Christians of this period to distinguish themselves in the rhetorical art.

enthusiasm for oratory gave rise also to the diligence which the pagans now showed in the preservation of ancient literature in general; which appeared to the philosophers as the appropriate means for maintaining the divine revelations in their purity, and giving a becoming exposition of them. In these efforts, moreover, the Greeks and Romans were in no slight degree animated by a devotion to ancestral institutions, and a pride in the olden renown of their state and people, all which seemed to be endangered by the new religion.<sup>69</sup> It is at once obvious, that on all these points a new direction, of a practical nature, would naturally be given in a short time to the neo-Platonic school, which, in the case of the emperor Julian, expressed itself in condemnation of a solitary life, and the eulogium of the Cynical or rather Stoical philosophy. He laboured to collect together all the ramifications of the ancient philosophy, with a view to oppose it in harmonious concentration to a foreign and intolerant religion.

<sup>69</sup> Of this we find many proofs in the writings and the life of the emperor Julian, for which I must refer to Neander's work on the Emperor Julian and his Times.

## CHAPTER III.

### CLOSE OF THE NEO-PLATONIC PHILOSOPHY.

THIS new political direction of the neo-Platonic philosophy was not calculated to be of long duration. It was foreign to its spirit, and was introduced by circumstances only. And these quickly changed. In practical life this philosophy was unable to vie with Christianity; its mission was simply the preservation of the olden learning, science, and art. When therefore, in the time of Theodosius the Great, Christianity was perfect master of the state, the neo-Platonic philosophy became again a mere matter of the school; its practical influence rapidly declined, or at least, was confined to private life and individual pursuits. It maintained indeed, to its close, that theurgical character, which from the time of Jamblichus it had pre-eminently assumed, but associated with it a certain procedure, which, in accordance with its character as a philosophical school, and consisted in the development of scientific propositions, and thereby vindicated the importance of scientific enlightenment conjointly with that of theurgy. After that Christianity had, generally speaking, gained the victory over heathenism, the latter still maintained its repute among the two classes of society which stood at the lowest (the pagani), and the highest



grades of mental enlightenment. With the former class, as being in general the last to which the progress of enlightenment forces its way, the love of what is old, custom, the fact that whatever is new is to them incomprehensible, and the distrust which indisposes them to all innovation, co-operated greatly in producing a stubborn adherence to the olden superstitions of heathenism. The latter were influenced by a sense of the value of the enlightenment both in science and art, which they inherited from their forefathers, but which seemed to be of no repute in the view of Christianity. These benefits they could not readily abandon for a religion which in its actual guise at least, whatever may have been the case with its principles, appeared as the enemy of all such advantages. These two classes of the still lingering adherents of heathenism were intellectually far removed from each other. One tie alone united them, and this was the practice of theurgical arts and the superstition connected therewith.

The modification of the neo-Platonic philosophy to a strictly scholastic form cannot be historically traced to its origin. It is, however, not improbable that it took its rise principally at Athens, where schools after the old Greek model had maintained themselves the longest, and struck deepest root. It is not known in what connection the Athenian school of neo-Platonists stood to that of Jamblichus, whose seat was principally in Asia. All that we know is, that in the beginning of the fifth century an Athenian, Plutarch son of Nestorius, had a well-frequented school at Athens, in which he was afterwards

succeeded by his disciple Syrianus of Alexandria.<sup>1</sup> With this individual we are better acquainted by means of a commentary which he composed on the metaphysics of Aristotle.<sup>2</sup> From this work we can clearly see that his doctrine bore the character of a regular scholastic formulary. To every proposition of Aristotle which he seeks to expound, he does not fail to attach whatever doctrinal position his own school maintained, to refute those positions of Aristotle which in his own view were false, and on the other hand, to confirm his doctrine by first principles. He proceeds throughout, on the view that the principle of contradiction, in the sense that the same cannot be both affirmed and denied of the same, holds universally as a fundamental principle, but that in the other sense in which it posits as true either the affirmative or negative of any proposition, is only valid of things which may be matters of knowledge, but not of those which transcend both language and science; for these admit neither of affirmation nor of negation, simply because every assertion with respect to them must be equally false.<sup>3</sup> It is obvious, that this explanation attributes to deductive reasoning, which indeed is indispensable to a school as such, a greater importance than Plotinus gave to it. This circumstance will also serve to explain the high value which Syrianus set upon the writings and philosophy of Aristotle,

<sup>1</sup> Marini v. Procli, 12.

<sup>2</sup> We are only able to refer to a Latin version by Hieronymus Bagolinus of the 2nd, 12th, and 13th Books, which as yet are the only one printed complete. A MS. of the Greek text is still extant, out of which Brandis (*Scholia Græca in Arist. Metaphysica*) has published several fragments.

<sup>3</sup> In *Metaph.* ii, fol. 13. b.

as is apparent from the great pains, which he has been at, to prove, that he ought not, merely out of respect to the authority of this philosopher, to question the doctrines of the Pythagoreans and Plato concerning first principles, merely because Aristotle warmly opposed them. To guard against such a prejudice in weaker minds, he sets himself to refute the objections and arguments of Aristotle.<sup>4</sup> There is nothing further worth extracting from the writings of Syrianus: they contain in general the ordinary theses of his school, which he defends by the usual distinctions against the conflicting views of Aristotle.

More deserving of notice is his disciple and successor Proclus, of whose life and doctrine we possess more precise information. His life was written by his faithful disciple Marinus, who describes him as a model, not only of political, but also of the higher theurgical and philosophical virtues. As this biography, however, bears a strong appearance of being a mere panegyric of the school, full of lavish praises of his virtues, in terms borrowed from Plotinus,<sup>5</sup> it fails in conveying to the mind a living portraiture of the personal character of Proclus. Nevertheless, we do occasionally catch a glance at nice traits, which give a more precise indication of his personal and mental character. Proclus who is usually surnamed the Lycian, as being descended from Lycian parents, and receiving his earliest education at Anthus in Lycia, was born at Constantinople, A.D. 412, and from his father

<sup>4</sup> Ib. xii. Proœm. p. 41 a, sq.

<sup>5</sup> See the notes of Boissonade to this work.

who was a man of wealth, received a careful education, with a view to the profession of forensic oratory. But upon the completion of his studies at Alexandria, he devoted himself to scientific pursuits, in which his curiosity had been awakened, but not satisfied, by his Alexandrian teachers. With the view of prosecuting these inquiries, he proceeded to Athens, where he was the disciple of the aged Plutarch, and afterwards of Syrianus. From this time he devoted himself to the neo-Platonic and heathen theology, and after the death of Syrianus, succeeded him as the teacher and representative of his school.<sup>6</sup> By his great industry as a writer, not only of philosophical works but also of hymns ; by regular observance of religious ceremonies, by strict fasts, not only at the usual seasons but at others self-imposed ; by a revival of religious rites, which in many places had fallen into disuse and oblivion, and by his controversy with the Christians, he attained to great distinction, and for a considerable period before his death, which happened at a very advanced age, was looked up to as the main pillar of the ancient but declining faith.<sup>7</sup> His life affords proof of the danger incurred by those who, in those times of Christian persecution of the heathen idolatry, professed the religion of paganism. It was only in secret that they dared to celebrate their religious rites, and the neo-Platonists even concealed from their scholars the practice of their religion. Proclus having fallen under suspicion of having acted in this respect contrary to the edicts

<sup>6</sup> Marini v. Procl. 6 ; 8 ; 11 ; 12.

<sup>7</sup> Ib. 13 ; 15 ; 18 ; 19 ; 22 ; 28.

of the Christian emperors, was forced to retire for a while from Athens, and upon his return, appears to have proceeded with greater caution, in which he was aided by the position of his residence. It was on this account that he constantly enjoined on all the proverb "live concealed," and did not communicate the profounder mysteries of his doctrine but to the well tried among his disciples, who were assembled for this purpose in the evening on condition of not divulging the subject of their meeting (*ἀγραφοὶ συννοεῖν*).<sup>8</sup> Thus had this public worship become the affair of a secret sect. The zeal which Proclus displayed for the maintenance and diffusion of the olden religion, was rewarded by many distinctions, not merely at the hands of men but also of the gods. During his whole life he experienced in an especial manner the favour of Athena, Apollo, and Asclepius. He was raised to the contemplation, not indeed of the absolute One, but yet of the supra-sensible archetypes, and he was not limited to a life of speculation simply, but by theurgy was elevated to the higher practical life. His prayers could effect cures; and by magic forms and ceremonies he could call forth fertilising showers, and still earthquakes. He was frequently favoured with premonitory dreams; and in one it was revealed to him, that he formed a link in the hermetic chain, and that within him dwelt the soul of the Pythagorean Nicomachus.<sup>9</sup> When the Christians were meditating on removing the statue of Athena, which had till then stood in the Parthenon, a beautiful woman appeared in a vision to him, and ordered him to prepare his

<sup>8</sup> Ib. 11; 15; 22; 29.

<sup>9</sup> Ib. 22; 28.

house for the reception of the goddess.<sup>10</sup> His veneration was not confined to the Grecian deities; but he was accustomed to declare that the philosopher ought not to be a worshipper of the gods of a single state or people, but to be a priest of the whole world.<sup>11</sup> It is singular that a man who devoted so much industry to the composition of original, and the exposition of other men's works, should, nevertheless, have placed so little value on the preservation of written documents, as to declare frequently, that if it depended upon himself he would permit the circulation of no other ancient works than the Oracles, and the *Timæus*, and withdraw all others from his contemporaries, since they who read them indiscriminately and without due preparation, derived nothing but injury from the perusal.<sup>12</sup> This, however, is but another trait of an age weary with the weight of years, and unable to bear the burden of ancient recollections. We see in it also, a proof that it was not the Christians alone who were anxious to withdraw the ancient writers from the people; the heathens of these times were equally tired of them. They selected a few favoured works from the vast riches of antiquity, which they cherished and preserved with love. But what they thus chose was far from being its best works, but such as could be most easily adapted and reconciled to their own mystical

<sup>10</sup> Ib. 30.

<sup>11</sup> Ib. 19. Τὸν φιλόσοφον προσήκει οὐ μίᾳ τινὲς πόλει, οὐδὲ τῶν παρ' ἐνίοις πατρίων εἶναι θεραπευτήν, κοινῇ δὲ τοῦ ὅλου κόσμου ἱεροφάντην.

<sup>12</sup> Ib. 38. fin. Εἰδῶθαι δὲ πολλάκις καὶ τοῦτο λίγειν, ὅτι κύριος εἰ ἦν, μόνα ἂν τῶν ἀρχαίων ἀπάντων βιβλίων ἐποίουν φέρεσθαι τὰ λόγια καὶ τὸν *Τίμαιον*, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ἡφάνιζον ἐκ τῶν νῦν ἀνθρώπων διὰ τὸ καὶ βλάπτεισθαι ἐνίοις τῶν ἐκῆ καὶ ἀβασανίστως ἐντυγχανόντων αὐτοῖς.

reveries. Such works, and whatever else was indebted for its preservation to the hereditary habit of the schools, were furnished with lengthy commentaries; but to judge of these, we need only to read those of Proclus, which are extant in considerable numbers, and we shall not find that he has often hit the true meaning of the ancient writers, or even displayed a good and honest will to discover it by a careful examination of their works. They seem to afford him little more than an occasion for the exposition of his own opinions, and for fortifying them by their authority.

Upon a perusal of the original works of Proclus, and especially of his "Institutio Theologica," we cannot fail to observe in them a constant effort to give to the whole body of his doctrine a firm coherence, by means of a chain of precise and strictly logical reasoning. Thus, too, in his exposition of Plato's works, among other objects which he proposes to himself, is that of exhibiting the enchainment of Plato's proofs, and their conformity to the strict laws of logic; in which procedure he occasionally stretched the laws of logic to their utmost extent. In general he seems to have held the view that the pupil of theology ought to avail himself of every branch of enlightenment, but the philosophical especially, as a means to a higher intelligence; in that he is to purify himself by virtue, to make himself master of physics, and by logical exercises prepare himself for a knowledge of the divine.<sup>13</sup> And even if this be also the general doctrine

<sup>13</sup> Theol. Plat. i. 2, p. 4, sq. Πρὸ γὰρ τῆς τοιαύτης ἐν τοῖς λόγοις πλάνης (πάλης;) χαλεπὴ καὶ ἀπορὸς ἐστὶν ἡ τῶν θείων γενῶν καὶ τῆς ἐν αὐτοῖς καθιέρυμινος ἀληθείας κατανόησις.

of his school, still the extent to which Proclus enters upon these logical deductions is far beyond what we meet with in any of the earlier neo-Platonists. His object is to construct a complete system of theology on a train of consequential reasoning. He considers, it is true, right method as being in itself not worth its trouble, but still considers it to be indispensable to science.<sup>14</sup> With this view was connected his admiration of Plato, which went so far as to lead him to boast, as if in contradistinction to Plotinus, that he desires to be the expositor of Plato rather than a propagator of original opinions.<sup>15</sup> The pre-eminence of Plato consisted, in the view of Proclus, in scientific method of exposition, which distinguished his writings from the symbolical Orphic doctrines, and from the figurative teaching of the Pythagoreans.<sup>16</sup> This scientific form does not, indeed, exclusively meet with his approbation, but he makes its excellence to consist in this, that it expresses its ideas without disguise, in which respect the words of divine inspiration alone approximate to it.<sup>17</sup>

But, on the other hand, the praises of mysticism, which are even more frequent in Proclus than in Plotinus, present a strange contrast to his logical labours. Who, he demands, can ever express the truth of divinity? Man may, perhaps, speak about the gods, but he can never express what they really are. Man may speak scientifically, but yet not

<sup>14</sup> In Parm. i. p. 29.

<sup>15</sup> In Alcib. Pr. 76, p. 226, sq. Creuz. "ἵνα δὴ τοῦ Πλάτωνος ὤμην ἐξηγηταὶ καὶ μὴ πρὸς ἰδίᾳς ἐπιευθύνωμεν τὰς τοῦ φιλοσόφου ῥήσεις. Plotinus is not named, but it is his doctrine that is here controverted.

<sup>16</sup> Theol. Plat. i. 4, p. 9.

<sup>17</sup> L. l.



rationally.<sup>18</sup> Now such a view evidently makes the scientific inferior to the rational. In the same way that Plotinus praised certainty (*πίστις*) as contrasted with persuasion, does Proclus extol it; but with this difference, that he opposes it to knowledge, and regards it as a mystical introduction to a divine illumination. By it man is made to indwell in the unknowable and hidden unity, wherein every motion and energy of his soul arrive at rest.<sup>19</sup> This certainty or faith is expressly distinguished from the reliance on general ideas, by which we become cognizant only of individuals, but are not united with the One. The Good is that wherewith faith unites man; it is the highest certainty; we place confidence in it in the way that we place reliance on truth-speaking individuals. It leads many to works of theurgy, which is better than any human wisdom, and comprises all the benefits of magic, purifications, initiations, and all the operations of divine inspiration.<sup>20</sup> This faith, he said,

<sup>18</sup> In Tim. ii. p. 92, fin. Οὐχὶ καὶ πολλὰ καὶ περὶ τοῦ δημιουργοῦ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων θεῶν καὶ ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἐνὸς αὐτοῦ λέγομεν; περὶ αὐτῶν μὲν λέγομεν, αὐτὸ δὲ ἕκαστον οὐ λέγομεν καὶ ἐπιστημονικῶς μὲν δυνάμεθα λέγειν, νοιρῶς δὲ οὐ.

<sup>19</sup> L. l.; in Alcib. Pr. 18; Theol. Plat. i. 25. Τί οὖν ἡμᾶς ἐνώσει πρὸς αὐτό; τί τῆς ἐνεργείας παύσει καὶ κινήσει; . . . ὥς μὲν τὸ ὅλον εἰπεῖν τῶν θεῶν πίστις ἐστὶν ἢ πρὸς τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἀρρήτως ἐνίζουσα τὰ θεῶν γίνῃ σύμπαντα καὶ δαιμόνων καὶ ψυχῶν τὰς ἐνδαίμονας. δεῖ γὰρ οὐ γνωστικῶς οὐδὲ ἀτελῶς τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐπιζητεῖν, ἀλλ' ἐπιδόντας ἑαυτοὺς τῷ θεῷ φωτὶ καὶ μύσαντας οὕτως ἐνιδρύνεσθαι τῇ ἀγνώστῃ καὶ κρυφίῃ τῶν ὄντων ἐνάδι. The following is the classification of ideas which he proposes, both here and in Alcib. 16, p. 51, sq.: goodness, wisdom, and beauty, to which respectively correspond faith, truth (philosophy), and love.

<sup>20</sup> Theol. Plat. i. l. Καὶ τούτων (l. τοῦτο, sc. τὸ ἀγαθόν) μάλιστα τοῖς ὄσιν ἅπασι πιστόν . . . ἀναγκαῖον ἄρα καὶ τὸν μὲν φιλαλήθη πιστόν εἶναι, τὸν δὲ πιστόν εἰς φιλίαν εὐάρμοστον. . . . τὰ δὲ διὰ τῆς θεωρητικῆς δυνάμεως, ἢ κρείττων ἐστὶν ἀπάσης ἀνθρωπίνης σωφροσύνης καὶ

cannot, however, be regarded as rational. It is, therefore, to be observed, that Proclus attempts to show that the union with their origin, which all things strive after, cannot be accomplished by rational thought, nor by the energy of the essence; even because, as all things must be partakers of this union, it is shared by those also which are deprived of cognition and energy.<sup>21</sup> It is apparent, that Proclus has here in view a very different union from that which Plotinus felt himself justified in conceding to the pure Reason alone. It is not merely through their knowledge, but their existence also (*ὑπαρξίς*), that all things are in union with God.<sup>22</sup> This vague idea, existence, implied to the mind of Proclus something more elevated than reason, and by it he plunges deep into that mystical theurgy which the later neo-Platonists had raised to such importance. He had, moreover, a full faith in the miraculous virtue of the names and symbols of the gods.<sup>23</sup>

Nevertheless, all these mystical propositions have but little influence on the scientific form of exposition adopted by Proclus. In treating of these things he proceeds without restraint syllogistically, and talks both of the One and of the gods, and higher orders of existence, as if they could be made objects of science, and their ideas and relations were capable of being expressed in definite propo-

*ἰπισυλλαβοῦσα τὰ τε τῆς μαντικῆς ἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ τῆς τελειουργικῆς καθαρτικὰς δυνάμεις καὶ πάντα ἀπλῶς τὰ τῆς ἐνθίου κατακωχῆς ἐνεργήματα.*

<sup>21</sup> Ib. i. 3, p. 5, sq.; ii. 1, p. 85, fin.; 4, p. 96. 'Ἐπεὶ καὶ τὰ γνώσεις ἁμοῖα τῷ πρώτῳ συνήνεται καὶ τὰ πάσης ἐνεργείας ἰσπερημένα μετέχει κατὰ τὴν αὐτῶν τάξιν τῆς πρὸς αὐτὸ συναφῆς.

<sup>22</sup> Ib. i. 25. Καὶ τὸ μὲν νοεῖν ἀφίησιν (sc. ἡ ψυχὴ) εἰς τὴν ἑαυτῆς ὑπαρξιν ἀναδραμοῦσα. Ib. iii. 7, p. 133; in Alcib. Pr. 82, p. 247.

<sup>23</sup> Cf. Theol. Plat. i. 29; in Cratyl. 69, p. 33, sq.

sitions. He therefore does not hesitate to apply to the consideration of entity all the relations of thought. Thus each order of the First has in a peculiar manner the form of the One immediately higher,<sup>24</sup> just as every notion is limited by the next higher. Hence he concludes that the nearer a monad is to the First One, and the higher, consequently, it stands in the order of monads, the greater must be the extent of what it comprises and produces out of itself, and the greater, consequently, must be its potentiality: on the other hand it has less of the multiplicity of species, and is more simple. Hence the magnitudes of potentiality and properties are in inverse ratio; while those of simplicity and potentiality are identical;<sup>25</sup>—a view which fully agrees with the relation of the contents and comprehensiveness of a notion.

It cannot be denied, that by this notional and syllogistic exposition the doctrine of Plotinus has acquired a greater precision than that of any of the neo-Platonists. It is very far, however, from gaining thereby a greater internal consistency. The arbitrary positions from which, in several sections, the argument proceeds, the notions which Proclus adopts traditionally from the earlier philosophy, and from his own theological views, do not admit of a consistent line of reasoning. At first he appears to wish, in his theological institutes, to proceed after the manner of the Eleatæ. His arguments, after the manner of those ancient dialecticians, set out from perfectly abstract notions, such as that of the One, the Perfect, and so forth. Suddenly, however, the procedure is changed, and the idea of the One and the Perfect is associated

<sup>24</sup> *Inst. Theol.* 112.

<sup>25</sup> *Ib.* 25, 57, 62; *Theol. Plat.* iii. 1, p. 125.

with that of the creative, or what brings into being (*παράγον*), and we are brought to perceive that in the One there is, by reason of its perfection, a superfluity of potentiality by which it permits the second to issue from out of itself; which process, agreeably to the fundamental principle of the theory of emanations, is then carried on to a last efflux.<sup>26</sup> In the working out of these principles, there is nothing peculiarly novel to call for notice. There is one point only to which we are anxious to direct attention. In order to designate the First, Proclus, like Plotinus, avails himself of the ideas of the One and the Good. His arguments, however, attach themselves to the former rather than to the latter. When, however, he would call attention to the fact, that these ideas do not express properly the nature of the First, but are derived from man's relation to him, his striving to attain to him, he gives it to be understood that the notion of good possesses an analogical and positive signification; whereas that of the One is simply negative.<sup>27</sup> By this observation he probably intends to signify that it is only by simplification, and putting off all multiplicity, that man may hope to attain to God. Hence it follows also, that his deductions from the notion of the One are but merely negative results.

On certain points Proclus has deviated from Plotinus, and these seem to demand our notice.

<sup>26</sup> Inst. Theol. 27, in. Πάν τὸ παράγον διὰ τελειότητα καὶ δυνάμει περιουσίαν παρακτικὸν ἴσκει τῶν δευτέρων. Theol. Plat. iii. 1, p. 119.

<sup>27</sup> Theol. Plat. ii. 4, p. 96. Δύο δὲ τῆς ἀνόδου τρόπους ἀφορίζομεν τῇ μὲν τάχα τοῦ προσηγορίας τῇ (ed. τὸν) διὰ τῆς ἀναλογίας συνάπτοντες, τῇ δὲ τοῦ ἐνός τῇ διὰ τῶν ἀποφάσεων.

Proclus, in agreement with the rest of his school, assumes that every emanation is inferior to that from which it emanates;<sup>28</sup> which assumption, as we have already observed, implies a graduated division of forces proceeding to infinity. Consequently Proclus has proceeded more consequentially than Plotinus, in that he has admitted not only that Reason and the Soul pass into several rational beings and souls, but that the Divine also divides into several gods or divine unities.<sup>29</sup> Such an admission necessarily had its difficulties, for Plotinus, who sought to maintain the absolute unity of the First, and its total freedom from all multiplicity as furnishing the distinction between it and the multiplicity of Reason and the ideas. But with such a view, the plurality of gods could only be conceivable as a plurality of spirits or souls, by which conception the dignity of the gods was lowered. Consequently it was perfectly conformable to the tendency of the neo-Platonic school, if Proclus, boldly disregarding the scruples of Plotinus, should without further hesitation assert that God simply, as the original of all, must necessarily produce a multiplicity which should be cognate to himself, and, agreeably to its distinctive properties, should be divine and unitary.<sup>30</sup> This view connects itself very appropriately with the manner in which Proclus proceeds to derive logically the inferior from

<sup>28</sup> Inst. Theol. 7.

<sup>29</sup> Ib. 62; 113.

<sup>30</sup> Ib. 113. Εἰ ἄρα ἔστι πλῆθος θεῶν, ἐνιαῖόν ἐστι τὸ πλῆθος. ἀλλὰ μὲν ὅτι ἔστι, δῆλον· εἴπερ πᾶν αἰτίον ἀρχικὸν οἰκίου πλήθους ἡγεῖται καὶ ὁμοίου πρὸς αὐτὸ καὶ συγγενοῦς. Theol. Plat. iii. 1, p. 121.

the superior. For all the kinds, which stand under the divine, are naturally of a divine nature. But to this again the gradual deduction of the emanations attaches itself, inasmuch as the different kinds of gods stand in a certain subordination to each other, on which point Proclus approximates to the views of Jamblichus, and distinguishes the gods into supra-mundane and mundane, conceivable and conceiving.<sup>31</sup> In this way the lower is brought into connection with the higher by means of an infinite multiplication of grades; for in the subordinate deities higher and lower gradations are again assumed, so that the series of them appears incalculable, and then again arises the series of demons, which holding a middle position in the system of the world, and thereby connecting the whole together without change, is itself carried through innumerable gradation.<sup>32</sup> Now Proclus insists that the grades of things should be strictly determined, and therefore severely censures those who explain the souls to be migrated demons, since, he says, the essence cannot be changed by any change of condition.<sup>33</sup> Nevertheless, Proclus was unable to carry out, with logical strictness, this attempt to establish a rigorously notional division. For he admitted that the highest demons are themselves, by reason of their predominant resemblance to the gods, rightly so called, and that generally

<sup>31</sup> In Tim. v. p. 299; in Parm. 1, in.

<sup>32</sup> In Alcib. Pr. 21. Πλήθος . . δαιμόνων ἀμύθητον. . . . τὰ δὲ μίσα τῶν δαιμόνων γίνη συμπληροῖ τὰ ὅλα καὶ συνδιῖ καὶ συνέχει τὴν κοινωσίαν αὐτῶν. μετίχεται μὲν τῶν θιῶν, μετεχομένη (μετεχόμενα?) δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν θνητῶν. xxii. 67, sqq.

<sup>33</sup> Ib. xxi. 70.

the first in every order, preserves the form of the superior order.<sup>34</sup> This is the only way in which he believes it to be possible to establish a close enchainment of the higher with the lower.<sup>35</sup> But the confusion of ideas in this doctrine is further increased by the position that the first reason as well as the first demon is also a god,<sup>36</sup> from which we might perhaps be disposed to believe that in the mind of Proclus the rational and the demonic were the same, did not his division of the latter contradict such an opinion.<sup>37</sup> In fact, his doctrine of the demons is as it were an interpolation into the scientific division of the divine effluxes, which he adopted as it was transmitted by Plotinus, enforced by the authority of his school and its agreement with the mythology of Plato. The absence of a careful attempt to connect it with the rest of his system, certainly furnishes a proof that all his logical art is but the cloak of his own caprices. It did not prevent him from mixing together at will all the most important notions of his system. Thus, according to the logical and notional arrangement of his system, the gods cannot be either Reason or Soul; every god is above essence, reason, and life;<sup>38</sup> and then, again, on the other hand, Proclus speaks of a reason which, however, although it is not the supreme incommunicable Reason, is one in which the souls of the gods participate.<sup>39</sup>

<sup>34</sup> Ib. xxii. 71. Ὡς γὰρ καθ' ὅλου φάναι πάσης τάξεως τὸ πρῶτιστον σώζει τὴν τοῦ πρὸ ἑαυτοῦ μορφήν. Ib. lvi. 158.

<sup>35</sup> Inst. Theol. 21, 111, 112.

<sup>36</sup> Ib. 112; in Alcib. Pr. xxii. 71. Καὶ γὰρ νοῦς ὁ πρῶτιστος αὐτόθεν θεός.

<sup>37</sup> In Alcib. Pr. 22.

<sup>38</sup> Inst. Theol. 115.

<sup>39</sup> In Alcib. Pr. xix. 65.

From such loose and indeterminate expressions, which are not always quite consistent, it is difficult to ascertain the real end which the author had in view to establish; nevertheless one point appears to be certain, and that is, that Proclus was much more disposed than Plotinus to represent the condition of humanity and the power of human reason as mean and low, and requiring extrinsic aid. As we have already seen, the Reason, according to Plotinus, is incapable, either by cogitation or any other energy, of uniting us with God; it is nearly related indeed to the One, but nevertheless many gods are between Reason and the One. The noble boldness of his own mind had led Plotinus to describe the Reason in its highest excellence, when free from passivity, as able fully to contemplate the One; but since he ascribed this perfection of Reason to man and the Soul, he fell into manifold errors, which perhaps were inevitable in the theory of emanations. These errors Proclus adopted, and drew from them the means of establishing a direct contradiction to the theory of Plotinus. The latter had ultimately based his theory on the broad distinction of the corporeal and the incorporeal; and by it he believed himself justified in positing the reason and the soul as absolutely unaffected by the affections of the body. This contrariety Proclus maintained as firmly; he even sought to determine it irrefutably by making the property of the incorporeal to be the faculty of turning back upon itself, or of reflecting, which does not belong to body, as having separate and independent parts.<sup>40</sup> This view is also the founda-

<sup>40</sup> Inst. Theol. xv. Πάν το πρὸς ἑαυτὸ ἐπιστρέφον ἀσώματόν ἐστιν.



tion of his proof of the soul's immortality, in which he argues that every essence which has the faculty of turning back upon itself, if it be united with something beside itself, with a body, in short, cannot be united to it inseparably; for in such a case the reflective faculty would remain in that with which it is united as an independent faculty, inasmuch as it has no reference to that whereunto it is united.<sup>41</sup> Nevertheless he at the same time admits, that the corporeal does in a certain measure participate in the soul, which is naturally influenced by it. Hence, as he says, the soul is undoubtedly in its essence self-moving, but in consequence of its participation in body it partakes also in some measure in imparted motion.<sup>42</sup> Consequently it was only natural that, with such a view, Proclus should have regarded the destiny of the soul as not absolutely independent of that which is without it. He does, it is true, oppose all such systems as made human happiness dependent on external advantages; for these, he said, are equivalent to making the condition of the shadow to have an influence on the well-being of the substance.<sup>43</sup> He did, no doubt, deny that the material has any force and weight;<sup>44</sup> but he would not be understood as

οὐδὲν γὰρ τῶν σωμάτων πρὸς ἑαυτὸ πίφκειν ἐπιστρέφειν, κ.τ.λ. Ib. 83.

<sup>41</sup> Ib. 82 Πᾶν ἀσώματον πρὸς ἑαυτὸ ἐπιστρεπτικὸν δὲ ὑπ' ἄλλων μετεχόμενον χωριστῶς μετέχεται· εἰ γὰρ ἀχωρίστως, ἢ ἐνεργείᾳ αὐτοῦ οὐκ ἔσται χωριστὴ τοῦ μετέχοντος, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ ἡ οὐσία. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, οὐκ ἐπιστρέψει πρὸς ἑαυτό. Ib. 171; 186; 187; 189.

<sup>42</sup> In Alcib. Pr. lxxvi. 225. Κατ' οὐσίαν μὲν γὰρ ἐστὶν αὐτοκίνητος ἡ ψυχὴ, κοινωνήσασα δὲ τῷ σώματι μετέσχε πως τῆς ἑτεροκινήσεως.

<sup>43</sup> Ib. xxxv. 107.

<sup>44</sup> Ib. lviii. 164.

maintaining thereby that man, or the human soul, is without passion. On this point he expressly impugns the doctrine of Plotinus and his disciples, and censures it as an incorrect exposition of the Platonic principles. How, he argues, could the soul commit faults and sin, and again raise itself to the divine, unless it and its reason and its free-will did from its union with body partake in passivity, if it were not in the temporal and took to itself a material garment and put it off again at certain fixed periods?<sup>46</sup> Consequently, he found it impossible to assent to the doctrine of Plotinus, that the soul which comes into the world does not wholly descend,<sup>46</sup> but that its reason, as it were, still remains in the presence of the gods. This view was intimately interwoven with his own theological system. It has led him to suppose so close a connection between all souls in their mundane life that the sins of one pass over to others, and children are implicated in the guilt of their parents, and subjects in those of their sovereigns. This view he founds on the assumption that the mundane system forms a living unity, in which there are again other smaller unities which are separate, and perfectly constituted in themselves, so that it is only just, that the individual members should equally share the consequences of their acts as a body.<sup>47</sup> Proclus had an idea very similar to

<sup>46</sup> Ib. lxxvi. 227. Οὕτε αὖ ἐκείνους (sc. ἀποδεξόμεθα τοὺς λόγους), ὅσοι μέρος μὲν εἶναι τῆς θείας οὐσίας λέγουσι τὴν ψυχὴν, ὅμοιον δὲ τῷ ὅλῳ τὸ μέρος καὶ δεῖ τίλειον, τὸν δὲ θόρυβον εἶναι καὶ τὰ πάθη περὶ τὸ ζῶον. In Tim. v. 341; Inst. Theol. 190; 198—200. Cf. in Alcib. 48.

<sup>46</sup> Inst. Theol. 211. This was a point of dispute for the last days of the neo-Platonic philosophy. See Creuzer, ad l. 1.

<sup>47</sup> Dubit. Circa Provid. ix. 168, seq. ed. Cous.

one which we have already met with in the Vedanta philosophy, according to which the soul is invested with several envelopes, which it cannot put off except gradually and successively; it is in certain definite periods only that the soul can develop this process of its life, in which it rises the higher, the more of these outer investitures it has got rid of.<sup>48</sup> This liberation, however, the soul cannot attain to by its own activity alone, but it must be aided in it by demoniac assistance.<sup>49</sup> Thus does the soul assume, in the doctrine of Proclus, quite a different position from what it had assigned to it in that of Plotinus; it is represented as more imperfect and more in need of external aid.

There is, undoubtedly, in all this, an approximation to the teaching of actual experience. Nevertheless it is connected with the general principle of the theory of emanations, and with the theological views of Proclus. It requires to be especially noticed that the doctrine of Proclus evinces a disposition to enhance the idea of the Soul above that of Reason, whereas that of Plotinus conversely tended to merge the notion of Soul in that of Reason. The former tendency showed itself in the explanation which Proclus gave of the incorporeal by the reflex activity, in connection with which exposition is the thesis, that whatever is in a reflex activity is to be supposed to be more imperfect the nearer it is to the commencement; and the more perfect contrariwise, the nearer it is to the end.<sup>50</sup> This is the

<sup>48</sup> In Alcib. Pr. 48; Inst. Theol. 209.

<sup>49</sup> In Alcib. Pr. 89. 280, sqq.

<sup>50</sup> Inst. Theol. 37. Πάντων τῶν κατ' ἐπιστροφὴν ὑφισταμένων τὰ πρῶτα

natural consequence from the doctrine of the emanation and return of all things. From it, moreover, followed the assumption that all incorporeal things are in a gradual development, which, however, according to the views of the neo-Platonists could not in truth be ascribed to the pure reason, but only to the soul. This idea of Proclus, however, would have been deserving of much consideration if it had been carried out by him to any considerable degree, and if it did not stand in direct collision with other tendencies of his own theory of emanation.

The point on which the essential spirit of that theory was most opposed to the view of Proclus, was his attempt to ascribe to each emanation a precise notion or grade of existence. It was a fundamental principle of the view of Proclus, that whatever is produced must possess a certain resemblance to that which produced it, but yet cannot be like to it; so far as it resembles the producer it remains within it, but goes from it so far as it is unlike to it.<sup>61</sup> No reason can be found why and how the produced should in any way change its natural and essential similarity and dissimilarity: therefore we may regard the numerous passages in the writings of Proclus which speak of the issuing forth of all things from one principle, and of their return into the same, as in some degree beside the purpose. And when we meet with such an assertion as that every entity tends to its principle, while we acknowledge its accordance with the other theses of his

*ἀτελείστερα τῶν δευτέρων καὶ τὰ δεύτερα τῶν ἐξῆς, τὰ δὲ ἔσχατα τελειότερα.*

<sup>61</sup> Inst. Theol. 28; 30.

school, we must confess our inability to reconcile it with his own principle, that everything is, so far as possible, identical with its principle, and immanent in it.<sup>52</sup> Thus, however arbitrary were the suppositions with regard to the ideal world which neo-Platonism allowed to itself, it was beyond its power to establish a passage from the one to the other.

But we have now touched upon the point whereon Proclus deviated the furthest from Plotinus. The former found it impossible to conceive of a true and perfect return of the emanated into its principle; he acknowledges no such contemplation of the One as it was the object of Plotinus throughout to lead to. On the contrary, he steadily maintains the principle of the theory of emanation, that every lower emanation is not otherwise connected with the Highest than by the intermediate essence through which it immediately attained to existence. Therefore, when he is discussing the subject of the return of all things into their principle, he explains it as his opinion that that which emanates through an intermediate entity from the Highest, cannot return into the Highest except through the means, inasmuch as its resemblance is merely mediate.<sup>53</sup> Hence, he says, it is only through the demons that man is connected with the higher.<sup>54</sup>

So far we find a perfect agreement between the doctrine of Proclus and his general principles.

<sup>52</sup> Ib. 31.

<sup>53</sup> Ib. 38. *Καὶ πᾶσα ἐπίστροφη διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν, δι' ὧν καὶ ἡ πρόοδος. ἵππαι γὰρ δι' ὁμοιότητος ἑκάτερα γίνονται, τὸ μὲν ἀμίσως ἀπὸ τινος προελθόν καὶ ἐπίστραπται ἀμίσως πρὸς αὐτό· ἡ γὰρ ὁμοιότης ἀμεσος ἦν.*  
Ib. 132.

<sup>54</sup> In Alcib. Pr. 19, 63.

However, we can discover in it the influence of another motive, which is somewhat incongruous with his system. Thus, he says, although the One is not such that any part can be had in him by aught besides itself, yet that every other god is of such a nature.<sup>55</sup> From this it consequently follows, that the One is fully unknowable. The other gods, it is true, are also unknowable and ineffable, by reason of their super-substantial unity; for all that of which man is cognisant is an existent, but the divine is above existence: nevertheless, all the other gods but the One may be known mediately through that which participates in them; but as nothing has part in the First, it cannot be an object of such mediate cognition.<sup>56</sup> Thus then Proclus distinguishes three subordinate gradations: that in which there can be no participation: that which admits of participation, and that which participates.<sup>57</sup> But the One is not the only incommunicable, but there are also a Reason and Essence, in which naught can participate—both being the highest of their kind.<sup>58</sup> This is manifestly an attempt to raise the highest above all relativity.<sup>59</sup> And even

<sup>55</sup> Inst. Theol. 116. Πᾶς θεὸς μεθεκτός ἐστι πλὴν τοῦ ἐνός. In Plat. Theol. iii. 7, 133.

<sup>56</sup> Inst. Theol. 123. Πᾶν τὸ θεῖον αὐτὸ μὲν διὰ τὴν ὑπερούσιον ἕνωσιν ἀρρήτὸν ἐστὶ καὶ ἀγνωστον πᾶσι τοῖς δευτέροις· ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν μετεχόντων ληπτὸν ἐστὶ καὶ γνωστόν. διὸ μόνον τὸ πρῶτον παντελῶς ἀγνωστον, ὥστε ἀμέθεκτον ὄν. πᾶσα γὰρ ἢ διὰ λόγου γινώσις τῶν ὄντων ἐστὶ καὶ ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν ἔχει τὸ τῆς ἀληθείας καταληπτικόν, κ.τ.λ.

<sup>57</sup> Ib. 23.

<sup>58</sup> Ib. 166; in Alcib. Pr. xix. 65.

<sup>59</sup> Inst. Theol. 23. Τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀμέθεκτον μονάδος ἔχον λόγον ὡς ἑαυτοῦ ὄν καὶ οὐκ ἄλλου καὶ ἐξηρημένον τῶν μετεχόντων ἀπογεννᾷ τὰ μετεχέσθαι δυνάμενα . . . . τὸ δὲ μετεχόμενον πᾶν τινὸς γινόμενον, ὑφ'

against this classification, there would be nothing to object in the spirit of the theory of emanations, if it did in truth do nothing more than project two distinguishable sides of one and the same unity; for according to his view of the similarity and dissimilarity of the emitting and the emitted, that part of the higher which is not expressed in the lower, must be looked upon as incommunicable; and in this respect every higher order of emanation must be incommunicable to the lower. But it was not in this light that he considered the idea of the incommunicable: on the contrary, the One and the Supreme Reason and the Supreme Essence are wholly and absolutely incommunicable; in the higher members of each of the higher orders he taught, there is absolutely no state of relation. Now this assertion cannot, in fact, be reconciled with his view, that every emanation possesses a likeness to that from which it proceeded. In another passage, Proclus expressly advances the principle that the effect necessarily has some part in its cause, simply because it receives from it its essence.<sup>60</sup> And occasionally he admits, in agreement with the principle that all is known by the like, that we all partake in Reason through Reason, and in the First through the One which indwells within us, as it were, the flower of our Essence, through which we chiefly cohere together with the Divine.<sup>61</sup>

*οὐ μετίχεται, τινὸς γεγόμενον δευτερόν ἐστι τοῦ πᾶσιν ὁμοίως παρόντος καὶ πάντα ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ πληρώσαντος· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐν ἐνὶ ὧν ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις οὐκ ἔστιν.* Ib. 116.

<sup>60</sup> Inst. Theol. 28. 'Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἀνάγκη τὸ αἰτιατὸν τοῦ αἰτίου μετίχειν, ὥς ἐκεῖθεν ἔχον τὴν οὐσίαν.

<sup>61</sup> In Alcib. Pr. lxxvii 247. 'Ὡς γὰρ νοῦ μετ' ἔχομεν κατὰ τὸν εἰρημίνον

This distinction also between that in which nothing and that in which other participates, evidently affords food to the mystical habit of thought which Proclus cherished. It was not enough for him to maintain the mystical view of Plotinus of the supra-sensible contemplation of the One; such an intuition appeared to him to have too near a resemblance to the rational cogitation. On the contrary, he is disposed to withdraw the highest of every order of existence from human observation, and to place it in a sphere which man cannot approach, without however, venturing to deny to him a hope of ultimately arriving at a mystical relation with it by means of the intermediate existences, whom in the spirit of his heathen theology, he recommends man to worship. Thus he admits even of a certain mystical revelation of the First God, which is imparted to man by the mediation of the lower deities.<sup>62</sup> And it was with reference thereunto that we must understand his praise of faith, and truth, and love, which are relative to the three attributes of divinity, goodness, wisdom, and beauty.<sup>63</sup> By means of love, which is an especial object of his commendation, every lower essence may be united

νοῦν, οὕτω καὶ τοῦ πρώτου, παρ' οὗ πᾶσιν ἡ γνῶσις, κατὰ τὸ ἐν καὶ οἷον ἄνθος τῆς οὐσίας ἡμῶν, καθ' ὃ καὶ μάλιστα τῷ θεῷ συναπτόμεθα. τῷ γὰρ ὁμοίῳ τὸ ὅμοιον πανταχοῦ καταληπτόν.

<sup>62</sup> Theol. Plat. iii. 14. Καὶ γὰρ αἱ τρεῖς αὐταὶ τριάδες μυστικῶς ἐπαγγέλλουσι τὴν τοῦ πρώτου θεοῦ καὶ ἀμεθίκτου παντελῶς ἀγνωστον αἰτίαν. We have not thought it necessary to give an exposition of Proclus's doctrine of the three Trinities, which attaching itself to certain Platonic notions is spun out to great length. It is part of the learned apparatus of this philosopher, and does not form an essential feature of his doctrine.

<sup>63</sup> Ib. i. 24, 25; in Alcib. pr. xvi. 51, seq.; somewhat differently in Theol. Plat. iii. xi. 139.



with the higher.<sup>64</sup> Proclus does, it is true, advance the opinion that the supra-sensible, that which is knowable only by the Reason, requires not the mediation of love for the purpose of its ineffable union; but the truth is, that this opinion seems to have escaped him without premeditation; for in another passage he advances the directly opposite view, that by love, the gods also are united with the supra-sensible beauty, and by it in like manner the demons are united with the gods, and souls with the demons.<sup>65</sup>

In these deviations of Proclus from the neo-Platonic school, we see nothing more than a continuance of those movements which had gradually spread themselves from the time of Jamblichus. They directed themselves exclusively to the mystical aspect of the school-doctrine, and attached themselves to the theurgic superstitions of paganism, which now evinced less boldness in its designs, and withdrew more and more into the retirement of private life. And this was naturally attended with this result, that the mystical impulse should confine itself gradually to the feelings, and consequently exhibit itself as faith and love. By this the scientific element of the neo-Platonic system fell more and more into the back-ground. We have undoubtedly to remark of the Athenian branch of the neo-Platonic school, that it highly distinguished itself by its endeavour, by observing the forms of logical demonstration, to give a firm foundation to its doctrine; still we cannot conceal the fact, that the internal value of the thoughts does but little correspond to

<sup>64</sup> In Alcib. Pr. xvi. 53.

<sup>65</sup> Ib. xix. 65.

the external regularity, and that the subject-matter and the form of exposition seldom support each other. This is but a part of the general decay and dissolution of age,—a sign that the form of the school is merely a matter of teaching, not the result of the development of an intrinsic vitality.

If of Plotinus it can be said that he exercised a considerable influence on the philosophy of later times, whether heathen or Christian, the same cannot be said with equal justice of Proclus. In his day the Christian philosophy had lost the first freshness of its youthful vigour; and it was only on a few mystical excrescences of it, that the doctrine of Proclus could have had any influence. On the heathen philosophy his influence could not have been much greater, notwithstanding the high estimation which he enjoyed in his own school. For as we have already observed, the sphere of this school was now greatly contracted, and had declined into the watchword of a falling party. Such is the appearance it assumes in all the accounts which have reached us concerning it at this date. These accounts are full of traits of exaggerated praise or of the petty envyings, which are so rife among the adherents of exclusive sects.<sup>66</sup> We see from them that the school preserved but a tottering existence under leaders who were unable to gain the perfect

<sup>66</sup> Cf. Phot. Bibl. Cod. 181, 242; and the articles in Suidas which relate to these last days of the neo-Platonic school. All this is undoubtedly drawn from the life of Isidore, written by Damascius, still it must be allowed to convey the true character of the school. The judgment of Photius is just. Cod. clxxxi. 212. Hoesch. Πάντων δ' ὅσους ἐξαίρει (ὁ Δαμάσκιος) τοῖς λόγοις καὶ κρείττους ἢ κατ' ἀνθρώπων φύσιν θαιάζει γαγενῖναι . . . οὐκ ἔστιν ὅτου μὴ καθήκοντο ἰφ' ἑκάστου τῶν θαυματοποιούντων μὴ ἐνδείστερον ἔχειν, κ.τ.λ.

confidence of their party. Of these individuals our accounts are very imperfect. Among them three scholars of Proclus, Marinus, Isidore, and Zenodotus, are expressly named as successively presiding for a certain period over the school, not so much from a free choice, as compelled by a fear that otherwise the neo-Platonic school would have been without a teacher. In all probability they were conscious of the weakness of their philosophical system, and, moreover, they did not perhaps regard philosophy as the highest end of human speculation, for, in truth, the superstitious belief in marvellous rites, and the pagan religion was held in higher esteem by them than philosophy, whose senile decrepitude they deplored, merely because it was fitted to be a preparation of mankind for that which is the higher.<sup>67</sup> Their unwillingness to assume the office of teacher may have had its origin in the danger which, as is clear from the life of Proclus and many other testimonies, attended the holders of it from the persecution of the Christians.

Of the philosophical writings of these men, if they left any behind them, nothing now survives; for all that we know of them we are indebted to their disciple Damascius, who, in his life of Isidore, has given us a description of the state of the latest neo-Platonic school, over which he himself presided for a considerable period.<sup>68</sup> From the extracts of this biography, we perceive the ridiculous extent to which the passion for the marvellous ruled in this school; and how the spirit of superstition gained continually

<sup>67</sup> Cf. the opinions expressed by Isidore in Phot. Bibl. Cod. xxiv. 568.

<sup>68</sup> This we infer from his surname *Διδάσκαλος*.

the ascendancy. Of Damascius, there is a work extant on the doubts as to first principles and the solutions of them,<sup>69</sup> which proves that a spirit of philosophical plodding united itself to superstition, in order to facilitate and favour the wildest mysticism. We also recognize in it the characteristic feature of the Athenian school, the disposition to lose itself in endless arguments in order to show merely that all these reasonings are insufficient to furnish an unquestionable determination of the first ground of things. According to Damascius, the first ground of all things is the ineffable, which does not admit of being expressed in any definite terms. It is not rightly called the Prime Cause, the First, the Good, the Beginning, or the Final Cause, or by any other term; the three causes, which are distinguished by human speech, are not to be posited as three; it is only humanly speaking that we call them three.<sup>70</sup> His whole work has this object, to retract by negations whatever he has previously advanced affirmatively of the principles of things. The procession of things from out of these principles is not properly a procession; the soul by its return into the same dissolves its procession.<sup>71</sup> All he says must be resumed again into the unintelligible One. All

<sup>69</sup> Published by J. Kopp. Frankf. on the Maine, 1826. The continuation of Proclus's commentary on the Parmenides, which is given to Damascius cannot in its present form at least be ascribed to him. As to what is still unprinted, see Kopp's preface.

<sup>70</sup> De Princ. 2, 6, 7, 22, 41, 118.

<sup>71</sup> Ib. 75, 107. What Creuzer, ad Procl. Instit. Theol. 211, quotes from a commentary of Damascius on the Parmenides ὥστε ἀληθινὸς ὁ Πλωτίνου λόγος, ὡς οὐ πᾶσα κἀταίσι ἡ ψυχὴ, must be regarded as the doctrine of Damascius. Therefore it would appear that he rejected the distinction which Proclus drew between *μεικτόν* and *ἀμείκτον*, De Princ. l. l.

man's talking is but a confession that he knows nothing, but must yet raise himself above that of which he takes cognizance. He calls the ineffable, unknowable, from the fact that he invariably finds that whatever surpasses knowledge is more estimable than the knowable; so that that which is beyond all knowledge, if it could be discovered, would be found to be more estimable. If the One is the last knowable, then that which goes beyond the One is the wholly unknowable, which, indeed, is so unknowable that man cannot be certain whether it be knowable or not. It is so separate from all else that it cannot be said in reality to be separate; for the end of all human speaking is the silence of perplexity, and an admission that man cannot know anything of the unknowable.<sup>72</sup> Thus did the philosophy of neo-Platonism end in an unqualified scepticism. What it wished to know it found to be unknowable, and, at the same time, did not hesitate to call it such. While it hovered around an unattainable height it completely lost sight of the position of humanity, and all the thoughts of man appeared absolutely incapable of exhibiting the truth. It despised the earthly, and on that account alone it could not gain the heavenly.

<sup>72</sup> Ib. 6. Οἶδα γάρ, ὅτι οὐκ οἶδεν αὐτό· καὶ γάρ ἐστιν ἀπλῶς ἡ τοιαύτη γνῶσις οὐκ ἐκείνου, ἀλλὰ τῆς οἰκείας ἀγνοίας. Ib. 7. Πῶς γάρ ἐκείνο ἀγνωστον λέγομεν; ἐνὶ μὲν λόγῳ τῷ ῥηθῆντι, ὅτι αἰεὶ τὸ ὑπὲρ τὴν γνῶσιν τιμιώτερον εὐρίσκομεν· ὥστε τὸ ὑπὲρ ἅπασαν γνῶσιν, εἴπερ ἦν εὐρετόν, εὐρεθείη ἂν καὶ αὐτὸ τιμιώτατον. . . . . εἰ τοίνυν τὸ ζῆν ἔχσατόν ἐστι γνωστὸν τῶν ὅπως ποτὲ γνωριζομένων ἢ ὑπονοουμένων, καὶ τὸ τοῦ ἐνὸς ἐπίκεινα τὸ πρῶτως ἐστὶ καὶ πάντῃ ἀγνωστον, ὅπερ οὕτως ἐστὶν ἀγνωστοί, ὥς μὴδὲ τὸ ἀγνωστον ἔχειν φύσιν, μὴδὲ ὡς ἀγνώστῳ προσβάλλειν ἡμᾶς, ἀγνωεῖν δὲ καὶ, εἰ ἀγνωστον. . . . . καὶ τί πῖρας ἔσται τοῦ λόγου πλὴν σιγῆς ἀμηχάνου καὶ ὁμολογίας τοῦ μὴδὲν γινώσκειν, ὧν μὴδὲ θίμις ἀδυνάτων ὄντων εἰς γνῶσιν ἐλθεῖν;

This was the termination of the neo-Platonic school, and therein also of ancient philosophy itself. In the year 529 of our era, the emperor Justinian prohibited the teaching of philosophy at Athens.<sup>73</sup> This edict appears to have been the cause why the most eminent philosophers of that day, and among these Isidorus,<sup>74</sup> Damascius, and Simplicius the commentator of Aristotle, quitted Athens for Persia. In their native country, they saw philosophy despised, the olden religion which they professed under persecution, and a new, foreign, and hateful worship predominant. They despaired of good to their country, and the opinions which had long prevailed in their school taught them to see in the East the fountain of wisdom, and the seat of holiness of life. In Persia, they fondly dreamed, is a better and a milder government; it is ruled by Chosroes, a king and a philosopher, after the principles of Plato; and as the government is just, so is the subject temperate, and riches, though unguarded, safe even in the wilderness. Quickly then did they make for this desired country. Poor unfortunates, how quickly did they discover their delusion! Of all their fond hopes not one was realized! Scarcely had they beheld the strange, cruel, unjust, and luxurious habits of the people; scarcely had the king, who though a philosopher, was not one of their school, a lover of pleasure rather than of austerity,—than they were seized with regret and a longing for their home. There

<sup>73</sup> Joh. Malal. xviii. 187, ed. Oxon.

<sup>74</sup> It is a doubt whether this is the above mentioned Isidorus, who in Suid. s. v. *Συριανός*, is called an Alexandrian, whereas the one here meant is named from Gaza. Cf. Brucker, Hist. Phil. ii. 341.

they preferred to die to living in honour in a foreign land. In the peace between the Persians and Romans they were not forgotten, and the safe practice of their philosophy and religion was stipulated for and ensured to them.<sup>75</sup> But how could they survive the disappointment of all their hopes ! Confidence in terrestrial things was now utterly at an end with them. Heathen philosophy sank into the grave ; at least after then no further trace of it is to be found in history.

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FROM this tragical conclusion of ancient philosophy, it is impossible to turn without many a reflection suggesting itself. What ! this, then, is the end to which those doctrinal systems, which once came forward with so much energy, such bold confidence, and with such lofty pretensions, were fated to come ! What promise was there that they did not make to the human race ? Science, wisdom, and happiness, were to follow in their train ; and the contemplation of the Deity itself was to be opened to the human mind. All these hopes are now no more. These doctrines themselves were in their mortal agony and must prepare for death. Not that they were to be utterly lost to mankind : the writings of Plato and Aristotle are still diligently studied, and the labours of the Stoics in the domain of science and for the strengthening of the human will, are still known and

<sup>75</sup> Agath. ii. 30, sq. p. 67, sq. Ed. Par. ; hence is taken what is said by Suid. s. v. *πρίσβεις*.

acknowledged. When, however, at this time, men reflected on the ideas of the earlier sages, they were struck with occasional thoughts, whose constraining force they felt without being able to give to them a full assent. For soon other thoughts presented themselves of sufficient force to weaken, if not to upset, the authority of the first. And thus we find contradiction heaped upon contradiction in the philosophy of this period. It was now plainly shown, that neither fertility of thought, nor formal culture of the mind, nor readiness in reasoning, can assure to the reason freedom from error. For all these advantages were unable to guard the philosophy of this age from the most absurd superstitions. Where now is that mental enlightenment which the ancient philosophy had promised to man? One might, perhaps, have expected, that the pride of philosophers, which had put forth such lofty pretensions would have been humbled by the result. Even the more modest philosophy of a Socrates or an Aristotle, it must be remarked, was involved in the same fate with its more pretending companions.

When we look a little more closely to the respective philosophers of this last age, we do, it is true, perceive in them a certain poverty and narrowness of idea, but it was not so much this poverty, as even richness of thought, that overwhelmed them. In the neo-Platonic school inquiry had confined itself almost entirely to theology, or, to use a modern phrase, to the highest ideas of metaphysics; and besides these scarcely any else but the more general ideas and forms of logical investigation, which might be useful as means. Physics and ethics were for



the most part, reduced to mere subordinate matters of little interest. The cause of this may be easily traced. These branches of philosophy, we must in truth admit, had been developed much less perfectly than logic. Consequently they had less intrinsic power to maintain themselves against the pressure of new modes of thought. The science of physics in particular, was based upon a series of imperfect analogies, combined with a limited and incomplete experience; whatever it possessed of a really scientific value, had become detached from it by being made the subject of a special experimental science, rarely if ever, pursued conjointly with philosophy. Ethics, on the other hand, which, in the best days of philosophy, had more or less of a political character, could scarcely maintain its importance in an age in which the political sentiment of the ancient races was dead; and the import and influence of the forms of state—the essence of education in the olden times—was lost. Ethics had now no other province than to furnish exhortations to virtue in private life. When however, a disposition grew up for social life in a religious community, a desire would naturally arise for a moral system under different forms, which, however, it was as yet impossible for the present age to establish in definite scientific notions. On this side, consequently, the circle of ideas among the last philosophers of antiquity, must have appeared limited; this, however, was only partially the case, for on the other it tended to enlarge itself. Now although it may be truly said, that this narrowness of view was inevitably prejudicial to the other portions also of philosophy, still we do not believe that we should be

justified in maintaining, that it was the chief source of the uncertainty which prevailed in ancient philosophy during the last ages of its history. It had its origin rather in a knowledge of the existence of a great diversity of views, of which a very vague notion was adopted without any attempt to arrive at a clear and profound estimate of their differences and agreements, and true import. To the mental weakness of the neo-Platonists must it be imputed, that they did not penetrate deeper; but, on the other hand, some praise is due to them, that they strove to preserve the whole treasure of transmitted doctrine, and did not, in any spirit of exclusiveness, devote themselves to any particular system. It is in truth an advance of philosophy, to have gained a large store of different ideas and different modes of view, and a wide review of the different directions of philosophical thought. But let no one flatter himself that this is all that is necessary. The mind will not be satisfied with this alone. Such satisfaction is not to be afforded without the ability to understand the several directions in their true import, and a clear insight into the principles from which they set out, and the results to which they tend, and consequently without the capacity to seize and make use of their true import for the reason. But this was not accomplished by the philosophers of whom we have been latterly speaking.

Whether it was or not in their power to accomplish it, is quite another question, and difficult to answer. We do not comprise in this question, the doubt whether the ideas which the neo Platonists borrowed respectively from Plato, Aristotle, and

the Stoics, and from Oriental modes of thinking, were of so conflicting a nature, that it was utterly impossible, even for one who had entered fully into their true significance, to combine them into an intrinsically coherent system. For it is our own opinion, that the ideas of philosophy possess an intrinsic congruity, and that their true import does not ultimately end in mutual contradiction. Consequently the inability of the neo-Platonists to reconcile the different directions of thought which lay in their accumulated store of ideas, could have had no other ground than the spirit of the age or party to which they belonged. In order, therefore, to be able to pass judgment upon them, it will be necessary to examine their peculiar position, which must be acknowledged to be the result of anterior historical circumstances.

The mental eulightenment of the age to which the neo-Platonists belonged, was the combined result of the Grecian and the Oriental mode of thought. Let us first examine the character of the Grecian. Every nation, whose history is accessible to our review, has had a culminating point in its development, beyond which their powers could not rise; and at that point, exactly, were they able to accomplish some benefit for humanity, which was worthy to be transmitted to later generations, in whose intellectual life again it was to continue its influence. But either to attain to or to transmit perfection was beyond their power. Now every age has undoubtedly its peculiar task to perform, and therefore produces in its turn something new. But, at the same time, a certain reference to, and com-

parison with, the past is indispensable; men begin after a while to perceive that the freshness of the creative faculty is withered and gone by, and they become conscious that their proper office is rather to preserve the old than to create the new. This was the position at which the Greeks had now long been standing. The culminating point of their development had long since been passed. In science it had been reached when Plato and Aristotle had ceased to teach. Compared with the mighty advance which the vigorous spirit of their nation had enabled these two philosophers, who were pre-eminently the men of their age, to make, all the labours of the Stoics—however they might have improved and enlarged a few points, and however much they may have sought to refer all things to a more simple principle—were of little value. At this time the Grecian nation, or rather the mixed multitude which now shared a Grecian education, lived, so far as philosophy was concerned, exclusively in the memory of anterior performances, until the Oriental traditions were brought within their reach, and men began to be aware that there was much in the latter which they would do well to adopt—much which would animate and give freshness to, and perhaps even complete, the ancient national enlightenment. Accordingly a strong desire now manifested itself to combine both Oriental and Grecian modes of thinking. Their different originals were not however sufficiently examined; but on the contrary, by a very lax method of explanation, Grecian ideas were introduced into Oriental traditions, and Oriental into Grecian. This was an historical error, but one far from presenting

any insuperable difficulty to a correct evolution of thought such as might have led to a perfect union and completion of the respective views of these two national tendencies of thought. If this was not actually effected, the reason of the failure must be found in the position which, in the midst of these different phases of speculation, philosophers took up.

And here we seem called upon to take a survey of the different character of the Grecian and the Oriental view. However difficult it may be to reduce to a single result modes of thought which have been developed through a series of extended investigations, and a variety of intermediate states, we must nevertheless undertake the hazardous duty. The philosophy of Greece ran through all grades, from the most unqualified Scepticism to the most unmitigated Dogmatism. At one time it absolutely rejected the sensuous presentation, and would place no reliance on aught but reason; and at another it resigned itself entirely to sensation; and between these two extremes it exhibited every possible gradation. It is unnecessary to mention other variations of view. In the midst of so many varieties of opinion, what are we to regard as the true character of the Grecian scientific view? According to the nature of the case, we must regard it as a series of developments—as a life which attempts gradually to understand itself, and in this course is liable to aberrations, nay, in the recklessness of folly or the agony of grief, even to total despair of its powers.

Let us now proceed to trace the course, and complications, of this life. In the Ionic school we meet

everywhere with the ruling idea, that whatever is real and true is in a perpetual evolution, whether it be of a single force or of a plurality of motions in the contrariety of a moving force and a moved matter. But the further this doctrine is worked out the greater prominence is given to the thought, that Reason is the ruling or ordering principle in the flux of phenomena. The Pythagoreans also conceived the world to be a living development which was destined to produce harmony in the contrariety of the unlimited, and the limitable of evil and of good. Even though they did assume a higher unity which should combine the two members of this contrariety, still they did not hesitate to posit the continuance of the contrariety itself as necessary; they could not hope for the duration of life except in the conflict of these opposite momenta. From the very first this school directed less of its attention to the sensible than to the rational, which they recognised in the proportional and the harmonical. But the third and the latest of the pre-Socratic schools, the Eleatic, applied itself still more earnestly than all before it, nay than all even after it, to the rational. It refused to acknowledge aught as true which the reason does not recognise; it declared Reason to be the essence, although we must admit, it did not accurately enough distinguish it from the natural, the corporeal; but on the other hand it distinguished it only the more sharply on this account from the sensible: for the senses, it taught, do but deceive; and in fact the most important part of its doctrine, by which it exercised any influence on succeeding ages, consisted in this controversy against the sensible in this

polemical movement. This is the source, too, of its denial of all plurality, all becoming and life. And if, nevertheless, it searched for the truth amidst the generations and the becoming of nature, still it advanced the result of this research only as mere opinion, inasmuch as it rested on the basis of a deceptive perception. Accordingly, we cannot fail to recognise its tendency to Scepticism, however precise and positive may be the positions in which it expresses its doctrines. Hence the Eleatic school was the point to which the sophistical movement attached itself—the most decided Scepticism, whatever form it took, whether ascribing to the corporeal alone a perfectly inscrutable truth, it rejected whatever belongs to soul or reason as a perfect delusion; or else made all truth to be lost amid the ceaseless flux of becoming; or lastly, ascribed the same truth to the non-existent as to the existent, and thereby overthrew the possibility of the truth of language and thought.

When then against this tumult of sophistry Socrates raised the idea of conscience as a standard to which all, whether old or young, who were anxious for knowledge, eagerly flocked—as a lofty ideal, which, with difficulty only, if indeed ever attainable, all must however strive to attain to; then—to neglect all consideration of certain unimportant remains of antiquated doctrines—the main question was with the unity of the Eleatæ, which is immutable and excludes all multiplicity, and also with the restless motion of Heraclitus. What man now sought to determine was, the notions, the essences of things, which however he no longer expected to

find on the surface and in the outward appearance of things, but hoped to reach, at least approximately, by a thorough cultivation of the intellect or reason. These notions, of which the very form seemed to point out a connection between them, required agreeably thereto to be exhibited as a science, such as apparently suggested the universal connection of all that is subjective and objective, and the common origin of rational thought, conscience, certainty, and truth. Hence resulted the necessity of recognising unity in plurality. But if man is to maintain his proper position, and discover the proper objects of his activity, it was not enough to exhibit the consciousness as a dead symbol in the human soul, but it must be one to stimulate man to rational action, in the midst of a natural world, which is subjected to the laws of necessary becoming.

Hence followed the necessity of assuming, besides the settled forms of thought and being, which are exhibited in the series of notions, an inchoate nature and an inchoate reason, as the subject-matter respectively of physics and ethics—two sciences subordinate to logic. Whether, indeed, this inchoation or becoming admitted of being exhibited in so fixed and settled a form as, it was hoped, the eternal generation of things and notions might be, was indeed questionable. How in any such a case the immutable and the becoming were to be combined together into unity, was again the subject of many opinions, which in various ways it was sought to raise and develop into science.

This problem of science was undertaken first of all by Plato: but the point of view from which he



principally regarded it, was that of the necessity of establishing a system of notions or ideas, by which a knowledge of the perfect and the good might be rendered attainable. In such a system, he thought that the unity of science and being, of reason and of truth, was to be found. When, however, he contemplated the inchoation or becoming of the sensible world, he was unable to see in it anything but a mixture of notions and truth, in which neither system nor order is observed—a complicated confusion of them which, indeed, contains the truth, but in an indeterminate or rather defective form, and one which by no means fully corresponded to the good. If asked to account for this confusion of the sensible, he was able to give no other answer than, that the ideas separately and one by one are incapable of perfection; but that defect and superfluity cling to each, in and by itself; that, besides good, evil also must be eternal in this world, where nothing more than a striving after good is possible, the attainment of it in its full perfection being impracticable. Thus he plunges, as it were, the soul into the flux of the becoming and the sensible; from which, according to the spirit of his theory, it can never wholly deliver itself.

In a somewhat different light did this sensible world appear to Aristotle, who saw in its becoming an union of real entity with potentiality, and an unceasing effort to realise the potential. This effort, however, is not to be supposed to develop itself with a perfect intelligence of its principles and designs, since it is only the pure and absolute reality that can possess an absolute knowledge of it-

self; whereas the indeterminate potentiality, which is yet in becoming, cannot possess more than an indeterminate knowledge. As then the object which Aristotle proposed to himself was to apprehend the real and the true, which is realised in the development of things, he therefore relied on the sufficiency of experience, and the penetration of the practised understanding, to discover the essential by means of the accidental, and to trace the principle in its phenomena. But he was not content with looking simply to the infinite series of moved and moving causes for the principles of all phenomena. For Aristotle held that reason abhors the infinite. As the truth, which it is the object of science to discover, is eternal and immutable, so reason requires as necessary a unity of science, and an ultimate principle of motion, which is not itself in motion, but is immutable and eternal. Thus was Aristotle led to his idea of a God, who, without being himself moved, is yet the prime mover, the principle of all becoming in the world; in his perfect essence he is *the Good*, who, being himself unmoved, moves all things by the desire which they all have for him. God possesses a complete intelligence, the complete idea of the all-perfect—of himself. He is pure energy, operating in all things, the source of all energy, all truth, and not merely of what pertains to phenomenality and privation, since he implants in them the desire which pervades both natural and rational life. In this manner did Aristotle bring life and becoming into a closer union with God, than it was possible for Plato to establish between them. But on the other he is

justly chargeable with a fault from which his great master is free: not only does he omit to point out the way by which man is to attain to the end which he nevertheless admits to be the destination of humanity, but gives even less hope than Plato did of a certain approximation thereto, and even considers man himself as a merely transitory being, who has only an indirect contact with the divine by means of numerous intermediate essences. Equally difficult of explanation on the theory of Aristotle was the existence of a series of imperfect objects along with the perfect operation of God; he was content to declare it a law of necessity that it should be so, that it had always been so, and will be so for ever.

Out of these two different views a certain general result seems to have established itself, that, namely, in order to arrive at a knowledge of the supra-sensible ground, it is necessary to investigate and determine *the good*. But in what good consisted was a question on which little unanimity prevailed. Plato placed it in a system of immutable ideas; Aristotle in the energy of life. The former, therefore, evidently conceived it to be further removed from the motion of the sensible world than the latter did; Plato cherished the thought of an ideal world, which should possess good in its absolute purity; whereas Aristotle rejected the hypothesis of such a world, and hoped to find it, although only under certain limiting conditions, in the world of sense. From this point one step only was to be taken to plunge man again in the sensible world. The Sceptics, indeed, did not venture to take it, for

they still vacillated between the sensible and the supra-sensible world. The latter, indeed, they held to be the true world, but yet taught that it exists not for man, whose nature is so thoroughly hemmed in by the sensible that escape from it is impossible. All that is in man's power is simply the moderation of his sensuous emotions ; which moderation, however, is not the really good, but at most a limitation of evil. Epicurus was less hesitating ; he believed that the good was really to be found in the sensible world, and placed it in a wise adjustment of sensual pleasures.

These, however, are but the difficulties which at all times are to be met with in the development of science, and which, except in a sickly and dis-tempered age, never arrive at a general importance. The doctrine of the Stoics was of a different kind. The importance of this system in the history of Grecian philosophy, is too general and extensive to admit of a doubt as to its right to be considered a natural step in its development. The cause which led to its formation was the inadequacy of the Platonic and the Aristotelian philosophy to discover the principle of connection between God and the sensible world. Whence, it was asked, arises the imperfection of things in the midst of which man is placed ? If, it was urged, it be necessary to posit an imperfect world of becoming alongside of the unchangeable perfect, this apparently must involve a dualism. Again, it was objected, the idea of God, which does not represent him as an active and efficient energy, and producing by himself all things that are in this world, must derogate from his vitality ; if God is to reveal himself to man, and

become an object of human cognition in this world, he must be actually in it. On these grounds the Stoics declared God to be the vital force, which in certain periods of life originates the world, and again dissolves it into himself; who fashions in himself his own proper matter; out of its generality God forms its special properties, which he again resolves into the general. All the things of this world, whether they enjoy in the general course of life a longer or shorter existence, are alike swallowed up in the necessity of life. Thus did the Stoics arrive at the idea of a corporeal God, who, nevertheless, is full of the most active vitality, and endowed with most perfect wisdom and intelligence. He comprises in himself all ideas, and is the only object of science; but these ideas are not merely abstract and dead images of the unchangeable essence, but each of them is a living force, and bears in itself the germ of development. To the Stoical view, everything is corporeal and sensible, and consequently the sensuous presentations are alone credible and trustworthy. But in the development—the progress of life, and in the relations of the contrarieties which result therefrom, the Stoics distinguished several degrees of existence; and the highest of these, the Stoics insisted, can be no other than the force which holds the whole in union and combination, and rules as well in the individual parts as in the whole. This force they declared to be Reason. And thus they resolved the opposition between the sensible and the supra-sensible into a difference of degree, but still acknowledged the superior dignity of Reason. And even the life of this world has its ultimate destination;

all things must again return into their generality. Man must learn to submit himself with proper intelligence to the supreme laws, and acknowledge that there is no higher end of his being than with perfect science to sacrifice himself. And when this resolution of all things shall have been accomplished, a new development will commence, and it is even this unceasing circulation of life and activity that constitutes the true essence of divinity.

This doctrine is the conclusion to which the development of Grecian philosophy ultimately led; although, indeed, it did not steadily maintain itself at this point without occasional fluctuation and wavering. A recollection, however weak, of the earlier system was evinced in the objections which the New Academy took to the system of the Stoics. The authority of sensation was not universally acknowledged; and testimonies were found to another reason than that of the Stoics, which was nothing more than an exaltation of sensuous perception; there were a few who had not forgotten that it was necessary to look for a God superior to the world, and different from the god of the Stoics, who was endowed indeed with life, but by his very vitality subject to perpetual change.

In this state the philosophy of Greece came to the Romans and Orientals. With the former, for the most part, it degenerated into an erudite and Eclectical mode of treating the transmitted doctrines which was of a somewhat sceptical tendency, combined with a practical application to private life, enforcing a stern fortitude and contempt for those blows of fortune which were so common in these disordered times. And thus was formed the later

character of Stoicism, which, placing a firm reliance in the moral energy of man, taught the necessity of dispensing with, and the absolute worthlessness of, external advantages; referring all truth to the sensuous presentation, and recommending in all things resignation to the divine dispensations. With these, with the Orientals, the introduction of Grecian philosophy led to a ferment of opinions, by whose reaction a great change was effected even in the ideas of the Greeks themselves.

The philosophical doctrines which were evolved in the East, present a far simpler aspect than the philosophy of Greece can exhibit. They all, without exception, venerate as the highest excellence, profound and undisturbed repose, which is neither motion nor yet the result of motion. This repose is the attribute of God, but is not wanting altogether to the essence of the soul. To attain to this state of repose is the highest object of humanity. Motion and activity on the other hand constitute the misery of this world. The object therefore which Oriental philosophy proposed to itself, was to eliminate this misery, at least for man—for the soul. If then it admitted the doctrine of a supreme God, it was forced to make him totally indifferent to motion, in order to withdraw from the contagion of evil. The principles of motion, nevertheless, were supposed to emanate from God, but in such a manner as not in any wise to affect his essence. It was impossible for this philosophy to admit that motions accrue to the soul from God, since in such a case the soul would be for ever subject to it. It must, then, accrue to the soul as unessentially and contingently as to the Deity himself. The carrying out of this

doctrine to its extreme consequence, must ultimately lead to the assumption, that becoming is without essence and naught—an illusion and semblance, in which whatever there is of truth is of the eternal God; or at most it will concede to becoming a certain importance, which, however, is extrinsical to, and concerns not the soul, and therefore strives to make it intelligible to the soul, that essentially it has no concern or interest in becoming. And this then leads naturally to the opinion, that it is a dispensation of God that has placed man amidst the becoming, without however its really affecting him; to this dispensation man must submit, and tranquilly allow becoming to pass over him, in full confidence that it need neither pollute nor disturb him in his immortal essence,—such a submission to the divine dispensation being truest liberty. The whole of these Oriental ideas unquestionably proceed upon the principle, that the essence of things is unchangeable and altogether distinct from life, which is not regarded as a development of the essence, but as something wholly unimportant to it. Whatever profundity there is in these ideas, consists in the rigor with which it insisted upon the absolute perfection of the essence, and refused, from any consideration of the troubles of life, to doubt the possibility of its realization. But in order to promise to man this supreme perfection, it was necessary to assert the nothingness of these disturbances of life and even of life itself, since the former are inseparable from the latter. What the Oriental philosophy promises to man, is not so much the attainment of his true destination—his perfect life, as his emancipation from whatever



obscures his true essence, and prevents him from seeing that his true essence is perfect from all eternity : man's true wisdom a conviction of the nothingness of human life.

In fact, the respective views of Greece and the East were widely different. By a noble and vigorous activity, by the energy of his reason, the Greek hoped to attain to whatever either in politics or science is accessible to the limited faculties of man. In this active pursuit he found his enjoyment, and all the good that his nature is capable of. But he felt it impossible to promise himself the attainment of such an ultimate end of his labours, as should in fact fully satisfy all the requisitions of his reason. One occupation only leads him to another ; for in this world, to which man belongs once for all, the necessity of limitation becomes invariably combined with the liberty of reason. The hopes of the Greek rose not to a higher object than the harmony of the conflicting elements of his life, to which mutation, matter, and privation, necessarily belong. According to the most characteristic expression of his view ; the end of human existence, which it is necessary for man to propose to himself, is but the greatest possible exaltation of life, which, however, must again sink into lower grades by reason of the change to which life is of necessity subject. Very different was the end towards which the Oriental tended, and which he believed to be attainable by man. Properly, however, this end is already within man's possession, for the essence of all things is eternal ; as it is illimitable and imperturbable, so all that man has to do is to keep himself undisturbed by the unimportant phenomena

of life. Man must seek to recover that peace, of which he has, in some inexplicable way, been deprived by his own guilt, the illusion of circumstances, or by the unessential, gradually descending, emanations of God. Abandoned to this repose, man may contemplate the essence of God, and in mystical union with him enjoy his felicity.

But however conflicting these views may be, they nevertheless possessed one point in common. They both looked upon life as necessarily imperfect, and consequently unfitted to be a perfect means for the acquisition of the perfect.

We have already observed, that it was not impossible to reconcile these opposite views, if he who attempted the task should carefully extract the truths they severally contained, and reject as unessential whatever was false and erroneous in them. But how much was required for the successful execution of such a task! The Greek must have given up his prejudice, that the necessary form of man's existence in this world does not permit of his attaining to the ultimate limit of perfection—a truly happy life. The Greeks felt existence to be a life of continual conflict and struggle; the more eagerly they longed for the enjoyment of the present, the more sensibly they felt its defect and its insufficiency. Pure peace with man, with God, was not designed to be their lot; they dare not even hope for it. In the stranger they saw only a barbarian, an enemy, or a slave; and even if this prejudice was gradually softened, this improvement was attended with the loss of their national character and independence. In the gods they saw nothing but jealous and constraining powers; and

even if their philosophers, by the light of science, attained to a clearer and more cheerful view, and even acknowledged a supreme Deity, who being himself good is the author of nothing but good, still a feeling of evil, in which they saw human life to be involved, forced them to renounce all hope of perfect excellence. The complication of phenomena amidst which man is placed appeared to them too great for any satisfactory solution to be possible, and they therefore believed him to be subject to certain higher powers, who did not participate in pure goodness. Of these convictions, of this hopelessness of everything beyond the mere approximation to good, the scientific systems of the Greeks are without exception full. He who takes them as they are, will derive from them at most but an insufficient consolation for the cares of life. They seek to apprehend life in its reality, but they do but prejudice its truth by their incapacity to regard life as the means to the acquisition of the Highest—the way to God. But still, we must give them credit for the earnestness with which they laboured to bring man near to the truth of life, and refused to consider, with the Orientals, the activity of human reason, as a semblance or something wholly without essence. The Orientals, on the other hand, have the merit which the Greeks have no title to, of promising to man a total emancipation from evil, even though it be to be purchased by an absolute renunciation of life, and the acknowledgment of its utter nothingness for humanity, and by his absorption thereby into the eternal quietude of his essence or principle. This, indeed, is the strong prejudice in the mental character of the Orientals,

which hindered them from seeing that life in its truth, as the development of man's proper essence, may yet bear or produce of itself peace and felicity. They contemplated life under a single aspect alone—that of its sensuous frailty.

If now we proceed to investigate the causes which may have led the Greeks and the Orientals to such a view of life, we may remark in general, that there is little that is strange or surprising in the ordinary fact, that men take but a cheerless view of human life. For the most part we are satisfied if we see a man labouring to gain but a slight advance in human life, and hoping to make a gradual progress, even though he should not look forward to, nor even venture to hope for, any end of his toil. Thus is youth ever content to live for the day alone; by abandoning himself wholly to sensible phenomena, which dazzle and charm him by their novelty, he hopes to ensure their friendship. But should he gradually arrive at a fuller consciousness of his proper nature, he is so far deserving of praise, if, no longer extracting from the phenomena of the world around him a merely sensual gratification, he seeks to convert them into a source of permanent and intellectual pleasure, to give to them a harmonious arrangement, and to apprehend them as a form of beauty either by introducing into or discovering in them the impress of intelligence. With this humour of youth we may compare the manner in which the Greeks contemplated the world; with them the imagination was more lively than the understanding. Not unwillingly do we linger on the contemplation of a pursuit which, however deficient in earnestness of purpose, was never-

theless impelled by the freshness of life, and which contented itself with looking for and carefully tracing the good in the beautiful. But, on the other hand, we could not severely censure him who, taking a more comprehensive view of these images of life—these fleeting shadows of the truth—should persuade himself that he had discovered that all things, whatever promise of permanency they may present, nevertheless soon vanish into the depth of oblivion, and who with sighs should exclaim, All is vanity ! Such feelings, however, are but rare, and in a healthy and vigorous youth to be met only at a few, transitory moments ; they are however the ordinary sentiments of fretful old age. Age turns within himself, and withdrawing him from the external world, hopes to find within the long-desired repose from the labours of an unprofiting carefulness. Neither view can we look upon as the true one ; still we see much to excuse and to palliate both ; and we are disposed to regard them as modes of thought and feeling, which man must necessarily pass through before he can arrive at a correct view of this life and the universe.

But on what ground do we thus excuse them ? We excuse the hasty enthusiasm of youth, because it appears to be the impulse of strong and vigorous natures, to seize the present circumstance, and to adopt all that offers, whatever it be ; and also because it is the office of youth, to promote, by unceasing activity and exercise, the culture of reason, rather than to direct it to any comprehensive and forecasting purpose. Accurately examined, this justification of youth will be found to be drawn not from the erroneous belief in its superior felicity, but

rather from its attendant disadvantages. The very impulse of a fresh and youthful nature—its very facility of adaptation and exercise imply the existence, in this period of life, of many and great obstacles to the empire of reason. Youth is the season for habituating man to the sphere of his future labours, and for teaching him the use and giving him a command of his tools. It is only the magnitude and variety of these obstacles which can excuse youth, if it does not at once direct its endeavours to the mastering of them all, or at least to maintain its proper position unmoved in the midst of them. But in the same spirit we can also excuse old age, when reviewing the labours of the past it estimates but cheaply their results, and, exaggerating the magnitude of the fresh difficulties which appear to be arising on all sides, begins to fear that all attempts to conquer or even to be at peace with the external world are vain and fruitless. In both cases alike, it is the magnitude of the surrounding difficulties which hinders the hopes of men to raise themselves to the full grandeur and universality of life. Such, generally speaking, was the position of antiquity—the youthful age of humanity, wherein the youthhood of rash enthusiasm was followed by a despairing old age which, renouncing the external world, withdrew entirely within itself: deeply impressed with a sense of its difficulties—of the evil of this life, it despaired of ever attaining to a firm hope of the possibility of triumphing over evil, with the divine help, by man's activity—by the development of human reason.

This was exactly the position which the neo-Platonists maintained. To pass beyond it, it was

necessary for man to feel in himself the spirit of a new life, and to direct his eye and his hopes to futurity. The past was not absolutely to be thrown away, but still it must be admitted to be in a great error, whose remedy was only to be looked for in the humility and new hopes of Christianity. But it was not in this spirit that the neo-Platonists pursued their investigations. They rather did homage to antiquity. Their view turned back towards the past, and they looked to the earliest times of antiquity, for the wisdom which was to fructify their minds. This was in some degree inevitable, unless they had been content to abandon altogether the position of the ancient nations; so long as they stood there, they must feed their hopes with the splendour of olden recollections. While then the neo-Platonists laboured to collect the sum of all the discoveries of earlier ages, they were at one time attracted by the joyous view of life which the Greeks had cherished; at another, they fell into that weariness of life which led the Orientals to recommend a total renunciation of its duties, and an utter absorption into self. Between the two views they vacillated, unable to adhere steadily to either. It was but natural that at first, as was the case with Plotinus, they should have been strongly possessed with the hope that, by a retired life wholly devoted to the internal meditation of Reason, they might perhaps attain to perfect peace; but that latterly, this hope should gradually sink, with the growing perception that the complete withdrawal of reason from the external world is impossible, and as the limits of finite existence appeared more and more impassable.

Then they at last renounced the highest aim of philosophy as unattainable ; then they found their only comfort in the consideration that man is at least a subordinate member in a long series of existences, which, however, at both its extremities, stands in some inexplicable connection with the Supreme.

In these reflections we have directed our attention chiefly to the general sentiment which expresses itself in ancient philosophy, and we have attempted to show how this sentiment affected, in a great variety of ways, the ideas of philosophers. Still we are not ignorant, that yet another element enters into the development of philosophy ; or, if some will rather have it so, makes up the proper essence of philosophical development. The present, however, is not the proper place to bring to a decision the conflicting opinions on this point. What we mean is, the form itself of philosophical thought. This possesses a constraining power, a convincing force ; but still it is only gradually, and under many obstacles, that it works its way upon the consciousness. Although not always triumphant, yet in the course of time, it gains itself a firmer footing and a wider field. In it lies the regular progression of philosophy. It is, however, a progress which derives its ground from the general sentiments and mental character, indeed the whole life, of the philosopher, and therefore in like manner may be disturbed when the form of philosophical thought does not, when it seeks to elaborate itself, find suitable matter in the mind of the philosopher. These two elements of philosophical development, however in conflict with each other, seek no other object than peace.



Such a conflict is the moving principle of the whole history of philosophy. We must then acknowledge, that it is only in union with right sentiments that the form of philosophical thought can reach to a perfect development. Where the mental character has not extent and depth enough, there the philosophical thought cannot evolve itself with due rigour of consequence, nor in perfect consistency. It is the mental character alone of the writer that can give to his doctrine a solid basis and a finished consistency. Now a true profundity and a true comprehensiveness of the mental character was not to be found in any period of antiquity. It was Christianity that first imparted these blessings to mankind. Consequently it was only after its diffusion that a consequential development of philosophy could commence, which, however, it must be confessed, was still exposed to many obstacles, and like all else that is human, could only gradually attain to maturity. In short, we would wish simply to intimate hereby, that there was in ancient philosophy an element which the Christian could take to itself and adopt, even while it remained unaffected by the general sentiments of antiquity which Christianity of necessity rejected. Consequently the philosophical labour of antiquity has not been in vain, however vague and fluctuating its development was. We are still reaping the fruits of it, and it is our hope that we have in some measure succeeded by our exposition of the doctrines of antiquity, in exhibiting whatever true results of science it had attained to.

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
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
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